

Race, Identity, and Belonging in Early Zimbabwean Nationalism(s), 1957-1965

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This thesis interrogates traditional understandings of race within Zimbabwean nationalism. It explores the interactions between socio-cultural identities and belonging in black African nationalist thinking and politics, and focuses on the formative decade between the emergence of mass African nationalist political parties in 1957 and the widespread adoption of an anti-white violent struggle in 1966. It reassesses the place of non-black individuals within African anti-settler movements. Using the chronological narrative provided by the experiences of marginal non-black supporters (including white, Asian, coloured, and Indian individuals), it argues that anti-colonial nationalist organisations during the pre-Liberation War period were heavily influenced by the competing racial theories and politics espoused by their elite leadership. It further argues that the imagined future Zimbabwean nations had a fluid and reflexive positioning of citizens based on racial identities that changed continuously. Finally, this thesis examines the construction of racial identities through the discourse used by black Zimbabweans and non-black migrants and citizens, and the relationships between these groups, to contend that race was an inexorable factor in determining belonging.

Drawing upon archival sources created by non-black 'radical' participants and Zimbabwean nationalists, and oral interviews conducted during fieldwork in South Africa and Zimbabwe in 2015, the research is a revisionist approach to existing academic literature on Zimbabwean nationalism: in the words of Terence Ranger, it is not a nationalist history but a history of nationalism. It situates itself within multiple bodies of study, including conceptual nationalist and racial theory, the histories of marginal groups within African nationalist movements, and studies of citizenship and belonging. It seeks to critically approach the ideologies and practices of Zimbabwean nationalism, and to interrogate the role race played in defining the imagined Zimbabwean nation, her citizens, and her politics. It also provides much-needed detail into the under-examined histories of minority racial groups and their relationships to early Zimbabwean nationalist parties. The conclusions drawn demonstrate that identities and participation within Zimbabwean nationalism were inherently affected by overarching concepts of biological race and skin colour, and that Zimbabwean nationalism was reciprocally shaped by these factors as well.

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**This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
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Preface

This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work done in collaboration except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text.

It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text. I further state that no substantial part of my dissertation has already been submitted, or, is being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in the text

It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee.

Acknowledgements

As Michel Foucault once said, 'I don't feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning.'¹ Nothing describes the process of undertaking a history PhD more accurately. It is a long and often lonely commitment, made possible only through the help of others and consequently there are many people to whom I owe thanks for helping me over the last four years.

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¹ Michael Foucault, 'Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault - October 25th, 1982', in L.H. Martin, et al., eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (London, 1988), p.9

No research is conducted in isolation and I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of individuals who helped sharpen my thinking, direct my academic inquiries, and provide feedback on work in progress. Zoë Groves was a constant source of assistance and guidance in both my academic and professional development, and her ardent transnationalism forced me to think outside my nation-minded box. David Moore helped shape my understanding of Zimbabwean nationalism in ways I would never have thought (even if I always walked away from our chats far more confused than I was before), and Tim Scarnecchia provided invaluable feedback on the fundamentals of my research and the overlap with his own incredible work. George Karekwaivanane was an always cheerful guiding light during the first year of my PhD and his generous donation of time to talk to an uncertain doctoral candidate gave me the foundations I would need to continue my research. Brian Raftopoulos afforded me an insight into Zimbabwean nationalism from both an academic and an activist perspective which was invaluable and much appreciated. Hasu Patel deserves a multitude of thanks, for not only talking at length with me on subjects hidden in existing literature but providing a list of sources and contacts which made my research a thousand times more relevant. To Lindsay Frederick Braun, I express my heartfelt appreciation for your always insightful communications from Oregon and I offer Ambassador Matthew Neuhaus my thanks for the conversations and the networking he provided; you opened otherwise closed doors to me without a second's hesitation. To Peter Fry, whose interview with me emphasised to me the necessities of nuance and to John Reed, whose diaries let me view the world of 1950s-60s Rhodesia through his own eyes. I owe my gratitude.

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It is easy to let a PhD become your life; indeed, it is often necessary to dive headfirst into work for long periods to the detriment of other things. However, such efforts also make you appreciate the things outside of academia far more than you

otherwise would have. It is to many of the people who gave me an escape that I owe the greatest thanks, including some who were there for the beginning but not the end. To my dad, Ian, who remains a constant source of support and encouragement, and has done from the moment of my acceptance to the date of submission. Thank you for providing me the second-best possible place to live when writing up (after that imaginary cabin on the Scottish Highlands). To my mum, Carinth, for always being there and always knowing just what to do in every situation, and for ensuring there was a (usually healthy) meal available at her table. I am so grateful to the two of you and for everything you've done for me to make me the man I am today. I will never be able to repay you. To Viv, my grandma, for her unbelievable support and very valiant efforts to undo my mum's healthy influences. To my brother, AJ, for constantly making me shake my head in bemusement and helpfully reminding me I'll never be a 'real' doctor. To my dog, Max; I sorely miss our evening walks that helped clear my head and renew my willingness to sit in front of the computer for another day. To Kieran Witter for giving me a place to stay for my forays into London and being an excellent travelling companion further afield. To Will Harvey, who will always have my thanks for making me feel at home in the 'other place' and ensuring our get-togethers provided much needed breaks from the realities of writing a PhD (and often from being a student all together). And to my oldest friend, Oli Gaskell, who has been there for me through rain or shine or continents apart for 28 years. The final thank you goes to Larisa Vircavs, whose love and support gave me the final push over the finish line. Your patience with me and my need to work makes me realise how lucky I am to have you and how relieved you must be that I have finally finished.

Contents

Acronyms	vii.
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 Alternative Trajectories: the context for race in Zimbabwean nationalism, c.1890-1957	29
Chapter 2 Non-racialism versus black consciousness: the emergence of a Zimbabwean nationalism, 1957-59	75
Chapter 3 Open Nationalism and Internal Disagreements: The NDP and ZAPU, 1959-62	108
Chapter 4 Racial Identities in the underground Zimbabwean nationalist movement, 1962-63	148
Chapter 5 The Rise of Black Identity Politics: ZAPU and ZANU in 1964	188
Chapter 6 Uncertainty and Untaken Trajectories: Zimbabwean nationalism and UDI, 1964-65	231
Conclusion	276
Bibliography	284

Acronyms

ADN	- <i>African Daily News</i>
ARM	- African Resistance Movement
BCSR	- Bantu Congress of Southern Rhodesia
BSAP	- British South Africa Police
CACBA	- Citizens Against the Colour Bar Association
CAS	- Capricorn Africa Society
CAF	- Central African Federation
CAP	- Central Africa Party
CIO	- Central Intelligence Organisation
CYL	- City Youth League
FISB	-Federal Intelligence and Security Bureau
IASR	- Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia
ICU	- Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Rhodesia
LOMA	- Law and Order (Maintenance) Act
LTTE	- Letters to the Editor
MHS	- Matabele Home Society
MRIC	- Majority Rule Independence Committee
NAA	- National Affairs Association
NDP	- National Democratic Party
(O)SRANC	- (Original) Southern Rhodesian African National Congress
PCC	- Peoples' Caretaker Council
RF	- Rhodesian Front
RICU	- Reformed Industrial Commercial Union
RLP	- Rhodesia Labour Party
RNA	- Rhodesia National Association

SACP	- South African Communist Party
SRANC	- Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (1957)
SRLAWF	- Southern Rhodesian Legal Aid and Welfare Fund
SRLP	- Southern Rhodesia Labour Party
TUC	- Trade Union Congress
UCRN	- University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
UDI	- Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UFP	- United Federal Party
ZANLA	- Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	- Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	- Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZAPU	- Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union
ZAPU/PCC	- Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union/People's Caretaker Council
ZNP	- Zimbabwe National Party

Introduction

In October 2014 (the same month that work on this thesis began), a funeral was held for a white Zimbabwean named Paul Brickhill. During the service, the opposition Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union's (ZAPU) President Dumiso Dabengwa gave a scathing indictment at the lack of recognition Brickhill had been afforded for his role in Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. As members of ZAPU's intelligence branch during the liberation war, both Paul and his brother Jeremy had been active combatants in the fight against white minority rule on the African continent, alongside thousands of black Zimbabweans. Yet in Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF's Zimbabwe of 2014, Dabengwa lamented there was:

[...] no place for individuals such as Brickhill because the ZANU-PF official history finds it inconvenient to admit that there were white Zimbabweans who contributed to the liberation struggle. [...] Our official history cannot face inconvenient truths and that is because the truth reminds us of the non-racial, free, and democratic Zimbabwe we still have to achieve.¹

Although the erasure of non-black participation was not as total as Dabengwa asserted, race in Zimbabwean nationalism obscured the fact that non-black people were fundamentally involved in the liberation struggle. In the thirty-eight years since independence, the Zimbabwean state has officially recognised only five non-black individuals for their contributions to the liberation struggle.² Of the hundreds of other non-black participants who suffered in the name of Zimbabwean nationalism, there are no formal memorials. As Blessing-Miles Tendi explains, the 'Patriotic History' of Mugabe's Zimbabwe asserts that there 'are no "good" white people' in the story of Zimbabwe's liberation.³ Despised by many former white Rhodesians for betraying their race and marginalised by black Zimbabweans for being a part of the ruling

¹ 'Dabengwa lashes at Zanu PF's liberation narrative', *New Zimbabwe* (18 October 2014)

² John Conradie, Stuart Hargreaves, Kantibai G. Patel, Kiki Divaris, and Guy Clutton-Brock.

³ Blessing-Miles Tendi, *Making History in Mugabe's Zimbabwe: Politics, Intellectuals, and the Media* (Oxford, 2010), p.128

white minority, the white radicals who worked for African rule are depicted as a footnote to the struggle between black Africa and white settler colonialism. This racial prism defines citizenship in contemporary Zimbabwe and claims to the nation, with nationhood being inexorably tied to race. 'The land is still in the hands of white people and they are not Africans. These whites who think they are Zimbabwean, we will just deport them back to Britain,' proclaimed Chenjerai 'Hitler' Hunzvi (former Chairman of the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association) in 2000.⁴

Yet this was not always the case. Zimbabwean nationalism initially emerged as an ideology of inclusiveness, non-racialism, and tolerance for all individuals with shared ideals of African advancement and an end to racial discrimination. It was led by prominent multi-racialists⁵ with a multitude of non-black friends, and saw white, Asian, Indian, and coloured men and women elected to office in local branches. Many of the leadership envisaged the Zimbabwean nation as a complete antithesis of the racialised Rhodesian state, permitting any person to be treated equally regardless of race, ethnicity, gender, or politics. The various non-black populations residing in Rhodesia were to be included in the nation building efforts, as the country belonged to them as much as the African majority. For several years between 1957 and 1964, nationalist parties and their leaders embraced non-black participation as an indication that the imagined Zimbabwean nation was to be truly non-racial at all levels.

How, and when, and why Zimbabwean nationalism's stance on race shifted so dramatically remains largely misunderstood. Academics point to the Liberation War as the decisive factor in instigating a racialised ideology but the reality is that the adoption of an anti-white discourse had occurred well-before the first shots were fired at the Battle of Sinoia in 1966.

Intent and Key Questions

⁴ Quoted in David Blair, *Degrees in Violence: Robert Mugabe and the Struggle for Power in Zimbabwe* (London, 2002), p.74

⁵ The distinction between multi-racialism and non-racialism is discussed on p.53

This thesis is about a significant moment in the history of the Zimbabwean nation. It is about the individuals, organisations, and politics that drove the formative development of a Zimbabwean national consciousness in between 1957 and 1965. It is a study of multiple concepts (identity, race, nation, citizenship, community, and belonging) and it explores these themes during the pursuit of an independent African state. It uses one element of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement as the means of doing so: the non-black radicals in the struggle. By examining the mentalities, ideologies, and composition of the white, Asian, Indian, and coloured radicals who found themselves playing an extraordinarily involved role in the African struggle, I challenge how the post-colonial political community in an independent Zimbabwe came to be construed, particularly as it pertained to race.

This 'non-racial nationalism' encompasses the interplay between race, nation, and citizenship within Zimbabwean nationalism, but the focus on this small group of non-black participants also addresses a critical omission in existing understandings of the construction of the Zimbabwean nation. There has been little investigation into the role played by these non-black radicals as a group and as individuals in the nationalist struggle and their impact on Zimbabwean nationalist thinking. In light of this absence, this thesis therefore considers the non-black participants in the nationalist struggle as an integral element of early Zimbabwean nationalism as well as a distinct group of individuals with their own beliefs, desires, and identities. Furthermore, their presence and actions provide a crucial way of examining the meaning of race in Zimbabwean nationalism in both a practical and rhetorical sense. This framework of non-black participation facilitates an understanding of the competing versions of the Zimbabwean nation imagined by various elements of the African political elite.

One consequence of employing a narrative focusing on the non-black radicals is an almost inevitable corresponding emphasis on the elites of the Zimbabwean nationalist movements as opposed to the many who comprised the majority of politically active black Zimbabweans. This is a product of the rarefied level at which

most of the interactions between black nationalists and non-black radicals occurred and in the debates around a post-colonial political community in Zimbabwe, it is the elites who had the loudest voices. Yet this narrow focus on the elites and the non-black radicals does not mean there is no benefit for understanding how ordinary African's approached race and Zimbabwean nationalism. As John Iliffe showed across central and southern Africa, there was a dialectical exchange of ideas between the elites and the masses, with each group acting on the other, and both acting on the movement as a whole.⁶ The actions and attitudes of the political leaders are set within the context of a growing political mobilisation that encompassed students, urban workers, peasants, and an emergent African middle class, all of whom influenced the development of a Zimbabwean nationalism. It is this broader environment within which the non-black radicals and their black African counterparts that I intend to include as part of my analysis.

The use of a nation-state framework for this research is also deliberate. Studies of African nationalism have seen a growing and worthwhile collective effort to employ a transnational or regional focus in recent years. Scholars have considered the migration and interactions of people, ideas, and commonalities that went beyond nationalities as drivers of political and social upheaval across national borders. This thesis is no different. There is an inherent transnationalism in the concept of non-black foreign-born members in an African nationalist struggle, as there are in the concepts of race and post-colonial African socio-political reconstruction. The prominent non-black radicals who made significant contributions to the liberation struggle in South Africa (and to a lesser extent Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya) overlapped with those in Zimbabwe in actions and ideologies. The impact of events and ideas elsewhere on the continent had a key impact on the Zimbabwean story. Zimbabwean nationalism's connections to the ideologies and political movements elsewhere in Africa calls for comparisons with the debates about post-colonial community construction in other settler states and former British colonies. Doing so

⁶ John Iliffe, *Africans: the history of a continent* (Cambridge, 1995), pp.249-253

is the most appropriate way to shed light upon how questions of citizenship and belonging dealt with race within Zimbabwe itself.

Yet Zimbabwean nationalism also lends itself to a nation-state focus. The arena for the struggle in the eyes of most Zimbabwean nationalist leaders appeared to be the first and foremost the state as it had been imagined and constructed by white settlers since 1890. This was particularly the case from the early 1960s, by which time the majority of the neighbouring African states had achieved independence from their colonial metropolises and post-colonial borders consolidated. In the resulting circumstances, Zimbabwean nationalists found themselves facing an increasingly resilient white Rhodesian state facing encirclement by independent African nations. The rhetoric and discourse of the nationalist elites and the non-black radicals mostly emphasised a national focus for the struggle, albeit situated in the context of a transnational arena. Zimbabwean nationalist ideology carried an intent of creating a nation synonymous with the state and so the fundamental questions being asked revolved around what would make the Zimbabwean nation, who would belong to it, and on what basis. There was an emphasis on the conditions for citizenship of the imagined Zimbabwean nation and it is this debate which demands a national focus.

Definitions and Terminology

The two central concepts within this thesis ('race' and 'nationalism') require defining in order to frame the arguments made. Race is a highly contested term and one which has become increasingly significant in debates during recent years.⁷ Academics have sought to examine abstract theories of race in various societies from a variety of

⁷ Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, *Racism* (Oxford, 1999), p.5. See also Jean-Francois Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity* (Chicago, 2005); Mahmood Mamdani, *Define and Rule: Native as Political Identity* (Johannesburg, 2012); Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis, *Racialized Boundaries: Race, Nation, Gender, Colour, and Class and the Anti-Racist Struggle* (London, 1992); and Étienne Balibar & Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London, 1991)

standpoints.⁸ These studies have highlighted three common points: the fluidity of racial identities, the reflexive nature of race as a concept, and the social construction inherent in any employment of race.⁹ Race is subject to the social, cultural, and political environment in which it is employed, all of which have a significant impact on the meaning attached to it. In contemporary society, race is most commonly used to describe physiological and cultural distinctions between humans as a means of identifying and classifying genetic heritage, geographical residence, physical appearance, and cultural adherence. When used in non-academic discourse, race is frequently employed as a means of describing someone's place of birth or membership to a specific group of others with shared perceived racial traits. Colloquially, it is skin colour that tends to supersede all other supposed identifiers, in what Alan Burns called 'colour prejudice'.¹⁰

Yet scholars and intellectuals have sought to challenge the idea of unalterable physical characteristics as being the defining features of an individual's race, preferring to instead highlight the attitudes, beliefs, and ideals that a person comes to identify with during their life. The American anthropologist and co-founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People, W.E.B. Du Bois, defined race in 1897 as being the product of 'common language, common ancestry, common history, and common strivings'. Du Bois contended that race could be identified without any reference to biological characteristics as a factor in distinguishing racial groups.¹¹ Other scholars have argued that shared religious or societal beliefs are sufficient to create a racial identity, particularly in the case of Judaism and Islam (including in Zimbabwe), whilst Rogers Brubaker and Frederick

⁸ See for instance Philomena Essed & David Theo Goldberg, eds., *Race Critical Theories: Text and Context* (Oxford, 2001); Caroline Knowles, *Race and Social Analysis* (London, 2003); Alice Bloch & John Solomos, *Race and Ethnicity in the 21st Century* (Basingstoke, 2010); and Máirtín Mac an Ghaill, *Contemporary Racisms and Ethnicities: Social and Cultural Transformations* (Buckingham, 1999)

⁹ See Joshua Glasgow, *A Theory of Race* (New York, 2009)

¹⁰ Alan Burns, *Colour Prejudice* (London, 1948), p.16

¹¹ Robert Gooding-Williams, 'Outlaw, Appiah, and Du Bois's "The Conservation of Races"', in Bernard Bell, Emily Grosholz, and James Stewart, eds., *W.E.B. Du Bois on Race and Culture* (New York, 1996), p.44, 50

Cooper have even criticised the concept of 'identity'.¹² The sheer breadth of traits that can be seen as classifying an individual's race are apparent from the scholarship on racial theory and racial philosophy.¹³ As a result there are no 'unambiguous, water-tight definitions of ethnicity, racism and myriad terms in-between.'¹⁴

Compared to South Africa, there have been only a few concentrated studies of race and racial theory in Rhodesia. Dane Kennedy and Morris Hirsch have written on Rhodesian racial identities and relationships (mostly from the perspective of the white community),¹⁵ Claire Palley and Busani Mpfu have explored the explicit racial discrimination of the Rhodesian state (touched upon by George Karekwaivanane as well),¹⁶ and David McDermott Hughes, Yuka Suzuki, and Rory Pilosof have looked at racial formation in post-colonial Zimbabwe.¹⁷ The use of racial descriptors like black, white, African, or European are particularly complicated given the meanings attached to these terms in Rhodesian history. Race in the Zimbabwean context ardently retained biological connotations and was clearly

¹² Ephraim C. Mandivenga, *Islam in Zimbabwe* (Harare, 1983); Craig R. Prentiss, ed., *Religion and the Creation of Race and Ethnicity: An Introduction* (New York, 2003); and Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society*, Vol.29, No.1 (2000), pp.1-47

¹³ See Rodney D. Coates, Abby L. Ferber, & David L. Brunnsma, eds., *The Matrix of Race: Social Construction, Intersectionality, and Inequality* (London, 2018); & Tina Patel, *Race and Society* (London, 2017)

¹⁴ Ali Rattansi & Sallie Westwood, eds., *Racism. Modernity and Identity* (Cambridge, 1994), p.53

¹⁵ See Dane Kennedy, *Islands of White: Settler Society and Culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939* (Durham, 1987); and Morris. I. Hirsch, *For Whom the Land?: An Assessment of Multiracial Southern Africa - The Factors and Trends, The Ways and Means* (Salisbury, 1967)

¹⁶ Claire Palley, 'Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation under the Rhodesia Front from 1963-1969', *Race and Class*, Vol.12, No.1 (1970), pp.15-47; Busani Mpfu, '"Undesirable" Indians, Residential Segregation, and the Ill-Fated Rise of the White "Housing Conventers" in Bulawayo, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1930-1973', *South African Historical Journal*, Vol.63, No.4 (2011), pp.553-580; & George Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle over State Power in Zimbabwe: Law and Politics since 1950* (Cambridge, 2017)

¹⁷ David McDermott Hughes, *Whiteness in Zimbabwe: Race, Landscape, and the Problem of Belonging* (New York, 2010), ch.6; Yuka Suzuki, *The Nature of Whiteness: Race, Animals, and Nation in Zimbabwe* (Seattle, 2016); and Rory Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: Farmers' Voices from Zimbabwe* (Cape Town, 2013)

defined on the basis of skin colour, much as it had been during the colonial era. From its foundation, the white Rhodesian state had constructed a nation where skin colour acted as the defining means of categorisation and citizenship, with little room for ambiguity about an individual's membership of a specific race - what Mahmood Mamdani called the 'race option' of colonial rule.¹⁸ Racial identities in colonial Zimbabwe used skin pigmentation as both an explanation and a precursor for those social characteristics identified by Du Bois: common language, ancestry, history, and strivings. It was this physical manifestation of race and the question of skin pigmentation which became the colloquial definition of race, as well as the legal and codified one.

Despite being intimately dependent upon the concept of biological race, the rhetoric of the white Rhodesian state also employed geography alongside skin colour as the dominant racial descriptors. Until the 1969 Constitution changed the official classifications, the six largest racial groups in Rhodesia were legally defined as Europeans, Africans, Asians, Indians, Chinese, and Eurafricans, and these terms were often preferred in official literature to those based on skin colour.¹⁹ The concept of clearly delineated communities was seen as necessary to the functioning of the hierarchical Rhodesian society, particularly given the racial segregation that affected almost every aspect of daily life, so utilising terms based on geographic heritage reinforced these Eurocentric notions of racial superiority.²⁰ The result is that in 1950s and 1960s Rhodesia, the terms black, white, and coloured were used alongside and interchangeably with African, European, Indian, and Asian dependent upon personal preference and politics.²¹

¹⁸ Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary African and the Legacy of Late Colonial Rule* (Princeton, 1996), pp.93-95

¹⁹ Palley, 'Law and the Unequal Society', p.17

²⁰ Kennedy, *Islands of White*, ch.3. See also Luise White, *Unpopular Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization* (Chicago, 2015), pp.32-35

²¹ I have chosen not to capitalise the terms 'black', 'white', and 'coloured' throughout this thesis as they are social constructs reflecting racial groupings and are not tied to proper nouns in the same way as Chinese, Indian, or Asian.

This thesis uses the racial adjectives black and white in preference to African and European to reflect the fact that not all of those with white skin in colonial Zimbabwe identified with the European colonial ideals, nor did all of those supportive of African politics have black skin. Blair Rutherford, whose work on black farm workers in Zimbabwe drew its definition from skin colour as a racially divisive category, noted just this issue:

The adjectives "white" and "black" are commonly used in Africa to denote people whose ancestry lies in Europe or sub-Saharan Africa respectively. There is a tendency in academic literature to treat these labels as more "natural" indices of human differences (i.e. of phenotypal variation) than, say, biological "races" and thus somehow not culturally constructed [...]. Although I will not place quotation marks around these terms in the remainder of the text, I want to stress that this does not mean that they are somehow outside of culture any more than the terms "European" and "African".²²

It is crucial to note these were the terms used in self-definition by those being studied. There were few Zimbabwean equivalents to Steve Biko or Robert Sobukwe who put pen to paper during the struggle and in clear terms laid out their stance on non-black participants in the struggle and the place of biological race within their ideologies. Ndabaningi Sithole's declaration in 1959 that 'African nationalism is directed against European domination, and not against the white man' was one of the notable exceptions.²³ Yet the stances of the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders can be ascertained from other sources, discussed later in this introduction. The Zimbabwean nationalists self-identified as black Africans and their supporters as white, Asian, Indian, Chinese, and coloureds respectively. There was no hesitancy to utilise these racial categories to define their own identities, either during the struggle or in the years after. The conception of racial identities as being tied to skin colour or geographic origins was adopted by the Zimbabwean nationalists, the non-black radicals, and the Rhodesian state during the period in question with only minor

²² Blair Rutherford, *Working on the Margins: Black workers, white farmers in postcolonial Zimbabwe* (Harare, 2001), p.5

²³ Ndabaningi Sithole, *African Nationalism* (London, 1959), p.24

debate. Race was contested only where there was uncertainty regarding citizenship rights, particularly regarding racial minorities like Asian, Indian, or coloured individuals. Since Zimbabwean nationalists utilised the discourse and rhetoric of the Rhodesian state regarding race, they inherited the same ambiguities inherent in the socio-political structures of the Rhodesian state. Such adoption highlighted both the general salience and the necessity of challenging racial thinking as Sithole explained, 'African nationalism is, paradoxically, the child of white supremacy'.²⁴ As will be seen in later chapters, 'blackness' would come to play a significant role in the formation of a Zimbabwean nationalist consciousness and concepts of citizenship for the imagined Zimbabwean nation.

Zimbabwean conceptions of nationalism also require defining and this thesis is an attempt to do just that. It is worth emphasising the current approach to studying Zimbabwean nationalism because it provides insight into how this thesis seeks to tackle the main questions regarding race and citizenship. In many respects this research is about how the Zimbabwean future was being envisaged by various different parties, at different times, in response to different stimuli and catalysts. A Zimbabwean case study provides a useful comparison to the state of the recent literature on nation making in Africa precisely because of the existence and agency of established white, coloured and Asian settlers in the territory. Furthermore, the Rhodesian state was strongly entrenched, a factor that heavily influenced both the imagined future Zimbabwean nation and citizenship. Zimbabwean nationalists were forced to integrate racial minorities with established claims on the land and an inherited political structure, complete with historic and traditional obligations to citizens of the colonial state.²⁵

The notions of citizenship espoused and the characteristics of these citizens both rely heavily on understanding what role race and racial identities played in such debates. Rogers Brubaker's work is influential for understanding contrasting types of

²⁴ Ibid., p.37

²⁵ Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject*, pp.90-94

national identity and the proscription of group and individual rights within a nation, particularly the concept of 'inside-outside' relationships.

If insiders are defined positively - as members of a family, clan, association, organization, or state - outsiders are defined negatively and residually. They are excluded not because of what they are but because of what they are not - because they are not recognized or acknowledged as insiders.²⁶

Brubaker takes this argument further, contending that through what he terms 'presumptive connections', a person's parentage, place of birth, biological ancestry, and social status are seen by national leaders as indicative of ties to a nation state.²⁷ Ascertaining how the African nationalist movement perceived foreign, non-black individuals and their place in the Zimbabwean nation is crucial. Similarly, the concept of national identity is brought into play as an analytical tool on the basis that citizenship and national identities are subject to change dependent on place of residence, shared ideological beliefs and other voluntary characteristics. These non-black radicals were never termed 'nationalists' by the Rhodesian state as a refusal to see beyond racial divisions. Instead they were described as supporters or sympathisers and kept external to Zimbabwean nationalism. As Brubaker explains, 'citizenship is an abstract, formal construct. In principle it has nothing to do with ethnocultural nationality or with any other immediately interpretable markers and identifiers of everyday life.'²⁸ Whether this was the case in imaginings of the Zimbabwean nation in the late-1950s and early-1960s provides a crucial line of investigation in this research.

Other themes of national theory and identity politics are examined, including some that have recently been tackled by recent work of Africanist scholars working on different regions and societies. Academics including Jean Allman, Justin Pearce, and Kate Skinner have emphasised the role of competing nationalisms in the

²⁶ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (London, 1992), p.29

²⁷ Ibid., p.92

²⁸ Ibid., p.30

construction of post-colonial nation states.²⁹ Others like Emma Hunter, James Brennan, and Miles Larmer have highlighted the construction of nationalist thinking and racial identities in opposition to existing state structures, including the popular debates surrounding concepts of 'democracy', 'representation', and 'citizenship' within their own specific national contexts.³⁰ Key themes raised include the persistence of racial categories from colonial society, the clashes between individual autonomy and state unity, and the conditions for political membership of the created nation-states. All highlight the importance of reframing broad concepts within specific national discourses and a *longue durée* approach to African nationalism.³¹

The competing nationalist visions of the future espoused by different groups are another key theme of this research. As Miles Larmer argues, nationalism provides a framework for assorted factions to express societal discontent and establish their claims to a national identity.³² In the Zimbabwean context, specific elements of the nationalist movement would come to dominate the discourse both intellectually and politically, just as the nationalist elements of African politics had come to dominate other African political movements. Frederick Cooper's assertion that majority rule and a majority nationalist government were not the only outcomes available to colonial societies during the transition from colonial to post-colonial states is a useful counter to the teleology of nationalist historians.³³ As will be seen

²⁹ Jean Allman, *The Quills of the Porcupine - Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana* (Madison WI, 1993); Justin Pearce, *Political Identity and Conflict in Central Angola, 1975-2002* (Cambridge, 2015); & Kate Skinner, *The Fruits of Freedom in British Togoland: Literacy, Politics and Nationalism, 1914-2014* (New York, 2015)

³⁰ Emma Hunter, *Political Thought and the Public Sphere in Tanzania: Freedom, Democracy and Citizenship in the Era of Decolonization* (New York, 2015); James Brennan, *Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania* (Athens OH, 2012); & Miles Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics: A History of Opposition in Zambia* (Farnham, 2011)

³¹ James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley, 1971)

³² Miles Larmer, 'Studying African nationalism as nationalism', Keynote Address at the Researching Africa Day 2017, Oxford University, 4 March 2017

³³ Frederick Cooper, 'An Antinationalist Anticolonialism: Politics in French West Africa, 1945-1960', paper presented at the Council on African Studies Lecture Series, Yale University, 2 December 2014. Also Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present* (Cambridge, 2002)

throughout this thesis, majority rule in Zimbabwe itself seemed unlikely and was contested for the first several years of the nationalist movement. Meanwhile other routes through decolonization were proposed, including liberal multi-racialism expressed through compromise and cooperation with the white Rhodesian state, and trade union-led, class-based socialist reform. The analysis presented rejects the idea of a homogenous and inevitable Zimbabwean nation as having been imagined by the black political elites of the mid-twentieth century. Instead it will present a complex and constantly evolving Zimbabwean nationalism which was simultaneously an academic and political phenomenon, situated in theory and realised in practice, conceptualised by intellectuals and utilised by popular mass movements.

Historiography

This thesis does not neatly fit into a single category of Zimbabwean historiography. It makes contributions to a wide ranging library of academic work, much of which has been written by and for distinct disciplines including sociology, anthropology, and history with diverse reasons and objectives in mind. By asking what non-black participation in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement meant in terms of citizenship and debates about belonging, I critique the relationship between racial identities and nation building that is depicted in the existing work. Furthermore, because of this emphasis on non-black radicals within the context of the Zimbabwean nationalist movements, this thesis is deliberately situated between two particular perspectives on the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. These conflicting standpoints revolve around a binary academic paradigm of white Rhodesians or black Zimbabweans.

One group of scholars engage from the perspective of the white Rhodesian state, giving the role of the protagonist to white Rhodesians and relegating the black Zimbabweans to a background position of opposition, to be dealt with by white politicians, soldiers, and civilians in defence of their nation. Contained within this coterie are the academics whose focus is on the Rhodesian political landscape and the actions of the Rhodesian government, including Larry Bowman, Morris Hirsch,

Elaine Windrich, and J.R.T. Wood.³⁴ Others explore the attitudes and actions of the white Rhodesian population; W.G. Eaton, Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, Dane Kennedy, Alois Mlambo, Graham Kinloch, and Cyril Rogers and C. Frantz, amongst others.³⁵ Yet throughout this extensive historiography, there have been only a few examinations into the dissident elements of white society and these few investigations have been dominated by a focus on the broad grouping of 'liberal' as opposed to 'radical' whites.³⁶ Kate Law, Dickson Mungazi, and Ian Hancock all shed light on the non-conformist whites and their impact on the Rhodesian state, yet all neglect the role of the white radicals who actively participated in the African nationalist cause.³⁷

Hancock's research in particular purports to present an all-encompassing account of white criticism to the Rhodesian state and successfully recognises the important divisions within white non-conformity. Yet it pushes the white supporters

³⁴ Larry Bowman, *Politics in Rhodesia: White Power in an African State* (Harvard, 1973); Morris I. Hirsch, *Focus on Southern Rhodesia, the Constitution and Independence: an Analysis* (Greenwich, 2009); Elaine Windrich, *The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front Rule* (Gwelo, 1981); J.R.T. Wood, *A Matter of Weeks Rather Than Months: The Impasse Between Harold Wilson and Ian Smith; Sanctions, Aborted Settlements and War, 1965-1969* (Victoria, B.C., 2008); and J.R.T. Wood, *So Far and No Further!: Rhodesia's Bid for Independence During the Retreat from Empire, 1959-1965* (Victoria, B.C., 2005)

³⁵ W.G. Eaton, *A Chronicle of Modern Sunlight: The story of what happened to Rhodesians* (Rohnert Park, 1996); Peter Godwin & Ian Hancock, *'Rhodesians Never Die': The Impact of War and Political Change on White Rhodesia, c.1970-1980* (Oxford, 1993); Kennedy, *Islands of White*; Alois Mlambo, *White Immigration into Rhodesia: From Occupation to Federation* (Harare, 2002); Graham C. Kinloch, *Racial Conflict in Rhodesia: A Socio-Historical Study* (Washington, 1978); and Cyril A. Rogers & C. Frantz, *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behaviour of the White Population* (New Haven, 1962)

³⁶ Although explained more thoroughly on p.87-89, 'radical' whites in the Rhodesian context refers to those activists for independence and nationalist causes that went beyond multi-racial liberalism. The term encompasses the anti-colonial intelligentsia, non-racialists, and decolonialists, amongst others, and provides an umbrella description for separating them from white liberals.

³⁷ Kate Law, *Gendering the Settler State: white women, race, liberalism and empire in Rhodesia, 1950-1980* (London, 2015); Dickson A. Mungazi, *The Last British Liberals in Africa: Michael Blundell and Garfield Todd* (Westport, 1999); and Ian Hancock, *White Liberals, Moderates and Radicals in Rhodesia, 1953-1980* (London, 1984)

of African nationalism to the margins and glosses over those who identified more strongly with African-led nationalism than white multi-racial liberalism. Partly this is due to Hancock's stringent methodological approach of situating resistance to white minority rule within the framework of white society, since such restrictions leave little space for those who removed themselves from their compatriots and acted more in keeping with black nationalist agendas than white dissidence. This restrictive focus was re-addressed somewhat in post-1980 writing which presented more insightful accounts of white society's heterogeneous nature, notably David Caute's portrayal of the heterogeneous mentalities of whites in Rhodesia.³⁸ Yet even in Caute's outstanding work, the radical elements of non-black societies (white, Asian, coloured, Indian) remain hidden, their voices, contributions, and impact muted. There is little comprehension as to why these individuals sided with the nationalists as opposed to the white liberals, and even less understanding about the role their own identities played in explaining their actions. The marginality of these individuals for a variety of reasons (including their sexuality, race, religious beliefs, political ideologies, or social status) shed light on these questions and yet they remain underexplored.

Given the non-black radicals' political beliefs and the exclusion from their own societies they suffered, situating them as a component of African nationalism permits a more thorough investigation into their actions and influence than if they are viewed simply as an extraneous group of dissent within their own communities. This field of research shifts the focus to the black Africans in Rhodesia and their efforts to secure independence through various means against the intransigent white state. The majority of this literature has been reviewed in detail by Brian Raftopoulos, Tinashe Nyamunda, Terence Ranger, and Jocelyn Alexander and there is no need to reprise it here.³⁹ However it is worthwhile to briefly summarise the key texts and their themes

³⁸ David Caute, *Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia* (Harmondsworth, 1983)

³⁹ See Brian Raftopoulos, 'Problematising Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Historiographical Perspective', *Zambezia*, Vol.27, No.2 (1999), pp.115-134; Tinashe Nyamunda, 'Insights Into Independent Zimbabwe: Some Historiographical Reflections', *Strategic Review for Southern*

and to highlight the gaps, shortcomings, and conceptual failings with which this thesis engages. There are five academic trends that have shaped the current paradigm regarding Zimbabwean nationalism.

First, those works produced around the 1960s in the service of Zimbabwean nationalism as a means of providing what Terence Ranger called 'a usable African past to the nationalist struggle'.⁴⁰ Alongside Ranger were the works of Zimbabwean nationalists Ndabaningi Sithole and Eshmael Mlambo.⁴¹ These were not histories of nationalism but 'nationalist histories'. The authors saw history as ideology and employed this history as politics in the service of a distinct and defined Zimbabwean nationalism to serve 'the agenda of the day', in the words of Enocent Msindo.⁴²

Seeking to challenge these ideological histories were the Marxist school of social and economic academics that emerged during the 1970s, led by Giovanni Arrighi, André Astrow, Ian Phimister, and Charles Van Onselen.⁴³ This group focused on theories of development and underdevelopment as a response to the inability of new nations throughout Africa to achieve real economic and social liberation. Their work was predominantly focused on class and increasingly critical

Africa, Vol.36, No.1 (May, 2014), pp.72-89; Terence Ranger, 'Nationalist Historiography, Patriotic History, and the History of the Nation: the Struggle over the Past in Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.30, No.2 (Jun., 2004), pp.215-234; and Jocelyn Alexander, 'The Historiography of Land in Zimbabwe: Strengths, Silences, and Questions', *Safundi*, Vol.8, No.2 (2007), pp.183-198

⁴⁰ Terence Ranger, 'Towards a Usable African Past', in Christopher Fyfe, ed., *African Studies since 1945: a Tribute to Basil Davidson* (London, 1976), pp.17-30

⁴¹ Terence Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-7: a study in African resistance* (London, 1967); Sithole, *African Nationalism*; and Eshmael Mlambo, *Rhodesia, The Struggle for a Birthright* (London, 1972)

⁴² Enocent Msindo, 'Towards a New Understanding of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: Ideologies, Alternative Platforms, and the Place of Violence', paper presented at a Sociology Seminar, Rhodes University, 30 March 2011, p.3. See also Temu Arnold & Swai Bonaventure, *Historians and Africanist History: A Critique. Post-Colonial Historiography Examined* (London, 1981)

⁴³ Giovanni Arrighi, 'The Political Economy of Rhodesia', in John Saul & Giovanni Arrighi, eds., *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa* (New York, 1973); André Astrow, *Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost Its Way?* (London, 1983); and Ian Phimister, & Charles Van Onselen, 'The Political Economy of Tribal Animosity: A Case Study of the 1929 Bulawayo Location "Faction Fight"', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.6, No.1 (Oct., 1979), pp.1-43

of the largely pro-capitalist attitudes within the nationalist movements, as well as the failures of African nationalism to address the underlying issues within Rhodesian society.

As Zimbabwe secured its own independence in 1980, a third academic cohort emerged who produced the 'official histories' of Zimbabwean nationalism as a means of legitimating the newly-elected ZANU-PF. Most notable was the work of David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, which ignored the contributions to the struggle of most non-ZANU elements and become the main historical text for all Zimbabwean secondary schools.⁴⁴ In response to the selective narrative and unified depiction of the nationalist movements, there was a counter-turn to histories which sought to complicate and disaggregate the liberation struggle through distinct collectivities such as class, ethnicity, religion, gender, age, or labour. Highlighting the existence of struggles within the struggle were Norma Kriger, David Lan, Terence Ranger, David Maxwell, Joanne McGregor, and Jocelyn Alexander, all of whom downplayed the role of a central ideology and emphasised the agency of ideas other than nationalism to highlight the heterogeneity of the liberation movements.⁴⁵

By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the combination of ZANU-PF's third decade of rule and a series of socio-economic crises saw a new generation of scholars began to focus on the history and legacies of the liberation struggle as context for the contemporary situation. Brian Raftopoulos and Timothy Scarnecchia explored the origins of authoritarianism within the nationalist movements from the

⁴⁴ David Martin & Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe* (London, 1981)

⁴⁵ Norma Kriger, 'The Zimbabwean War of Liberation: Struggles within the Struggle', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.14, No.2 (Jan., 1988), pp.304-322; Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices* (Cambridge, 1992); David Lan, *Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (London, 1985); Terence Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness and Guerrilla War in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study* (London, 1985); David Maxwell, *Christians and Chiefs in Zimbabwe: A Social History of the Hwesa People, c.1870s-1990s* (Edinburgh, 1999); Jocelyn Alexander, Joanne McGregor, & Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the "Dark Forests" of Matabeleland* (Oxford, 2000)

perspective of the present.⁴⁶ Angus Selby, Joost Fontein, Rory Pilosof, Bridget M. Mupfuvi, and Jocelyn Alexander conversely examine how fundamental societal questions that had persisted throughout the liberation struggle (in this case land), have become politicised in post-independence Zimbabwe, and how these themes have been employed as political tools.⁴⁷ The use of history as socio-political legitimacy and the manipulation of Zimbabwean nationalism was more recently expanded upon by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, Preben Kaarsholm and Blessing Miles Tendi.⁴⁸

The relationship between citizenship and nationalism in Zimbabwe has further been assessed in the work of Sara Dorman, Sarah Chiumbu, Bridget M. Mupfuvi, and Jocelyn Alexander.⁴⁹ All four highlighted the importance of controlling the historical narratives, and how far claims to the memory of the liberation struggle have become an intrinsic part of Zimbabwean socio-political life.

⁴⁶ Brian Raftopoulos, 'Zimbabwe: race and nationalism in a post-colonial state', Research Paper 10, Harare: Institute of Development Studies Zimbabwe, 1994; Timothy Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964* (Rochester, 2008)

⁴⁷ Angus Selby, 'Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe', Ph.D., University of Oxford, 2006; Joost Fontein, *Remaking Mutirikwi: Landscape, Water and Belonging in Southern Zimbabwe* (New York, 2015); Pilosof, *The Unbearable Whiteness*; Bridget M. Mupfuvi, 'Land to the People: Peasants and Nationalism in the Development of Land Ownership Structure in Zimbabwe from Pre-Colonialism to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) Period', Ph.D., University of Salford, 2014; and Jocelyn Alexander, *The Unsettled Land: State-Making and the Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, 1893-2003* (Oxford, 2006)

⁴⁸ See S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Empire Global Coloniality, and African Subjectivity* (Oxford, 2013); and S.J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, *Do "Zimbabweans" exist? Trajectories of Nationalism, National Identity Formation and Crisis in a Postcolonial State* (Oxford, 2009); Ruramisai Charumbira, *Imagining a Nation: History and Memory in Making Zimbabwe* (London, 2015); Tendi, *Making History*; and Preben Kaarsholm, 'The Past as Battlefield in Rhodesia and Zimbabwe: The Struggle of Competing Nationalisms over History from Colonization to Independence', in Shula Marks, ed., *The Societies of Southern Africa in the 19th and 20th Centuries: Collected Seminar Papers: Vol.17* (London, 1991)

⁴⁹ Sara Dorman, *Understanding Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism* (London, 2016); Sarah Chiumbu & Muchapara Musemwa, eds., *Crisis! What Crisis?: The Multiple Dimensions of the Zimbabwean Crisis* (Cape Town, 2012); Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett, & Paul Nugent, eds., *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (Leiden, 2007); Mupfuvi, 'Land to the People'; and Alexander, *The Unsettled Land*

More importantly, they raise important discussions about the ideological role of characteristics as markers for belonging or exclusion within a nation. This approach has recently also been emphasised by Miles Larmer and Baz Lecocq.⁵⁰ Their concept of 'competing nationalisms' (in which some ideologies collapse, others survive by adapting) provides a better understanding of African nationalism's role in state construction and citizenship by highlighting the complexities and heterogeneity of African political agendas. All of these authors also address the distinctions of authority and legitimacy provided by membership or allegiance to a specific ideology in the contemporary situation, and the role of uncertainty and competition in defining a nation and its citizens.

This idea of competing nationalisms is crucial to this thesis. Non-racialism was one of the alternative forms of Zimbabwean nationalism that would ultimately lose out to an ideology focused on black identity politics. Nevertheless, the existence of a non-racial ideology and of non-black radicals within the movement forced the dominant nationalist theories to address the ideas of race and national belonging. Compared to studies into apartheid South Africa, the role of race in constructing a national identity remains severely understudied in existing literature on colonial Zimbabwe. David Everatt's research on the theme of non-racialism in the early days of the anti-apartheid movement presents the counterpart to this thesis.⁵¹ Andries Du Toit, Saul Dubow, George Frederickson, Shula Marks, Stanley Trapido, Kenneth Hendrickse, and Julie Frederikse have also provided thorough and comprehensive insights into the role race played in the development of black South African nationalism during the anti-apartheid struggle.⁵² As with their work, it is the non-

⁵⁰ Miles Larmer, & Baz Lecocq, 'Rethinking Nationalism, Ethnicity and Separatism in African Studies', published on H-Net.org as Part 9 of a series *Secessionism and Separatism Monthly Series*, 20 September 2016

⁵¹ David Everatt, *The Origins of Non-Racialism: White Opposition to Apartheid in the 1950s* (Johannesburg, 2009)

⁵² Andries Du Toit, 'Fragile Defiance: the African Resistance Movement', in I. Liebenberg, F. Lortan, B. Nel, & G. van der Westhuizen, eds., *The Long March: The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa* (Pretoria, 1994); Saul Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge, 1995); George M. Fredrickson, *Black Liberation: A*

black radical actors that provide the cohesion needed to integrate white dissent with African nationalism in the Zimbabwean context as the visible manifestations of racial policy and thinking.

Sources and Research Methodology

The single most valuable sources surveyed were the extensive diaries of a non-black participant in the liberation struggle during its early years, the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (UCRN) lecturer John Reed. His daily entries - frequently running to a half-dozen or more pages - provide the foundation for the chronological narrative adopted by this thesis. A British academic in English literature, Reed emigrated to Southern Rhodesia in 1957 to take up a teaching position at the newly established university. Described by his brother as 'always a man of the left',⁵³ Reed's diaries are a unique source charting the experiences of a white supporter of African nationalism and record in detail the evolution of racial thinking and concepts of citizenship within Zimbabwean nationalist movements. The immediacy of the entries, combined with Reed's special position as one of only a handful of white supporters permitted access to the most prominent leaders, provide an insight into the period's events and ideological developments that no other sources provide. In this regard, it is an invaluable source. As Ruth Watson notes, a good diary not only enables

the detailed reconstruction of an individual life, it also illuminates the lives of people with whom the diary writer interacted. A richly detailed diary sustained

Comparative History of Black Ideologies in the United States and South Africa (Oxford, 1995); Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, *The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Century South Africa* (London, 1987); Kenneth Hendrickse, *The Essence of Multi-Racialism: An Analysis of the Role of Jewish Consciousness in South African "Leftist" Politics* (Cape Town, 1959); and Julie Frederikse, *The Unbreakable Thread: Non-racialism in South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1990)

⁵³ Alan Reed, 'John Reed obituary', [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com),

<https://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/jan/30/john-reed-obituary> (accessed 3 March 2018)

over a long period can reveal a cultural and social world, enabling the biographer to write a history of much more than just one person.⁵⁴

Reed's diaries afford just that ability and are thus utilised at length. Yet a reliance on the diary of a single person is not without issue. Reed is a compelling writer (a consequence of his literary profession) but he is also an individual recording events from his own perspective. Throughout his time in Rhodesia, Reed struggled with difficult issues like his own sexuality, periods of depression, serious disagreements with friends and colleagues, doubts over his contributions to the African struggle, and the pervasive threat of imprisonment for his actions and political views. His vivid accounts often overshadow the fact that he was fundamentally a man trying to survive in a society where he felt an outcast and thus desperately sought belonging through other means, such as his political activities. All of this impacts upon the content of the diaries themselves.

In her work on African colonial diaries, Ruth Watson asks: 'central to using diaries as historical sources, but often ignored, is the question of audience. Who reads diaries and for whom are they written?'⁵⁵ With Reed this is never clear. At times it appears that he views the diaries as a deeply personal endeavour, a means of facilitating his own mental stability, admitting he finds it difficult to recall even the preceding day's events if they were not recorded on paper. Occasionally he seems to acknowledge some unspecified future reader. In June 1961, he wrote: 'this diary is full of lies. Slack habits of thought. Evasion. Fatigue. Perhaps I ought to go through and cross out in red ink everything that I know is false, or which is a deliberate under or overstatement, designed to mislead.'⁵⁶ Reed was writing for a purpose (to record his existence at each moment of his life) and as comparisons with other accounts of the period indicate, he was far from infallible.

⁵⁴ Ruth Watson, '"No One Knows What He is Until He is Told": Audience and Personhood in a Colonial African Diary', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, Vol.44, No.5 (2016), pp.815-832, p.815

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.816. See also Jocelyn Alexander, 'Political Prisoners' Memoirs in Zimbabwe: Narratives of Self and Nation', *Cultural and Social History*, Vol.5, No.4 (2008), pp.395-409

⁵⁶ Reed, 'Wednesday 21 June 1961', Diary, Vol.86

Despite these thoughts of editorialisation, Reed never did follow through, leaving the diaries almost entirely untouched.⁵⁷ The only obvious edits are seen in the self-censoring of the names of romantic interests or of individuals involved with the more elicited parts of the African struggle; likely a response to the risks Reed noted he was taking in keeping the diaries, particularly during times of heightened police interest in the Rhodesian white radicals. Twice (in 1959 and in 1963), Reed admitted that the Rhodesian intelligence services would almost certainly be reading his entries at some point in the future and wryly noted their potential reactions to the content.⁵⁸ Nevertheless he kept writing. In the ten years of diaries examined for this thesis, Reed deliberately stopped only once, for similar fears of discovery. He lasted less than a month before beginning again to record his daily life, noting when he did that: 'the habits of a lifetime are hard to break, even though I risk trouble through them being found.'⁵⁹

One means of countering the restrictions of Reed's diaries is to compliment them with carefully selected other sources from a variety of perspectives and origins. The majority of those surveyed are primary archival sources created during the period under examination. Some of the archives like the Ian Smith cabinet papers or documents from the Southern Rhodesia Ministry of Information provide the Rhodesian state's perspective on the nationalist movement. Others were created by the nationalists or the non-black radicals themselves, including correspondence between and within the nationalist leaders and non-black radicals. South African and Rhodesian newspapers provide a valuable source for ascertaining the salience and the general public's attitude to events. Newspapers not only provide the information from which the general public make their opinions, but also decide which topics will become prioritised amongst the public agenda. As Maxwell McCombs explains, 'through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, editors and news

⁵⁷ As bound books, missing pages would be easily noticed, and the misspellings and crossed out words show these were first drafts and not transcribed copies.

⁵⁸ Reed, 'Tuesday 8 May 1959', Diary, Vol.79; and Reed, 'Friday 12 November 1963', Diary, Vol.90

⁵⁹ Reed, 'Monday 4 April 1966', Diary, Vol.102

directors focus our attention and influence our perceptions of what are the most important issues of the day.’⁶⁰ Newspapers, however, also have a dialectical relationship between with society which permits conclusions to be drawn regarding the public opinion on a salient issue and providing context for the debates around race and citizenship.⁶¹

Alongside Reed's diaries, archival documents, and newspapers, the next largest set of sources surveyed were autobiographies and memoirs produced by the primary actors involved in Zimbabwean nationalism during these early years. Non-black radicals like Peter Mackay, Fay Chung, Terence Ranger, and Guy Clutton-Brock, and black nationalists including Joshua Nkomo, George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, Enoch Dumbutshena, and others, have all produced accounts of the period *ex post facto*. Most explicitly or implicitly articulate how these individuals and others articulated racial thinking within the nationalist movement, as well as documenting the events that occurred. Taken in corroboration with the archival sources, the personalised nature of autobiographies, memoirs, and interviews provide an invaluable insight into how ideas of race and racialism were created on an individual level and the realities of integrating these themes into Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. They are also a unique standpoint from which to understand the memory of specific topics from different perspectives, shaping the 'ways in which African's socio-cultural history [and] trans-cultural memory [...] are produced, perceived and consumed.’⁶² As a combination of fact, fiction, history and narrative, autobiographies becomes a representation of an individual's story as well as one facet

⁶⁰ Maxwell McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Cambridge, 2004), p.1

⁶¹ John E. Richardson, *Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis* (London, 2007), p.114. See also Emma Hunter & Derek Peterson, ‘Print culture in colonial Africa’, in Emma Hunter, Derek Peterson, & Stephanie Newell, *African Print Cultures: Newspapers and Their Publics in the Twentieth Century* (Ann Arbor, 2016)

⁶² Muchativugwa Hove, & Kgomotso Masemola, 'Introduction', in Muchativugwa Hove, & Kgomotso Masemola, eds., *Strategies of Representation in Auto/biography: Reconstructing and Remembering* (New York, 2014), p.1

of the broader community within which the author existed.⁶³ Questions of legitimacy and appeals for recognition were bolstered through autobiographical works by those outside of the dominant authoritative positions, such as former ZAPU leaders. Autobiographies by ordinary nationalists such as Joshua Mpofu or Phinias-Mogorosi Makhurane also provide an opportunity to present an alternative historical narrative to the 'official' one, as authorised and created by the state and its ruling elite.⁶⁴

One notable point about these sources is that they were mostly generated by elites and consequently have both strengths and weaknesses due to this focus.⁶⁵ The most glaring weakness is the significance attached to the non-black radicals themselves. Most ordinary black nationalists had little interaction with non-black supporters. When the white radicals John Reed and Terence Ranger attended a nationalist rally in January 1961, they were heckled by the African crowd who refused to believe they were members of the nationalist party.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the nationalist leadership socialised with non-black radicals on a regular basis, and were often on first name terms. This disconnect means that the influence of the non-black radicals on the movement as a whole is inflated.

In order to rectify this elite focus somewhat, I conducted targeted interviews a range of individuals including black nationalist supporters, non-black radicals, and white Rhodesian liberals, moderates, and conservatives active between 1957 and 1966. These interviews took the form of semi-formal conversations, structured in part with important questions, but left largely to develop as the informant sees fit. In doing so, it made it possible for nuances of the topic to be revealed without unnecessary direction and permitted the interviewee to speak more freely than an

⁶³ Melissa Levin & Laurice Taitz, 'Fictional Autobiographies or Autobiographical Fictions?' in Flora Veit-Wild, & Anthony Chennells, eds., *Emerging Perspectives on Dambuzo Marechera* (Asmara, 1999), p.163

⁶⁴ Joshua Mpofu, *My Life in the Struggle for the Liberation of Zimbabwe* (Bloomington, 2014); & Phinias-Mogorosi Makhurane, *Phinias-Mogorosi Makgurane: An Autobiography* (Gweru, 2010)

⁶⁵ Paula S. Fass, 'The Memoir Problem', *Reviews in American History*, Vol.34, No.1 (2006), pp.107-123

⁶⁶ John Reed, 'Sunday 8 January 1961', *Diary*, Vol.90

intensely structured interview would allow. These interviews, combined with previously unexplored primary sources, provided the bedrock of this research, and it is upon their foundations that the other primary sources and secondary literature are situated.

Thesis Layout

The thesis takes a narrative approach, tracing the evolution of racial and nationalist thinking in the specific moments in Zimbabwe's history. The use of a narrative foundation is intrinsic to the research itself.⁶⁷ Narrative has an explanatory power and is particularly important in understanding the fluid nature of Zimbabwean nationalism during this period. A narrative approach provides the best framework for an analysis of the concepts as well as the actors, and ensures that the debates and actions of individuals and groups are situated properly. As Frederick Cooper succinctly put it in his remarkable study of citizenship in French Africa:

Because one can take for granted neither continuity nor change in any actor's way of thinking and arguing, I have brought out certain arguments that recur consistently as well as those that shift, incrementally or sharply. [...] We can easily miss the kinds of approaches that political actors were pursuing. We know some turned into dead ends; the people involved did not.⁶⁸

It is impossible to trace in full every actor present and every event that occurred during even the short period surveyed by this thesis. A narrative approach permits the use of examples to represent the main themes expressed by the individuals and the movement as a whole without being teleological in the analysis. Many significant events in the history of Zimbabwean nationalism are diminished or passed over in favour of others and the same applies to individual actors. Yet the overall picture is stronger because of the strength of the specific examples selected.

⁶⁷ Christine Bold, *Using Narrative in Research* (London, 2013)

⁶⁸ Frederick Cooper, *Citizenship between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960* (Princeton, 2014), p.x, p.3

The thesis is divided into six chronological chapters. The first chapter explores the origins of Zimbabwean nationalism in the pre-1957 socio-political landscape of colonial Zimbabwe. It focuses on four preconditions which prove influential in understanding the nationalist leaders' conceptions of race, nationalism, and citizenship in later years: childhood influences, the role of education, the multi-racial liberalism of the 1950s, and finally the localised African political protest groups that preceded the SRANC. The emergence of a national African political movement in September 1957 was just one possible culmination of a long and uncertain socio-political development and it is crucial to recognise that the SRANC's policies did not form in a vacuum but were formed from a multitude of precursor groups and organisations.

The period surrounding the formation of the SRANC forms the basis of chapter two. The role of non-black supporters during these early days was significant but there remained an overlap between liberals and radicals that makes the clear distinctions of the 1960s between such groups more difficult to state. The conflict within the early nationalist movement over the role of non-blacks in the struggle and in the imagined Zimbabwean nation are also explored, and concepts of race and 'blackness' provide much of the fuel for these arguments. The chapter traces the rise and fall of the SRANC in the face of a restrictive white government, and the impact this repression had on the racial nature of the struggle as it developed.

The third chapter focuses on the disorganisation that came to define the SRANC's successors, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), and the contradictions between words and actions that enveloped their attitudes to race and citizenship. Differences between the leadership and the ordinary members became increasingly apparent, particularly in the reception given to non-black supporters during times of unrest. The NDP and ZAPU were arguably the most successful of the nationalist parties during this period of 'open nationalism' but they were also the first to suffer from vocal elements calling for an anti-white form of nationalism. The legacy of these sentiments would persist in the following years as the white state's increasingly repressive actions made clear

that racial cooperation needed serious reassessment to achieve the goal of majority rule.

Chapter four examines the attitudes and experiences of the predominantly Salisbury-based non-black nationalists in the wake of ZAPU's banning. The continuing role of the UCRN as an arena for these vocal and prominent members of the struggle against the white state is also investigated. The internal strife amongst the black Zimbabwean nationalists during 1963 is shown to generate a significant discussion with regards to their stance on non-racialism and race within the struggle, at even the most elite levels. The rise of the Rhodesian Front (RF) and its increasingly intolerant stance towards those few who assisted the nationalists in their still largely non-violent fight provides the backdrop to this chapter.

Following on from that period, the penultimate chapter focuses on the escalation of violence by the nationalists and the white state in 1964. This shift provides a key component in understanding why identities of race became increasingly dominant in discussion of nationhood and citizenship. The resurgence of racial segregation in Rhodesian society combined with a clear division between the racial groups' political ideologies in the nation, made for a challenging situation for non-black radicals. Furthermore, as a popular cultural nationalism made itself felt, black identity politics became increasingly dominant within the Zimbabwean nationalist rhetoric at the expense of non-racial ideals. Yet until this point, the non-black radicals had remained largely uninvolved with the violent side of the struggle.

The final chapter explores how and why the activities of the non-black supporters changed during 1965. Uncertainty is the key theme underpinning this discussion. The fractured conceptions of race and Zimbabwean nationalism, not only between ZANU and ZAPU but within the parties themselves, led to conflicting understandings for the place of non-black radicals within the newly radicalised nationalist movements. The strengthening of the white state around the issue of majority rule and independence from Britain (which resulted in the UDI of November 1965) is also examined for the impact it had on the white radicals into. The chapter and the thesis conclude with the declaration of UDI by the RF

government; an event which marked the end of peaceful non-black radicalism within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement.

Chapter 1

Alternative Trajectories: the context for race in

Zimbabwean nationalism, c.1890-1957

Introduction

Given the strength of nationalist thinking in Zimbabwe's politics since 1957, it is difficult to envision a situation in which a black-consciousness nationalism did not become the paramount political ideology of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe. Yet at no point during the early years of organised African political opposition was it inevitable that the Zimbabwean anti-colonial movement would come to be represented by a group of African elites espousing a nationalist agenda. The emergence of the nationalist Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) in 1957 instead of one of the competing ideologies was dependent upon a unique set of precipitants. Trying to explain why mass Zimbabwean nationalism emerged when and in the form it did involves assessing these many precursory elements, as several scholars have already done.¹ All highlight the role of the multiple preceding movements and their collective impact on the development of a political nationalist ideology. The summary from this literature is best explained by Alois Mlambo.

While towards the end of the period an African political consensus eventually emerged, initially the anti-colonial struggle took different and sometimes conflicting forms, as each social grouping – alien and indigenous urban

¹ See Alexander, McGregor, & Ranger, *Violence and Memory: Kriger, Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War*; and Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*

workers, the rural population, the emerging middle class – sought to advance its own interests.²

The influence of competing claims also applies to the concept of racial thinking. Race is an incredibly complex concept and it is especially difficult to explain how the formation of racial ideas takes place given the wide variety of factors that go into the construction of personal beliefs. It is even more difficult in the Zimbabwean case where few sources exist that specifically record the understandings of a racial concept by black Africans during the first half of the twentieth century. The limited academic work dealing with this subject is highly problematic. Vernon Johnson, for example, argues that there was no racial consciousness amongst black Africans in Zimbabwe prior to 1923, and only a limited comprehension of a racial identity prior to 1957. Yet he cites little evidence to back up these claims, using black nationalism as the sole indicator of racial thinking and describing the existing social sentiments as 'ethnically' based (i.e. revolving around Shona or Ndebele identities).³ This argument deliberately relegates to inconsequential positions all other articulations of racial consciousness during the pre-1957 colonial era that were not based in a nationalist ideology. As with the pre-SRANC basis of Zimbabwean nationalist thinking, the black consciousness element of post-1950s nationalism had its foundations in earlier groups and doctrines and it is crucial to understand not only why but how racial abstractions developed in response to these earlier conceptions.

This first chapter therefore tackles both nationalist thinking and racial formation prior to the formation of the SRANC in 1957. It highlights the ways in which four specific precursory influences defined the specific ideas contained within mass Zimbabwean nationalism and the movement's leadership. Part one examines the impact of mission school education on the attitudes of those raised within it. It

² Alois S. Mlambo, 'From the Second World War to UDI, 1940-1965', in Brian Raftopoulos, & Alois S. Mlambo, eds., *Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008* (Harare, 2009), p.77

³ Vernon D. Johnson, 'Racial Formation in Zimbabwe', in Matthew Holden Jr., ed., *The Changing Racial Regime: National Political Science Review*, Vol.5 (New Brunswick, 1995), pp.245-248

addresses the influence of white missionaries on the social and political conceptions of race for those young black Africans who would become significant actors in the nationalist political movement. The second section explores how these views on race were subsequently shaped by further education or work abroad in South Africa, Europe, or the USA, and the ramifications that a non-Rhodesian environment had on the burgeoning African elite's mindset and actions as they returned to Rhodesia in the 1940s and 1950s.

The final two parts detail the socio-political environment in Rhodesia during the entry of these elites into politics. They highlight the importance of racial attitudes in explaining the decisions of politically conscious Africans to participate either in white liberal multi-racial organisations, localised African political protest groups, or (occasionally) both. Neither the influences of multi-racialism nor those of African protests can be properly understood without reference to each other. Despite them often being afforded widely different places in the narrative of Zimbabwe's liberation struggle (the former as a part of what Hardwicke Holderness called the failed 'liberal effort'⁴, the latter within Misheck Sibanda's 'foundations of mass nationalism'⁵), both are equally important in explaining the attitudes to race that dominated the SRANC and its successors. Multi-racialism as an idea existed largely as a reactionary balance to the actions and demands of the African organisations which had sprung up since the turn of the century, including both trade unions and local representation or protest groups.⁶ Consequently they are considered in tandem as two-aspects of the same narrative.

i. The Role of Childhood: parents, mission schools, and missionaries

⁴ Hardwicke Holderness, *Lost Chance: Southern Rhodesia 1945-58* (Harare, 1985), p.6

⁵ Misheck J. Sibanda, 'Early Foundations of African Nationalism', in Canaan Banana, ed., *Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe, 1890-1990* (Harare, 1989), p.33

⁶ See Mlambo, 'From the Second World War'

Robert Cary and Diana Mitchell have examined in detail the early lives and education of most of the nationalist leaders,⁷ and there emerge a number of common experiences that emphasise the importance of childhood on the development of a nationalist ideology amongst these leaders.⁸ According to the American Quaker George Loft who assisted detained nationalists in 1959, two factors distinguished the elites from ordinary black Africans: 'their relatively younger age, averaging thirty-three and a half years' and that 'their primary education had been confined to their home colony's missionary schools, with high school in South Africa.'⁹ Scholarship has highlighted the importance of childhood in the development of racial thinking, and the ways in which many of the future Zimbabwean nationalists came to regard race and the concept of national belonging and citizenship is apparent from these individual's own accounts, including several specific themes.¹⁰

First, there are repeated assertions of an inherited social awareness relating to the manner of Rhodesia's colonisation in the 1890s. Many nationalist leaders situate their adolescent political awakening within the framework of a colonised people's mentality. In what Hayden White describes as the need 'to fashion the sequence of events into a story of a particular kind', the African nationalist leaders employed their social histories as oppressed people to produce a 'formist tragedy', justifying their own understandings of racial identities through the narrative of Rhodesia's creation.¹¹ The influence of Terence Ranger's early work undoubtedly played a part in setting this agenda, arguing as it did that the mid-twentieth century African struggles were a

⁷ Robert Cary & Diana Mitchell, eds., *African Nationalist Leaders in Rhodesia: Who's Who* (Bulawayo, 1977)

⁸ Alcinda Honwana, 'Africa: Youth, "Waithood", and Protest', paper presented at the Fifth European Conference on African Studies, Lisbon, 28 June 2013

⁹ George Loft quoted in Charumbira, *Imagining a Nation*, p.245

¹⁰ D.P. Swanson et al., 'Racial identity development during childhood', in Helen Neville, Brendesha Tynes, & Shawn Utsey, eds., *Handbook of African American Psychology* (Thousand Oaks, CA, 2009)

¹¹ Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore, 1973), p.17

continuation of the primary resistance movements of the 1890s.¹² Many of the African nationalist leaders were well aware of Ranger's work, as it was undertaken with the objective of providing the nationalist movements of the 1960s with a tangible and usable historical footing, and particularly given Ranger's interactions with the nationalist elites after 1957.¹³ Nevertheless, accounts from the early 1960s (well before the publication of Ranger's work) contend that there were Africans already using their history as justification for the racial and political beliefs.¹⁴ For instance, the Canadian journalist Patrick Keatley wrote in 1963 that 'politically conscious' Africans are 'hungry today for history, one may even say ravenous. Call it self-defence, pride, or what you please; it is none the less a hard political fact.'¹⁵ In the absence of an established academic framework, they turned to their personal or familial histories to provide this information.

The decision to frame their motivations as part of the narrative of a colonised people was a deliberate one by the nationalist leadership. It reflected both a desire to justify their actions during the time of activity, but also a deliberate *ex post facto* construction of a collective memory brought about by later events. Highlighting the connection between the primary resistance movements of the 1890s and their politics half-a-century later provides what Michel Foucault terms a 'countermemory', in this case to the dominant narrative peddled by the white Rhodesian state.¹⁶ Thus when Joshua Nkomo used his autobiography (published in 1984) to explain his attitude to white Rhodesians, he was situating his beliefs in a broader context. 'These were the pale people, the Europeans, *Amakhiwa*. I understood almost without being told that

¹² See Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*: & Terence Ranger, 'Connexions between "Primary Resistance" Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: I & II', *Journal of African History*, Vol.9 (1968), pp.437-453, & 631-41

¹³ See Terence Ranger, *Writing Revolt: An Engagement with African Nationalism, 1957-67* (Woodbridge, 2013). Also this thesis, chapters 2-4.

¹⁴ See Sithole, *African Nationalism*, pp.156-159

¹⁵ Patrick Keatley, *The Politics of Partnership: The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (Harmondsworth, 1963), p.58

¹⁶ See Michel Foucault & Gilles Deleuze, 'Intellectuals and Power', in D.F. Bouchard, ed., *Language, Counter-Memory, and Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (Ithaca, 1977)

they had taken something from us. Later I discovered that what they had taken was our country,' he wrote.¹⁷ Apart from the association between skin colour ('pale people') and national belonging, the immediate ascription of the white colonisation being the loss of a 'country' as opposed to the land itself, served to tie racial belonging to a non-historical nation. Alois Mlambo describes the pre-colonial Zimbabwe region as 'not yet a nation in the sense of unified political, economic and cultural unit consisting of people who all shared a common history and values',¹⁸ yet that did not prevent a retroactive creation of a unified pre-colonial Zimbabwean nation by the nationalist leadership and academics like Terence Ranger. More importantly, this nation had been one of black Africans, thus Rhodesia as it existed was a country debased by the white settlers. As Saul Dubow shows in his study of segregation in South Africa and Jocelyn Alexander demonstrates in the Zimbabwean context, the relationship between national understandings of belonging and racial identities are routinely emphasised through the ownership of land itself.¹⁹ Claims to the land thus became an important element of the racial formation and national consciousness that Zimbabwean nationalism would later embrace.

Considering the 'specifics of the language used', it is important to examine why Zimbabwean nationalism was tied to the earliest days of childhood for the nationalist leaders.²⁰ The majority of the elites were from the first generation of black Africans to have been born after the white settlers had consolidated their control of the region. All of the SRANC's 1957 executive were born between 1910 and 1935 and their knowledge of the colonisation process was subsequently derived from older immediate family who could recall the pre-colonial situation and contrast it to life under white rule. The new generation of African leaders consequently attempted to connect their own struggles against white rules with those of their ancestors who had

¹⁷ Joshua Nkomo, *Nkomo: The Story of My Life* (London, 1984), p.16

¹⁸ Alois Mlambo, *A History of Zimbabwe* (Cambridge, 2014), p.29

¹⁹ See Saul Dubow, *Racial Segregation and the Origins of Apartheid in South Africa, 1919-1936* (London, 1989); and Alexander, *The Unsettled Land*

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York, 1972), pp.41-42

been involved in the primary resistance efforts. This was a means of buttressing their own claims to legitimacy in what Joost Fontein terms a 'performance of the past'.²¹ These elites were born into a world where the state was clearly delineated along racial lines but were exposed to older generations with memories of primary resistance movements. The younger generations utilised these narratives as a means of justifying challenges to the current status-quo. Joshua Mpofu (a ZAPU branch leader and one of the first leaders of ZAPU's militant groups in 1963) opens his own autobiography with exactly this argument:

I have to start off with mentions of my parents, because it was owing to their influence that I internalized some of the fundamentals of how my country was colonized by Europeans. [...] My father witnessed, and got bruised running away from the very first (1893) European invading army that overran his country when he was young, and resulted in the demise of African rule overnight.²²

Again the mention of a pre-colonial country and references to forceful seizure of the nation emphasise the subjugation attached to the black African identity. Moreover, the fundamental changes in the ruling authorities emphasised to young Africans how society had changed more broadly with colonial rule. This included the belief that to succeed in white Rhodesian society required obtaining an 'upward mobility' through religion, education, domesticity, and other cultural traits stemming from the society of the colonial state.²³ Frantz Fanon's theories on the external construction of identities for racially oppressed groups is crucial to this belief. Black men and women defined their race not through their own understandings, but through the definitions forced upon them by white settlers and rulers.²⁴ Justification for the

²¹ Joost Fontein, "'Traditional Connoisseurs' of the Past: The Ambiguity of Spirit Mediums and the Performance of the Past in southern Zimbabwe", Occasional Paper No.99 (2004), Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh

²² Mpofu, *My Life*, p.1

²³ Enoch Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy* (Nairobi, 1975), p.51; & Sithole, *African Nationalism*, pp.40-45

²⁴ Frantz Fanon, *Peau Noire, Masques Blanc* (Paris, 1967), trans. by Charles Lam Markmann (London, 1986), p.69

adoption of western cultural traits by the African elites were thus registered long before their entry into either the mission schools or places of higher education. Discussing his father's enrolment in a mission school around 1900 and the 'new transformative institutions that emerged', Joshua Mpofu notes '[my father] was scarcely aware that the "new" life he had experienced would pass to his offspring as a mixed bag.'²⁵

The themes of parental influence and first-hand experiences of racial discrimination against themselves or their families are the second principal tropes raised by nationalist leaders to explain their beliefs. In contrast to the colonisation stories of the 1890s which were distant and derivative accounts of how the racial situation in Rhodesia had arisen, personal encounters with discrimination acted as a more immediate stimulant. The affairs were exaggerated by the distinct lack of regular contact between rural black Africans and the white Rhodesian population, ensuring any interactions were keenly remembered. As Joshua Nkomo explained, 'in the reserves we very rarely saw a white man,'²⁶ and furthermore those interactions that the future leadership did see were viewed through the lens of their childhood. As children, they witnessed but were not necessarily part of the interactions with white Rhodesians and they therefore watched their familial authority figures bearing the brunt of the discrimination. In the highly-patriarchal Shona and Ndebele cultures in which the fathers particularly played a significant role,²⁷ seeing their male family members mistreated and discriminated against at the hands of white Rhodesians had a profound impact on the psyche of young black Africans and their understanding of how race tied into their place in the Rhodesian nation. Stanley Parirewa (a key figure in the early nationalist movements) revealed that 'it was an unpleasant experience at the hands of White authority which his father suffered in the late thirties, that made him [Parirewa] conscious of the deeply discriminatory laws affecting his people, and

²⁵ Mpofu, *My Life*, p.2

²⁶ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.18

²⁷ See Elizabeth Schmidt, *Peasants, Traders and Wives: Shona Women in the History of Zimbabwe, 1870-1939* (London, 1992), pp.16-30

of the need to change them.²⁸ Joshua Nkomo similarly recalled that observing white native commissioners disrespectfully addressing his father provided: 'one big lesson. There was something upside down in my country.'²⁹

The 'traditional political office holders' in African society found their influence diminished in the new racial hierarchy,³⁰ and it is significant that many of the nationalist leaders had older family members who shared dissatisfaction with the situation. The political beliefs of senior figures within the family could often influence the child's own thinking.³¹ Didymus Mutasa talked of his father explaining to him what a 'waste of time' it was to seek redress for the humiliation black Africans received at the hands of the whites, particularly when 'the accused will be the judge.' As Mutasa recalled:

You know what the judgement will be. I knew this feeling hurt my father as much as it hurt me. I was only eleven years old when this happened in 1946. Feelings affect both the young and the old.³²

Such interactions infantilised black Africans, argues Juliette Bridgette Milner-Thornton, meaning 'Africans viewed themselves through the lens of their white colonial masters, and thus perceived their blackness as inferior to whiteness' from an early age.³³ It is this hierarchy which Frantz Fanon highlights as being the fundamental issue behind anti-colonial nationalism for all oppressed racial groups.³⁴

The segregated Rhodesian school system reinforced the non-white children's understandings of the racially-discriminatory society. Underfunded and overcrowded African schools were visible contrasts to the well-appointed white schools. Agrippah Mutambara (a senior ZANLA commander during the liberation struggle) described

²⁸ Diana Mitchell, 'Notes on Stanley Pareirewa', Undated Document, H5.4, The Mitchell Papers, BC969, University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa

²⁹ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.16

³⁰ Weinrich, *Black and White Elites*, p.227

³¹ Fanon, *Peau Noire*, p.109-120

³² Didymus Mutasa, *Rhodesian Black Behind Bars* (Oxford, 1974), p.19

³³ Juliette Bridgette Milner-Thornton, "'Rider of Two Horses": Eurafricans in Zambia', in Rebecca C. King-O'Riain et al., eds., *Global Mixed Race* (New York, 2014), p.24

³⁴ See Fanon, *Peau Noire*, ch.4

an incident as a child outside the white Bindura School: 'I began questioning myself as to why there should be no black children studying at this school, and no black teachers either.'³⁵ As these individuals became parents themselves, they found their views on segregated education become of pressing importance. Referring to his literary representative for Rhodesia's black African population, Ndabaningi Sithole argued that Obed Mutezo's 'politics do not spring from the study of any textbooks. They spring from down-to-earth situations. [...] They spring from the shortage of schools for African children while European children have universal education.'³⁶

For those minority groups whose place in the racialised Rhodesian society was already precarious, the institution of schooling further exacerbated their uncertain status. The coloured, Asian, and Indian communities were particularly susceptible given their already uneasy claims to Rhodesian citizenship and Brian Raftopoulos explains the role the school system had on racial formation.

Originally, many coloureds lived with Africans. They lived as Africans. It was the deliberate policy of this government to take children of mixed race and put them in separate schools, even taking them out of the villages, and imposing this term "coloured".³⁷

The impact of this external categorisation would persist into the long-term. The students themselves were made acutely aware of the significance of their racial identity in defining their membership to the Rhodesian state, building upon the early childhood recognitions provided through social exposure. Fay Chung (a Chinese-Zimbabwean teacher for ZANU during the liberation war) recalled the headmaster at her primary school in the 1940s '[drumming] into our heads from the earliest grades that since we were not whites, we would only make our way in the world through

³⁵ Agrippah Mutambara, *The Rebel in Me: A ZANLA Guerrilla Commander in the Rhodesian Bush War, 1974-1980* (Harare, 2014), p.17

³⁶ Ndabaningi Sithole, *Obed Mutezo: The Mudzimu Christian Nationalist* (Nairobi, 1970), p.117

³⁷ Brian Raftopoulos quoted in Julie Frederikse, *None But Ourselves: Masses vs. Media in the Making of Zimbabwe* (Harare, 1982), p.238

education.³⁸ This mantra was one adopted by a number of the young black Africans during their primary education.

A vast majority of the nationalist leadership received their primary education in mission schools, often at the hands of moderately-liberal (and often expatriate) white missionaries. Of those nationalist leaders whose details are recorded by Cary and Mitchell, 55 of the 77 spent all or part of their education at mission schools, yet the range of the nationalities and denominations of these missions make it difficult to generalise about the specific politics imbued through such environments.³⁹ Carol Summers explains in her work on African education in Southern Rhodesia that there was little homogeneity within the African education experience as a whole, and even less within the mission schools where 'multiparty competition' caused huge discrepancies in teaching methods and results.⁴⁰ Whereas in rural areas there was often little choice about the schooling available (many mission schools catered to catchments covering hundreds of square miles), when there were options the mission schools were still regularly regarded as being the better education. Fay Chung recalled her parents' decision to remove her from a government school and send her to St. John's School, 'a well-known Roman Catholic school for Coloureds', on the basis that her 'father had great faith in the nuns, and believed they had special powers to improve a person's character and morality. [...] He was not very confident that a government school like Founders would provide the right moral background.'⁴¹

Although debates persist about the extent to which mission school education contributed to the advancement of African political aspirations,⁴² Fabulous Moyo has suggested that '[mission] education indirectly promoted, rather than hindered

³⁸ Fay Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (Stockholm, 2006), pp.32-33

³⁹ See Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*

⁴⁰ Carol Summers, *Colonial Lessons: Africans' Education in Southern Rhodesia, 1918-1940* (Oxford, 2002), p.24

⁴¹ Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.35. Founders was a coloured state school.

⁴² See James A. Mutambirwa, 'The Impact of Christianity of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Critique of the Sithole Thesis', *Journal of Southern African Affairs*, Vol.1, No.1 (1976), pp.69-81

Africans' efforts for socio-political advancement.' In particular Moyo points to the 'other philanthropic church channels such as individual missionaries' for their role in educating the future nationalist leaders.⁴³ The presence of a multi-racial teaching staff has been discussed by the nationalists themselves as being an important part of their political development, and almost every nationalist leader recounts how they were influenced to some extent by their mission educations. Daniel Madzimbamuto was a prominent nationalist in the Highfield township and credited 'his early grounding in politics [as coming] from a teacher at Mrewa Mission in 1947.'⁴⁴ Killion Bhebe (later the ANC's Organising Secretary for Mashonaland) pointed to 'political discussion with several of his teachers (including two American missionaries, Miss Collin and Miss Walen)' at Gwelo Mission as the key factor in his political awakening.⁴⁵ These formative experiences with white liberal missionaries made a lasting impression on the young black African elites.

As well as contributing to the development of their racial and national thinking, the education provided by missionaries influenced the young Africans understanding of their place in Rhodesian society. Referring to J.F.A. Ade Ajayi's work in Nigeria and Ranger's on Rhodesia, Ademola Adeleke argues that the influence of white missionaries on the development of an African nationalism was equal to the influence of African primary resistance movements. As Adeleke explains:

The educated African was a product of [...] the social "revolution" initiated by the Christian missions in the nineteenth century. The missionaries introduced European ideas of nation-building; they also educated the Africans who imbibed these ideas. [...] The rise of this [elite] class of Africans is, in the author's view, the greatest contribution of the missions to African nationalism.⁴⁶

⁴³ Fabulous Moyo, *The Bible, the Bullet, and the Ballot: Zimbabwe: The Impact of Christian Protest in Sociopolitical Transformation, ca.1900 - ca.2000* (Eugene, OR, 2015), p.183, 184

⁴⁴ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.48

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.60

⁴⁶ Ademola Adeleke, 'The Roots of African Nationalism: A Conceptual and Historiographical Discourse', *British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences*, Vol.8, No.1

The social connections and position of these African elites afforded by a missionary education were consolidated through personal relationships with white liberals. Anna Weinrich argues that 'the missions' contribution to African education, which results in personal ties of friendship between many members of the emergent African elite and missionaries, is a major factor contributing to the understanding between missionaries and Africans'.⁴⁷ Apart from the ideological associations, there was often a personal connection that carried over the racial divisions of Rhodesian society and it is notable that a number of the white supporters of African nationalism in Zimbabwe were missionaries. When the African nationalist politician and intellectual Ndabaningi Sithole formed the breakaway party ZANU in 1963, he turned to his former mission school teacher (and ousted Rhodesian Prime Minister) Garfield Todd to act as an intermediary with other nationalists, principally because Sithole personally trusted Todd.⁴⁸

The fundamental religious influence of mission schools was also crucial in shaping the national and racial thinking of black Africans. Important creeds contained within the Christian faith translated into community values, social beliefs, and political action, and challenged the dominant Rhodesian racial narratives presented.⁴⁹ It is virtually impossible to reconcile the Christian ideals of self-worth, human development, liberation, service to others, and a willingness for personal

(2012), pp.66-72, p.68. See also J.F.A. Ajayi, 'Nineteenth Century Origins of Nigerian Nationalism', in Martin Klein & G. Johnson, eds., *Perspectives on the African Past* (Boston, 1972)

⁴⁷ Anna K.H. Weinrich, *Black and white elites in rural Rhodesia* (Manchester, 1973), p.220. See also John Lonsdale, 'Mission Christianity and Settler Colonialism in Eastern Africa', in H. Hansen & M. Twaddle, eds., *Christian Missionaries and the State in the Third World* (Oxford, 2002)

⁴⁸ Ruth Weiss & Jane Parpart, *Sir Garfield Todd and the Making of Zimbabwe* (London, 1999), p.156

⁴⁹ Adrian Hastings, *A History of African Christianity, 1950-1975* (Cambridge, 1979); Terence Ranger & John Weller, eds., *Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa* (Berkeley, 1975); David Maxwell, 'Decolonization', in Norman Etherington, ed., *Missions and Empire* (Oxford, 2005); and Terence Ranger, 'Religious Movements and Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa', *African Studies Review*, Vol.29, No.2 (1986), pp.1-69

sacrifice, with the injustice and exploitation which prevails in South African society,' explained the South African Council of Churches,⁵⁰ and the same applied in Rhodesia. David Lan argues that black Africans in Rhodesia typically assessed social and political debates 'through the lens of their own worldviews',⁵¹ and Munyaradzi Munochiveyi suggests that this perspective consequently manifested itself through a Christian framework.⁵² The nationalist leaders were similarly affected. 'Christianity made an indelible imprint upon them [the nationalist leaders], and through their instrumentality, upon many others,' summarises Nathan Goto.⁵³

Assistance from the Catholic Church, and from individual mission stations during the liberation war, also proved to be important in the struggle against the white state.⁵⁴ Although there was a resurgence of traditional African belief systems (including spirit mediums) as a response to the anti-white and pro-black identity nationalism of the 1970s,⁵⁵ Christianity remained the spiritual *lingua franca* that united black Zimbabweans in their struggle. Furthermore, the radical progressive Christianity of individual missionaries facilitated an alternative dimension to the conceptions of the African's place in a colonial system. David Maxwell's work on Pentecostalism in Zimbabwe highlighted this Christian influence on African social organisations, as he explains in relation to the emergence of the Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa (ZAOGA):

⁵⁰ Quoted in Pam Christie, *The Right to Learn* (Braamfontein, 1991), p.12

⁵¹ Lan, *Guns and Rain*, pp.xv-xvi, 38-40

⁵² Munyaradzi B. Munochiveyi, "'We Do Not Want to be Ruled by Foreigners': Oral Histories of Nationalism in Colonial Zimbabwe", *The Historian*, Vol.73, No.1 (2011), pp.65-87, p.76

⁵³ Nathan Goto, 'A Great Central Mission: The Legacy of the United Methodist Church in Zimbabwe', *Methodist History*, Vol.33, No.1 (1994), pp.14-26, p.24

⁵⁴ David Maxwell, 'Local Politics and the War of Liberation in North-East Zimbabwe', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.19, No.3 (1993), pp.361-386. Also Janice McLaughlin, *On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Harare, 1996)

⁵⁵ Joost Fontein, 'Shared Legacies of the War: Spirit Mediums and War Veterans in Southern Zimbabwe', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, Vol.26, No.2 (2006), pp.167-199

ZAOGA's trajectory is not easily captured by the meta-narratives of class and nationalism, although both of these forces shaped its development. Emerging from Zimbabwean townships in the 1950s and 1960s it had no formal relation with the nationalist movement. It followed a different path, which focused its adherents' energies on transforming themselves, and their families, rather than the nation.⁵⁶

Yet this religious focus was not always positive and mission schools were often criticised for their educational policies. In his study of black nationalism in South Africa, George Frederickson notes that early African elites 'were too deeply imbued with the cosmopolitanism and universalism that they had learned in mission schools, at Fort Hare Native College, or from their association with white liberals and radicals to become whole-hearted and consistent Africanists.'⁵⁷ The outspoken American missionary, Ralph Dodge, similarly argued that 'the major blind spot of the total missionary program in Africa may well be the failure of white leaders to foresee the approaching rebellion and to train nationals for administrative responsibility.'⁵⁸ Nathan Goto expands upon Dodge's cautionary warnings:

The conspicuous missionary presence in the primary decision making processes impeded the development of top level African leadership. The organization pyramid created no space for capable, intelligent Africans. [...] Instead of teaching the African students to think independently and to develop fully as human beings, much of the curriculum, especially the religious elements, trained the African to be obedient. The African was trained to be a dependent person, mainly satisfied with pittance handouts. Initiative, resourcefulness, and self-help were discouraged.⁵⁹

Furthermore, the foreignness of missionaries to African society alienated them, despite 'often consciously identifying themselves with the African people'. As Anna Weinrich explains, missionaries 'do not normally meet socially with Africans who possess very little education and whose cultural environment is very different from

⁵⁶ David Maxwell, *African Gifts of the Spirit: Pentecostalism & the Rise of a Zimbabwean Transnational Religious Movement* (Oxford, 2006), p.13

⁵⁷ Fredrickson, *Black Liberation*, p.280

⁵⁸ Ralph E. Dodge, *The Revolutionary Bishop Who Saw God at Work in Africa* (Pasadena, 1986), p.153

⁵⁹ Goto, 'A Great Central Mission', p.21

that of Europeans'.⁶⁰ Ruramisai Charumbira summarises this alienation by contending that missionaries did not feel it was their 'place to challenge the colonial government's race-based policies and laws,'⁶¹ despite their distaste for them. Whilst some missionaries were actually overtly hostile to black Zimbabwean nationalist thinking, particularly during the earliest years,⁶² even moderately liberal ones found their own white congregations likely to criticise any 'untoward' behaviour.⁶³

This division often led to fundamental disagreements between the politics of white missionaries and their black students. Didymus Mutasa recalled writing an essay as a schoolboy on 'good citizenship' in which he highlighted the racial division of society in Rhodesia and for which he was punished by white mission-school headmaster. 'Being European, the Principal could never appreciate how I, as an African, felt about such citizenship,' Mutasa explained.⁶⁴ Such alienation would have a lasting legacy on the mindsets of the African nationalists and provided the foundation on which their expressions of political discontent could be built.

ii. High School and University: Transnational Political Awakenings

Access to secondary education within Southern Rhodesia was highly restrictive for non-white students. Only two government and one mission secondary schools for black Africans existed in Rhodesia in 1957.⁶⁵ The Rhodesian state preferred channelling smart black Africans towards industrial or teacher training schools and

⁶⁰ Weinrich, *Black and white elites*, p.220

⁶¹ Charumbira, *Imagining a Nation*, p.288

⁶² Maxwell, 'Christianity and the War', p.62

⁶³ Albert Mosley, 'The British Methodist Church and African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, 1950-1965', [methodistheritage.org.uk](http://www.methodistheritage.org.uk), <http://www.methodistheritage.org.uk/missionary-history-mosley-african-nationalism-nov-2007.pdf> (accessed 23 January 2018)

⁶⁴ Mutasa, *Black Behind Bars*, p.32

⁶⁵ Sybille Küster, *African Education in Colonial Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi: Government control, settler antagonism and African agency, 1890-1964* (Hamburg, 1998), pp.178-180

then into established labour roles such as clerks or teachers.⁶⁶ There was an inherent contradiction in how young aspiring black Africans were treated by the white state. On the one hand, the paternalism of white Rhodesians recognised that a small group of African elites would be necessary to protect white prosperity. The author Doris Lessing recalled as a young girl in the 1930s hearing Godfrey Huggins (the Rhodesian Prime Minister) tell a meeting of farmers 'that the white people must create a class of privileged blacks to act as a bulwark against revolt.'⁶⁷ On the other hand, the racialism of white settlers throughout southern Africa maintained that black Africans lacked the capacity to rise beyond a working class, and that to encourage them would threaten poor white livelihoods. 'There is no place for the Bantu in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour,' argued Hendrik Verwoerd (South Africa's Minister of Native Affairs) in 1955.⁶⁸ Consequently, well-educated black Africans remained relatively rare in colonial Zimbabwe for a long time with Michael West noting that as late as 1965, less than a thousand black adults in Rhodesia held college degrees.⁶⁹

The restrictive nature of further education in Rhodesia meant young, aspirant black Africans typically had to look abroad, mainly to South Africa. Driven by their understanding of Rhodesia as a white-dominated nation, many of the emergent African elites saw education as necessary for their success in Rhodesian society. 'Those men [the elites and intellectuals] and their education levels are important, because most of them later used their access to Western education to turn toward the African past,' summarises Ruramisai Charumbira.⁷⁰ Nobody espoused the typical story of this transnational (and multifaceted) education more than the 'father of

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.61-63: See also Lieke Dierdorff, 'Racially Segregated Education in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia', MA thesis, Utrecht University, 2015

⁶⁷ Doris Lessing, *Going Home* (St. Albans, 1968), p.88

⁶⁸ Quoted in Christie, *The Right to Learn*, p.12

⁶⁹ Michael Oliver West, *The Rise of an African Middle Class: Colonial Zimbabwe, 1898-1965* (Bloomington, 2002), p.65

⁷⁰ Charumbira, *Imagining a Nation*, p.287

nationalism in Zimbabwe', Joshua Nkomo.⁷¹ After a primary education in Rhodesia, Nkomo studied at Adams College in Durban, South Africa, one of several institutions for higher education in South Africa that brought together young Africans from across southern and central Africa in a truly transnational environment. Amongst its alumni, Adams College counted the Zimbabwean nationalists Joshua Nkomo, Enoch Dumbutshena, Matthew Wakatama, Stephen Parenyatwa, Herbert Chitepo, Paul Moton Malianga, and Stanlake Samkange,⁷² as well as the South Africans Edgar Brookes, Z.K. Matthews, and Albert J. Luthuli (a Nobel laureate),⁷³ and a number of others from Malawi, Zambia, and Botswana. Under the guidance of outspoken teachers such as George Copeland "Jack" Grant (the Trinidad-born British missionary and famous cricketer)⁷⁴, these young Africans formed friendships and shared ideas that persisted well after they had moved on to further occupations.⁷⁵

It was at Adams College that Nkomo found his understanding of race and African politics broadening. As Nkomo recalled:

Since it drew students from all over central and east Africa, I got to know people from other countries, as well as facts about those countries. Yet I do not think any lesson was so important as the one Mrs. Hoskin [a white clerk at the school] taught me: that white people too were human beings, if you could somehow get through the barriers that society erected to stop us being friends.⁷⁶

When Nkomo continued his studies at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Science in Johannesburg, it was the same Mrs. Hoskin who paid his fees and supported him

⁷¹ Josiah Nyando, 'Reconstructing the Self: Hauntology and Spectrality in Nkomo's Autobiography', in Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ed., *Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo of Zimbabwe: Politics, Power and Memory* (New York, 2017), p.336

⁷² See Eugene Wason, *Banned: The Story of the African Daily News, Southern Rhodesia, 1964* (London, 1976), p.45

⁷³ Peter Walshe, *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa: The African National Congress, 1912-1952* (London, 1970), p.351

⁷⁴ See Jack Grant, *Jack Grant's Story* (London, 1980)

⁷⁵ Makhurane, *An Autobiography*, p.69

⁷⁶ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.33

through his studies.⁷⁷ Having grown up regarding the racial divisions in colonial southern Africa as insurmountable, these compassionate actions by a member of the ruling racial group challenged personal beliefs. As with many other nationalist leaders, it was early experiences like this which proved highly influential in shaping the racial views they espoused in their politics.

Other academic institutions in South Africa also proved crucial in the political development of young black Africans, none more so than Fort Hare University College. Described as 'the Mecca of the lucky and talented black students', Fort Hare in the 1940s was the place where 'black students developed a vision of a better Africa.'⁷⁸ The multinational student body facilitated the spread of a solidarity between all black Africans 'united by the single fact of their common identity as members of the dominated groups of the population'.⁷⁹ Henry Chipembere was one of the Nyasaland nationalist leaders to attend Fort Hare. Of his time there, he recalled:

Fort Hare remained the training ground of future leaders in South Africa. There was [...] enough political activity and awareness to transform each student into a much more radicalised and politically enlightened person by the time he completed his studies.⁸⁰

Young radical black South Africans like Robert Sobukwe publicly argued during protests at the university that 'education meant identification with the masses and service to Africa' and encouraged black Africans to use their opportunities to advance the struggle in their own nations.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.19

⁷⁸ Toyin Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals* (New York, 2001), p.188

⁷⁹ Terence Beard, 'Background to student activities at the University College of Fort Hare', in Hendrick van der Merwe & D. Walsh, eds., *Student perspectives on South Africa* (Cape Town, 1972), p.158

⁸⁰ Robert Rotberg, ed., *Hero of the Nation. Chipembere of Malawi: An Autobiography* (Blantyre, 2002), p.137

⁸¹ T.R.H. White, 'Z.K. Matthews and the formation of the ANC Youth League at the University College of Fort Hare', *African Historical Review*, Vol.27, No.1 (1995), pp.124-144, p.133

When a branch of the South African ANC youth league was launched at the university in 1948, many of the Zimbabwean students were quick to join. Yet they were still regarded as somewhat reactionary compared to their South African counterparts and accused of being dominated by a multi-racial liberalism which encouraged the need to work within the settler states to achieve change. Critics pointed to their only significant protest so far being 'about the fact that senior teaching positions in schools would be closed to Africans.'⁸² In 1949, Maurice Nyagumbo (a Fort Hare student between 1947 and 1949 and long-time member of the South African Communist Party [SACP]) and his fellow Zimbabwean James Chikerema formed the Central African Social Club, 'the aim of which was to involve Rhodesian Africans in political activity.'⁸³ The ANC youth league were quick to criticise the group for 'adopting the duplicitous Stalinist and Trotskyite class agenda in the face of the African Nationalism becoming rooted in South Africa.'⁸⁴ The radical environment offered through the exposure to South African nationalist thinking apparently could not breach the underlying awareness of the racial divide and the purported dominance of white settlers that defined Rhodesian society. As Nyagumbo recalled: 'although [...] I had had some political education in South Africa, I still felt very shy to speak to white Rhodesians.'⁸⁵

One consequence of this mentality was a desire amongst the young African elites to understand, negotiate, and present themselves within the framework of a white western society. Whether a deliberate undermining of the socio-cultural divisions in Rhodesia or not, there was an almost universal adoption of European fashion and language within the elites. In many ways, this adoption of European cultural traits was a continuation of the attitudes imbued during their mission school educations with white culture seen as something to aspire to. Grace Keith, the wife of

⁸² Zöe Groves, 'Transnational Networks and Regional Solidarity: The Case of the Central African Federation, 1953-1963', *African Studies*, Vol.72, No.2 (2013), pp.155-175, p.169

⁸³ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.57

⁸⁴ 'Divisions within native student groups', *Natal Daily News* (14 November 1949)

⁸⁵ Tapfumaneyi (Maurice) Nyagumbo, 'As humble as a dove', in Eileen Haddon, ed., *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock: Reminiscences by their family and friends* (Harare, 1987), p.117

the only white liberal MP in the CAF Parliament, described the African elites in Southern Rhodesia as having 'a readiness to adopt European culture. [...] Oxford accents, bridal veils, Beatles and sundowner parties, but in a hundred and one other facets of everyday life, and those at the very top are by no means immune from the general trend.'⁸⁶ She added:

It is almost as though they have aspired to live up to their white "oppressors" way of life for so long that they would be lost without it, and only by adopting the white man's habits, fashions and standards - even his sense of humour - as closely as possible, can they feel secure.⁸⁷

Anna Weinrich notes that the 'top stratum' of the African elite (which included members of the African political leadership), 'distinguish themselves through a way of life which closely resembles that of Europeans. Most of them receive high salaries, and all are well educated. Many of them have visited Europe or America.'⁸⁸ The adopted cultural traits were those of the British middle- and upper-classes, as demonstrated by George Nyandoro's propensity towards dinner jackets.⁸⁹ This cultural affection was both personal (as Enoch Dumbutshena explained of his close friend Joshua Nkomo, 'he belonged to the class of many educated Africans who, at that time [1950s], sought the comforts of European civilisation.'⁹⁰) but also political. By conforming to the culture of the dominant racial group, these African elites hoped they could engage with sympathetic and antagonistic whites in a way that diminished inherently-racist concerns. James Campbell terms this approach 'racial vindication' whereby black Africans sought to demonstrate their capacity 'to uphold "recognised standards" in their personal and collective lives' to hasten inclusion into white society.⁹¹ This approach met with limited success. Eugene Wason, the Scottish-born

⁸⁶ Grace Keith, *The Fading Colour Bar* (London, 1966), p.150

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.38

⁸⁸ Weinrich, *Black and white elites*, p.224

⁸⁹ Mary Ndlovu & Gugu Ndlovu, interviewed by author (11 December 2015)

⁹⁰ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.51

⁹¹ James Campbell, *Songs of Zion: The African Methodist Episcopal Church in the United States and South Africa* (Oxford, 1995), p.64

white editor of the *African Daily News*, recalled a dinner with white friends at which Josiah Chinamano was in attendance. Chinamano was a nationalist leader, university graduate, and the headmaster of a school in the Highfield township. 'I'm ashamed to admit that I watched him [Chinamano] carefully at dinner and was surprised he seemed quite at ease and behaved exactly like a European,' Wason noted.⁹² Although Chinamano 'behaved' like a European, the adopted cultural traits were not enough to overcome the prejudice of skin colour.

iii. Multi-racial Politics

Upon their return to Rhodesia, many of the African elites began to seek the means to protest the inequalities they found in Rhodesian society. Yet the political environment of Southern Rhodesia prior to 1950 was distinctly unwelcoming to direct black African participation. Direct involvement with the dominant political parties was almost entirely impossible. Although 'the state did not legislate for separate racially defined institutional representation, the dynamics of the society ensured such an outcome through informal discriminatory practices,' explains Pierre Du Toit.⁹³ The desires of the African population were regarded by white politicians as largely irrelevant to the administration of the state. The multi-racialist MP Hardwicke Holderness reflected in 1958 that Godfrey Huggins (the Rhodesian Prime Minister) largely considered:

as far as the African population is concerned, everything in the garden will be lovely as long as economic development is maintained, any manifestations of activities hostile to the established government are dealt with "firmly" and European leaders remain apart and in a position of authority.⁹⁴

⁹² Wason, *Banned*, p.60

⁹³ Pierre Du Toit, *State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa: A comparative study of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe* (Pretoria, 1995), p.200

⁹⁴ Hardwicke Holderness quoted in Robert Blake, *A History of Rhodesia* (New York, 1978), p.315

Even when two African MPs were elected to the first Federal Legislative Assembly in 1954, they had little influence on governmental proceedings and were there solely on the support of the United Federal Party (UFP) and its white voters.⁹⁵ The same racial attitude which had restricted the number of African secondary schools also dictated the perceived place of Africans in politics. Rhodesian society revolved around an 'evolutionary paradigm in which Africans figured as less "civilised", and in need of European custodianship' notes George Karekwaivanane.⁹⁶ The result was that despite a growing number of young Africans seeking to make their voices heard, few white Rhodesian political parties were willing to risk the political fallout that came with non-white membership.

One of the few white organisations to count Africans amongst its registered members was the Rhodesia Labour Party (RLP) formed in 1923 and its successor the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party (SRLP) formed in January 1944.⁹⁷ The disastrous experiences of this group regarding black participation emphasised the bellicose nature of racial discussions in Rhodesian politics prior to the 1950s. The SRLP's non-white membership revolved around the prominent African trade unionist, Charles Mzingeli, who the SRLP had courted since the late 1930s.⁹⁸ Despite his misgivings about 'Labour's traditional attitude to the black worker,'⁹⁹ Mzingeli eventually joined the SRLP in the belief that 'the ideals of true democracy, irrespective of race and colour, would be a fundamental and guiding principle' of the party.¹⁰⁰ In 1939, an African members branch was established under Mzingeli but the literacy requirement

⁹⁵ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.278

⁹⁶ Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, p.93

⁹⁷ The history of these parties is explored in Murray C. Steele, 'White working-class disunity: the Southern Rhodesia Labour Party', *Rhodesian History: The Journal of The Central Africa Historical Association*, Vol.1 (1970), pp.59-82

⁹⁸ Timothy Scarnecchia, *Fighting for the Underdog: Rhetoric, Violence, and Gender in Zimbabwean Nationalism, 1940-1964* (New York, 2008), p.4

⁹⁹ Steele, 'White working-class disunity', p.66

¹⁰⁰ Charles Mzingeli: 'A Brief History of the African Branch: September 1944', Fabian Colonial Bureau Papers, LXV, Rhodesia (Southern), Political and Constitutional, Rhodes House, Oxford

for membership ensured that by 1944 only thirty-one African elites had joined, of whom just seven were voters.¹⁰¹

Despite the low number of African members in a party espousing socialist principles of non-racialism, the 'wider consequences of African involvement in white men's politics' proved to be 'the overt and immediate cause of the disintegration of the [SRLP] party' in less than six months.¹⁰² As the journalist, author, and SRLP member Doris Lessing explained: 'whenever racial questions are discussed reason flies out of the window, and people become unbalanced.'¹⁰³ Lessing was talking about the party's own members but broader Rhodesian society was no more accommodating. As Murray Steele relates:

The Liberal Party published a cartoon depicting a black "cookboy" informing his indignant "madam", '*Mena funa hamba lo blanch meeting ka lo Labour Party* (I want to go to the Branch Meeting of the Labour Party)'.¹⁰⁴ [...] At a Raylton public meeting, the SRLP candidate was subjected to an interrogation as to whether members of his party would "sit down to dinner with a native, or let a native marry their daughters."¹⁰⁵

Rhodesian politics proved unready for even partial multi-racialism. Despite the failings of the SRLP, the younger generation of politically active black Africans learnt from the events that transpired. A white-led political party had accepted Africans as members, implemented multi-racial strategies for (albeit separate) political and economic development, and defended the participation of black supporters in the face of an unwelcoming environment. Regardless of the paternalist motives behind the SRLP's acceptance of black members, the few years in which an African branch had existed proved to African elites of both the top and middle

¹⁰¹ Steele, 'White working-class disunity', p.68

¹⁰² Ibid., p.62, 59

¹⁰³ Doris Lessing to *The Rhodesia Herald*, 15 September 1945 (not sent), quoted in Ibid., p.62

¹⁰⁴ *New Rhodesia*, (17 September 1945). Quoted in Steele, 'White working-class disunity', p.76

¹⁰⁵ *The Bulawayo Chronicle* (3 March 1946). Quoted in Ibid., p.76

stratum that they could participate in Rhodesian politics through cooperation with liberal or radical whites.

Yet the milieu would not shift enough for black participation on a substantial level until the early 1950s, with the emergence of explicitly multi-racial groups led by white liberals (a term that has itself been the subject of much debate¹⁰⁶) and catering mainly to African elites. These organisations were physical manifestations of a multi-racial ideal that had grown from the white Christian paternalist 'civilising mission' of the nineteenth century.¹⁰⁷ In distinction to the espoused 'non-racialism' of the later Zimbabwean nationalist parties (and the failure of other scholars to clearly delineate between the two¹⁰⁸), multi-racialism or inter-racialism was a stand-alone and proactive political ideology that recognised racial distinctions as cultural and social differences but envisaged cooperation between the races as being possible and advantageous. In 1953, this multiracialism was one key ideal behind the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (also known as the Central African Federation [CAF]), the existence of which would act as a catalyst for African political development in all three nations.¹⁰⁹ The moderate white liberals behind the CAF and the multi-racial ideology believed that the growing African political activity could be controlled and dictated through the inclusion of African elites in white politics. Hardwicke Holderness was one of the most prominent and vocal proponents and explained his motivations during a Parliamentary debate in 1955:

[...] with the development of our country and the uprooting of the African people you have a whole section of people who are politically conscious, and, as I once said before are, for lack of a better phrase, knocking at the door of Western civilisation. That being the position, we must accept it, and we must

¹⁰⁶ See Hancock, *White Liberals*, p.2

¹⁰⁷ See Jennifer Pitts, *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France* (Princeton, 2006)

¹⁰⁸ See John David Leaver, 'Multiracialism and Nationalisms: A Political Retrospective on 1950s Southern Rhodesia (Colonial Zimbabwe)', *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol.23, No.2 (2006), pp.167-188

¹⁰⁹ Anthony Robert King, 'Identity and Decolonisation: The Policy of Partnership in Southern Rhodesia, 1945-62', D.Phil., University of Oxford, 2001

try to take positive measures, we must find ways and means of integrating these people into Western civilisation, and we must in fact find an inter-racial nationalism.¹¹⁰

By “an inter-racial nationalism”, Holderness meant a hierarchical white nationalism in which black Africans occupied subservient positions. Thus although multi-racialism was often framed as a way of promoting African advancement, there was also a clear belief in its ability to stifle African nationalism. Holderness admitted as much, stating that the Interracial Association of Southern Rhodesia (IASR), founded in 1952, rejected any politics that created racial discord within Rhodesian society.¹¹¹ David Stirling, the founder of the multi-racial, transnational Capricorn Africa Society (CAS), described the organisation's role as preventing the emergence of an 'effective African nationalist movement whose purpose would be to push the European out of Africa.'¹¹² Perhaps most damning was the description by the Prime Minister of the newly created CAF, Godfrey Huggins, of multi-racialism in the colony as being something akin to the partnership between a horse (the Africans) and its rider (the Europeans).¹¹³

After his first meeting with David Stirling, the newly arrived white radical¹¹⁴ British lecturer John Reed bluntly explained the flaws he saw in this multi-racial agenda.

Stirling apparently really believes he has the Africans behind him. His next move is to found a political party, and then put the weight of it behind [Garfield] Todd - what Stirling feels is the best possible thing for Rhodesia, but unfortunately hasn't got the confidence of the Africans. So really Capricorn is committed to present policies, but wants to secure the African will for these policies. But it is impossible to appraise whether Capricorn is therefore a good or a bad thing, because the whole thing is so utterly unrealistic as to be out of the realm of political thinking altogether. It is obvious the Africans are not behind Capricorn - both on the evidence, and by the natural laws of political

¹¹⁰ Hardwicke Holderness quoted in Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, p.92

¹¹¹ Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.94

¹¹² Quoted in Luise White, *The Assassination of Herbert Chitepo* (Indianapolis, 2003), p.68

¹¹³ West, *African Middle Class*, p.192

¹¹⁴ See this thesis, pp.87-89

movement - Capricorn offers the Africans nothing - it merely asks them to be good. Why should they support it?¹¹⁵

Other white radicals were also wary about a multi-racial approach. Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock were British missionaries who had arrived in Southern Rhodesia in 1948 and established a multi-racial farm at St. Faith's Mission near Rusape. Yet they found themselves isolated from white society for their views and questioning the benefits partnership offered to black Africans.

I asked one such [sympathetic white] if he would gather leaders of the white opposition in Rusape to discuss our differences frankly and confidentially. "Good idea", he said, "I'll try." After a fortnight he reported: "Sorry, they won't meet you. They say when it comes to the crunch, you'll be on the natives' side." Through all the Federal talk of "partnership", it was ever thus. "It's Them or Us; and it's going to be Us."¹¹⁶

The situation was made worse by a Rhodesian state concerned by the rapidity with which African elites were joining these parties and increasingly critical of the more radical, expatriate whites who encouraged multi-racial partnership. In a speech to Parliament on 7 August 1957, the leader of the opposition Edward Aitken-Cade denounced the multi-racial organisations.

It is merely a group of people from outside, from places which are not Rhodesia's problems, working here under special conditions, upsetting and corrupting the minds of the imperiously young... giving them ideas which can have no place in the society where they must move... these are the Fifth Columnists. The traitors are the Rhodesians themselves - such as the Capricorn Africa Society or the Interracial Association [...] and also such as with a screen of words try to hide the activities of the Fifth Columnists.¹¹⁷

The most notable aspect of Aitken-Cade's denouncement was the emphasis placed on race. The *laager* mentality which would come to dominate Rhodesian politics over the next two decades demonised all whites who failed to toe the line of racial

¹¹⁵ Reed, 'Thursday 23 May 1957', Diary, Vol.75

¹¹⁶ Guy Clutton-Brock & Molly Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted* (Oxford, 1972), p.75

¹¹⁷ 'Traitors and Irresponsibility', *The Rhodesia Herald* (8 August 1957), p.4

division. As the race of the white multi-racialists was unquestionable, the focus was shifted to their foreignness instead and the organisations were painted as the work of external forces attempting to undermine the stability of Rhodesian society.¹¹⁸ This is discussed more in later chapters, but the first associations between white radicals and foreign influence arose with multi-racial partnership.

Despite multi-racialism's restrictive traits and largely apolitical stance,¹¹⁹ organisations like the CAS and IASR saw the widespread participation of mission-educated African elites and white liberals. The IASR had 120 members, of whom a quarter were black, including Joshua Nkomo.¹²⁰ Nathan Shamuyarira (later the ZANU Secretary for External Affairs) also joined the IASR in 1953, and Leopold Takawira was a paid official of the CAS for several years.¹²¹ Many more of those who would later become militant nationalists were committed advocates of multi-racialism during the 1950s, including Mike Hove, Jasper Savanhu, Stanlake Samkange, Lawrence Vambe, Chad Chipunza and Patrick Rubitaka.¹²² Enoch Dumbutshena was also one of this generation and noted how the desire of Africans for political representation overcame the conflict concerns with partnership's paternalistic ideals.

There was a time in Zimbabwe when it was believed that partnership between the races would triumph. Africans were invited to European houses to sundowners and tea parties. Most enlightened Africans, including some of the present nationalist leaders, accepted multi-racialism and the methods by which it sought to provide a final solution to the racial problems.¹²³

¹¹⁸ Donald G. Baker, 'Race, Power and White Siege Cultures', *Social Dynamics: A Journal of African Studies*, Vol.1, No.2 (1975), pp.143-157

¹¹⁹ Neither the IASR or the CAS participated in elections as political parties or submitted candidates for parliamentary seats.

¹²⁰ 'Bulawayo Inter-Racial Society Report: 1955' Mrs G.C. Coleman Papers, GB/193/CO. Borthwick Institute of Historical Research, York University, York, UK

¹²¹ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.110

¹²² John David Leaver, 'Whites in Zimbabwe and Rhodesia: Hapana Mutsauko Here: Is it the same difference?', paper presented at the South-Eastern Regional Seminar in African Studies (SERSAS), University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, Fall Meeting, 27-28 October 2000

¹²³ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.59

Multi-racialism was more than a political ideology, with white liberals encouraging the implementation of partnership across multiple socio-political divides. The impact of these experiences on the discourses of racial identities and national belonging was particularly profound.¹²⁴ Those educated Africans who had adopted European styles of dress and culture found themselves welcomed with open arms. Alongside social gatherings such as the tea parties mentioned by Dumbutshena, the 'new liberal movement' (as Hardwicke Holderness termed multi-racialism) introduced 'a kind of self-education programme in national affairs.'¹²⁵ This was the National Affairs Association (NAA) which organised a series of lectures by prominent white Rhodesians and encouraged a multi-racial approach. As with multi-racialism more broadly, the NAA made half-hearted efforts to attract support from other racial communities. Hasu Patel recalls being approached to speak at an NAA meeting on the relationship between the Indian community with the other Rhodesian races.¹²⁶ Yet there was little broad support for multi-racialism outside of the dominant black and white populations. Patel notes that the Asian Association, established in the late 1940s and dominated by first generation immigrants, was resistant to the idea of fighting racial discrimination if it was not being fought in terms of special rights for Indians.¹²⁷ James Muzondidya similarly asserts that 'only a handful of Coloureds [...] joined or actively participated in the political activities of multiracial organisations,' preferring instead to focus their activities on groups centred within their own established communities.¹²⁸

Regardless, the NAA did find support amongst black Africans. Many of the meetings were held in the African townships and drew large crowds; one talk in

¹²⁴ Leaver, 'Multiracialism and Nationalisms', p.184

¹²⁵ Holderness, *Lost Chance*, p.6

¹²⁶ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (8 December 2015)

¹²⁷ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (8 December 2015). See also Hasu Patel, 'Asian Political Activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to 1972', *Rhodesian History*, Vol.9 (1978), pp.70-80

¹²⁸ James Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope: Towards a Social History of the Coloured Community of Zimbabwe* (Trenton, 2005), p.165

Harare on the pre-colonial history of Rhodesia attracted some 200 Africans, demonstrating again the avid interest many African elites had in their histories even prior to the nationalist histories of the 1960s.¹²⁹ This support highlighted the prevailing racial sentiments of the period. Although the white Rhodesian state discriminated against all non-white populations, there was not yet the animosity that would come to dominate race relations in later years. The 1940s saw 'a time in liberalisation in racial attitudes, coinciding with a huge wave of immigration from Britain into Southern Rhodesia after the war,' recalled Joshua Nkomo.¹³⁰ The involvement of many educated African elites with the multi-racial partnership ideals would become a source of contention in the mid-1960s and the ZAPU-ZANU split, with many of the radical ZANU leaders denouncing ZAPU's leaders (including Joshua Nkomo) for being too familiar with the white population. Yet as Enoch Dumbutshena countered, 'it must have seemed to most of them that multi-racialism was a thaw in the long crusted and frozen political life in Zimbabwe.'¹³¹

What the multi-racial societies appeared to offer was a race conscious but less-discriminatory stance on politics, where Africans could speak for themselves alongside the whites. 'The African elite were buoyed by a naive optimism in the ability and willingness of the dominant white population to reform itself; they believed that it was a sensible for them to participate in the country's multiracial liberal experiment,' explains Nathan Shamuyarira, himself a member of the IASR.¹³² Enoch Dumbutshena (also an IASR member) expanded further, 'It must have seemed to most of the [African leaders] that multi-racialism was a thaw in the long crusted and frozen political life in Zimbabwe.'¹³³ These secular organisations were seen as credible alternatives to the protest-based racial militancy that the African political groups were advocating. And perhaps more importantly, the organisations focused their efforts on the participating African elites themselves. With a paternalistic

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.80

¹³⁰ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.42

¹³¹ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.52

¹³² See Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.93

¹³³ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.52

approach to universal adult suffrage ('it was the eventual goal but would not be rushed'¹³⁴) the concept of racial partnership was deliberately designed to elevate a few African elites to work with the white population, and to ensure an eventual transition to majority rule without any negative effects on white industry or society.¹³⁵ The IASR, for example, saw no problem with the common voters role 'because it already exists, is simple and workable, and gives hope to Africans, and lessens the possibility of future racial politics.'¹³⁶

Another social component of this elite-focused multi-racial agenda were the African Women's Clubs formed in the 1950s. These groups were run by white liberals with the intent 'to help and encourage all African women to become good homemakers and to work together in unity for the advancement of their people,'¹³⁷ and so they provide a counterpoint to the dominant representation of African politics as a male orientated space.¹³⁸ Groups like the Radio Homecraft movement sought to educate African women on various aspects of European style domesticity, like cleaning, sewing, and cooking. Alongside home demonstrators like the 'Jeanes teachers',¹³⁹ African domesticity was believed to improve both the home environment and African communities, whilst also increasing the acceptability of close habitation of Africans to white Rhodesians.¹⁴⁰

However, the African Women's Clubs arose at such a time that the demanded subservience of blacks under white instructors had begun to lose hold, permitting

¹³⁴ Judith Todd, interviewed by author (10 December 2015)

¹³⁵ See Richard Hughes, *Capricorn: David Stirling's Second African Campaign* (London, 2003), p.82.

¹³⁶ Holderness, *Lost Chance*, p.150

¹³⁷ Margaret Tredgold, 1956, quoted in Amy Kaler, 'Visions of Domesticity in the African Women's Homecraft Movement in Rhodesia', *Social Science History*, Vol.23, No.3 (Autumn, 1999), pp.269-309, p.269

¹³⁸ See Kaler, 'Visions of Domesticity': Carolyn Martin Shaw, *Women and Power in Zimbabwe: Promises of Feminism* (Chicago, 2015); Law, *Gendering the Settler State*; and Terri Barnes, *"We Women Worked So Hard": Gender, Urbanisation, and Social Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930-56* (Oxford, 1999)

¹³⁹ Jackson Davis, *The Jeanes Visiting Teachers* (New York, 1936)

¹⁴⁰ See Timothy Burke, *Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Modern Zimbabwe* (New York, 1996)

questions about ascribed racial roles to be asked. As Carolyn Shaw explains, it is justified to 'compare African women's acceptance of the tenets of the Homecraft syllabus to emergent middle-class men's desire to be recognised and respected over and above the "raw native", as "civilized men".¹⁴¹ Agnes Kanogoiwa was a founding member of the Harare Radio Homecraft Club in 1952 and during its formation had made acquaintance with the Governor of Rhodesia, John Noble Kennedy. Given this prominence, Kanogoiwa was invited to a women's forum of the Salisbury City Council discussing segregation where she emphasised what she saw as the benefits of multi-racialism.

I saw so many European women. I was the only African [...] So I was called. I prayed. "Oh God, help me! I am the only African here. Help me to open my mind, help me to say what will help my people tomorrow." So they said, "We don't like to mix. Africans must have their own place to rest and so on and to eat." And the one who was in the Chair said, "Mrs. Kanogoiwa, have you got anything to say to this?" And I said, "Yes, I have." And then I said, "We learn from each other. If we don't see each other often, then how can you learn from me? Because you won't see what I do. If I don't see a European woman, how can I learn from her?"¹⁴²

The value of these kind of interactions on changing opinions was an important tenet of the 1950s multi-racial ideals and did much to influence African racial thinking. The spaces opened up by partnership were not as restrictive as the white liberals had desired and provided many opportunities for black African elites to exert their own agendas. Because of the involvement of African elites, many individuals found their authority within African politics growing. It was no coincidence that same names appear in the executives of the multi-racial organisations and the post-1957 nationalist parties. Thus the Zimbabwean nationalist leadership's early attitudes to race were a reflection of these earlier political experiences, alongside the influence of pre-nationalist African organisations.

¹⁴¹ Shaw, *Women and Power*, p.26. See also Amy Kaler, *Running After Pills: Politics, Gender, and Contraception in Colonial Zimbabwe* (Portsmouth, 2003)

¹⁴² Agnes Kanogoiwa quoted in Terri Barnes and Everjoyce Win, *To Live a Better Life: An Oral History of Women in the City of Harare, 1930-1970* (Harare, 1992), pp.162-163

iv. The inevitability of white rule: African social, political, and professional associations pre-1957

The counterpart to the multi-racialist groups were the local associations led by black Africans and promoting black African interests; social protest organisations, trade unions, and (from a later date) youth leagues. For many politically conscious black Africans in Rhodesia, these associations provided an alternate means of expression that ostensibly went beyond the limitations of white politics. Michael West argues that 'the "nationalising" of the African elite took an important turn in the mid-1930s',¹⁴³ and it was these associations which acted as contiguous cause and effect. Although 'people were not very active as they were only just beginning to organize themselves',¹⁴⁴ recalled Maudy Muzenda (the wife of a prominent African activist), these groups still acted as significant incubators for Zimbabwean nationalism. African elites within these organisations received a practical education in leadership, as well as an opportunity to develop and challenge concepts of nationalist and racial thinking. Despite the differences in composition and goals, these groups unilaterally encouraged a recognition of black solidarity in achieving social and political change, and called for Africans to secure their own advancement through self-improvement and public action. Acting as pressure groups for specific agendas, the associations refused to participate in formal state politics.

Many of these traits would be adopted by the later Zimbabwean nationalist movement, leading some scholars to describe these earlier groups as 'proto-nationalist organisations',¹⁴⁵ expressing an 'inchoate black nationalism'.¹⁴⁶ If we consider a nationalist ideology as being the intent of creating a nation synonymous

¹⁴³ West, *African Middle Class*, p.34

¹⁴⁴ Maudy Muzenda quoted in Irene Staunton, ed., *Mothers of the Revolution* (Harare, 1990), p.60

¹⁴⁵ David Kenrick, 'Pioneers and Progress: White Rhodesian nation-building, c.1964-1979', D.Phil., University of Oxford, 2016, p.18

¹⁴⁶ Johnson, 'Racial Formation', p.249

with the state, then some of these groups were indeed truly nationalist in their thinking. Nevertheless they remained heavily localised in regional, occupational, class, or ethnic terms, and retained restrictive sub-national memberships based on exclusionary criteria. As Michael West explains: 'even when they had the will, the quest for national representativity [...] eluded earlier protest groups.'¹⁴⁷ Miles Larmer consequently employs the term 'African self-organisation' in the place of 'proto-nationalist politics',¹⁴⁸ and this description provides a much more appropriate framework.

The nationalisms being espoused at this point were as varied as the groups themselves. One initiative was the Ndebele Home Movement (later the Matabele Home Society [MHS]), who called for a 'restored kingship in a consolidated "national home"' (a semi-autonomous ethnically-based Ndebele nation contained within the Rhodesian state).¹⁴⁹ Some imagined nations were more ethnically-defined than others, particularly those emerging out of Bulawayo, the historic centre of the Ndebele society.¹⁵⁰ Like the MHS, the Rhodesian Bantu Voters Association adopted a vocally anti-Shona stance and drew heavily upon the nineteenth century hostilities as justification for their exclusionary politics.¹⁵¹ Conversely, the Rhodesian Native Association formed by 'progressive Shona farmers' ('the tiny black petty-bourgeoisie' in the words of Ian Phimister¹⁵²), denounced the Ndebele and called for a modestly incorporationist policy for Shona into the Rhodesian state.¹⁵³

When it became apparent that ethnic-based strategies were failing to achieve traction, a multi-ethnic Bantu nation was proposed by the Bantu Congress of

¹⁴⁷ West, *African Middle Class*, pp.33-34

¹⁴⁸ Larmer, *Rethinking African Politics*, p.22

¹⁴⁹ Ian Phimister, 'Capital and Class in Zimbabwe, 1890-1948', Henderson Seminar Paper No.50, Department of History, University of Zimbabwe, 6 October 1980, p.14

¹⁵⁰ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1991)

¹⁵¹ See Terence Ranger, *The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930* (London, 1970), pp.90-93

¹⁵² Phimister, 'Capital and Class', p.14

¹⁵³ Johnson, 'Racial Formation', p.249

Southern Rhodesia (BCSR). The BCSR was formed by Aaron Jacha and 'other leading black teachers, catechists and clerks from both Mashonaland and Matabeleland' in 1934.¹⁵⁴ With its non-ethnic membership, the BCSR was the first African organisation to provide black Zimbabweans (as opposed to a sub-ethnic group) with a self-controlled channel to work against racially discriminatory policies. Although limited in its aims, Dickson Mungazi nevertheless argues that the BCSR 'created a new level of consciousness among Africans in a way that set the stage for the political transformation of Zimbabwe beginning in 1957.'¹⁵⁵ Similar claims can be made of two other significant African political organisations active in post-war Rhodesia. These were the (British) African Voice Association, established by Benjamin Burombo in 1947 and which played a crucial role in the organisation of the 1948 African industrial strike with its links to the trade union movements¹⁵⁶, and the original Southern Rhodesia African National Congress [(O)SRANC], under Joshua Nkomo, Jerry W. Vera, and Thompson Samkange. The latter was a popular movement in Bulawayo throughout the late 1940s but largely inactive by 1955.¹⁵⁷ Many of those African nationalists cut their political teeth in these early groups.

As products of a Rhodesian socio-economic landscape that permitted the rise of the elite African class, these earlier groups were inherently elite focused and their objectives and tactics were in many ways comparable to that of the multi-racialists. The BCSR counted several white missionaries within its most active encouragers,¹⁵⁸ and the (O)SRANC's 1936 constitution emphasised co-operation with the settler

¹⁵⁴ Peter Baxter, 'The amaNdebele and modern African imperial history', peterbaxterhistory.com.

<http://peterbaxterhistory.com/2011/08/12/the-amandebele-and-modern-african-imperial-history/> (accessed 24 April 2017)

¹⁵⁵ Mungazi, *The Last British Liberals*, p.227

¹⁵⁶ Ian Phimister & Brian Raftopoulos, "'Kana sora ratswa ngaritswe": African Nationalists and Black Workers - The 1948 General Strike in Colonial Zimbabwe', *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol.13, No.3 (2000), pp.289-324

¹⁵⁷ Ngwabi Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle, 1957-1962', in Banana, *Turmoil and Tenacity*, p.51

¹⁵⁸ Jaap van Velsen, 'Trends in African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia', *Kroniek van Afrika*, Vol.4, No.2 (1964), pp.139-157, p.141

Government, going so far as to invite a Rhodesian Government official to open its meetings.¹⁵⁹ As Jaap van Velsen explained in his 1964 history of Zimbabwean nationalism,

these societies tended to be run by and appeal to the new African elite who were greatly concerned to gain from the whites social recognition as "advanced natives" in contrast to the "uneducated masses".¹⁶⁰

The well-educated elites found themselves joining older generations of African politicians and thus having to cooperate with the paternalistic rhetoric of the group as a whole.¹⁶¹ They focused on challenging the logic of empire including the 'uncivilised' label attached to all black Africans, and utilised education, wealth, and culture to do so. The leadership's goals (including 'the relaxation of the Pass and Liquor laws for enfranchised African voters'¹⁶²) reflected their newly-acquired elite status and their adoption of European culture and there were almost no calls for majority rule from these groups.

Although widely accepted during the 1930s and 1940s, the groups' failures to challenge white rule led to criticisms by later nationalists. The prominent African journalist and nationalist Willie Musarurwa explained:

these organisations accepted the white man's rule as inevitable and sought to improve the African social and economic position within the established social and political framework. The idea of seeking political power for the African people was completely ruled out.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ W.D. Musarurwa, 'African Nationalism in Rhodesia', in *Cary & Mitchell, African Nationalist Leaders*, p.xviii

¹⁶⁰ van Velsen, 'Trends in African Nationalism', p.141

¹⁶¹ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.13

¹⁶² Steele, 'White working-class disunity', p.66. See also Michael O. West, "'Equal Rights for all Civilized Men': Elite Africans and the Quest for "European" Liquor in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1924-1961', *International Review of Social History*, Vol.37 (1992), pp.376-397

¹⁶³ Musarurwa, 'African Nationalism', p.xviii

A similar accusation was levelled at the independent African trade unions, including the Independent Industrial and Commercial Workers Union of Rhodesia (ICU) and the Reformed Industrial Commercial Union (RICU). Although scholars still disagree about what role organised African labour had in the emergence of a mass Zimbabwean nationalism in 1957, one conclusion is clear.¹⁶⁴ As Nelson Sambureni summarises, 'the independent African trade unions provided a forum for the expression of popular discontent over economic, political and social issues' that rivalled, conflicted, and sometimes cooperated with the other forms of African representation.¹⁶⁵ Nevertheless African trade unionism failed to achieve the mass support it would elsewhere with some scholars like André Astrow blaming the leadership for failing to effectively direct the agency of the African workers,¹⁶⁶ whilst others like Brian Raftopoulos highlight the lack of a properly constituted African working class.¹⁶⁷

Raftopoulos also argues that the African trade unions in Rhodesia were subject to a multi-racialist ideology that was incomparable to the black consciousness of South African industrial workers. The very emergence of the African trade unions in Rhodesia had been in the context of white efforts to stifle the power of an African labour force. Thus in the words of the trade unionist Thompson Samkange, 'a simple economic issue [had] taken a racial form in Southern Rhodesia.'¹⁶⁸ The stories of Charles Mzingeli and the RICU personify this argument.¹⁶⁹ After finding

¹⁶⁴ See Nelson Sambureni, 'The emergence of independent African trade unions in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia, 1920s to 1950s: toward mass nationalism?', *Kleio*, Vol.28, No.1 (1996), pp.153-173; T.H. Mothibe, 'Zimbabwe: African working class nationalism, 1957-1963', *Zambezia*, Vol.23, No.2 (1996), pp.157-180; Ngwabi Bhebe, *Benjamin Burombo: African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1947-1958* (Harare, 1989); Brian Raftopoulos and Ian R. Phimister, *Keep on Knocking: A History of the Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1900-1997* (Harare, 1997); and Philip R. Warhurst, 'African Trade Unions in Southern Rhodesia, 1948-56: Prelude to Mass Nationalism?', Unpublished Mimeo, undated

¹⁶⁵ Sambureni, 'Independent African trade unions', p.155

¹⁶⁶ Astrow, *Zimbabwe*, pp.20-22

¹⁶⁷ See Brian Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour in Salisbury, 1953-65', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.21, No.1 (1995), pp.79-93

¹⁶⁸ 'Samkange: Equality in Working Wages', *Bantu Mirror* (2 March 1946)

¹⁶⁹ For a history of Mzingeli, see Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, ch.1

employment on the railways at fourteen, Mzingeli quickly found himself working with the South African ICU. Impressed by their successes, he adopted the same strategy of 'race-pride populism with an attention to local grievances' upon his return to Bulawayo, with the fallibility of the supposedly-superior white race a focal point in his actions.¹⁷⁰ Mzingeli was not afraid to call European officials thieves and would use the popular play on words that mocked the supposed authority of European native commissioners who expected Africans to refer to them as "chief",¹⁷¹ relates Scarnecchia, and indeed Mzingeli went so far as to contrast the concept of race supremacy in southern Africa with Hitler's principle of *Herrenvolk* in 1946.¹⁷¹

Yet Mzingeli's anti-white sentiments were overshadowed by his distaste for racial discrimination in politics. Calling segregation 'a fanatical deliberation in the creation of race hatred',¹⁷² Mzingeli participated in liberal multi-racialism, including joining the SRLP.¹⁷³ Between the trade unions and African protest groups, there was a significant overlap between leadership and ideology. Mzingeli, Joshua Nkomo, and Enoch Dumbutshena were all members of the IASR and trade unions, and all believed that there was no conflict between representing the African working class through the trade unions, whilst also promoting their own interests through elitist multi-racial groups.¹⁷⁴

However, these commitments also demonstrated the conflicts about racial thinking that had begun to emerge within the African leadership during this period of 'African self-organisation'. Whilst most educated African elites maintained that multi-racialism was the surest way to secure change for the African population, a growing number were becoming disenchanted with the failures of partnership to produce tangible benefits. Generational differences in Karl Mannheim's sense of the term emerged within the African population as young radical Africans began to make their voices heard. Explaining that distinct generational identities arise from unique

¹⁷⁰ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.16

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p.16 & 24

¹⁷² Quoted in Ibid., p.28

¹⁷³ See this chapter, section three; also Sambureni, 'Independent African trade unions', p.155

¹⁷⁴ Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour', p.87

'reactions to moments of social upheaval and transformation,' Mannheim argues that generations are 'united by a rather mysterious "intuitive understanding" of coevality created by individual reactions to shared events and by "collective" memories of those experiences.'¹⁷⁵ In this case, generations were defined by their attitudes to the struggle for African representation and an end to racial discrimination.

The radical generation included James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Edson Sithole, Henry Hamadziripi, Thomson Gonese, and Duduza Chisiza. These men would become a key stimulant behind the emergence of a mass Zimbabwean nationalism later in the 1950s and their ideologies were an explicit response to the failings of existing vehicles for African voices. Although all lacked a formal university education, they were recognised by contemporaries as intelligent and capable men.¹⁷⁶ Chisiza was described as 'extremely intelligent and a brilliant orator', Nyandoro was 'admired for his skill in argument' and his efforts to 'read widely and in depth', and Sithole would later become only the second black man to pass the Rhodesian Bar.¹⁷⁷ However, they were not so removed from the ordinary African population as to alienate themselves from a potentially important membership base, and their objectives reflected this somewhat anti-elite stance.¹⁷⁸ As Raftopoulos summarises, the group sought 'to challenge [...] the dominance of an increasingly conservative Mzingeli [...] and the leadership of the intellectuals who were participating in multi-racial organisations such as the Capricorn Society and the Inter-Racial Society.'¹⁷⁹ Both of these goals appealed to a number of discontented black Africans, frustrated by the limitations of the existing groups.

The product of this agitation was the formation of the City Youth League (CYL) in August 1955, described as 'the first of the new militant African political

¹⁷⁵ See Karl Mannheim, 'The Problem of Generations', in Paul Kecskemeti, ed., *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), p.282

¹⁷⁶ Chikerema had twice enrolled for a BA at the University of Cape Town in 1949 and 1950 but sat no exams.

¹⁷⁷ See Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.69, 41, 73

¹⁷⁸ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.301

¹⁷⁹ Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour', p.87

movements.¹⁸⁰ Under those same young Africans who had publicly criticised the multi-racial groups, the CYL sparked the beginning of what Michael West calls the 'Nationalist Moment' of Zimbabwean history.¹⁸¹ The movement quickly gained popular support amongst young urban African workers, and 'soon eclipsed the multi-racial politics of the elites'.¹⁸² The CYL's stringent anti-partnership stance and its rejection of elitist politics forced Africans to choose whether they would work with the white liberals or pursue national affairs through the mobilisation of African agency. The leaders accused those Africans who supported the concept of racial partnership as having been 'bought off' by a Federal government offering economic expansion and a relative wage increase of unskilled labour in place of genuine social advancement.¹⁸³

This turn against multi-racialism was fuelled in part by the elites' realisation that even their assimilation of European culture did not spare them from racial discrimination. 'We were half-trusted and half-respected by the African masses and half-feared and half-accepted by the European Society,' wrote Bernard Chidzero in 1959.¹⁸⁴ Black Africans 'assumed their "lack of education" was the main reason for exclusion as "uncivilised"'.¹⁸⁵ When this belief was proven false, the comprehension that race was the defining feature of social status resulted in what Jean-Paul Sartre called 'an anti-racist racism'. Whilst ultimately aiming for a race-less society, it was necessary to use 'positive discrimination' along racial lines to achieve that goal.¹⁸⁶ These young radical Africans 'accepted the racial identity constructed for them by

¹⁸⁰ Henry Slater, 'The Politics of Frustration: The ZAPU-ZANU Split in Historical Perspective', *Kenya Historical Review*, Vol.3, No.2 (1975), pp.261-286, p.265. The CYL was later renamed the African National Youth League.

¹⁸¹ See West, *African Middle Class*, p.207

¹⁸² Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.104

¹⁸³ 'Wage Increases Inevitable', *Bantu Mirror*, 13 April 1957. Also see Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour', p.85

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in Raftopoulos, 'Nationalism and Labour', p.90

¹⁸⁵ Charumbira, *Imagining a Nation*, p.287

¹⁸⁶ Jean-Paul Sartre, 'Black Orpheus', trans. John MacCombie, *The Massachusetts Review*, Vol.6, No.1 (1964), pp.13-52, p.18

white oppressors and turned it against its creators by using it as a basis of solidarity and struggle against white domination,' explains George Frederickson.¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, alongside the tripartite of white liberal multi-racialism, elite-driven African protest, and pro-African trade unionism, these young radicals were also influenced by the experiences of its leaders elsewhere. The transfer of ideas across national borders was made possible by several factors including the shared racial subjugation of European colonialism, education at the hands of European missionaries, and transnational networks created through foreign study and work. The politics of black South Africans were particularly influential on the young Zimbabweans.¹⁸⁸ Daniel Madzimbamuto, Maurice Nyagumbo, and James Chikerema had all lived in South Africa, and Chikerema's membership of the ANC Youth League [ANCYL] during his time as a student at Cape Town University had a significant impact on his own politics.¹⁸⁹ 'He [Chikerema] brought with him the South African Youth League constitution, which became the guideline for the Youth League that he helped set up in Salisbury,' argued the American activist George Houser, demonstrating the connection went beyond mere rhetoric.¹⁹⁰ The racial policies of the CYL were unsurprisingly also heavily influenced by the ANCYL, although the CYL retained a less racist agenda than their counterparts to the south. Driven by the 'Africanist' ideologies of Marcus Garvey and the ANCYL's Anton Lembede,¹⁹¹ the ANCYL insisted only black Africans could join the organisation.¹⁹² They believed they would 'be wasting their time and deflecting their forces if they look up to Europeans either for inspiration or help in their political struggle,' explains

¹⁸⁷ Frederickson, *Black Liberation*, p.278

¹⁸⁸ David Birmingham & Phyllis Martin, eds., *History of Central Africa: Vol.2* (London, 1983), chapter nine

¹⁸⁹ Lawrence Vambe, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (London, 1976), pp.275-276

¹⁹⁰ George M. Houser, *No One Can Stop The Rain: Glimpses of Africa's Liberation Struggle* (New York, 1989), p.221

¹⁹¹ Frederickson, *Black Liberation*, p.280

¹⁹² Gail M. Gerhart, *Black Power in South Africa: The Evolution of an Ideology* (Berkeley, 1978), p.60.

Thomas Karis,¹⁹³ and consequently encouraged separate anti-apartheid organisations along racial lines.¹⁹⁴ The belief was formed that African parties must exclude non-black individuals in order to ensure the strength of the party remained with the cohesion of shared experiences.¹⁹⁵

The Rhodesian CYL, however, did not exclude non-black groups from participation (although it did not actively seek non-black membership), with James Chikerema recalling that the CYL found 'limited support among coloured and Asian businessmen and professionals'.¹⁹⁶ Nathan Shamuyarira similarly refers to a 'pamphlet on self-determination obtained from the Indian diplomatic mission in Salisbury' as providing an inspiration to the founders of the CYL,¹⁹⁷ and it is no coincidence that Dunduzu Chisiza, a founding member, worked for the Indian High Commission.¹⁹⁸ Maurice Nyagumbo had further been a member of the non-racial SACP whilst working in Cape Town for most of the 1940s,¹⁹⁹ and noted how his attendance with a fellow black Zimbabwean, Willie Mashaba, at a party organised by the SACP fundamentally altered his view of how races could cooperate within a political organisation.

When we arrived at the hall, we found two European girls in the ticket-office at the door who greeted Willie as "comrade". [...] As we entered the hall, Willie was embraced by a group of cheering European and Coloured girls and when we had taken our seats, Willie introduced me to them. One of them, Jean, took me to one corner of the hall where she started to explain the aims and the objects of the party. Although I did not understand a word of what she was

¹⁹³ Thomas Karis, *Hope and Challenge, 1935-1953*, vol.2 of Thomas Karis and Gwendolin M. Carter, eds., *From Protest to Challenge: a documentary history of African politics in South Africa, 1882-1964* (Stanford, 1973), p.330

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., pp.326-60

¹⁹⁵ 'Basic policy of the Congress Youth League', ANC Youth League (1948)

¹⁹⁶ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.168

¹⁹⁷ Nathan Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia* (London, 1965), p.26

¹⁹⁸ Diana Mitchell, 'Notes on Dunduzu Chisiza', Undated, H5.3, BC969, The Mitchell Papers, University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa

¹⁹⁹ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.71

talking about, I agreed to join the party, because I was impressed by the behaviour of the European girls.²⁰⁰

Interaction with radical whites in Rhodesia also proved to be an important element in the development of the CYL's racialist thinking. A chance encounter with Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock in 1955 impacted upon Nyagumbo's beliefs.

They [Guy and Molly] both appeared rugged white Rhodesian fighters. The only difference was their conversation with us. As [Guy] talked about the political situation in the country where he observed that Africans did not have any right in their land of birth and he was wondering how that kind of situation as going to change in those circumstances. He shocked me by his clear thinking and understanding of the situation. It was at a time when the Youth League in Harare was inaugurated. [...] During my next visit to Harare I talked to James Chikerema, George Nyandoro and Paul Mushonga about this man Guy Clutton-Brock I had met at St Francis Mission and requested the three people to make a visit to see Guy Clutton-Brock. In 1956 the three men, James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, and Paul Mushonga, visited St Faith's. All three men expressed their appreciation of Guy's explanation of the situation which existed. From that time onwards Guy became identified with our struggle.²⁰¹

Clutton-Brock's influence on the racial thinking of these young African radicals would come to play an important role throughout the liberation struggle, as would his physical presence within the African movement. Nevertheless, despite the inclusion of non-black individuals within the organisation, the CYL's relative radicalism led many African elites to 'stand aloof' from what they termed the 'more crude manifestations of the [African] movement'.²⁰² Those with authority in established groups remained hesitant to join, especially given Chikerema and Nyandoro's condemnation of multi-racial elitism. The CYL's members were younger, often less educated and frequently poorer than their counterparts in the CAS or IASR.²⁰³ As a result the group struggled to present itself as a respectable alternative to the multi-

²⁰⁰ Maurice Nyagumbo, *With the People: an autobiography from the Zimbabwe Struggle* (Salisbury, 1980), p.72

²⁰¹ Tapfumaneyi (Maurice) Nyagumbo, 'As humble as a dove', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.117

²⁰² Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.135

²⁰³ See West, *African Middle Class*, p.204

racial societies. For all of its claims to represent the black population of Rhodesia, the CYL also remained largely focused around Salisbury and had a predominantly Shona membership which even changing its name to the African National Youth League (ANYL) could not overcome. Consequently, Joshua Nkomo, Herbert Chitepo, Leopold Takawira, Michael Mawema, Ndabaningi Sithole, and a number of others regarded the CYL as a potentially destructive movement. Even some of the CYL's founders were initially reluctant to embrace a radical stance. Nyagumbo recalled a meeting with Chikerema in July 1955 in which the latter first raised the possibility of forming a Youth League:

He [Chikerema] told me that the move to form this organisation was being backed by a large number of enthusiastic and intelligent people, and he asked me to attend the inaugural day. The idea of the youth league did not appear attractive to me. I argued that the best thing was to form a national party and not a youth league which I thought was bound to be run by irresponsible town gangsters.²⁰⁴

These limitations of the CYL in terms of membership and ideology had to be overcome in order to produce a politically-usable Zimbabwean nationalism, but it had nevertheless provided a valuable testing ground for new ideas.²⁰⁵

Conclusion

By the summer of 1957, it was apparent that the conflict between the multi-racialists and the African organisations was showing no signs of resolution, despite the formation of the CYL.²⁰⁶ With the failures of the CAS and IASR to create a shared sense of racial cooperation, the white radical Peter Mackay argued that 1957 'was the time for Africans to dispose, to assert their claims to a better order in their own

²⁰⁴ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.101

²⁰⁵ Eliakim M. Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union, 1961-87: A Political History of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia* (Trenton, 2005), p.34

²⁰⁶ Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.104

land.²⁰⁷ This sentiment had begun to gain support within politically-conscious Africans. On 15 June 1957, at a meeting of the IASR, the Prime Minister Garfield Todd spoke on the need for the continued advancement of Africans. When the African politician Thompson Samkange responded to Todd, John Reed recorded the reaction of the largely African crowd:

Samkange: "Those of us who have to sit in Parliament, and hear the debates - we have often thought, when we have been listening to the Prime Minister [...] how long can this go on? [...] The Prime Minister spoke the way he did, and was the only one of his Cabinet who voted the way he did, we thought what strange bedfellows he has with him. And if he does leave his party, and form a true liberal party..."

African Voice [from the hall]: "He can join the Congress ([O]SRANC)."

Samkange: "I hope whoever said the Prime Minister can join the Congress will remember that he can also join the Prime Minister's Party."²⁰⁸

Whilst many of the loudest voices still called for Africans to participate in white-led parties, a growing vocal minority had begun to demand the opposite. Given the demand for a truly nationalist African organisation, the result was the coming together in September 1957 of the disparate elements of African politics; trade unionism, multi-racialism, and African associations.

This is the key point to be taken away from the pre-1957 period. African nationalism was not the only possible ideology to come to define the African struggle, but it was the only one which fitted the specific criteria demanded at that moment in time. It was the result of preconditions (childhood experiences, Western-style educations, and a racially-exclusionary political environment) combined with a particular set of precipitants (the clash of multi-racialist and Africanist principles within the context of a growing pan-Africanism). These same conditions defined the racial thinking inherent in Zimbabwean nationalism. The relationships built during the era of liberal partnership and the experiences of working alongside whites,

²⁰⁷ Peter Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow: Stirrings in Africa, 1959-67* (Norwich, 2008), p.70

²⁰⁸ Reed, 'Saturday 15 June 1957', Diary, Vol.75. Emphasis in original. Congress refers to the largely defunct (O)SRANC that still existed loosely in Rhodesia.

Asians, Indians, and coloureds was a central basis on which some of the nationalist's leading figures would organise their policies.

Chapter 2

Non-racialism versus black consciousness: the emergence of a Zimbabwean nationalism, 1957-1959

Introduction

As the previous chapter argued, it was anything but inevitable that a black nationalist ideology would come to dominate the Zimbabwean anti-colonial struggle. Indeed, the situation prior to 1957 emphasised the complexity of African politics and the seemingly insurmountable divisions within African society. It was thus surprising when an African party emerged in September 1957 that counted multi-racialists, youth-leaguers, and trade-unionists within its members. More remarkable was that this Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) embraced an African nationalism previously unseen in the nation. From 1957 through to independence in 1980, African politics in the nation would be (broadly) dominated by nationalist parties, led by the same group of elite Africans, and espousing ideologies descended from the SRANC. Although these movements and the nationalist discourse (particularly regarding non-black positioning within the struggle and the imagined nation) were constantly changing, the formation of the SRANC would prove to be a defining moment in the history of race and Zimbabwean nationalism.

This second chapter thus sets out to accomplish two goals. First, to provide a detailed account of the role of non-black radicals within the first nationalist movement, including the anatomy of the non-black radical group involved and the means by which these individuals supported the nationalist cause. It examines how non-black participation shaped the racial policies of the incipient nationalist movement, and the reaction by the white state to such dissent. It delves into the motivations of these radicals to understand their decisions for supporting African

nationalism over liberal multi-racialism and how the transnationalism of white radicals informed perceptions of their usefulness to the cause. Secondly, this chapter also addresses the impact non-black participation had on conceptions of race for the imagined future Zimbabwean nation. It challenges the lazy assertions by scholars that 'race was not a primary concern for Nkomo and other [...] nationalists,'¹ and argues that race was in fact a paramount feature of early nationalist discourse. Finally, it details how a new form of racial thinking called 'non-racialism' emerged and became an intrinsic part of late-1950s Zimbabwean nationalism.

i. The formation of the SRANC

Formed in September 1957 from a broader support base than any previous African political group,² the SRANC was a party of contradiction. An amalgamation of the CYL under James Chikerema and George Nyandoro, and the defunct (O)SRANC under Joshua Nkomo, the SRANC combined the political sophistication of the older generation of African elites with the youth, vigour and determination of the younger nationalists in a deliberate effort to appeal to as many Africans as possible. The SRANC gained unprecedented popular support across both rural and urban African populations and by May 1958 had thirty-nine branches throughout the colony and a membership of 6,000.³ Within a year, a further 11,000 people purchased membership cards.⁴ These figures, however, do not show the full level of support, as Munyaradzi Munochiveyi explains:

¹ Eliakim M. Sibanda, 'The Contributions of Joshua Nkomo to the Liberation of Zimbabwe', in Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ed., *Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo of Zimbabwe: Politics, Power, and Memory* (Cham, 2017), p.64

² Didymus Mutasa, 'St. Faiths and Cold Comfort Farm', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.107

³ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.65

⁴ Edwin Lichtenstein, 'The African Nationalist Parties (in Rhodesia)', in G.C. Grant, ed., *The Africans' Predicament in Rhodesia: Minority Rights Group, Report No.8* (London, 1972)

An African-led party, rejecting European tutelage and voicing African aspirations, was at that time a novel concept for most Africans and only the most politically committed and bravest people joined. Others, particularly in the countryside, supported the SRANC silently.⁵

Nevertheless, the diversity within the leadership and supporters complicated a group that required unity in order to overcome the entrenched political viewpoints of existing African politics. As a result of these conflicting ideologies, disagreements arose about how best to achieve that goal and what form this imagined future nation would take, and the SRANC found itself tied to two agendas struggling for position.

The first was a rejection of the slow crawl towards racial equality as encouraged by the multi-racialists (including the CAS and IASR), and to which many African elites remained committed.⁶ George Nyandoro (the SRANC's Secretary General) made clear the nationalists' attitudes to multi-racialism. 'Any policy of striving for power through Parliament is ridiculous and [...] Africans should no longer look to European political parties as the latter have rejected partnership; instead, they should join congress.'⁷ The SRANC blamed the multi-racialists for the failure of existing political strategies. In an anonymous article published in the nationalist-supporting magazine *Dissent* produced by John Reed, Terence Ranger, and Reverend Whitfield Foy, the author (likely Reed) explained:

There are racial blocs - and the conflict of interest between African and European cannot now be influenced except in very minor ways by the existence of our multiracial liberal bridge builders - over whose bridges no-one ever crossed anyway except the builders themselves.⁸

Consequently, as a means of distinguishing themselves from the multi-racialists, the SRANC consolidated its racial policies into a recognition of the exceptionalism of black Africans and vocalised a connection between authority and indigeneity.

⁵ Munyaradzi B. Munochiveyi, *Prisoners of Rhodesia: Inmates and Detainees in the Struggle for Zimbabwean Liberation, 1960-1980* (Basingstoke, 2014), p.29. See also Alexander, McGregor, & Ranger, *Violence and Memory*, pp.85-94

⁶ Mlambo, *The Struggle for a Birthright*, p.117

⁷ Quoted in Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.60

⁸ 'The Need for Politics', *Dissent*, No.3 (April, 1959), p.2

According to the Zimbabwean intellectual Ndabaningi Sithole, the SRANC argued 'we do not want to be ruled by foreigners. We want to rule ourselves.'⁹ This ideology manifested itself in a policy of 'denunciation' and a complete rejection of the authority of the white state. Joshua Nkomo (the SRANC's President) recalled that 'the ANC in that period was against everything the government did, whatever it was.'¹⁰ Denunciation was more successful than the 'one man, one vote' slogans of previous parties,¹¹ largely because the rejection of white power appealed to all Africans who had experienced racial discrimination.¹² The promises to not only target everyday discrimination, but to do so immediately rather than in some undetermined future as promised by multi-racialism, was a broadly popular ideology. In common with the concepts of African nationalism arising elsewhere on the continent during the same period, Zimbabwean nationalism was at its heart a movement against white supremacy and the tangible objectives of this struggle were well-received.

This is where the second agenda of the SRANC came in to play. Whilst also a rejection of white multi-racialism, the party was fundamentally a proponent of black African nationalism. As its founding statement declared, 'all inhabitants of the country in true partnership regardless of race, colour and creed,' and its conceptions of power in the future nation reflected this.¹³ The party rejected a few African elites participating in a system dominated by the white minority and foresaw a system where state power reflected the numerical superiority of the black population. In September 1957 the SRANC released a press statement which argued that the party would champion for 'the interests and aspirations of both the educated and

⁹ Sithole, *Obed Mutezo*, p.116

¹⁰ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.69

¹¹ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.111

¹² See Mothibe, 'African Working Class Nationalism', p.165

¹³ SRANC, 'Statement of Principles, policy and programme, Salisbury, 1957', in C. Nyangoni, & G. Nyandoro, eds., *Zimbabwe Independence Movement: Select Documents* (London, 1979)

uneducated Africans, a movement of the under-privileged and un-enfranchised.¹⁴ Steve Biko, the pioneer behind the black consciousness movement in South Africa, highlighted why this shift was both a rejection of white liberalism and an opportunity.

The role of the white liberal in the black man's history in South Africa is a curious one. Very few black organisations were not under white direction. True to their image, the white liberals always knew what was good for the blacks and told them so. The wonder of it all is that the black people have believed in them for so long. It was only at the end of the 50s that the blacks started demanding to be their own guardians.¹⁵

Accused of making disparaging remarks about the Minister of Native Affairs, the trial of Chikerema in June 1958 reaffirmed the uneasy accommodation of a non-racial ideology alongside the rejection of multi-racialism. Several white SRANC supporters were subpoenaed to appear in court and their names printed in the *Rhodesia Herald*, including the UCRN lecturers John Reed and Terence Ranger (alongside his wife Shelagh), the journalist Eileen Haddon, and a doctoral candidate named Eleanor Glynn-Jones.¹⁶ The Rhodesian government's intent behind this public act was apparent. As Reed noted in his diary, 'the Government has handled this case so as to bring odium, both from the European and African population on those white people who have been willing to take an interest in Congress.'¹⁷ As in South Africa,¹⁸ this strategy worked and the presence of white SRANC members testifying against one of the black leadership reportedly exacerbated tensions: 'these Europeans, look at them, they come to meetings and pretend to be on our side - and then they turn and give evidence against us', ranted one SRANC member outside the courtroom.¹⁹

¹⁴ 'A New Party, A New Future', SRANC Statement, 18 September 1957, Diana Mitchell Papers, BC 969, University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa

¹⁵ Steve Biko/ Frank Talk, 'I write what I like', *SASO Newsletter*, August 1970, in Steve Biko, *I write what I like: selected writings* (Chicago, 1978), p.19

¹⁶ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.29

¹⁷ Reed, 'Monday 26 May 1958', Diary, Vol.78

¹⁸ See this thesis pp.233-234

¹⁹ Quoted in Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.31

Considering that the white radicals had been forced to appear in court (and gave little useful testimony in any case), such accusations were baseless. Nevertheless the incident had a significant impact during an important moment in the early history of Zimbabwean nationalism. The trials of nationalists like Chikerema's were significant events in swaying African public opinion to the side of the nationalist cause, and there was an interest in using the attention to highlight the independence of the African leaders.²⁰ Whether or not the leaders truly believed the racial rhetoric is something discussed later in this thesis, but a recognition of the important interplay between public and private discourse is crucial to situating the statements in their proper context.

What these early incidents demonstrated was an incipient belief amongst some nationalists that the non-black supporters were less committed to African politics than their black counterparts. Returning to the concepts of 'insiders' and 'outsiders', white radicals were regarded as being unable to fully comprehend the realities of a struggle against oppression because they had not suffered due to their race under the settler state. In 1959, John Reed noted in his diary that:

Whatever you do, and whatever theories about race you may hold, a white liberal can never become an African. Even the missionaries who believe in the economic witness and live like the Africans obviously are never going to be accepted by Africans as Africans and they know this.²¹

Peter Mackay, the Scottish-born radical and former soldier, similarly recalled:

I was not part, I knew, of the wrongs being done [by the white state], for I was beyond the laager's pale. But I remained, I knew, outside the Africans' gate [...] But if I could not stand aside as an angry witness I remained conscious of the limitations on a non-African involvement in what was essentially an African cause. Certainly it was not a time for Greenmantles. Yet, if one could

²⁰ See Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, pp.99-100

²¹ 'Orwell in Africa', *Dissent*, No.13 (12 November 1959), p.15

serve what one believed to be justice perhaps one could also serve one's friends in their cause.²²

Many amongst the nationalist leadership's more radical elements also argued that whites, Asians, Indians and coloureds could not share the same intense sense of injustice as black Africans. In a vocal attack on those who had supported multi-racialism, Edson Sithole (a founding member of the CYL) criticised the failure of 'even the most liberal whites [...] to understand the deeply ingrained resentment that fuels the African's actions, the resentment of all Europeans for what their race has done to ours since conquering our country sixty years ago.'²³ Sithole's views on non-black participation led him to form the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP), an anti-white party discussed more in later chapters,²⁴ but one immediate consequence was that those non-black individuals wishing to support the African cause were forced to justify their support through an alternative discourse. The immovable foundation of racial experiences meant that since they could not be considered black Africans on the basis of their political beliefs, most remained firmly entrenched in their specific racial identities. The necessity of broaching these identities was highlighted by Guy Clutton-Brock.

When the Congress was formed, Molly and I had to decide whether to join and formally identify ourselves with the African movement, which was both political and social. We knew what it would mean to many of our fellow whites; we would be confirmed as one of "them", hence traitors to our kith and kin. We had come to live in Africa, however, so to us no other course seemed open than to identify with Africa. We paid our dues and took out membership cards.²⁵

²² Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.33. 'Greenmantles' is a reference to a 1918 John Buchan novel of the same name where a European soldier impersonates an Islamic religious leader in order to fight the Russians.

²³ Rhodesian Special Branch, 'Secret Memo: 30 December 1958', Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, S.R.C.(S) (58) 37, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

²⁴ See Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.120. Also this thesis, p.135, 155, 160

²⁵ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.79

Clutton-Brock's understanding was that although an individual remained defined by their racial identity, they could nevertheless 'empathise' with the African cause. The white radicals therefore drew upon their marginalities from society due to other factors including gender, sexuality, race (including Jewishness), radical Christianity, and left-wing politics. Peter Fry (a young British doctoral candidate researching in rural Rhodesia during the early 1960s) explicitly highlighted his sexuality as influencing his attitudes to the nationalists.

Because of the fact that one was ipso facto criminal just for existing, this involved a considerable amount of terror and care. I've often thought about this and I thought about this at the time, why my attitude to black nationalism was not that of an abstract political scientist, it wasn't a question of principle, it was an emotional relationship that I had. I identified very strongly with [the African nationalists], especially when people were threatened with silence and banishment, which was exactly what happened to the nationalists in Rhodesia. So it was a very personal feeling which I can talk to you about. [...] I was actually more afraid of being picked up for being gay than for being sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Because they were related in a funny kind of way in my own mind, and I felt strangely related, and one could accuse one of being a sort-of unrepentant romantic I suppose.²⁶

Alongside Fry's individual motivations, there were other broader commonalities within the white radicals which explained their involvement. Education and early-life experiences appear to have strongly shaped the views adopted in adulthood. Many white radicals were highly educated. Eileen Haddon had attended medical school at the University of the Witwatersrand,²⁷ and the Methodist minister Whitfield Foy had studied at the Wesleyan college at Headingly.²⁸ Peter Mackay had been head boy at Stowe public school and an instructor in what is now the Defence Academy of the

²⁶ Peter Fry, interviewed by author (1 May 2015). Fry's research would be published in Peter Fry, *Spirits of Protest: Spirit-Mediums and the Articulation of Consensus among the Zezuru of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)* (Cambridge, 1976)

²⁷ Terence Ranger, 'Eileen Haddon: A determined life spent fighting racism and injustice in southern Africa', [theguardian.com](https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/jul/22/guardianobituaries.southafrica), <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2003/jul/22/guardianobituaries.southafrica> (accessed 12 December 2016)

²⁸ Wendy George, 'Captain The Rev. Whitfield Foy, MC', paradata.org.uk, <https://paradata.org.uk/people/rev-whitfield-foy> (accessed 8 February 2016)

United Kingdom.²⁹ Garfield Todd, John Reed, Michael Faber, and Terence Ranger all attended Oxford University, whilst Guy Clutton-Brock and Peter Fry were Cambridge graduates. In his memoirs, Clutton-Brock emphasised the importance this environment had on his politics.

I spent most of my time at Cambridge with friends who felt strongly about the social situation in the 1920s [...] We gathered in his room, endlessly talking religion and politics, socialism and social work. We attended meetings of diverse groups, clubs and churches - Conservative, Communist, Liberal, Labour, Atheist, Anglo-Catholic, Roman Catholic, and 'Come and Be Saved in the Vestry' Evangelicals.³⁰

This intellectual openness was reflected in the fact that the decision to join the nationalists was not as clear a break with the multi-racial ideals as some scholars have sought to portray.³¹ Indeed, the SRANC simply appeared to be the most likely route at that moment to secure an end to racial discrimination and political representation for the black population. Many radicals and African elites retained their memberships in other groups including the CAS, IASR, African trade unions, and liberal white Rhodesian political parties like the Central Africa Party (CAP). The result is that even some of the most committed radicals in later years describe their membership of the SRANC without reference to nation building efforts. Peter Mackay, for instance, explained his initial participation with the SRANC as a 'stumble across the colour bar',³² and in 1958, John Reed highlighted his involvement with the SRANC as a cautionary attitude to black nationalism.

I will believe this - that every African meeting I go to, is something against the development of the Mau Mau situation, the absolute separation of black and

²⁹ John McCracken, 'Peter Mackay and the role of White Activists in the Nationalist Struggle in Malawi and Zimbabwe', paper presented at the opening of the Peter Mackay collection, Stirling University, Scotland, 22 September 2015

³⁰ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.15

³¹ See Leaver, 'Multiracialism and Nationalisms'

³² Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.71

white, by the apartheid, from both sides of violence, suppressing upon the apartheid from one side, of convention and oppression.³³

The Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya had highlighted what Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul called the 'living tradition [...] of peasant violence to redress socio-economic grievances'³⁴ and many non-black radicals were worried by the violence of events in another white settler state. Of further concern was the conflict in Algeria which had been steadily escalating since 1954, the Ifni War in Spanish West Africa which had seen Moroccan soldiers attack the Spanish-held city of Sidi Ifni in an act of national liberation, and the numerous strikes, boycotts, and protests across South Africa.³⁵

As with anti-colonial movements elsewhere on the continent, the SRANC could have adopted a strict black African membership policy and forced non-black activists to form their own groups. Black African nationalism was after all a concerted effort to withdraw black participation from integrated organisations. If the party's anti-partnership stance was interpreted in the way that historians like John David Leaver have attempted to do (as a rejection of any concept of racial cooperation), non-black membership of the SRANC would appear entirely antithetical.³⁶ Yet Terence Ranger has emphasised that the SRANC 'by comparison with other African movements elsewhere, [remained] a moderate and painstakingly non-racial organisation.'³⁷ Despite the vocal opposition of some, many African elites asserted that their fight was against white domination, not the whites themselves, and anybody who supported majority rule and was willing to work under African leadership was welcome to join. Willie Musarurwa (an SRANC founding member and one of the most prominent black journalists in Rhodesia) was an eternal optimist regarding racial co-operation.

³³ Reed, 'Sunday 13 April 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2)

³⁴ Giovanni Arrighi & John. S. Saul, 'Nationalism and revolution in sub-Saharan Africa', in Ralph Miliband & John Saville, eds., *The Socialist Register, 1969* (London, 1969), p.177

³⁵ Ali Al'Amin Mazrui, *Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa* (Berkeley, 1978), p.115. Also Saul Dubow, *The African National Congress* (Stroud, 2000)

³⁶ Leaver, 'Multiracialism and Nationalisms', p.168

³⁷ See Terence Ranger, *Crisis in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1960)

African nationalism, as the leaders have often stated, does not exclude whites, many of whom are natives of the country and who were born and bred here, having no other home but Rhodesia. It accepts the whites as part and parcel of a non-racial nation in which the skin colour of a person has no more significance than the accident it is.³⁸

Nevertheless, even during the earliest days of the SRANC, there were visible demonstrations of the heterogeneity in Zimbabwean nationalist thinking. The CYL leaders James Chikerema and George Nyandoro had both taken up seats within the SRANC's executive but found themselves outnumbered by former (O)SRANC multi-racialists like Jason Moyo, Francis Nehwati, and Joshua Nkomo. Thus whilst multi-racialism was lambasted for not permitting black Africans to think and act for themselves, non-blacks were still welcomed into the party. Noel St. Quintin (the Mayor of Salisbury in the 1940s and a well-informed political commentator and historian of Rhodesia) asserts that there were about fifteen white members of the SRANC by 1958.³⁹

Support for non-black participation was also conditional. Reed recounts a conversation with Joshua Nkomo in March 1958 in which the SRANC President lamented that 'at the moment there were only three Europeans in the Congress' and insisted 'that Congress does want Europeans - that they can be useful'.⁴⁰ This utility was demonstrated most visibly by the Clutton-Brocks, the British missionaries and non-racialists who had proved influential on the CYL leaders' political development in 1955 and who, as Stephen Matewa described in a letter in 1980, had 'known we were oppressed before we realised it ourselves'.⁴¹ Despite a difference in skin colour, the Clutton-Brocks' non-racial work at St. Faith's Mission in Rusape endeared them to the Africans in the area. 'Both seemed full of love for people. Race and colour just

³⁸ Musarurwa, 'African Nationalism', p.xviii

³⁹ Noel St. Quintin, 'History of the ANC SR', unpublished document, pr3631(i), Noel St. Quintin Collection, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

⁴⁰ Reed, 'Friday 7 March 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2)

⁴¹ Quoted in Ranger, 'Historical Perspective', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.79

didn't enter their minds at all,' described their close friend Patricia Chater.⁴² John Mutasa was another who worked with them.

Guy did a lot for us at St Faith's, more than anyone. He educated us politically. I remember him having a meeting at St Faith's with Herbert Chitepo and talking half the night. He spent much time with the nationalists. He was a man who had no class or colour bar in any form.⁴³

Given the Clutton-Brocks' reputations and support for the African cause, it was unsurprising they were quick to join the SRANC. Maurice Nyagumbo (Secretary of the Rusape branch of the SRANC and former member of the CYL) recalled Clutton-Brock's crucial role during the multiple assemblies in September 1957 from which the SRANC would be born. Clutton-Brock was asked at the last minute to fill in for Herbert Chitepo in chairing a meeting that included the CYL leaders James Chikerema and Paul Mushonga, as well as members of the (O)SRANC. Nyagumbo states that Clutton-Brock refused, answering bluntly that 'I am no different from Sir Patrick Fletcher [the Minister for Native Affairs]', and emphasising that he was a white man first and foremost and it would therefore be a mistake to include him in such a prominent way in what should be a black African affair.⁴⁴ However, at the same inaugural meeting, Clutton-Brock was the only non-black individual to speak and such acceptance did not go unnoticed as Eileen Haddon recorded.

Those attending the ANC meeting were almost all black, the few whites present being treated with great courtesy and given seats on the platform despite the fact that there were far too many people present for the seating available. The emphasis here was on non-racialism and genuine "partnership" and Guy's speech, given in English and translated into Shona by George Nyandoro, underlined the Christian message of love and equality of mankind.⁴⁵

⁴² Patricia Chater, *Hidden Treasure: A Memoir* (Harare, 2012)

⁴³ Quoted in Eileen Haddon, 'The first heroes of Zimbabwe: by some who worked with the Clutton-Brocks at St. Faiths', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.111

⁴⁴ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.107

⁴⁵ Eileen Haddon, 'Warm comforters', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.82

Word spread quickly about Clutton-Brock's involvement. In his diary entry for 15 September 1957, Reed recorded:

Whilst I have been away Terry [Ranger] has been meeting African leaders, and has attended the Inaugural meeting of the newly re-founded Southern Rhodesia African National Congress. [Guy] Clutton-Brock, who seems in an indefinite but real way somewhere behind the Congress, has suggested Terry should do work for it, without necessarily joining it - pointing out that they need a good propaganda which will have to be taken seriously by Europeans. But there is also the possibility that they have merely been persuaded by Clutton-Brock to have Europeans in, and in fact are not anxious.⁴⁶

Joshua Nkomo similarly highlighted Clutton-Brock's not-insignificant role in the context of the SRANC Executive's stated policy of non-racialism. 'There was – I must emphasise this – absolutely no intention to exclude white people as such from a full share in the national life. Guy Clutton-Brock in particular gave us significant help with drafting the new constitution.'⁴⁷ In later years the validity of this statement would be repeatedly challenged, but initially it appeared that despite the reservations some African leaders held, those non-black individuals who demonstrated a genuine support for the African cause were to be welcomed.

ii. Non-black participation

The history of white dissent in Rhodesia is a complicated one. Academics have had a tendency to divide individuals involved into three clearly defined groups: moderates, liberals, and radicals.⁴⁸ Yet these definitions were fluid, with individuals retaining multiple memberships simultaneously or transitioning from one group to another. Although such terms remain useful in broadly identifying an individual's position on the spectrum of white activism, it is important to recognise the fluidity and the role

⁴⁶ Reed, 'Sunday 15 September 1957', Diary, Vol.76

⁴⁷ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.72

⁴⁸ See Hancock, *White Liberals*, pp.2-5

self-ascribed identities played in defining one's position. Ian Hancock summarises the radicals as:

the handful of missionaries, farmers, professional people and housewives who offered more than mere sympathy for African aspirations and positively supported majority rule from the late 1950s [and] accepted a subordinate status within black-led politics.⁴⁹

The important distinction between a radical and liberal agenda was the belief in African nationalism. Like some of the African leaders, many white liberals abandoned their multi-racialism in favour of African-led politics. Peter Mackay was one example. As a result of his favourable impressions and relationships generated with African nationalists through shared experiences within the CAS, 'Peter made the same journey from "partnership" to nationalism as Leopold [Takawira],' explains Terence Ranger⁵⁰ and as the divisions between liberals and radicals widened, those who saw themselves as the latter began to voice their distaste for those who failed to follow. Writing in *Dissent* in 1959, John Reed (one of the first generation of radicals) laid bare this disdain.

Very few liberals really think being a liberal involves any sort of identification with African aspirations. They think of themselves as manipulating (so far they have done this very ineptly) an already existent political system in a direction which they believe will bring about a less racially divided country. The liberal adopts an inviting stance and waits for the African to run to join him. He doesn't join the African [...] They are striving to reform that they may preserve.⁵¹

This differences between liberal and radical activities were less clear. Both the welfare organisations seeking to support the families of detained African nationalists and the protest groups against the legal racial discrimination in Rhodesia were predominantly liberal groups in their goals and actions, yet were often led by

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.7

⁵⁰ Terence Ranger, 'Introduction', in Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.xv

⁵¹ 'Orwell in Africa', *Dissent*, No.13 (12 November 1959), p.14

radicals.⁵² Thus where the radicals are seen to stand apart was in their visions for the future. The radicals believed in a black African state; the liberals in a white state where black Africans played a significant but still subservient role to the white minority. 'A truly multiracial society, like a truly classless society, isn't just the old familiar society minus a few prejudices, with well-dressed Africans sitting in the restaurants,' explained Reed wryly.⁵³

The result of this relative extremism was that only a few whites were willing to openly support the SRANC, a pattern that also repeated within the coloured community.⁵⁴ In an interview from January 2000, James Chikerema claimed that 'in the two major towns of Salisbury and Bulawayo, [the SRANC] managed to find limited support among Coloured and Asian businessmen and professionals'⁵⁵ and Noel St. Quintin similarly notes in his unpublished manuscript on the SRANC that there were 'some coloured and Indian members,' but puts the figure at less than fifteen.⁵⁶ This small number was a reflection of how black African nationalism was regarded by those communities for whom it appeared to offer no obvious benefits over their existing policy of self-contained community-based activism. For the coloured population in particular, African nationalism remained a distant second as a means of securing change. Already marginalised by Rhodesian society for being outside of the easy taxonomy of geography ('European', 'African') or skin colour ('white', 'black'), the coloured community's rights to citizenship in Rhodesia were

⁵² See this thesis chapter 3.

⁵³ 'Orwell in Africa', *Dissent*, No.13 (12 November 1959), p.16

⁵⁴ A number of academics have argued about the use of the term 'coloured' given its problematic connotations. For a brief summary of the issues see Julia Katherine Seirlis, 'Undoing the United Front?: Coloured Soldiers in Rhodesia, 1939-1980', in *African Studies*, Vol.63, No.1 (2004), pp.73-94, p.73; & Mohammed Adhikari, 'From Narratives of Miscegenation to Post-Modernist Re-Imagining: Toward a Historiography of Coloured Identity in South Africa', in Mohamed Adhikari, ed., *Burdened by Race: Coloured Identities in Southern Africa* (Cape Town, 2009)

⁵⁵ Quoted in Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.168

⁵⁶ Noel St. Quintin, 'History of the ANC SR', unpublished document, pr3631(i), Noel St. Quintin Collection, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

perpetually uncertain despite over 90 per cent being born within the nation.⁵⁷ Thus a black nationalist ideology seemed to ignore them just as much as the white Rhodesian politics did, whilst an independent coloured movement offered them a political identity and voice which recognised their unique position in society. As James Muzondidya asserts:

the majority of coloured activists in the RTL [Rhodesia's Teachers League] and other coloured communal organisations continued to pursue their political objectives through the politics of co-operation [with] those white liberals who displayed signs of commitment to the gradual equalization of opportunities for advancement.⁵⁸

Organisations like the Coloured Community Service League and the Euro-African Patriotic Society (the latter founded by the prominent coloured Rhodesian hotelier Ronald Snapper) 'stepped up their mobilisation' and 'tried to improve their effectiveness by mobilising Coloureds [...] to defend and promote their social and economic interests as a group.'⁵⁹ The fear was that black African nationalism would absorb their distinct demands under a nationalist effort.

Although the coloured community as a whole was generally wealthier and more educated than their black counterparts, it was still only an elite sub-section who actively involved themselves in politics. Businessmen like Ronald Snapper, Christopher Raftopoulos, and Jack Jones were at the forefront. Coloured teachers were also particularly vocal critics of racial discrimination and a number were willing to 'pursue other strategies meant to yield positive results for their communities'.⁶⁰ Those coloured individuals who did join the nationalist movement in 1957 were predominantly the same generation of radical activists who had suggested closer political cooperation between coloureds and other oppressed groups in Rhodesia in the 1940s and thus had some experience of inter-racial political

⁵⁷ Floyd Dotson & Lillian Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi* (London, 1968), p.62

⁵⁸ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.165

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.85

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.165

collaboration.⁶¹ This small group had first advocated for coloured involvement with the SRLP, then the African trade unions, and finally the multi-racial organisations like the IASR and CAS. It was thus unsurprising that they embraced African nationalism when it arose.

The Indian community faced similar challenges in mobilising elements to support the Zimbabwean nationalist cause. In the 1950s a number of Indian groups were established, partly to demand rights and representation, but also according to Hasu Patel to 'search for what is the identity of the Indian community here, based on the fact that it is a migrant community'.⁶² In 1954 the radical Lotus Group was established in Bulawayo to encourage discussion around a monthly magazine. At the same time a political group (the Bulawayo Asian Civil Rights League) demonstrated the growing discontent with multi-racialism beyond the radicalism of black African elites.⁶³ Floyd and Lillian Dotson explain that the older Indian generation feared that there would be a 'moral contamination' through close cooperation with the African nationalists given the 'lower standing' of black Africans in Rhodesian society.⁶⁴ Yet although unwilling to follow the younger radicals on their progression from Indian-based protest groups to the emergent SRANC, a number of the older Indians recognised the benefit of a political cooperation based solely on the Indian community's 'non-white' classification. As was noted in a 1957 article in the *Bantu Mirror*, the older generation of leaders began referring to a partnership between all 'dark skinned people in the Federation' as something worth pursuing.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Ibbo Mandaza, *Race, Colour, and Class in Southern Africa: A study of the Coloured question in the context of an analysis of the Colonial and White settler racial ideology, and African nationalism in twentieth century Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi* (Harare, 1997), p.756

⁶² Hasu Patel, interviewed by author (8 December 2015 and 12 December 2015),

⁶³ Michael O. West, 'An Anticolonial International? Indians, India, and Africans in British Central Africa', in Vasant Kaiwar and Sucheta Mazumdar, eds., *Antinomies of Modernity: Essays on Race, Orient, Nation* (Durham, 2003), p.167

⁶⁴ Dotson, *Indians and Coloureds*, p.73

⁶⁵ 'Indians Aiming at Cooperation', *Bantu Mirror* (2 February 1957), p.13

The SRANC's leadership also recognised the benefits of a membership containing representatives of all the Rhodesian racial groups, especially the possibility of a multi-racial support base. A non-racial membership would visibly demonstrate to the white liberals with voices in Rhodesian politics as well as the ordinary rural and urban black Africans that Zimbabwean nationalism could function without the racial conflict that some of the more extremist SRANC leaders were agitating for. Such a claim was desirable from the perspective of the African party, if not imperative, at that delicate moment in time. When engaging the white state and white public, non-racialism within the African parties presented an interesting challenge to the perceptions of the African movement. 'A European party that admits Africans is multiracial: an African party that admits Europeans is still racist,' explained an article in *Dissent* in 1959.⁶⁶ This was to prove a key theme of changes in the perception of non-racialism within the nationalist movement over the next few years.

Relationships were beginning to form between many of the nationalists and the non-black supporters which added a personal dimension to the situation. As Peter Mackay explains,

I had come to know many of those who were active, or who in time would become active, in the African national movement, ordinary members of the Congress with high feelings and others who had emerged into positions of leadership.⁶⁷

These connections afforded an opportunity to force discussions. In 1957, Terence Ranger raised the question of non-black citizenship with the SRANC leaders. 'We ranged over nationalism and democracy. I tried to persuade them that they must do some serious thinking about minority safeguards and that democracy is about the rights of minorities,' he wrote.⁶⁸ John Reed's diaries similarly include a number of dinners with black and white friends including nationalist leaders, trade unionists,

⁶⁶ 'The State of the Parties', *Dissent*, No.6 (25 June 1959), p.7

⁶⁷ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.71

⁶⁸ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.27

and academics. On the 29 March 1958, Reed recorded that 'Nyandoro, Chikerema, [Moses] Ayema and [Paul] Mushona are Terry's guests to dinner,'⁶⁹ and on 30 May, Reed dined with Enoch Dumbetshena (one of the most prominent nationalists of the pre-CYL era). Afterwards both went for tea with Nathan Shamuyarira and the racial composition of the dining party was notable enough for Reed to emphasise the significance. 'Thus we sit together, European and Africans, in a house in Harare, eating and drinking and discussing.'⁷⁰ For the white Rhodesian state, this cross-racial socialising represented exactly the breakdown of established social segregation which it was desperately trying to prevent with the existing Colour Bar.

iii. Racial divisions: white Rhodesia's response to the SRANC

The reaction of the Rhodesian government to the formation of the nationalists' non-racial ideology revealed the underlying instability of Rhodesian society. The reliance on European domination of the political scene meant the existence of a popular African-led party indicated to the Rhodesian population as a whole that the government's policy of gradual advancement had failed. Compared to subsequent black nationalist parties, the SRANC's manifesto was not particularly radical. Aside from the calls for a complete revocation of the Land Apportionment Act,⁷¹ it was the fundamental incompatibility between guaranteeing a white voice in government and the SRANC's demands for majority rule which were viewed as anathema to the security of white Rhodesia. Nevertheless, the simple existence of the youth leaguers in an organisation alongside former multi-racialists was worrying for the white population. The activities of African political groups in both Nyasaland and Northern

⁶⁹ Reed, 'Saturday 29 March 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2)

⁷⁰ Reed, 'Friday 30 May 1958', Diary, Vol.78

⁷¹ Mupfuvi, 'Land to the People', p.85

Rhodesia further ensured that the SRANC was regarded as being explicitly anti-white.⁷²

The result was that whilst the dominant political paradigm in Rhodesia remained focused on multi-racial partnership, the fear of African nationalism spurred elements of the population to embrace increasingly racist politics. Stephen Hintz explains that 'the majority of white Rhodesians always possessed conservative racial attitudes, but a large percentage of this majority identified with the racially moderate party for non-racial reasons. These traditional ties were irreparably broken by the increasing prominence of racial issues.'⁷³ In an effort to stifle African nationalism, new white-led parties were formed that appealed for black and white supporters. Hercules Robinson, the leader of the Dominion Party (which would later become the RF), announced:

We must have Europeans and Africans in large numbers in all the main political parties. [...] The last thing we want to see in this country is all the Africans in one party and all the Europeans in another. If we are to do away with racial politics, it will only be done if the division in the country is political and not racial.⁷⁴

Even those white politicians who vocally supported African advancement found themselves struggling to reconcile the SRANC with their own political strategies. At the time of the SRANC's rapid early growth, the New Zealand-born farmer and missionary Garfield Todd was the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister.⁷⁵ A liberal by Rhodesian standards, Todd was nevertheless quick to attack the SRANC in December 1957 for having 'been captured [...] by those two extremists Nyandoro and

⁷² Zoë Groves, "'We Must Think in Terms of a Central African Nation': Collaboration between African Nationalisms, 1944-1963', in Kings M. Phiri, John McCracken, & Wapulumuka O. Mulwafu, eds., *Malawi in Crisis: The 1959/60 Nyasaland State of Emergency and its Legacy* (Zomba, 2012)

⁷³ Stephen E.C. Hintz, 'The Political Transformation of Rhodesia, 1958-1965', *African Studies Review*, Vol.15, No.2 (Sep., 1972), pp.173-183, p.174

⁷⁴ 'Europeans, Africans must join in political parties - Dominionite', *The Rhodesia Herald* (6 March 1958), p.2

⁷⁵ For more on Todd see Michael W. Casey, *The Rhetoric of Sir Garfield Todd: Christian Imagination and the Dream of an African Democracy* (Waco, 2007)

Clutton-Brock!⁷⁶ The involvement of both in the formation of the CYL in 1955 was public knowledge and earned them the epithet of extremist.

Todd would later become an ardent supporter of the nationalist movement, but in the late-1950s with the possibility of a multi-racial solution still on the table, he denounced racialised nationalism (of any sort) as a threat to stability in central Africa and set about attempting to secure change in his own way. The modest reforms Todd proposed would eventually see him ousted by his own cabinet, unhappy at the extent of the changes.⁷⁷ Denounced as an 'ultra-liberal',⁷⁸ Todd was accused in February 1958 of paying secret visits to Joshua Nkomo, desiring to destroy the authority of the Native Affairs Department, and prioritising the IASR over the Federation. Many scholars including John David Leaver and Dickson Mungazi see Todd's denouncement as marking 'the start of racial polarization' in the nation,⁷⁹ and emphasising to Africans that they 'could no longer place their trust and confidence in the so-called liberal whites'.⁸⁰ Even commentators at the time reiterated the significance of the event in shaping the racial nature of African politics, with Knight T.T. Maripe (Nkomo's successor in the SRTUC) declaring it 'a severe blow to the African community'.⁸¹ The multi-racialist Nathan Shamuyarira was a UFP delegate present when Todd was voted out and would later argue that with Todd's removal, the efforts 'for peaceful cooperation and swift progression toward racial equality - or better, a non-racial state -were over'.⁸² Although the government of Todd's successor Edgar Whitehead did not abandon multi-racialism completely (in

⁷⁶ Reed, 'Tuesday 3 December 1957', Diary, Vol.76

⁷⁷ See Mungazi, *The Last British Liberals*, pp.127-129.

⁷⁸ 'Editorial', *The Rhodesia Herald* (24 June 1957), p.8. 'Ultra-liberal' is a term which the Rhodesian state would increasingly use to define white nationalist supporters. See David Chanaiwa, 'The Premiership of Garfield Todd: Liberal Ideas versus Colonial Interests', paper presented at the African Studies Association Sixteenth Annual Meeting, Syracuse University, New York, 31 October - 3 November, 1973

⁷⁹ Leaver, 'Whites in Zimbabwe and Rhodesia', p.3

⁸⁰ Mungazi, *The Last British Liberals*, p.130

⁸¹ 'Removal of Todd Distresses S.R. Africans: Non-Committal on Whitehead', *African Daily News* (10 February 1958), p.1

⁸² Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, p.312

March 1958, the UFP's new branch at Bulawayo West was launched with an Indian chairman and secretary-treasurer⁸³), the new government rejected the extent and speed with which Todd had proposed changes. This stance dismayed many of the remaining African multi-racialists. Although a few would persist with partnership including Herbert Chitepo (Rhodesia's first black lawyer), Enoch Dumbutshena, and Reuben Jamela (the trade union leader), a large number shifted their support to the SRANC.

Several of these elites were motivated by personal grievances they believed could not be resolved under the Whitehead government. One was Bernard Chidzero, an academic offered a teaching position at the UCRN in 1959. Chidzero's marriage to a white French-Canadian woman meant he found himself unable to take up the place as there was nowhere for his family to reside near the university.⁸⁴ Realising any significant changes in these laws were unlikely given Todd's dismissal, Chidzero joined the SRANC in 1959 and marked his arrival with a public lecture on the topic 'Partnership in Practice', in which he criticised the differences between the actual and potential meanings of racial partnership.⁸⁵ A number of white liberals also joined the SRANC, with white membership jumping from less than twenty in December 1957 to around fifty by the autumn of 1958, according to one of the Rhodesian police tasked with observing the organisation.⁸⁶ Accompanying this surge of supporters, there appeared to be the possibility of cooperation between the largely antagonistic trade unions, nationalists, and multi-racialists. At a meeting in April 1958 organised by the Commercial and General Workers Union, the SRANC, Trade Unions Congress (TUC), Christian Action Group, and IASR were all represented, and attendees included Hardwicke Holderness, George Nyandoro, James Chikerema, Paul Mashona, John Reed, Terence Ranger, and Guy Clutton-Brock.⁸⁷

⁸³ 'Indians to lead UFP branch', *The Rhodesia Herald* (11 March 1958), p.5

⁸⁴ Cary & Mitchell, eds., *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.5

⁸⁵ Bernard Chidzero, *Partnership in Practice* (London, 1960)

⁸⁶ Roland Letchworth-Mills, interviewed by author (23 December 2014)

⁸⁷ 'Holderness to Speak', *African Daily News* (13 April 1958), p.2

Unfortunately, the public knowledge that whites were involved with the nationalist leadership enabled the Rhodesian government to propagate rumours of the 'educated African who poses as a leader of the people, but in whose background there is a white man who tells him what to do.'⁸⁸ On the 28 May 1958, Reed recorded 'there is some [...] nonsense about a story that there are six Europeans, who control Congress and they are all in the URP, and the URP is merely a facade for the ANC (or the other way round).'⁸⁹ Such attacks were indicative of a deeply rooted fear held by the white state; the mobilisation of the African population by a foreign power.

As would become familiar rhetoric in future years, the white Rhodesian state was quick to paint the nationalist movement as one influenced by outside forces, particularly Communist ones. In his New Year's message, Sir Roy Welensky (the CAF's Prime Minister) explicitly condemned the dangers of a 'communist influence through the medium of African nationalism.'⁹⁰ In the global context of the Cold War and with the presence of Soviet or Chinese weapons and instructors elsewhere on the continent (especially in Algeria and Egypt), attempts were made to highlight the foreignness of the white radicals from the white Rhodesian nation and thus discredit their connection to the African struggle. The white settlers ardently believed 'the "natives" could not have done it alone; there must have been a white hand behind it and that meant a red hand,' explained Clutton-Brock.⁹¹ In January 1958, Eric Louw (the South African Minister of External Affairs) stated that Africans in Southern Rhodesia were being:

led up the garden path by India and other Eastern countries who are looking only after their own interests and who will not hesitate to use and exploit the black peoples of Africa for the furtherance of such interests.⁹²

⁸⁸ Sithole, *African Nationalism*, p.34

⁸⁹ Reed, 'Thursday 28 May 1958', Diary, Vol.78

⁹⁰ 'Danger to Federation is recognised', *The Rhodesia Herald*, (1 January 1958), p.3

⁹¹ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.90

⁹² 'Africa warned against Asian influence', *The Rhodesia Herald* (18 January 1958), p.3

The labelling of all white radicals as communists, regardless of their politics, afforded the Rhodesian government with justification to keep them under observation. On 19 March 1958, Garfield Todd reported to Terence Ranger that he had seen both Ranger and Reed's names on a list of white SRANC members,⁹³ and Reed's ongoing engagement with the African trade unions had also been noted by the intelligence services.⁹⁴ The distrust of any dissenting elements of the white Rhodesian state would grow until all institutions potentially harbouring liberals or radicals were viewed with suspicion. These included the Cold Comfort Farm of the Clutton-Brocks, Ranche House College established and run by Ken and Lillian Mew,⁹⁵ and even the UCRN.

iv. 1959 State of Emergency

The description of Zimbabwean nationalism as being part of an international movement was also a response to the pan-Africanism surrounding the independence of Ghana in 1958. As Zoë Groves has shown, the events that transpired in 1958 and 1959 regarding the SRANC cannot be understood without considering the transnational collaboration of the African nationalist movements within the CAF and beyond.⁹⁶ The nationalist movements in all three federal territories shared a number of aims and objectives, and the pan-African sentiments that had emerged provided a framework on which the peoples of the CAF had sought to work together. As evidenced in the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra in December 1958 'such

⁹³ Reed, 'Wednesday 19 March 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2)

⁹⁴ 'FISB Secret Memo: 18 November 1959', S.R.C.(S)(59)289, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

⁹⁵ See Rowland Fothergill, *Laboratory for Peace: the story of Ken and Lilian Mew and of Ranche House College* (Bulawayo, 1984), pp.168-169, 202

⁹⁶ See Groves, 'Transnational Networks'

contacts with older nationalist movements were important in that they helped to internationalise what later became known as the Rhodesian problem.⁹⁷

Whilst protests in Southern Rhodesia remained relatively peaceful, worries were growing regarding the escalating violence in Nyasaland.⁹⁸ On 26 February 1959 a State of Emergency was declared across the CAF. Under the pretence of growing African violence in the region, 495 people were detained for their association with the ANC parties of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁹⁹ Of those detained, 492 were black men, two were black women, and one (Guy Clutton-Brock) was the sole white detainee.¹⁰⁰ As a sign of the distrust white Rhodesians had for Clutton-Brock, Edward Aitken-Cade (leader of the opposition) 'appealed to the Government that the [Emergency] regulations should be implemented without discrimination', adding 'there are Europeans in these organisations for whom he hoped there would be room in the Federation's prisons.'¹⁰¹ Clutton-Brock held the honour of being 'the first European to be arrested under emergency regulations',¹⁰² and the Clutton-Brocks' daughter Sally vividly recalled her realisation that the family were no longer regarded as nuisance liberals.

The crunch came in 1959. Five hundred Africans and Dad were arrested. I'd overheard girls at school saying "Kill all those terrorists" and there it was on the front page of the paper – my Dad was one of them and white into the bargain. There was silence when I walked into the locker room.¹⁰³

⁹⁷ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.68. For an example of the negative aspect, see Harold Soref, & Ian Greig, eds., *The Puppeteers: An examination of those organisations and bodies concerned with the elimination of the white man in Africa* (London, 1965)

⁹⁸ John McCracken, *A History of Malawi, 1859-1966* (Woodbridge, 2012), p.351

⁹⁹ See Vambe, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, p.281

¹⁰⁰ 'The Forgotten Men', *Dissent*, No.3 (23 April 1959), p.5. Some sources claim 495 people were arrested.

¹⁰¹ "'Best to remove troublemakers and keep them out of mischief", Sir Edgar tells House', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 February 1959), p.2

¹⁰² 'European detained under emergency regulations', *The Rhodesia Herald* (2 March 1959), p.1

¹⁰³ Sally Roschnik, 'Growing Up: As the C-B's only child', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.69

Clutton-Brock's arrest was also recognised by the black nationalists as noteworthy. As Terence Ranger wrote:

I remember arrested and detained members of Congress writing to me in 1959 to say that they were astonished that Guy had been arrested: that it was only Guy and a few other people who reminded Africans that the struggle was not a racial one, but a struggle for justice.¹⁰⁴

The attention given to Clutton-Brock's detention demonstrates how prominent the presence of non-Africans within the nationalist movement was and how discouraging the rise of this non-racial nationalist movement was for the white state. Edgar Whitehead was particularly reluctant to let the black nationalism replace white-led multi-racialism. On 26 February 1959, Whitehead warned that 'unless multi-racialism worked [...] there could be nothing but misery ahead for the country.' During the same press conference, Whitehead was asked what had been the biggest motivation for him proclaiming an emergency. He replied: 'I feared the Congress pressure on Africans who believed in multi-racial development was getting worse and worse.'¹⁰⁵ In Parliament the following month, Edwin Aitkin-Cade pressed the Minister of Justice to both reveal the names of any whites who were members of the SRANC and to state the extent to which the party had been externally financed. When the Minister refused the former on the basis of public interest and the latter on a lack of concrete information, Aitkin-Cade insisted that since the name of Clutton-Brock had been publicly disclosed, the names of the other members should be also.¹⁰⁶

Although fifty African detainees were freed shortly after, Clutton-Brock was the first to be released in a move which brought international focus to the nationalist struggle.¹⁰⁷ An article in *Time Magazine* on 4 June 1959 entitled 'Religion: The

¹⁰⁴ Ranger, 'Historical Perspective', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.79

¹⁰⁵ 'The Future: Whitehead has Faith in Partnership', *The Rhodesia Herald* (27 February 1959), p.1

¹⁰⁶ 'Minister Refuses to Name Arrested Europeans', *The African Daily News* (5 March 1959), p.4

¹⁰⁷ Wood, *So far*, p.18

Practical Christian', portrayed Clutton-Brock as an integral part of the African nationalist struggle. Although a distinctly American racialised rhetoric crept into the article (especially the use of the term 'Negroes'), it nevertheless emphasised Clutton-Brock's commitment to the cause and highlighted both his month in prison and his camaraderie with the African nationalists. 'When Congress organizers were branded "agitators", he [Clutton-Brock] said: "It is the duty of every citizen and Christian to be an agitator for justice, righteousness and truth"', the article reported.¹⁰⁸

As the article demonstrated, little is said of Clutton-Brock which does not take into account his religious and socio-political beliefs, often deliberately misconstrued by his critics as communist in their basis. A more accurate assessment is that Clutton-Brock was able to 'reconcile Christianity with Marxism',¹⁰⁹ resulting in what Donald S. Moore describes as a 'Christian humanism dedicated to racial equality.' Because of this belief system 'Clutton-Brock embodied access to capital, knowledge, and support that spanned countries and continents'.¹¹⁰ Along with those Africans who had been educated through the mission school system, Clutton-Brock believed that there was no place for racial discrimination in a Christian society. As he himself explained, 'living close to African life, we inevitably identified ourselves with the problems of those among whom we lived.'¹¹¹ Christianity provided him with a greater understanding of these issues than a purely economic or political foundation. Furthermore, Clutton-Brock's religious faith earned him support from other radical elements of the Christian community. After his arrest, Cecil Alderson (Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland) stated that 'Clutton-Brock has taken the only course open to an honourable man to take.'¹¹² Others took his actions as indicative of

¹⁰⁸ 'Religion: The Practical Christian', *Time Magazine* (4 June 1959)

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in Trevor Grundy, 'Champion of the wretched....', walesonline.co.uk, <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/local-news/champion-wretched----2342425> (accessed 24 March 2015)

¹¹⁰ Donald S. Moore, *Suffering for Territory: Race, Place and Power in Zimbabwe* (Harare, 2005), pp.200-202

¹¹¹ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.75

¹¹² Moyo, *The Bible, the Bullet, and the Ballot*, p.95

the strength of spirit a strong conviction in a socialist agenda afforded, including the British Labour Party.¹¹³

Nevertheless, as J.R.T. Wood notes, 'Clutton-Brock, of course, was far more involved in the activities of the SRANC than the protestors would concede,'¹¹⁴ and many white Rhodesians did not view the single white arrest as going far enough. Motions were put forward in the Rhodesian Parliament for the ANC parties throughout the CAF to be banned permanently due to the undue influence of whites within the groups, as one MP explained.

I am satisfied that certain persons have set out wrongly to inflame the legitimate grievances of Africans in Southern Rhodesia [...] These persons have endeavoured to instil in the minds of Africans a contempt for properly constituted authority [...] They have brought terror by threat and intimidation.¹¹⁵

Into this environment was brought the Unlawful Organisations Bill which legally banned the ANC in all three Federal territories and made membership of any proscribed organisation punishable by up to five years in prison.¹¹⁶ As an attempt to suppress the rise of the SRANC, the widespread repression was successful - albeit temporarily - and the arrests of many of the leading nationalist stalwarts ensured a disruption in the daily running of the nationalist parties.¹¹⁷ Yet the Rhodesian state's actions also served to exacerbate racial tensions, particularly between the nationalist leaders and the white Rhodesian government. In the aftermath, attitudes to the settler governments throughout the CAF became increasingly hostile. As *Dissent* reported on Nyasaland, 'the events of the emergency have made their hatred of Federation

¹¹³ Wood, *So Far*, p.18

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18

¹¹⁵ John Pittman quoted in 'Order will last 5 years', *The Rhodesia Herald* 18 March 1959), p.1

¹¹⁶ Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, pp.87-93

¹¹⁷ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.120

almost obsessive. This hatred and the suspicion of all Europeans which it engenders is damaging both to the present and the future prosperity of Nyasaland.¹¹⁸

Similar attitudes had arisen in Southern Rhodesia. Despite the SRANC's relative moderation,¹¹⁹ the firm actions of the Rhodesian state ensured that African nationalism began to swing more broadly towards majority rule and anti-white sentiments. The infamous Law and Order (Maintenance) Act [LOMA] introduced in December 1960 was a particularly clear sign of the deliberately racialised repressive stance of the white state.¹²⁰ Writing in 1960, Richard Gray described the polarisation of the races as a result of the emergency measures,¹²¹ and in casual conversations amongst members of the SRANC, the growing rancour against all whites in Rhodesia was noted as having taken on an unprecedented antagonism. 'I cannot help but sense an inevitable misunderstanding and mistrust between the African and even the European who wants there to be understanding and trust,' Reed had noted on 15 September 1959.¹²²

Despite the surge in anti-white sentiments, by 1959 there remained a few moderate African elites who remained committed to multi-racialism including Mike Hove, Patrick Rubatika, Stanlake Samkange, Jasper Savanhu and Lawrence Vambe.¹²³ Their reasoning was explained in *Dissent*.

Some 'moderates' feel that a withdrawal of this kind [from multi-racial activities] would betray the liberal Europeans and not hurt others. [...] Others are still suspicious that the mass African political movements will drift into methods which they condemn as much as ever.¹²⁴

¹¹⁸ 'Boma's Dilemma', *Dissent*, No.10 (10 September 1959), p.4

¹¹⁹ For more on the SRANC's relative moderation, see Groves, 'Transnational Networks', p.169

¹²⁰ See Palley, 'Law and the Unequal Society'

¹²¹ Richard Gray, *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in The Rhodesias and Nyasaland* (London, 1960), pp.293-294

¹²² Reed, 'Tuesday 15 September 1959', Diary, Vol.85

¹²³ See David Moore, 'The Contradictory Construction of Hegemony in Zimbabwe: Politics, Ideology and Class in the Formation of a New African State', D.Phil., University of York, Canada, 1990, p.80

¹²⁴ 'Africa Year in Southern Rhodesia', *Dissent*, No.15 (14 January 1960), p.15

These tensions were a mere indicator of the internal struggles that would dominate the nationalist movement, and in which the role of non-blacks would come to be increasingly scrutinised. Even at this stage, there was no certainty as to which route would be likely to succeed in securing majority rule, and many Africans were willing to try to keep open as many options as possible.

Conclusion

Although the SRANC was ultimately banned, it made substantial advances in defining Zimbabwean nationalist ideology and what citizenship of the future imagined nation would entail. It began to establish the role non-black individuals could play in the African cause and what positions they would occupy after independence. More broadly it affected relatively significant changes within Southern Rhodesian society and politics. As Ngwabi Bhebe explains:

The SRANC was successful in that it brought about the genesis of mass nationalism in Southern Rhodesia; in that its methods were effective enough to frighten the whites into banning it as well as into embarking upon reforming their colonial system, even though the reforms were far below what the Africans wanted. Moreover, the founders of the new SRANC succeeded in one of their ambitions in that they established “a national organisation” which spoke with authority and backing on all matters affecting (African) interests.¹²⁵

In an article in *Dissent* published in October 1959, the inherent challenges Whitehead faced in preventing a resurgence of the SRANC were laid bare.

The Government must know - [...] after the information gathered during the Emergency - how difficult this task [of removing African grievances] is going to be. They must now realise that Congress had widespread support and the grievances which ensured it that support were not "pin-pricks" but sprang from the fundamental legislation of the country. For Congress was not merely the instrument of the half-educated city slicker - if it had been it would not have presented the degree of danger that it did to the Government. Congress was

¹²⁵ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.69

remarkable because it brought together for the first time two potentially dynamic African political forces - the force of the peasantry and the force of the urban worker - a traditionally potent revolutionary combination. Congress had the sympathy of the educated, "emergent" African and it was led by the frustrated half-educated. But its impetus was given by the peasants and the workers.¹²⁶

After the emergency, the Rhodesian government made clear its belief that African nationalism had been silenced and that the way forward would now be through the policies of gradual advancement offered by Whitehead's government.

Yet there were three factors that undermined such claims. First, the Devlin Commission's report published in July 1959 highlighted the mass support that the SRANC had held, including from non-black sections of the Federation's population.¹²⁷ Secondly, the release within a month of a large proportion of those detained during the Emergency ensured that the nationalist movement retained some impetus. Imbued now with their experiences in detention to add to their complaints against the government, the nationalist leaders gained a legitimacy with being arrested. In the interim, the removal of certain leaders had permitted 'stand-in players to come on stage [...] Michael Mawema, Leopold Takawira, Sketchley Samkange, Moton Malianga, George Silundika, Enos Nkala in the colony and Robert Mugabe abroad.'¹²⁸ Many of this new generation would be important in defining the racialism of Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. Their sudden prominence marked a crucial opportunity to attain personal power, but also to bring to the fore their own beliefs for the struggle, and with the continued detention of the older nationalist leaders, this shift within the movement would become notable in the following years.

Thirdly, and most importantly, the Emergency of 1959 provided an opportunity for non-blacks to once again demonstrate their commitment to the

¹²⁶ 'The Edgarian Settlement', *Dissent*, No.12 (22 October 1959), p.11

¹²⁷ See Patrick Devlin (Baron), *Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry as presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Colonies by command of Her Majesty, July 1959* (London, 1959). Also Brian Simpson, 'The Devlin Commission (1959): Colonialism, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law', *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Vol.22, No.1 (2002), pp.17-52

¹²⁸ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.72

African cause in the face of anti-white antagonism. As Guy Clutton-Brock would reflect, 'the racial emergency produced a new outburst of non-racial activity.'¹²⁹ A core-group of radicals including John Reed, Peter Mackay, and Shelagh Ranger made repeat visits to the Khami and Selukwe prisons in order to assist the families of detainees in seeing their imprisoned fathers, husbands, brothers, and sons.¹³⁰ The Rangers, Clutton-Brocks, and Haddons further worked with Stanlake Samkange, Nathan Shamuyarira and Herbert Chitepo to establish the Southern Rhodesian (Detainees) Legal Aid and Welfare Fund (SRLAWF), an organisation whose primary goal was to raise funds in order to provide legal defence for arrested African nationalists.¹³¹ With international support from religious and secular organisations, the SRLAWF won admiration from the detainees and their families and from the African public more broadly, and would persist well into the 1960s.¹³² With help from the Christian Action Group (another multi-racial non-political organisation active in Southern Rhodesia¹³³), the SRLAWF ensured that 'every detainee has received assistance to put in his answer to the Government's charges, [...] the longest and most complicated cases have been defended and [...] the general case for Congress has been stated.'¹³⁴ As George Karekwaivanane has shown, the legal and racial aspects of such cases also highlighted the racial divisions within the trust of the law and those who practised it. Herbert Chitepo, the first African lawyer in Southern Rhodesia, played a significant role in defending the nationalist detainees largely with

¹²⁹ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.94

¹³⁰ Reed, 'Tuesday 22 September 1959', Diary, Vol.85

¹³¹ 'Committee Meeting Minutes, 1959', Southern Rhodesia Legal Aid and Welfare Fund Papers, ICS/107, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, UK. The 'detainees' was dropped shortly after its creation.

¹³² In its first appeal, the Fund raised £1,567 from within Rhodesia and £2,041 from overseas. See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.44

¹³³ For more on the Christian Action Group see W.R. Peadar, 'Aspects of the Church and its Political Involvement in Southern Rhodesia, 1959-1972', *Zambezia*, Vol.7, No.2 (1979), pp.191-210, p.197

¹³⁴ 'An Appeal', *Dissent*, No.9 (27 August 1959), p.14.

funding from the SRLAWF,¹³⁵ and did so alongside white lawyers such as Edwin Lichtenstein, Bryan Elliot, Antony Eastwood, Ken Reagan, and Leo Baron. Many of these strongly objected to the 'actions of the Rhodesian authorities and fought tirelessly on behalf of their clients,' regardless of their own stance on Zimbabwean nationalism.¹³⁶

Such actions demonstrated the breadth of ways in which the white radicals sought to demonstrate their utility to the African cause, and to justify their inclusion in a Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. Membership of the SRANC had demonstrated a willingness to participate in African politics, and the arrest of Clutton-Brock had emphasised their readiness to suffer in the name of the cause. Although their role remained uncertain, their continuing presence ensured that they could not be ignored. Race had to be discussed and debated, and a new form of racial politics created to replace multi-racial partnership. Given the strength of these convictions it was unsurprising that the issue of race was raised as soon as mention of a replacement nationalist party was made. With the National Democratic Party's (NDP) formation, the non-black radicals found themselves not only tolerated but valued because of their racial identities. If the SRANC had set the stage for non-racial nationalism, it was the NDP which cemented the place of non-blacks in the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle. Yet this acceptance was hard fought and had to be maintained in the face of new challenges, as the next chapter shows.

¹³⁵ George Karekwaivanane, 'Intermediaries, Intellectuals and Translators: Examining the History of the First Generation of African Lawyers in Zimbabwe', paper presented at the World History Seminar Series, University of Cambridge, 5 March 2015

¹³⁶ Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, p.152

Chapter 3

Open Nationalism and Internal Disagreements: The NDP and ZAPU, 1959-1962

Introduction

On 1 January 1960, the NDP was launched in the African township of Highfield near Salisbury. For what was designed to be a successor to the banned SRANC, the NDP did not appear to be anything of the sort. Despite the presence of several stalwarts of African nationalism, the NDP's executive was dominated by new adherents to the nationalist cause. These comprised a younger generation of well-educated, internationally-minded radicals alongside several older multi-racialist elites and intellectuals who saw the banning of the SRANC as an opportunity to impose their own agendas onto a malleable political context. Consequently, the NDP quickly established itself as being far more radical than its predecessor, and explicitly called for majority rule and a universal franchise. Rather than simply envisioning a wholesale take-over of the Rhodesian state, the NDP also began to discuss the details involved in constructing a Zimbabwean nation, including the creation of a national consciousness that embraced their identities as black Africans.

The resulting movement became a 'milestone in the resurgence of African politics'.¹ The NDP and its successor the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU) provided the most successful definitions of Zimbabwean nationalism during the period of 'open nationalism'. But this consolidation also led to the first large-scale internal disagreements, including the formation of radical splinter groups espousing a competing (and often antithetical) nationalist agenda. As both a continuation of the objectives of the SRANC and a more focused liberation ideology, this chapter argues

¹ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.168

that the NDP and ZAPU nevertheless retained many of the problems which had historically plagued African politics in Zimbabwe. These included an elite focus, a failure to transfer non-racial ideals from the leadership to the ordinary African supporters, and a lack of cohesion around race and citizenship in the imagined Zimbabwean nation. As with the SRANC, uncertainty about the chosen direction for the anti-colonial struggle was complicated by the existence of non-nationalist movements including the African trade unions and multi-racial white-led political parties.

The first two sections of this chapter focus on the debates about race which accompanied the emergence of the NDP. The argument is put forward that distrust with multi-racial politics and the impact the white state's repression did much to shape racial thinking within the NDP. The leadership were forced to more clearly define the positioning of non-black supporters within the movement and in the future Zimbabwean nation than within the SRANC. Furthermore, debates about the place of those individuals who were neither black nor white (particularly involving the coloured community) also gained importance. The third section tackles the short-lived tolerance of ZAPU and the spaces created for discussion and change after the NDP's banning. The perennial confusion that dominated the leadership of the nationalist movement also became apparent during this period, and the interactions between non-black radicals, the nationalist leadership, and ordinary African nationalists, are all explored. Finally, the growing risks to non-black radicals for their support of the African cause and the internal conflicts surrounding an increasingly racist and violent movement are assessed, with the banning of ZAPU in September 1962 bringing the chapter to a close.

i. Race and Citizenship in the NDP's formation, January 1960 - June 1960

The NDP made clear from the outset that it was not going to shy away from the controversial issues of race and citizenship. Partly this was a reflection of the SRANC's own troubled efforts to distinguish itself from multi-racial organisations,

whilst simultaneously accommodating former multi-racialists. Because the SRANC had failed to clearly define its own position regarding non-black individuals within the struggle, it had permitted contradictory viewpoints to arise, much to the confusion of those non-blacks looking to provide assistance. Indeed, as the previous chapter demonstrated, it was only the personal relationships between prominent white radicals like Guy Clutton-Brock and the former CYL leaders which had permitted a non-racial policy based on utility to emerge in the first place.

However, the NDP's deliberate focus on non-black supporters was also a reflection of the shift at the highest ranks. Maurice Nyagumbo (who remained in detention at Selukwe) described the NDP 'as much or more the creation of a new generation of political activists many of whom [...] had remained relatively aloof in the Congress period'.² At an inaugural meeting attended by some 900 people, an interim executive council was elected including the seasoned African politician Michael Mawema as interim president, Moton Malianga, Stanlake Samkange, Nazaris Marondera, Enos Nkala and Joshua Nkomo (from abroad).³ This combination of younger radicals like Malianga with older African politicians like Mawema and Samkange guaranteed conflict within the leadership over fundamental policies, but this first NDP meeting also demonstrated several other important changes involving the nationalist movement and the Rhodesian political landscape. Several prominent multi-racialists participated in the discussions, including Leopold Takawira (the former organising secretary of the CAS and a member of the white-led multi-racial CAP) who remained convinced that a multi-racial solution was still needed. As Michael West explains, Takawira's speech to the meeting was 'pure partnership' and focused on a moderate solution to Rhodesia's problems, to the extent that the NDP leaders 'found it prudent to disassociate themselves from his comments'.⁴ Terence Ranger further reported that a group of the African middle class

² Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.128

³ See Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.71

⁴ West, *African Middle Class*, p.221

(colloquially called the 'Beatrice Cottage group'⁵) also attended the first meeting.⁶ Such support was not entirely surprising. Many of the African elites and aspirant middle-classes had been hostile to African nationalism because of the challenge it posed to their own social status. Yet by the time of the NDP's formation, it was apparent that there had been a steady disintegration of multi-racial partnership ideals whilst African nationalism was in a period of sustained growth. Individuals like Takawira therefore believed their best chance of persisting with a multi-racialist agenda was to play a role in defining African nationalism from an early stage. Although not well received, Takawira's attendance at the NDP meeting was a means of testing how responsive the movement was to non-racial ideologies.

The NDP's maiden meeting further provided an opportunity for the non-black radicals to ascertain their ascribed roles within the new party. As with the SRANC, assurances about the NDP's non-racial stance were quickly forthcoming. 'Europeans, it was made clear, were welcome - if they were prepared to accept African leadership - but the time had come when only Africans could help Africans,' recalled one attendee.⁷ This was a more clearly worded condition for participation than the SRANC had ever made, but it was also a tentative acknowledgement that it was unwise to completely exclude non-black supporters. Issues of race within the nationalist ideology were further clarified by the NDP's publicity secretary Nazaris Marondera the following month. In a letter published in *Dissent*, Marondera laid out the NDP's criteria for non-black citizenship in the future Zimbabwean nation.

The party has defined that any immigrant who has decided to make Africa his home and subscribes to the belief that all men are born free and equal shall be called an African. The party sees no sense in anybody calling himself a European when he has decided to make Africa his home. The party has

⁵ They were named for their residence in the 74 cottages let to middle-class black Africans just outside the Harare township. See Kudakwashe Manganga, 'A historical study of industrial ethnicity in urban colonial Zimbabwe and its contemporary transitions: The case of African Harare, c.1890-1980', Ph.D., Stellenbosch University, 2013, pp.120-121

⁶ 'Terence Ranger to John Reed, 6 January 1960', Terence Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

⁷ 'African Year in Southern Rhodesia', *Dissent*, No.15 (14 January 1960), p.15

therefore committed itself to a non-racial policy. For its membership, it depends on popular support freely given on the full appreciation of its policies and principles [...] If any racial group decides as a racial group to exclude itself from the National Democratic Party, it does not then follow that the party is a racist organisation.⁸

Rarely had an African politician spoken so candidly about race and the nationalist struggle. Marondera's letter was the first time that a senior member in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement clarified the fluidity of the term 'African' and the associated rights to participation in the nation building efforts that came with the label. As well as a clear rejection of the Rhodesian state's use of biological race, Marondera's statement was a dismissal of racial terms based on skin colour. It indicated that the Zimbabwean nationalist ideology espoused by the NDP did not associate 'Africanness' with 'blackness', as it would in later years. Rather it was possible for anyone to claim the right to participate in an African nation regardless of their skin colour. The reasoning behind this explicit stance lies with Raymond Suttner's theory that the advancement of a non-racial stance involved considering not only the ideological, but also the practical realities of organising a political activity.⁹ The NDP had come into being at the very moment in Rhodesian history where multi-racialism still held sway whilst African nationalism was not yet viewed as a militant movement. Consequently, its racial stance reflected this context, including considering non-black individuals as intrinsic to the struggle.

Another reason for the NDP's non-racialism was the influence of two brothers: Sketchley and Stanlake Samkange. The sons of the African minister and politician Thompson Samkange, the Samkange brothers represented the dichotomy in Zimbabwean nationalism. Stanlake was a product of mission primary schools and South African higher education (including Adams College and Fort Hare), who turned his attention first to politics and then to journalism, before continuing his

⁸ N.K. Marondera, 'Letter to the Editor', *Dissent*, No.16 (16 February 1960), p.14

⁹ Raymond Suttner, 'Understanding Non-racialism as an Emancipatory Concept in South Africa', *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, Vol.59, No.130 (2012), pp.22-41, p.28

studies in the USA. Whilst abroad from 1957 to 1959, Stanlake formed close friendships with a number of American civil rights activists and became a firm supporter of Garfield Todd's multi-racialism upon his return (he was elected the junior Deputy President of the CAP, as well as the chairman of the Christian Action Group).¹⁰ Many of the non-black radicals spoke of Stanlake in glowing terms. Terence Ranger was a particularly close friend, describing him as a man 'without a trace of racial feeling,'¹¹ and John Reed was similarly effusive:

[Stanlake] looks forward not to a time when the Africans have won, but to a time when there will be no bitterness or difficulties between Africans and Europeans. [He] would like to see 2000 Europeans in the NDP - this would be a kind of guarantee of good will between the races.¹²

Sketchley Samkange's early life and career could not have contrasted more to that of his older brother, yet he too retained a strong belief in non-racialism. After struggling in school, Sketchley had briefly run a farm before finding himself more and more involved in African politics. He was a founding member of the NDP, and became a close friend of Ranger, Mackay, and Reed, and all three were present when Sketchley tragically drowned in a Malawian swimming pool in May 1961, aged only 25.¹³ An indication of Sketchley's non-racial influence came at his funeral, which saw prominent African politicians like Michael Mawema and Leopold Takawira mourn alongside the Clutton-Brocks, the Rangers, Mackay, and Reed. As Reed recorded,

Michael Mawema talks about their work together, when they formed the NDP. And how they were arrested together last year and shared the same cell. Sketchley had sung all through the night and in the morning had said that if he died before freedom came, he knew there would come others after him. He could make friends with people of all races and so we see the white people who

¹⁰ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, pp.33-34

¹¹ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.61

¹² Reed, '8 August 1960', Diary, Vol.89

¹³ See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, pp.89-90

are here today at his funeral - and yet he had no hatred in his heart for those who were opposed to him.¹⁴

The Samkange brothers' firm belief in a non-racial approach to African liberation was more in keeping with the ideology of non-black radicals like Reed than many nationalist leaders. Whilst Reed explained in April 1958 that interactions between the radicals and nationalists were important if 'the absolute separation of black and white' was to be avoided,¹⁵ Sketchley similarly insisted that it would be a mistake for the NDP to isolate itself from potential supporters on the grounds of race. Tasked with attending NDP meetings and noting the non-black attendees,¹⁶ a Rhodesian police officer named Steven McCarthy recalled one local branch meeting at which Sketchley Samkange made an impassioned speech.

One point that they all made [...] was the need for more Europeans in their new organisation than in their last [...] One of the blacks spoke, he was a known troublemaker, from one of the known radical families; this boy spoke for a while [...] and he said that they could not afford to lose the help of willing volunteers because of the colour of their skin.¹⁷

However, whilst the positioning of whites was receiving attention within the NDP, the same could not be said of other non-black groups, particularly the coloured community. No other racial group in Rhodesia was as neglected in political discourse as the coloured population. Only a few days after the NDP's launch, the Rhodesia National Association (RNA) which represented the coloured and other mixed race elements, formally complained about a speech given by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in mid-January 1960. In a telegram sent to Macmillan, the RNA wrote:

We beg leave to draw your attention to the existence of over 20,000 Eurafrican or Coloured people in the Federation, exclusive of Africans, Europeans, and

¹⁴ Reed, '23 May 1961', Diary, Vol.93

¹⁵ Reed, 'Sunday 13 April 1958', Diary, Vol.76(2)

¹⁶ As the NDP was a registered political party, it was illegal to bar police from observing their meetings.

¹⁷ Steven McCarthy, interviewed by author (15 January 2015)

Asians. Regret and disappointed that you did not mention this racial group in your speech today after mentioning the other three. May we know the reason please.¹⁸

Macmillan's failure to include the coloured community in his speech was indicative of a broader trend that saw it as easier to dismiss the coloured population than it was to clarify their position in Rhodesian society. As Mohammed Adhikari explains, many coloureds saw themselves as white through a result of skin colour and ancestry,¹⁹ particularly because identifying as white provided them far more benefits in Rhodesian society.²⁰ This conflict over classification led both black Africans and white settlers to oppose the concept of a distinct coloured identity,²¹ and 'the Asians and coloureds were so few that we were unable or unwilling to form our own racial clique,' recalled Fay Chung (a Chinese-Zimbabwean UCRN student).²² Himself a coloured Zimbabwean, Brian Raftopoulos explained that 'the term "coloured" is in fact a very artificial one, imposed here by the colonial government. [...] Originally, many coloureds lived with Africans. They lived as Africans.'²³ By the time of the NDP's emergence in 1960, there was a growing resentment amongst the coloured minority of their status as 'second class citizens' which could have encouraged their participation with African nationalism.²⁴

Yet these shared grievances proved not to be enough to overcome three factors identified by James Muzondidya as preventing a widespread coloured support of African nationalist politics.²⁵ The first of these was the marginality of coloureds within the social, political, and economic systems of Southern Rhodesia, tied to the

¹⁸ 'Coloureds Protest to Macmillan', *The Rhodesia Herald* (20 January 1960), p.1.

¹⁹ See Adhikari, 'From Narratives of Miscegnation', p.171

²⁰ See Milner-Thornton, "'Rider of Two Horses'"

²¹ B.J. Mnyanda quoted in James Muzondidya, 'Race, ethnicity and the politics of positioning: the making of coloured identities in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1980', in Adhikari, *Burdened by Race*, p.167; & Josiah Brownell, *The Collapse of Rhodesia: Population Demographics and the Politics of Race* (London, 2011), p.26

²² Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.40

²³ Quoted in Frederikse, *None but Ourselves*, p.238

²⁴ Mandaza, *Race, Colour, and Class*, pp.809-814

²⁵ See Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, pp.170-174

isolationist development along racial lines. Coloureds attended their own schools and generally lived in separate suburbs, due in part to the segregationist laws of the time.²⁶ Their economic marginality was demonstrated not only through their reduced earnings, but their predominant employment in a few specific professions (including shop owners, laundry, tailoring, or hospitality).²⁷ Small urban areas like Rotten Row in Salisbury became known for the number of coloured businesses.²⁸ The result was that this marginality 'constrained the mobilisation of coloureds into radical nationalist politics'.²⁹

Secondly, this marginality also created what Muzondidya describes as structural impediments to coloured engagement in nationalist politics. Between 1950 and 1960, six pieces of legislation had been introduced 'to come to terms with the rise of nationalism', including the LOMA.³⁰ Given their already precarious position in society, many coloured radicals found the threat of imprisonment or unemployment too large to justify political activities. John Reed, Terence Ranger, and several other white radicals employed at the UCRN also raised concerns yet as white members of Rhodesian society they had a labour mobility that many of the coloured working class lacked.³¹ Attending nationalist meetings or marches in African townships presented other issues, such as navigating the various segregated urban laws. Migrant coloured workers were particularly at risk since the conditions of their immigration restricted political activity on threat of deportation.³²

Finally, this marginality from society also affected the way the Zimbabwean nationalists viewed coloured participation. As Muzondidya contends:

²⁶ Juliette Bridgette Milner-Thornton, *The Long Shadow of the British Empire: The Ongoing Legacies of Race and Class in Zambia* (London, 2012), p.137

²⁷ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.148

²⁸ Brian Raftopoulos, interviewed by author (27 November 2015)

²⁹ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.170

³⁰ Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, p.87

³¹ See Kenneth Good, 'Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia', *African Affairs*, Vol.73, No.1 (1974), pp.10-36, especially pp.16-19

³² Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.174

The position of coloureds or the place of coloured identity in a resurgent African nationalism was [...] never fully defined. In the prevailing African nationalist movement, coloureds, like other non-black groups, and the issue of coloured identity were treated as an adjunct of African nationalism rather than as an integral part of the whole political movement.³³

The stated intent of the NDP was to see majority rule in the nation and it was first and foremost a movement which revolved around the liberation of black Africans. Given their socio-economic dominance, whites were temporarily considered a necessary component of Zimbabwean nationalism. Joshua Mpofu was an NDP branch leader who argued that the party's demand for universal adult suffrage was 'the only way to achieve self-government and democracy that would meet the legitimate aspirations of the majority of the citizenry without undermining the rights of white people.'³⁴ The other minority racial groups meant they were not afforded the same attention. No efforts were made to clearly define where the coloured population fit into Zimbabwean nationalism beyond the NDP's broad non-racialism, although several coloured individuals would actively participate in the NDP at branch level. The focus was on African solidarity and the strength of a black African movement. Non-black members thus remained a secondary concern during the first months of 1960.

The NDP quickly attracted white members including Guy Clutton-Brock, Peter Mackay, Whitfield Foy, and Shelagh Ranger (her husband joined two months later). Yet the most significant membership came with a mass migration of African elites from Garfield Todd's CAP. A flawed organisation since its formation, the CAP had attempted to appeal to African supporters of partnership without 'giving way to African extremist demands and without diminishing the material benefits which Europeans enjoy in the Federation.'³⁵ In the face of the NDP's non-racialism, the gradual advancement of the CAP lost its allure for black and non-black supporters

³³ Ibid., p.176

³⁴ Mpofu, *My Life*, p.45

³⁵ See West, *African Middle Class*, p.214

alike.³⁶ As Terence Ranger (a CAP executive member) reported in March 1960, the position had given him 'power at last but in a rapidly sinking ship.'³⁷ At a territorial congress of the CAP that same month, a proposal to see an African majority franchise saw the abandonment of the party by the majority of its supporters. For many this was the end of their support for multi-racial partnership.³⁸ Between June and September 1960, Ndabaningi Sithole, Terence Ranger, Eileen Haddon, and Herbert Chitepo all resigned from the CAP and joined the NDP.³⁹ Leopold Takawira had already resigned in late January 1960 and released a detailed statement explaining his decision.

I am fully committed and dedicated to non-racialism in this country [...] My latest discovery, however, is that unless we Africans organise ourselves completely and unite ourselves solidly, Europeans will not enter into a real partnership with us. Multi-racial organisations alone will not be able to bring this so much needed change and harmony about [...] The Central Africa Party caters for the voters and as such cannot speak for the blacks with that natural and native emotion which can only be arrived at from personal physical sufferings and humiliations which Africans encounter day in and day out. In these struggles our sincere European friends shall always remain sympathisers but never physical co-sufferers. I therefore firmly feel and believe that an African run party like the NDP on strict principles of self-discipline, non-violence and non-intimidation and open to all races will hasten the day of peace and common patriotism in this country.⁴⁰

Takawira's statement was a clear example of the shift that had occurred regarding race in African political discourse. In an interview, Brian Raftopoulos explained that:

I think multi-racialism was very much a liberal discourse and seen as such, for all the ambiguities that went with it. When it moved into nationalism, it was more about non-racialism but never clearly defined because they didn't see it as a priority. Once the nationalist discourse emerged, it was because of a loss of faith in the liberal rhetoric, including multi-racialism. The liberals promised

³⁶ John Day, 'Southern Rhodesian African Nationalists and the 1961 Constitution', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol.7, No.2 (1969), pp.221-22

³⁷ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.62

³⁸ Hancock, *White Liberals*, p.84

³⁹ 'Todd's CAP loses African support', *The Rhodesia Herald* (2 September 1960), p.2

⁴⁰ Leopold Takawira, 'Takawira Resigns', *African Daily News* (28 January 1960), p.1

them things they couldn't deliver. And in the end they got angry with that, they got despondent with it, and they said to hell with it. We will set up our own discourse.⁴¹

For those non-black individuals who did join the NDP, they had to accept a new, subservient position within the movement. The young Bulawayo-based lawyer Edwin Lichtenstein joined the NDP in 1961, frustrated with the CAP's failure to demand universal adult suffrage which he saw as a necessary policy that was both 'realistic and practical'.⁴² Recalling his motivations in a 1983 interview, Lichtenstein stated: 'I did it for the view that one's task as a white man was not to remain within a white dominated liberal party, but - if one wanted universal suffrage - that one had to join a black political movement and accept black leadership.'⁴³ John Reed, who had been in England for the first part of the year and thus a distant observer, also joined the NDP in July 1960 after some deliberation.⁴⁴ In a lengthy article published in *Dissent*,⁴⁵ Reed argued that although membership of the NDP was no different than membership of any other political party, joining as a white man required accepting 'that the underlying political and economic struggles in Southern Rhodesia are manifesting themselves and will manifest themselves in what is, generally speaking, a struggle between the races. It means thinking that the relation between the races for the time being is one of conflict.'⁴⁶ This conflict was explained as being the result of fundamental racial difference:

The European is not a very useful member to have. He lives far away from the great majority of the members; and is not easily in touch with them. It is often difficult for him to come to meetings in the townships, or even to get word that meetings are to be held. At the meetings he is often a kind of awkward exception.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Brian Raftopoulos, interviewed by author (27 November 2015)

⁴² Edwin Lichtenstein, 'One Man - One Vote', *Central African Examiner*, Vol.5, No.7 (1961), pp.12-18

⁴³ Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

⁴⁴ Reed, 'Thursday 5 July 1960', *Diary*, Vol.88

⁴⁵ John Reed, 'Joining the NDP', *Dissent*, No.21 (4 August 1960), pp.10-12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.10

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.11

The presence of non-blacks in a black African movement was therefore largely based on personal connections. 'The NDP, although it accepts and on a personal level welcomes Europeans, does not need them,' argued Reed,⁴⁸ and yet these personal attitudes sometimes carried over into political discourse. As Michael Mawema proclaimed, 'Southern Rhodesia is part of Africa and that it will have an African future. But for Europeans who can bear to live in an African Southern Rhodesia the NDP has so far offered nothing but welcome - and a promise of safeguarded individual rights.'⁴⁹ Despite being geographically removed from the white radicals based in Salisbury, Lichtenstein consequently recalled 'I don't think there was active recruitment [of whites] but there was obviously a welcome extended and they [the nationalists] were always prepared to speak at white gatherings and things like Rhodesian National Affairs.'⁵⁰

This conflicted attitude to white participation was stimulated by a growing consensus within African politicians was that whilst whites could sympathise with African suffering, they could never truly understand it. Returning to Rogers Brubaker's concept of 'insider-outsider' citizenship, the NDP had begun building a national identity around race insofar as it referred to the specific experiences attached to these racial identities. Although it is the discrimination suffered that renders the individual as part of the group, it is the racial identity that stimulated that discrimination. Whites 'shall always remain sympathisers but never physical co-sufferers,' explained Leopold Takawira,⁵¹ and Reed expanded upon this argument:

The NDP is not anti-European in a racialist way: its solidarity is based not, as far as I can see, on a common consciousness of race but on the common experience of all Africans living in Southern Rhodesia - and into this experience the European cannot enter. At one meeting of the NDP I remember a speaker began "All of us in this hall have suffered"; and then, remembering

⁴⁸ Ibid.,

⁴⁹ Michael Mawema quoted in 'Comment', *Dissent*, No.21 (4 August 1960), p.5

⁵⁰ Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

⁵¹ Leopold Takawira, 'Takawira Resigns', *African Daily News* (28 January 1960), p.1

there were a few Europeans at the back, added "Except the Europeans who are here."⁵²

If the common consciousness of Zimbabwean nationalism was not based on race but on shared experiences of discrimination, a problem is presented by the specific identities of those non-blacks who joined the NDP. Most were themselves on the margins of white society for their sexuality, religion, or political beliefs (explored in the next chapter). Consequently, because the NDP saw experiences of *racial* discrimination as the defining right for participation in Zimbabwean nationalism, race was the ultimate factor in ascribing the 'inside-outside' dynamic. This racial focus is further explained by what Brian Raftopoulos calls the 'ambiguity of non-racialism'.

There has always been a problem with the concept of non-racialism in southern Africa [...]. Often it has meant that whites become part of a movement and assume they can dominate it, they can assume a certain superiority in the movement under the guise of non-racialism. And the black nationalists have been very sensitive about that. So it has sometimes been abused as a way of perpetuating certain white dominance.⁵³

The lingering spectre of multi-racial partnership helped shaped racial thinking and both black nationalists and white radicals were conscious of how white participation could be problematic. Two letters in the *African Daily News* explained the African concerns. 'The trouble with admitting Europeans in African parties is that they like to come as advisors and when their advice is not accepted, they begin to despise those African leaders who disagree with them,' stated one.⁵⁴ A second echoed this sentiment more explicitly:

I personally think that Europeans in African parties are dangerous because they could act as "moderate advisors" to our leaders and spoil our plans. For instance when certain Europeans joined the [...] National Democratic Party

⁵² Reed, 'Joining the NDP', p.11

⁵³ Brian Raftopoulos, interviewed by author (27 November 2015)

⁵⁴ 'LTTE: Matimba "unfairly criticised" for marrying white woman', *African Daily News* (8 May 1962), p.22

some of the things went wrong which to my opinion, would have done well if handled by Africans alone.⁵⁵

This issue of non-black participation was so divisive that in June 1961, the Zimbabwe National Party (ZNP) was formed by Thompson Gonese, Patrick Matimba, Edson Sithole, Nathan Shamuyarira, Paul Mushonga, and Michael Mawema.⁵⁶ Disenchanted with Nkomo's toleration of non-black members, the ZNP took a firm anti-white stance but never gained popular support.⁵⁷ As one tongue-in-cheek article explained, 'Europeans, Asians and any other people who choose to live and work with Africans in this country as equals should not be made uneasy by the remarks of Mr. Gonese - they do not represent the views of Africans - not even the six in his meeting.'⁵⁸ Nevertheless the racist rhetoric of the ZNP and elements of the NDP made white Rhodesians uneasy and those white radicals involved with any African political groups found themselves ostracised from white Rhodesian society.. As Reed noted,

Europeans in the NDP cannot even serve as a link between the party and the white population. Indeed by joining the NDP a European completely loses any chance he may have had to influence the minds and attitudes of the Europeans he lives among.⁵⁹

Suggestions were therefore made that it would be more useful for whites to remain outside of African politics and use their positions within white society to cajole other whites in the nation. 'Some thoughtful African members of the NDP seem to think that sympathetic Europeans would do better to maintain some sort of reputation, even if a doubtful one, in their own community and use it to work what changes they could in the outlook of their acquaintances,' recorded Reed.⁶⁰ In light of the many problems that arose from the involvement of a non-black with the nationalist cause,

⁵⁵ 'LTTE: Suspicious of "white nationalists"', *African Daily News* (8 May 1962), p.22

⁵⁶ Wood, *So Far and No Further!*, p.86

⁵⁷ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.50

⁵⁸ 'The Policy of ZNP', *African Daily News* (12 April 1962), p.2

⁵⁹ Reed, 'Joining the NDP', p.12

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.12

Reed concluded by asking 'is it worth any European joining the NDP?' He maintained that it was. 'The struggle has become virtually a struggle between Africans and Europeans, and nothing now can radically alter that struggle. But at least it need not be mindlessly racialistic.'⁶¹

ii. Unrest and violence: acting in opposition, July 1960 - December 1961

With the shift in discourse surrounding the NDP between January and July 1960, the Rhodesian state grew increasingly concerned with the surge of black nationalism. In a speech in July, the Edgar Whitehead ranted that 'the arguments advanced at [the NDP's] political meetings are becoming more and more blatantly militant and anti-European. The theme is that Africa is only for Africans, that Europe is for the Europeans, and that all Europeans should go back to Europe.'⁶² Consequently, the Rhodesian state launched a crackdown, arresting and charging three NDP leaders.⁶³ Terence Ranger (whose own home was searched) was particularly upset about the arrests of Sketchley Samkange and Michael Mawema. 'In the leadership of the NDP Sketchley and Mawema are the two men who stand for moderation; they are the two who have European friends and who have from inside the NDP been integral for this,' he informed Reed.⁶⁴ The day after the arrests, 7,000 NDP marchers were met with police tear gas, amongst them Peter Mackay, and such actions came to define Mackay's views of his participation in African nationalism.

I believe the march of the 7,000 had made my commitment irrevocable, for to march is not to stumble [across the colour bar], and I knew as we sat under the lights with the police cordon ahead that I was declaring alliance with those around me. [...] I was proud to be thus accepted.

⁶¹ Reed, 'Joining the NDP', p.10

⁶² 'Whitehead Addresses Parliament over African Violence', *The Rhodesia Herald* (27 July 1960), p.3

⁶³ 'NDP Leaders in Salisbury are Held on Bail', *The Rhodesia Herald* (20 July 1960), p.13

⁶⁴ Reed, 'Tuesday 19 July 1960', *Diary*, Vol.88

Mackay's involvement in the march further highlighted the underlying divisions within the white radicals. A former British Army officer, Mackay had initially been a member of the CAS but simultaneously a critic of Godfrey Huggins' conservative multi-racialism. He became one of the Zimbabwean and Malawian independence struggle's most prominent advocates, yet maintained a strong allegiance to the British government (when the British MP John Stonehouse visited Rhodesia in February 1959 to ascertain the state of African grievances in the colony, one of the white radicals he spoke to was Mackay).⁶⁵ Mackay's politics reflected these contradictions. He regarded white Rhodesians not only as British citizens, but as citizens of an African nation waiting to be. When the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan gave his 'Wind of Change' speech to the South African Parliament in February 1960, Mackay celebrated the apparent strategy for British withdrawal from the continent that opened up spaces for African political activities.⁶⁶

Many radicals admired Mackay's attitude and activities, with Guy Clutton-Brock describing Mackay as a 'golden individual [who] marched lost in the African crowd and found himself more than ever fulfilled as an individual.'⁶⁷ According to Reed, it was Mackay's actions which set the example for the rest of them.

You have to consider carefully not out of a concern of personal safety, but out of a concern about the economy of one's usefulness to the cause. I hardly feel this, though I can see that it is time. It is a conflict between symbolic and practical action: I myself am fascinated by the act; Peter devoted to activity, the life of usefulness and devoted friendship he lives [...] and against this my own attitude seems tawdry and theatrical.⁶⁸

Reed's phrase 'the economy of one's usefulness to the cause' was another recognition that participation within the nationalist movement was not confined to a single role. Whilst Mackay was a visible actor in physical acts of protest, other radicals

⁶⁵ John Stonehouse, *Prohibited Immigrant* (London, 1960). Stonehouse was barred from returning to Rhodesia for his criticisms of the Whitehead government.

⁶⁶ Reed, 'Wednesday 3 March 1960', Diary, Vol.87.

⁶⁷ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.109

⁶⁸ Reed, 'Saturday 7 January 1961', Diary, Vol.89

contributed in different ways. In July 1960, protests in Bulawayo escalated into urban unrest, leading to the deaths of three Africans.⁶⁹ In response a small non-racial group of NDP members including Mackay, Reed, Shelagh Ranger, Herbert Chitepo, and Edward Pswarayi released a statement on behalf of the party explicitly attacking the government.⁷⁰ Able to draw upon a transnationalism which many of the African elites lacked (despite their international education and adoption of western culture), the public actions of the white radicals were important in helping shape the NDP's non-racial image. At a Clutton-Brocks' party in August 1960, both Sarah Chavunduka (the first black female student at the UCRN) and Michael Mawema insisted that there was no reason 'why Europeans cannot take part in the reconstruction' of Rhodesia, although no concrete policies were laid down.⁷¹

The NDP's focus during the second half of 1960 remained on the civil unrest throughout the country. Any violence by the African population was condemned by the NDP, and just as quickly categorised by Whitehead as an indication that the party could not control its members.⁷² A secret memo produced by the Rhodesian intelligence services argued that the NDP was utilising African grievances 'in order to turn the country into violent turbulence,'⁷³ and some of the threats were reported as specifically targeting white policeman.⁷⁴ The anti-white racialism amongst the ordinary members concerned the NDP's executive, none more so than the newly-elected NDP President, Joshua Nkomo. Having returned to Rhodesia to a rapturous welcome, Nkomo now used his popularity and the NDP's first anniversary to reaffirm that the African cause was a non-racial one.⁷⁵ As Reed recorded, Nkomo spoke 'carefully, stressing democracy, inviting Asian and Coloured and Europeans

⁶⁹ Francis Nehwati, 'The Social and Communal Background to "Zhi": The African Riots in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia in 1960', *African Affairs*, Vol.69, No.276 (1970), pp.250-266, p.253; & Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, pp.67-70

⁷⁰ 'Whitehead blamed by NDP', *The Rhodesia Herald* (26 July 1960), p.4

⁷¹ Reed, 'Sunday 7 August 1960', *Diary*, Vol.89

⁷² Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', pp.75-78

⁷³ Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.77

⁷⁴ Barry Woan, interviewed by author (17 November 2015)

⁷⁵ For an account of his return see Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.91

to join in building a country of free and equal men.'⁷⁶ Yet the constructive non-racial rhetoric failed to translate into the actions of ordinary NDP members. One explanation is the difference risks faced by the two groups. Whilst the leaders were being restricted or detained, 505 Africans had been arrested and twelve shot dead by the police over the course of three months in 1960.⁷⁷ On a single day in October 1960, seven Africans were killed during rioting in the Harare township,⁷⁸ and these deaths elicited a surge of anti-white sentiments completely at contrast to the NDP's official stance. A first-hand black African account from the Harare riots on 8 October 1960 reported on the extent of this racism.

As I was coming to the river I saw five boys armed with empty quart beer bottles, sticks and iron bars. It was getting dark and they could not see well. They called out to ask me if I was African or European. They told me they would have killed me if I were European.⁷⁹

This was not an isolated incident. Mackay's experiences in the 'March of 7,000' saw him note 'tempers seem to be rising and the people growing more hostile to Europeans.'⁸⁰ Indeed, if George Silundika (the NDP's secretary general) had not stepped alongside Mackay in solidarity, there was a very real risk the situation could have escalated further.⁸¹ Similarly at an NDP rally in Harare in January 1961 attended by some 30,000 people, the supposedly well-known John Reed and Terence Ranger found themselves met with hostility.⁸²

Terry and I walk forward among these people who are pleased enough to have an opportunity to be rude to Europeans and shout to us to sit down [...] As we

⁷⁶ Reed, 'Sunday 1 January 1961', Diary, Vol.90.

⁷⁷ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.76

⁷⁸ 'The Terrible Mistake Policy', *Dissent*, No.22 (20 October 1960), p.2

⁷⁹ 'The Day of the Riots', *Dissent*, No.22 (20 October 1960), p.7

⁸⁰ Reed, 'Wednesday 20 July 1960', Diary, Vol.88

⁸¹ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.88

⁸² 'NDP Rally Draws Huge Crowds: Police Ready for Violence', *The Rhodesia Herald* (9 January 1961), p.1

pass through the crowd we attract attention. "You must join the Party", some call out. We tell them we are already members, and this seems a joke to them.⁸³

This division between leaders and ordinary members was exacerbated by circumstances within the top of the NDP, particularly the issue of a new Rhodesian constitution.⁸⁴ Some of the NDP's leaders regarded the new constitution as a chance to ensure change and end the urban violence between Africans and the police. Others denounced the constitution as a selling-out of the NDP's demand for majority rule.⁸⁵ The white radicals found themselves unsure of what to do, as Reed recorded in March 1961.

For us I think there is nothing to do. To side with the acceptance of the proposals would enable those objecting to say that you might expect Europeans to favour proposals so disastrous to the African cause. To side with the objectors would but bring the accusation that the Europeans are working for the dissolution and overthrow of the party. Silence therefore.⁸⁶

The situation highlighted the divisions within the white radicals and Mackay, Ranger, Reed, and the newly-arrived Dutch lecturer Jaap van Velsen discussed amongst themselves the question of white allegiance if the split became unavoidable. Mackay stated he would follow whichever group emerged that demanded majority rule, whilst Ranger contended he would likely side with the more moderate figures of Nkomo or Sithole.⁸⁷ Reed described the differences in opinion as fundamentally a difference in ideology. 'The people who have got stuck, today's reactionaries who were in the 1940s considered white radicals; and the people who have come unstuck, yesterday's moderates and precisions are today's wild men - Peter Mackay the most notable of these.'⁸⁸ These divisions was relatively minor and remained largely genial

⁸³ Reed, 'Sunday 8 January 1961', Diary, Vol.90

⁸⁴ See Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', pp.86-88

⁸⁵ See 'Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Agreement - For and Against', *Dissent*, No.24 (2 March 1961), pp.7-14

⁸⁶ Reed, 'Saturday 11 March 1961', Diary, Vol.90

⁸⁷ Reed, 'Saturday 7 January 1961', Diary, Vol.90

⁸⁸ Reed, 'Tuesday 11 July 1961', Diary, Vol.91

for the time being, but reflected a fundamental difference in opinion as to how involved non-blacks could be.

Nothing exemplified the differences in opinion more than the Citizens Against the Colour Bar Association (CACBA), launched in May 1961 by Terence Ranger and Reverend Whitfield Foy. A multi-racial organisation designed to protest the racially discriminatory policies of the colony, the group used similar methods to the American civil rights movements.⁸⁹ Hasu Patel (a young Indian radical in Salisbury) played a prominent role, including publishing a four page pamphlet stating the CACBA's aims, policies and non-racial stance.⁹⁰ Despite receiving prominent coverage in Rhodesia (including being described in Parliament as a matter of 'some national concern'⁹¹), the CACBA was nevertheless often mistaken for the NDP's 'Salisbury Sit-In Campaign', given the similar tactics.⁹² As one of the founding members, Ranger inevitably depicts the CACBA as a crucial part of the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle and there is no doubting that they did succeed in challenging some of Rhodesia's segregationist laws, as well as increasing the salience of non-black radicals in the nation.⁹³ However, the effect of the movement on the African nationalists was largely negative. Efforts to undermine the colour bar were regarded as ineffectual and even damaging to the image of the white supporters of the nationalist struggle.⁹⁴ Incidents such as Ranger being pushed into a swimming pool by an angry white Rhodesian served only to associate the radicals with the liberals of the CAS and IASR with their focus on minor social reform. Given the distrust for multi-racialism, this connection tarnished the reputations of those

⁸⁹ See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, pp.110-116

⁹⁰ Hasu Patel, 'CACBA - Vote No Against the Colour Bar', Date Unknown, The Diaries of John Reed (1920-2012) Collection, Chetham's Library, Manchester, UK

⁹¹ 'Break-colour-bar Campaign debated in SR Parliament', *The Rhodesia Herald* (17 June 1961), p.1

⁹² 'No Cinema, but Four Asians Get Into Hotel', *The Rhodesian Herald* (12 June 1961), p.2; Also Letters to the Editors, *The Rhodesia Herald* (20 June 1961), p.5

⁹³ See for instance 'S.R. Cinemas Likely to be Multi-Racial Soon', *Natal Mercury* (28 July 1961), p.2

⁹⁴ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.158

involved and by 1964 the damage done would become a serious point of contention for the white radicals still in Rhodesia.⁹⁵

The publicity garnered by the CACBA did, however, have a positive consequence. In an attempt to reframe the non-black radicals' role, the suggestion was made that a Salisbury North City Branch of the NDP be established. Ndabaningi Sithole was anxious that it was the non-black members who launched the group, and invited all present NDP members in Salisbury to attend and elect a multi-racial committee. To this end, Sithole instructed Robert Mugabe (press secretary for the NDP) to provide John Reed with a list of all white NDP members.⁹⁶ As Reed recorded, Herbert Chitepo also 'seem[ed] very anxious to attract or to keep Europeans. Herbert says he feels the NDP has neglected its European members and in future will be calling on them more often for ideas.'⁹⁷

Despite the introduction in late July of a ban on any public meetings, the NDP Salisbury Branch was formally launched on 9 August 1961.⁹⁸ Only six non-black men and women out of an audience of fifty were present for the inaugural meeting; a grim reflection of the current urban unrest surrounding the party.⁹⁹ John Reed was elected chairman, but described his own mixed emotions at his new position.

I am very pleased, and rather frightened, wondering whether I will find the energy, and the abiding interest to do this well. But glad that now at least I am really committed. I am afraid of being committed as well - what happens if the NDP suddenly gets involved in terrorism?¹⁰⁰

Reed's election to office garnered significant attention, with the three major Rhodesian newspapers all carrying stories about the first white man to become

⁹⁵ See this thesis, chapter 6

⁹⁶ Reed, 'Monday 29 May 1961', Diary, Vol.91

⁹⁷ Reed, 'Sunday 11 June 1961', Diary, Vol.91

⁹⁸ Robert Tredgold, *The Rhodesia that was My Life* (London, 1968), pp.229-233

⁹⁹ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.98

¹⁰⁰ Reed, 'Wednesday 9 August 1961', Diary, Vol.91

chairman of an NDP branch.¹⁰¹ Interestingly, none mentioned the racial composition of the rest of the branch's executive despite the election alongside Reed of three other whites (Margaret Moore, and Shelagh and Terence Ranger). Whilst the prominent positions of white women in a movement dominated by black men was an important challenge to the perceptions of racialism,¹⁰² the committee also contained two coloured men (Ronald Snapper, and George Copeland 'Jack' Grant¹⁰³), two Indians (N.R. Lalloo and Suman Mehta), and three Africans (Lovemore Chimonyo, Teresa Chirunga, and E.P. Mashaire), whose participation represented a significant challenge to existing conceptions of African nationalism in Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, although the racial composition of the group was somewhat radical, all involved remained elites in their communities. Snapper was the first coloured hotelier in Rhodesia and the secretary of the Inter-territorial Organisation for Eurafrican Organisations in Rhodesia.¹⁰⁴ Mehta was the secretary of the Salisbury Asian Association since 1946 and one of the most active Asian members of the nationalist movement, alongside Hasu Patel and R.K. Naik.¹⁰⁵ Margaret Moore (and her husband Stanley) were American Quakers who joined the SRLAWF early in its formation and became personal friends with Sally and Robert Mugabe during the 1960s.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰¹ 'University Lecturer is New Branch Chairman', *African Daily News* (10 August 1961), p.1; 'European Elected to NDP Branch', *Evening Standard* (10 August 1961), p.1; 'Reed Becomes First European Chairman in African Party', *The Rhodesia Herald* (10 August 1961), p.2

¹⁰² Discussed more in the subsequent chapter

¹⁰³ George Copeland 'Jack' Grant was the former principal of Adams College in South Africa from 1949 to 1956, where he met Joshua Nkomo and other Zimbabwean nationalists. He moved to Rhodesia in 1959 and became the Field Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and superintendent of the United Church of Christ in Rhodesia (1959-1972), where he involved himself in the African struggle. See Grant, *Jack Grant's Story*

¹⁰⁴ Muzondidya, *Walking a Tightrope*, p.147

¹⁰⁵ K. Natwar Singh, *Walking With Lions: Tales From a Diplomatic Past* (Noida, 2013), p.13

¹⁰⁶ Ron Kraybill, 'Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Role of Religious Actors', in Douglas Johnstron, & Cynthia Sampson, eds., *Religion, The Missing Dimension of Statecraft* (Oxford, 1995), p.235

The failure of contemporary press and scholarship to cover this diversity is a reflection of the nationalist struggle's typical reduction to a black-white racial binary, as well as the low numbers surrounding Asian, Indian, and coloured involvement. According to Clare Palley, only thirteen coloureds and nine Asians were prosecuted under the LOMA between 1960 and May 1965, compared to 58 whites and 6,301 Africans.¹⁰⁷ In an article in *Dissent* entitled 'The Indian Dilemma', Hasu Patel admitted that 'there has been a singular lack of indulgence in political activity by Indians in this country', and explained that the Indian had become a 'middleman', accepted by neither of the racial blocs.

It is for this reason that I feel that Partnership has failed, and failed miserably, and that Indians should pay a greater regard to the philosophy of multi-racialism (which is also the philosophy of the Nationalists) or non-racialism, whichever of the terms one uses - both, to my mind, mean the same thing [...] All the "oppressed" and its sympathisers should and must come together to work for the elimination of a common evil.¹⁰⁸

Patel's emphasis that members of the nationalist struggle were united by their status as 'oppressed' and his inclusion of those he termed 'sympathisers' is important as the implication is that those who have not been oppressed (namely white radicals) can still be a part of the struggle despite their externality. This was a challenge to the dominant assertions of the African nationalists that suffering was necessary for participation. In Patel's view, the common goal should overcome the concerns that persisted about racial cooperation.

Patel also pointed to the Lotus group as indicative that the contribution of an individual to the nationalist struggle was important, regardless of their community as a whole. The Lotus group had already made its presence felt in Indian affairs and was beginning to sway the political attitudes of the older generations of Indians.¹⁰⁹ In 1961, Don. K. Naik (an editor of *Lotus* magazine) was elected financial secretary of

¹⁰⁷ Claire Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965* (Oxford, 1966), p.626

¹⁰⁸ Hasu Patel, 'The Indian Dilemma', *Dissent*, No.16 (18 February 1960), pp.6-8

¹⁰⁹ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author (8 December 2015 and 12 December 2015)

the Bulawayo branch of the NDP and immediately began warning Indians that they 'could not be excused if they did not align themselves' with the wind of change blowing across Africa.¹¹⁰ Indian financial support proved vital to the African cause and it seems that Naik's inclusion was a response to practical rather than ideological considerations. As Michael West explains, it was 'an unprecedented move, and one no doubt made with an eye toward the party's bottom line.'¹¹¹ Usefulness to the nationalist cause was again important in justifying non-black participation.

Although more whites participated in the NDP than Indians, Asians, or coloureds, white radicals remained a tiny fraction of the total membership. Yet the white radicals were afforded a disproportionate level of attention, particularly since there were no non-black individuals on the national executive of the NDP and only a handful in local branch positions. Given its multi-racial status and the prominence of white radicals within the students and faculty, the UCRN inevitably became the centre for this attention during 1961. Whilst the FISB had prevented at least eight academics from taking up positions at the UCRN between 1956 and 1960 due to 'claims that they were either communists or strongly sympathetic to communists and African nationalists', there were still concerns about those already on campus.¹¹² Several prominent white radicals were or had been lecturers (including Reed, Ranger, Faber, and van Velsen) and the UCRN council came under pressure by the white state to rein in these more radical elements. In September 1961, Principal Walter Adams issued a warning letter to the academic staff.

The College Council is worried by the effect on the College of the publicity aroused by the political activities of some members of the staff [...] The problem is whether and how far a member of the academic staff, in his

¹¹⁰ "Naik Urges Asians to Join NDP", *Bantu Mirror* (22 April 1961), p.1; "Naik Forecasts Disaster if Constitution Is Imposed on Majority", *Bantu Mirror* (22 July 1961), p.1

¹¹¹ West, 'An Anticolonial International?'

¹¹² Tapiwa B. Zimudzi, 'Spies and Informers on Campus: Vetting, Surveillance and Deportation of Expatriate University Lecturers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1954-1963', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.33, No.1 (2007), pp.193-208, p.197

personal capacity as a citizen, should feel himself free to engage in public political activity.¹¹³

The following day, the *African Daily News* editor Eugene Wason wrote in an editorial:

As far as Africans are concerned there has been no anger or loss of confidence in the University at all as a result of the political activities already referred to: if anything, the reverse has been the case. We have not received a single complaint from our many African readers about the political activities of lecturers.¹¹⁴

Although unclear exactly how truthful this rebuttal was, other Africans were publicly supportive of the lecturers.¹¹⁵ Ndabaningi Sithole declared it the job of intellectuals to challenge the systems of government in a nation in a speech in the Harare township,¹¹⁶ and buttressed by these voices, the lecturers refused to tone down their stance or involvement. Even a renewed crackdown which saw 1,697 black Africans arrested in seven weeks from October 1961¹¹⁷ and the presence of armed police at NDP meetings and in African townships, failed to frighten the NDP's supporters.¹¹⁸ On 3 December, 10,000 people gathered in Highfield for the area's largest ever NDP meeting, leading the *Herald* to state disbelievingly that even the 'beerhalls and sportsfields were deserted throughout the township.'¹¹⁹ Terence Ranger was one of

¹¹³ 'Walter Adams to All Members of Academic Staff, 15 September 1961', Letter, The Diaries of John Reed (1920-2012) Collection, Chetham's Library, Manchester, UK.

¹¹⁴ 'University Feelings', *African Daily News* (19 September 1961), p.1

¹¹⁵ Although owned and edited by white Rhodesians, the *African Daily News* employed mostly black African journalists and assistant editors, and was targeted at an African readership. In 1964 it would be banned for supporting the nationalists. See this thesis, chapter 6

¹¹⁶ Harriet Tengende, interviewed by author (4 December 2015)

¹¹⁷ See Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.80

¹¹⁸ 'Intimidation and Violence the Order of the Day', *The Rhodesia Herald* (3 November 1961), p.1

¹¹⁹ 'Armed Police Surround 10,000 at NDP rally', *The Rhodesia Herald* (4 December 1961), p.1

the many speakers and his oration was 'greeted enthusiastically'.¹²⁰ First, he called on the crowd to reject any attempts by Whitehead's UFP to divide them on the basis of tribe, race, or class, declaring 'we must live as a nation while the UFP were talking about building one'.¹²¹ Secondly, he argued non-racial unity was needed for the future of the Zimbabwean nation. As Ranger recalled:

I went on to say that democratic unity, in which we could think and discuss and differ together, was needed especially to frame the shape of the new society we wanted: that we should begin to think about that new society.¹²²

This deliberate focus on framing a new society forced the issue of non-black participation into all levels of Zimbabwean nationalist discourse, and brought an emphasise to construction rather than destruction. The implementation of majority rule would not amount to anything if there were no guarantees of security for those not a part of the majority; a belief that was already shown to be a motivation for many non-black radicals.

However, the content of the speech went largely unnoticed by the white Rhodesians who were more enraged by Ranger's removal of his shoes in solidarity with the African speakers and crowd. The condemnation printed in the *Herald* over the following week included accusations of a 'Communist tactic' and a 'brain-washing campaign'. Under the pseudonym 'Stubbed-Toe', one letter mocked: 'I would be interested if Dr. Ranger could tell me in what way shoes are a symbol of oppression?'¹²³ As with the CACBA, the response to Ranger's barefoot appearance indicated that challenges to cultural racial divisions were more troublesome to Rhodesian sensibilities than any suggestions of a non-racial nationalism. Seeing a white man undermine the supposed superiority of western European culture

¹²⁰ 'CIO Secret Memo: 17 December 1961', Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, S.R.C.(S)(61)454, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

¹²¹ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, pp.118-119

¹²² Ibid.,

¹²³ 'Letters to the Editor: Shoe Symbol', *The Rhodesia Herald* (9 December 1961), p.8

threatened the belief that black Africans should aspire to emulate Europeans, and not vice-versa.

Some within the Zimbabwean nationalists had already recognised the potential of such strategies. Earlier in 1961, Robert Mugabe had spearheaded a cultural revival programme which saw ordinary members of the NDP asked to reject European culture in favour of traditional African practices. This was an attempt to reclaim black African identity, and included speaking chiShona or SiNdebele, drinking water in traditional gourds rather than cups,¹²⁴ and dispensing with 'shoes, socks, watches, hats and jackets' at NDP meetings.¹²⁵ The NDP leaders denounced the missionary educations discussed in chapter one as installing the belief of African culture being 'backward' and 'primitive', and instead encouraged people to 'use traditional musical instruments such as drums, wear cultural costumes, and pray to ancestral spirits for political delivery from colonialism.'¹²⁶ As Ngwabi Bhebe argues, such strategies were significant and 'the NDP can be credited with having started to build a liberation culture and language.'¹²⁷

Although this ideology could easily have excluded non-black NDP members, Ranger and Reed's visible inclusion indicated that there was little intention to do so. The NDP instead emphasised that as African elites had adopted western culture, so too could whites adopt African culture. Interestingly, only a few did. A notable exception were Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock, as a report by the district Native Commissioner noted: 'Clutton-Brock and his wife and associates, male and female, mix freely with the Natives. Natives, e.g. the Mission's lorry driver, eat in Clutton-Brock's house at table with him, they even sleep in his house.'¹²⁸ The Clutton-Brocks resided in a 'little round house' of traditional African style, ate traditional African

¹²⁴ See David Smith, Colin Simpson, & Ian Davies, *Mugabe Illustrated* (London, 1981), p.37

¹²⁵ Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, p.62

¹²⁶ Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Do "Zimbabweans" Exist?', p.250

¹²⁷ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.101

¹²⁸ H.B. Masterson, 'Report on St. Faiths in Rusape: 6 May 1957', quoted in Ranger, 'Historical Perspective', p.77

foods such as *sadza* (ground maize meal), and worked the land alongside black Africans with no regard for the Rhodesian policies of segregation.¹²⁹ As Stephen Matewa (a black Zimbabwean minister and teacher) wrote to Guy after the liberation war, 'I have never told you before that you are "blacker" than some of us. You worked harder than anybody in our struggle.'¹³⁰

Yet despite this integration into African society, even the Clutton-Brocks retained some European traits. Their daughter Sally was sent to an all-white girls boarding school,¹³¹ and they were insistent on providing afternoon tea or 'sundowners' to their guests.¹³² In this they were not alone. As Ian Hancock explains, many of the non-black radicals 'remained socially detached inside white society where they enjoyed the indignities heaped upon them by the new order.'¹³³ Most white radicals resided in white suburban areas, socialised predominantly with other whites in Rhodesia, dined and drank in white restaurants, and interacted mostly with westernised African elites. These same elites were similarly reluctant to completely reject western culture, retaining their London-tailored suits and shoes, and speaking English in public and private. The photograph of Terence Ranger's deportation in 1963 is often heralded for the lion skin hat on Ranger's head. Yet little is said of the nationalist leaders depicted (including Nkomo and Mugabe) dressed in suits and ties.¹³⁴ As Enocent Msindo summarised, the NDP's 'anti-Western culture was at best [sp.] superficial', and although the African cultural initiative would gain support during the liberation war, it would never completely Africanise the nationalist

¹²⁹ Faith Raven, 'From Europe to Africa - and back: Friends abroad', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.62

¹³⁰ Stephen Matewa to Guy Clutton-Brock, 8 April 1980, quoted in Ranger, 'Historical Perspective', p.79

¹³¹ Roschnik, 'Growing up', p.69

¹³² Reed, 'Thursday 18 May 1963', Diary, Vol.108. Sundowners refers to alcoholic drinks served in the early evening.

¹³³ Hancock, *White Liberals*, p.107

¹³⁴ See for example front cover image of the 2013 James Curry publication of Ranger, *Writing Revolt*.

ideology.¹³⁵ The nationalist leaders were too embedded within an elitist westernised African culture to reject it completely.

However, such cultural issues would have to be addressed by future nationalist groups. By the time of Ranger's barefoot address, the NDP's time was already drawing to a close. A series of protests at the start of December saw 500 African women arrested including Sally Mugabe, and subsequent riots resulted in the death of one African, with 25 injured and another 85 detained.¹³⁶ On 8 December 1961, the NDP was officially banned and troops called up in preparation to deal with rioters within the NDP's 87,000 registered members.¹³⁷ A lengthy statement by Edgar Whitehead revealed the reasoning: 'the [NDP's] history has been one of brutality and violence against anyone who disagrees with it. Their aim is one party state.'¹³⁸ A *Herald* editorial agreed, arguing that 'neither the NDP leaders nor their European apologists should now be surprised that the Government is not prepared to sit back and watch their attempts to overthrow the State by unconstitutional means.'¹³⁹ The acknowledgement of the NDP's non-black members was reinforced by targeted police actions against the group. Terence Ranger was soon restricted alongside several nationalist leaders and his home raided yet again,¹⁴⁰ and this pressure led John Reed (at the time in west Africa) to ask friends to hide his diaries for fear of discovery.¹⁴¹ Ironically, it appeared that the state's efforts to combat non-racial nationalism in fact achieved the opposite. Finding themselves office holders in a banned organisation, the non-black radicals shared the oppression of their black

¹³⁵ Msindo, 'Towards a New Understanding', p.8

¹³⁶ Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.102

¹³⁷ 'Rhodesia Bans Party', *The Evening News* (8 December 1961), p.3; & Lichtenstein, 'The African Nationalist Parties', p.3

¹³⁸ 'Sir Edgar Whitehead Explains Why the NDP was Banned and Calls for a removal of discrimination,' Public Relations Department, Rhodesia House, London (15 December 1961), ACC208, Southern Rhodesian Ministry of Information - Radio/Press and Publication Releases, University of South Africa Library, Pretoria, South Africa

¹³⁹ 'Editorial: The ban was inevitable', *The Rhodesia Herald* (11 December 1961), p.10

¹⁴⁰ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.106, 119; 'Ranger's Home Raided by Police', *The Rhodesia Herald* (11 December 1961), p.1

¹⁴¹ Reed, 'Thursday 8 December 1961', Diary, Vol.90

colleagues during this period. The NDP would ultimately prove to be the pinnacle of this non-racial nationalism, but the lessons learnt and relationships formed would prove to be crucial in the Zimbabwean nationalist movement during the coming years.

iii. The Zimbabwe African People's Union

On 17 December 1961, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was formed as a continuation of the NDP and contained several NDP leaders in the new executive committee.¹⁴² Yet despite this continuity, there was no specific mention of non-racialism in the party's policies.¹⁴³ On 2 February 1962, John Reed recalled being asked by a potential academic at the UCRN 'whether there would be any part to play in politics - is ZAPU accepting European members?' Reed responded: 'I say that as far as I know, it is.'¹⁴⁴ The very next day Reed received a letter from Terence Ranger, debating whether a Salisbury City branch of ZAPU should be started. To his reluctance, the general demand was that Reed should once again be chairman. 'I feel trapped again. I can't pull out now. On the other hand, I can hardly face going back to it all again - the meetings, the telephoning, and the waiting.'¹⁴⁵ For the non-black radicals, their isolation from the grievances of black Africans still provided them with the opportunity for detachment that Africans inside the party did not have. Yet Peter Mackay strongly condemned those who failed to fully commit to the African cause.

The instruction I was receiving had led me to believe that standing for African aspirations, even as a supernumerary – perhaps especially as a supernumerary – was not a pastime to be toyed with, to be taken up or discarded at whim, but a

¹⁴² 'New Party formed under Nkomo's Leadership', *The Rhodesia Herald* (18 December 1961), p.1; Bhebe lists the full interim executive. See Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.104

¹⁴³ Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, p.71

¹⁴⁴ Reed, 'Friday 2 February 1962', Diary, Vol.93

¹⁴⁵ Reed, 'Saturday 3 February 1962', Diary, Vol.93

commitment to be respected. It was easy for non-blacks who espoused the African nationalist cause – and there were some – to dabble as I had done, and it was understandable that personal interests should prevent them from going further than dabbling.¹⁴⁶

Reed also questioned his commitment. 'Before I went away [Terence] was saying that for himself he wanted to avoid being deeply involved in the NDP [...] He might have taken the opportunity, provided by Sir Edgar banning the NDP, to keep clear altogether. And so might I.'¹⁴⁷ Yet neither Ranger nor Reed took a step back. As long as ZAPU was willing to accept white members, the radicals were willing to participate and in the months after ZAPU's formation, it seemed that the radicals were going to be provided with more opportunities.

At a meeting in Chaminuka Square on 18 April 1962, a crowd of over 25,000 people heard Reed announce ZAPU's 'Equality Campaign.' Reed informed the audience that many whites were 'leaving the country in fear of an eventual take over' and that 'a great deal depended on how ZAPU followers are going to conduct themselves to the Europeans remaining here.'¹⁴⁸ Much like Ranger's barefoot speech, Reed was cheered off the stage. Yet there were some within the nationalist leadership who remained unsure about this vocal white participation, as Reed recalled.

[Edwin Lichtenstein] has had a long talk with [Agrippa] Mukahlera about the future of Europeans in the party, in the country [...] Edwin said well, if Terry Ranger were black where would he be in the party. Mukahlera said the time was not ripe yet for Europeans in the Executive. Later on it might be. On the other hand, some people had wanted when ZAPU started that Europeans should be allowed to become associate members. This had been rejected at the time. But it might be necessary to go back to the idea later.¹⁴⁹

Lichtenstein's depressed account left Reed questioning ZAPU's policies.

¹⁴⁶ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.134

¹⁴⁷ Reed, 'Thursday 1 March 1962', Diary, Vol.93

¹⁴⁸ 'ZAPU to conduct an equality campaign, says Reed', *African Daily News* (19 April 1962), p.1

¹⁴⁹ Reed, 'Thursday 1 May 1962', Diary, Vol.94

There goes on being a point to working in ZAPU, indeed, all this is really nothing new to me. I would agree it is a bad time to have Europeans in the Executive. But what happens when the change does come. Do all the Europeans leave, and then the country falls to pieces - or are Europeans given some kind of security - so a few do stay on?¹⁵⁰

The white radicals were increasingly concerned about the lack of clarity surrounding the post-colonial political community in Zimbabwe, including a desire for clearly specified citizenship requirements and a recognition of the need to address what Emma Hunter terms the conflict between subject and citizen.¹⁵¹ Many held specific concerns that instead of the individual ascription of rights, notions of Zimbabwean citizenship would revolve around racial groups as they did in Rhodesia. Yet this urge to direct nationalist policies were tempered by the need to follow African leadership. In May 1962, in the midst of these debates, Peter Mackay ranted to several white radicals that 'it is blasphemy [...] if you are not committed, absolutely, to the country [...] to interfere in its practices.'¹⁵²

Luckily for Mackay, the fluid nature of political authority and reactionary racist nationalism negated the role the radicals could have in the debates. Triggered by the slow trickle of support the ZNP were gaining through their anti-white racist rhetoric, May and June 1962 saw indications that the ZAPU leadership remained uncertain regarding white members. ZAPU and Nkomo's non-racialism became the weapon of choice for the ZNP, with one member writing to the *ADN* that:

The ZNP is fighting a battle in which our guns are directed at the white man. Our guns will soon be fired. We do not expect men like Dr. Ranger to turn round his gun and direct it to his fellow white man or to his cousin, just because he wants to maintain the rightful status of the African in his fatherland.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.,

¹⁵¹ See Emma Hunter, 'Introduction', in Emma Hunter, ed., *Citizenship, Belonging, and Political Community in Africa: Dialogues between Past and Present* (Athens, OH, 2016)

¹⁵² Reed, 'Saturday 5 May 1962', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁵³ 'ZNP "Will Never Work With ZAPU"', *Daily News* (22 August 1963), p.1

In the face of this racial rhetoric, even Nkomo was alleged to have stated that 'there is no future for Europeans here. [...] Europeans like [the radicals] will especially not be wanted, prattling as [they] do about the liberty of the subject and the need for more than one political party.'¹⁵⁴ Although van Velsen, Mackay, and Reed dismissed these reports by the British journalist Andrew Wilson as nothing more than creating a story out of gossip, the threat of exclusion was worrying.¹⁵⁵

It took several statements from nationalist leaders to begin to alleviate these concerns. Jason Z. Moyo (ZAPU's treasurer) declared at a meeting in Mtoko that 'ZAPU is not against Europeans but against "evil" [...] We have Europeans contributing at all levels of the cause.'¹⁵⁶ Dr. Samuel Parirenyatwa (ZAPU's Vice President) similarly informed the potential committee of the as-yet-unconfirmed Salisbury City Branch that ZAPU's leaders 'have been too preoccupied with African membership, we should worry about Europeans. The party needs them.'¹⁵⁷ But as Reed adroitly observed, 'there is no common mind in the party leadership - one can learn from talking to this man what he thinks - but not what the Executive thinks. Certainly not what the party is likely to do.'¹⁵⁸ This lack of cohesion meant discussions about citizenship were largely abstract and little practical policies emerged from them. Regardless, on 15 June 1962 a permanent district committee for ZAPU in Salisbury North was elected with Reed as chairman, Terence Ranger vice-chairman, and Edwin Lichtenstein treasurer. Reed was somewhat surprised. 'So Europeans begin to move up the party. In the context, it is astonishing how there is no prejudice against the Europeans.'¹⁵⁹

The ZAPU Salisbury branch was launched at a peak of anti-nationalist sentiments as the increasingly racist white Rhodesian population expressed their

¹⁵⁴ Reed, 'Sunday 11 May 1962', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁵⁵ 'Jaap van Velsen to John Reed' Letter, 13 May 1962, The Diaries of John Reed (1920-2012) Collection, Chetham's Library, Manchester, UK

¹⁵⁶ 'Threat of rural unrest', *The Rhodesia Herald* (12 May 1962), p.2

¹⁵⁷ Reed, 'Wednesday 30 May 1962', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.,

¹⁵⁹ Reed, 'Saturday 15 June 1962', Diary, Vol.94

discontent at Whitehead's 'pandering' to a 'few African dissidents.'¹⁶⁰ Between January and August 1962, over 2,500 Africans had been charged under various laws (more than in the entirety of 1961) and the non-black radicals were not exempt.¹⁶¹ In June 1962, two white members of the ZAPU Youth League at the UCRN had their rooms ransacked by police.¹⁶² Shortly afterwards Edwin Lichtenstein reported ZAPU's executive were planning something for which 'they are expecting to be jailed and for the party to be banned.' Yet as Reed observed in his diary:

Edwin also seems to think it is quite possible we [the Europeans] may be arrested ourselves, "just to show there is no racialism, you know." But this I do not think. The last detainees are trouble enough, but Guy Clutton-Brock was surely more trouble than the rest. Unfortunately, the one sure way to attract large attention is to arrest Europeans.¹⁶³

Again, the utility of non-black radicals lay with the publicity their actions garnered, particularly when such actions forced a response by the Rhodesian state, as Mackay noted.

If the laws were asinine I was prepared, as before, to work outside them and perhaps in the process help to display them as asinine. There did not seem to be virtue in provoking the laws for the sake of it, but neither was there merit in allowing them to get in the way of doing what should be done.¹⁶⁴

Imprisonment was also seen as a sign of commitment to the nationalist cause. Describing his arrest in 1959, Guy Clutton-Brock emphasised that he had been aware of police surveillance for months prior and the concern the Rhodesian state held

¹⁶⁰ See Hintz, 'The Political Transformation', p.177; Rogers & Frantz, *Racial Themes*, pp.257-269; and Hancock, *White Liberals*, p.97

Hancock, *White Liberals*, p.97

¹⁶¹ 'Act Amended to Stem Nationalist Activity', *The Rhodesia Herald* (4 August 1962), p.4. Also Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', pp.106-107

¹⁶² 'ZAPU rooms ransacked at University: Union investigating', *African Daily News* (27 June 1962), p.3

¹⁶³ Reed, 'Monday 21 May 1962', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁶⁴ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.165

about his radicalism.¹⁶⁵ Those who remained in detention from 1959 (such as James Chikerema and George Nyandoro) had earned admiration from ordinary Africans, in sharp contrast to the growing distrust for Nkomo's long period spent abroad.¹⁶⁶ As one anonymous African wrote to the *ADN*, 'detention is not only inevitable, but a badge of honour to be worn with pride and those who run from it, shame themselves.'¹⁶⁷ Thus when Nkomo returned to the country at the end of June 1962, he proclaimed that both he and all nationalists should be willing to face arrest.¹⁶⁸

By August 1962, it appeared that conflict along racial lines in Rhodesia was unavoidable. On 3 August, amendments to two Acts increased the ease with which police could arrest and charge individuals associated with the nationalist cause,¹⁶⁹ and on 14 August, ZAPU's vice-president Stephen Parirenyatwa was killed in a car crash alleged to have involved white soldiers.¹⁷⁰ With the restrictions and violence against African politics, there emerged a growing demand for violent struggle.¹⁷¹ Any groups still associated with the Rhodesian government were deemed enemies of African nationalism, especially the trade unions. As Scarnecchia relates, Parirenyatwa's funeral heralded attacks against Reuben Jamela (a TUC leader and close friend of Parirenyatwa).¹⁷² Accused of having been 'used by Whitehead's government to cause a split in the trade union movement,' Jamela was assaulted by ZAPU members.¹⁷³ Even the suggestion of a multi-racial inclination was seen as justification, as Lawrence Vambe explains.

¹⁶⁵ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, pp.78-93

¹⁶⁶ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.110

¹⁶⁷ 'Letters to the Editor: Actions and Consequences', *African Daily News* (25 June 1962), p.7.

¹⁶⁸ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.

¹⁶⁹ Karekwaivanane, *The Struggle*, p.96; also Bhebe, 'The Nationalist Struggle', p.108

¹⁷⁰ See Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.101; also Mpofu, *My Life*, pp.56-57

¹⁷¹ See Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*; also Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', pp.101-104

¹⁷² Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, pp.116-120

¹⁷³ Lawrence Vambe quoted in Brian Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement in Zimbabwe, 1945-65', in Raftopoulos & Phimister, *Keep on Knocking*, p.83

That was the end of Jamela's leadership – he was definitely the trade union leader of the day at that time. [...] He was a very strong person, and so the white people planned to use him, but I do not think that he wanted to be used. The way they offered him certain favours and the way they spoke of him, made people think he was being used. The government authorities would say, for instance: "if all leaders were like Jamela...". Unfortunately that made people think he was a sell-out.¹⁷⁴

Even traditionally non-violent nationalist leaders like Nkomo saw Parirenyatwa's death and the anger directed at Jamela as indications that the African political milieu had fundamentally changed. 'Nkomo, who made the funeral oration, was deeply angry and could scarcely contain his emotion. As we eventually dispersed, some of us had the premonition, I know, that our immediate future was to be even darker than the present,' recalled Vambe.¹⁷⁵ Within weeks, ZAPU's executive agreed to procure weapons in Cairo for the struggle.¹⁷⁶ The non-black radicals were also aware of the violent sentiments, as Reed noted on 24 August.

I can no longer believe that there is a chance of a settlement through which the transfer of power can take place. Even if Whitehead and even if ZAPU agreed - the change over from minority to majority rule will be catastrophic because there is no more possibility of a multiracial party. The country faces rebellion and economic collapse. Repression and long economic decline. Is there anything to do? Even the old project of keeping open the friendship between the races, preventing it from becoming merely a racial business - in God's name why? Since the situation will kill stone dead what has with such patience and care been kept alive, in the very first moment it would really be of use.¹⁷⁷

Surprisingly this violent hostility to the white state was not echoed in attitudes to the white radicals, likely due to the disjointed nature of ZAPU's leadership. Although anti-white leaders sought to make their voices heard, they remained tempered by the committed non-racialists within the ranks. In early September 1962, the Salisbury district committee made plans for a series of house meetings 'to which will be invited Asian, Coloureds and Europeans who are thought likely to join ZAPU, and at which

¹⁷⁴ Lawrence Vambe quoted in Raftopoulos, 'The Labour Movement', p.83

¹⁷⁵ Vambe, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe*, p.94

¹⁷⁶ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.102

¹⁷⁷ Reed, 'Monday 27 August 1962', Diary, Vol.94

we will have Nkomo and other leaders to talk to them.'¹⁷⁸ Yet the confusion within the nationalists meant even this somewhat innocuous idea was subject to debate, as Reed noted.

It is possible that it might become a political liability. The ZNP although insignificant at the moment, still strives for racial purity - Edison Sithole has recently said he hates European members in a pure Nationalist organisation. There are rumours, vague enough, that at the Congress in October there will be a resolution against non-black membership.¹⁷⁹

The ZNP had temporarily returned to the spotlight in early September when four members of the executive attempted to oust Patrick Matimba (the party President) because of his white wife.¹⁸⁰ These actions by prominent black Africans led Suman Mehta to report the non-blacks he approached on behalf of the Salisbury committee were reluctant to join ZAPU.¹⁸¹ Even Reed lamented that 'it strikes me with very great force that if the party is banned then the struggle is irretrievably committed to violence and desperate bitterness.'¹⁸²

The premonitions of the doubters were correct. On 20 September 1962, Whitehead banned ZAPU and both Ranger and Reed, as well as Stephen Lombard (a young white UCRN student), were issued restriction orders.¹⁸³ Ranger stated that he intended to appeal as 'ZAPU had not been endangering the public peace', and both he and Reed would not renounce their support for the African nationalist movement.¹⁸⁴ However, the Rhodesian state was equally belligerent, describing the banned party as

¹⁷⁸ Reed, 'Tuesday 4 September 1962', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.,

¹⁸⁰ 'ZNP row over white wife', *The Rhodesia Herald* (5 September 1962), p.2. John Reed, 'Portrait of an Agitator: Patrick Matimba', *Africa South*, Vol.4, No.2 (1960), pp.73-78

¹⁸¹ Reed, 'Thursday 13 September 1962', Diary, Vol.95

¹⁸² Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.129

¹⁸³ 'Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, 1960 as Amended - Orders made under Section 44A and Notices Tendered or Delivered to a Person under Section 11: Southern Rhodesia Notice No. 1114 of 1962', Southern Rhodesia Government Gazettes, Bulawayo Public Library, Bulawayo, Zimbabwe

¹⁸⁴ 'Ranger and Reed plan Appeal Against Restriction', *The Rhodesia Herald* (21 September 1962), p.2

'neo-Communist and pan-Africanist in character' and accusing ZAPU of fostering 'extreme racialism' within the nation.¹⁸⁵ It appeared now that the struggle was about to enter a new phase, and the question of non-black participation required re-contextualising.

Conclusion

As the last two chapters have shown, there are inherent difficulties in classifying the nationalist parties between 1957 and 1962 as being genuinely non-racial. Alongside differing perspectives between ordinary members and the leadership, internal conflict within the executive also made a comprehensive racial policy difficult to maintain. Contrasting stances on the necessity of race in the nationalist movement and the imagined future nation, and the difference between the public and private discourse of the nationalist leaders, all emphasised how fluid racial thinking was and how contested was a non-racial nationalism.

Nevertheless, the period surrounding the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU also saw the truly non-racial microcosms of Zimbabwean nationalism. The number of non-black radicals involved as both party members and personal friends of the nationalist leaders reached its peak with the NDP, whilst ZAPU would prove to the last time whites would hold elected office in any Zimbabwean nationalist party for almost twenty years. The Clutton-Brocks, the Haddons, the Rangers, John Reed, Peter Mackay, Margaret Moore, Hasu Patel, Suman Mehta, Edwin Lichtenstein, and numerous others were actively engaged in the nationalist movement. The financial and logistical support they offered and the close friendships they maintained with nationalist leaders had largely endeared the non-black supporters to the African leadership. But it was the establishment of an NDP (and subsequently ZAPU) branch with a non-racial committee that indicated the adherence by some nationalist leaders to a non-racial ideology. For the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU, it was the presence of

¹⁸⁵ 'Report on the Zimbabwe African People's Union', Jaap van Velsen Papers, ICS29/MSS/1, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, UK

non-black radicals requesting inclusion which challenged racial thinking, more so than the legacy of multi-racialism or the existence of a white settler population.

With the banning of ZAPU, the period of open nationalism had drawn to a close and specific amendments were introduced to prevent any new African nationalist party from emerging from ZAPU's structures. As Peter Mackay wrote, 'whereas ZAPU had been in all but name the direct successor of the National Democratic Party – which in its turn had succeeded the African National Congress – now the nationalist movement was denied any formal identity.'¹⁸⁶ The nationalists were forced underground, and non-black radicals were required to do so the same. Forced face-to-face with the realities of what an oppressed people's struggle against an entrenched state entailed, questions of commitment once again rose to the fore, especially when that state was willing to use violence to hold onto its position of power.

¹⁸⁶ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.172

Chapter 4

Racial Identities in the underground Zimbabwean nationalist movement, 1962-1963

Introduction

A month after the banning of ZAPU, Edgar Whitehead remained unequivocal in his condemnation of the proscribed party.

ZAPU was not banned because of its political opinions. It was banned because its members adopted terrorism as a weapon to force people to support its cause. [...] What I will not tolerate is a Party which [...] communicates with foreign powers with a view to overthrowing the legitimate government of the country; stirs up racial feelings and encourages hostility between the races.¹

The intention behind these pronouncements was clear. The nationalist leaders were no longer to be treated as genuine politicians or permitted to spread their views on race and the African struggle through legitimate means. Previous parties had been able to organise branch meetings, draw huge crowds in the African townships, and have a voice in important political decisions like the constitutional talks. However, Whitehead's decision to attack Zimbabwean nationalism rather than a single nationalist party forced African nationalism to become an underground organisation.

This chapter therefore focuses on four main themes and specifically on the period between ZAPU's banning in September 1962 and the murder of Petrus Oberholzer in July 1964 (the first white civilian death in the struggle). The opening theme is the escalation of anti-white rhetoric within the nationalist movement and its leaders. Although some elements had always held strong racist views, the absolute

¹ Southern Rhodesia Information Service, 'Leaders of the banned ZAPU will not be allowed to form any new party: Southern Rhodesia Government: Radio, Press and Publications Release No.86/62 (17 October 1962),' Southern Rhodesian Ministry of Information - Radio/Press and Publication Releases, ACC208, University of South Africa Library, Pretoria, South Africa

repression of the nationalist cause by the white state saw support for these viewpoints intensify, with clearly defined concepts of race becoming more popular than in previous parties. This led to the second theme of this chapter: disagreements within the African nationalist leadership and the non-black radicals. Conflicts worsened over the direction of Zimbabwean nationalism, and the irreversible split between Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo in the summer of 1963 led the Zimbabwean nationalist movement to fracture for good. Encouraged by the space opened by the ZAPU-ZANU split, black identity politics began to make the position of non-black supporters even more precarious.

The utility of non-black radicals within the nationalist struggle is the third theme explored. Given the growing adherence to a nationalist ideology associated with 'blackness', and the underground nature of the African cause, non-black supporters were forced to again justify their positions within the movement. The restrictions, detentions, and exiles of African leaders further broke established relationships between non-black radicals and senior nationalists, and the arrival of new non-black radicals meant new social dynamics came to direct interactions between the radicals and their African counterparts. Some of these younger radicals brought with them a white African perspective; many others drew upon European experiences and identities, further complicating the anatomy of non-black radicals in Rhodesia. This transnationalism is the final theme explored, with particular focus given to its role in defining the mentality of non-black radicals, but also in facilitating their actions. Comparisons are made with the restrictions placed on black African mobility and feed in to the debates around the utility of non-black radicals. The transferral of ideas throughout Africa are also highlighted for their impact on the shape of Zimbabwean nationalist thinking.

i. ZAPU Underground: Non-black radicals

The inevitability of ZAPU's proscription had been anticipated from as early as July 1962 when the ZAPU executive had made the decision not to form a new successor

party.² Yet this preparation did not lessen the impact, particularly given the restrictions of Ranger, Reed, and Lombard and the effect on the white radical community was severe. Several days after ZAPU were banned, the legal scholar Clare Palley and her liberal MP husband Ahrn hosted a dinner party at which the mood was largely despondent with Leone Lichtenstein (Edwin's wife) particularly 'full of the pointlessness of Europeans getting involved in African Nationalism,' reported Reed.³ A sense of frustration was building and being white and a member of an African nationalist party now seemed to be irreconcilable. When Peter Mackay's home and offices were searched by the police that same week, the relative liberty that white nationalists had enjoyed until that point appeared to be quickly disappearing, and Reed was quick to again hide his own ZAPU documents for fear of discovery.⁴

In light of the state persecution, each individual who supported the nationalist movement could either commit further to the cause and risk imprisonment or restriction, or renounce their allegiance to ZAPU and attempt to extricate themselves. The white radicals retained a level of mobility and financial security that enabled them to leave the country at relatively short notice and apart from the three restrictees, ZAPU's white supporters were able to travel freely within and outside of Southern Rhodesia. Previously this mobility had been used to support the nationalists, but now it became a means of escape and the Lichtensteins were amongst the first to emigrate from Rhodesia in the early 1960s. A South African lawyer, Edwin had begun practicing in Bulawayo in 1957 just as the African nationalist movement was emerging. Although he did not join the SRANC and was initially a supporter of Garfield Todd, he did have contact with Nkomo, Joseph Msika, and Clutton-Brock, and with the failure of multi-racialism, was the first white to join the Bulawayo NDP.⁵

² Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, 1957-1980* (Harare, 1979), p.35

³ Reed, 'Sunday 23 September 1962', Diary, Vol.95

⁴ Reed, 'Tuesday 25 September 1962', Diary, Vol.95

⁵ Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

Like many white radicals, Lichtenstein's motivations to support the African nationalists came from his own marginality from white society. In this case, it was his Jewish heritage which had given him an experience of discrimination based on an unalterable element of his identity. Comprising no more than 2.5 per cent of the white Rhodesian population,⁶ Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock argue that Rhodesian Jews 'felt isolated and uncomfortable within the Anglo-Celt hegemony' of white Rhodesian society and consequently garnered a liberal reputation.⁷ Counting several multi-racialists within their ranks including Ahrn Palley (a liberal MP), Leo Baron (Nkomo's lawyer), and Roy Welensky (the Federal Prime Minister),⁸ as multi-racialism fell from favour, 'the Jewish community which had been in the forefront of the "liberal" multiracial camp felt very vulnerable in this heightened political atmosphere'.⁹ Lichtenstein was one of those targeted.

When I was elected treasurer of the Bulawayo branch of the NDP, this was widely publicised and it did arouse a very hostile reaction from most of the white community. I [...] received a number of threatening phone calls and letters and this continued for some weeks actually, culminating in an assault on me in my office and eventually in the loss of my job in Bulawayo.¹⁰

This treatment was an unprecedented indicator of the potentially violent response of white Rhodesians to dissent in their community, and the alienation facing white radicals. Ostracised by the white Bulawayo population, Lichtenstein was also asked by his law firm to resign because of his politics. In 1961, the Lichtensteins moved to Salisbury where Edwin established his own practice catering almost exclusively to Africans charged with political crimes. It lasted less than a year.

It was becoming impossible for me to earn a living in Rhodesia at that time. I received an almost total boycott by the white community professionally. I had

⁶ Eric Rosenthal, 'Rhodesian Jewry and Its Story', Unpublished Manuscript, undated

⁷ Godwin & Hancock, *'Rhodesians Never Die'*, p.19

⁸ Maurice Wagner, 'Rhodesia', *The American Jewish Year Book*, Vol.78 (1978), pp.508-516

⁹ Barry A. Kosmin, *Majuta: A History of the Jewish Community of Zimbabwe* (Harare, 1980), p.119

¹⁰ Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

to rely on African political cases for which, very often, I didn't get paid and I would actually have to finance them for counsel's fees myself and it just became impossible.¹¹

In late 1962, Leone's teachership at the Teachers' Training College was also questioned in the Rhodesian Parliament because of her politics. Presented with the stark choice of renouncing their support for ZAPU or leaving Rhodesia, they chose the latter and emigrated to London only a few weeks after ZAPU were banned.¹²

The Lichtensteins were not alone in having to balance their political views with an ability to earn a living in Rhodesia as David Cate's account of Rhodesian society demonstrates.¹³ However, one notable exception was the UCRN which appeared to offer security for students and staff alike including Judith Todd (Garfield Todd's daughter and economics student). A ZAPU membership card in Todd's name, signed by Stephen Lombard as the ZAPU representative, was found in Lombard's room during a search by police.¹⁴ Todd brazenly responded by telling the *Bulawayo Chronicle* that she had joined ZAPU and would remain a member despite its ban.¹⁵ Along with the restrictions of Ranger, Reed, and Lombard, such incidents consolidated the image of the UCRN as a hotspot for non-black radicalism.¹⁶

Meanwhile a series of events towards the end of 1962 cast aspersions on the acceptance of non-blacks in an African nationalist movement. In September, leaflets were distributed in African townships calling for 'the killing of all whites'.¹⁷ Whether they were produced by the ZNP, Rhodesian Special Branch, or ZAPU is uncertain, but leaflets bearing ZAPU's name and containing open racism was a cause of concern.¹⁸ In a letter to Shelagh Ranger, Maurice Nyagumbo wrote 'what worries me

¹¹ Ibid.,

¹² Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

¹³ See Cate, *Under the Skin*, pp.212-214, 406-408

¹⁴ Edwin Albert Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone, (20 November 1983)

¹⁵ 'Todd's daughter ZAPU member', *Bulawayo Chronicle* (26 September 1962), p.3

¹⁶ J. Leo Cefkin, 'Rhodesian University Students in National Politics', in William John Hanna, ed., *University Students and African Politics* (London, 1975)

¹⁷ Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.117

¹⁸ LTTE, *African Daily News* (30 September 1962), p.8

is how to protect these settlers when we take over. Although most of our people do not believe in killing, [...] there seem to be a big number who may want to retaliate. I am finding it hard to avoid this situation,'¹⁹ and even the most senior nationalist leaders found themselves involved. In October 1962, Rhodesian newspapers published a statement from Nkomo which saw him completely withdraw his support for white radicals.

Because of the stand of the majority of Europeans in the country and the form of our struggle that is going on now, one feels embarrassed to have Europeans working with one. They have no place in the struggle of African nationalists in this country now.²⁰

Questions were immediately raised about the veracity of the statement, particularly in light of the campaign for white members that had been planned just prior to ZAPU's banning. As Reed noted in his diary: 'everything in the paper is a lie, however plausible it looks. And even if Nkomo did say it, what status it has, God knows. Does the party now get directives through Nkomo's public press statements?'²¹ Well-versed in the perennial uncertainty surrounding the nationalist elite's policy-making process, Reed's confusion with Nkomo's statement demonstrated how those outside of the executive were often none the wiser as to what was the party's stance as a whole.

In an effort to clarify the situation, Terence Ranger wrote to the detained Nyagumbo questioning the future of the nationalist movement.

I do not know whether it will be possible for me to [join a ZAPU replacement party]. It seems quite likely that any new party will now take an exclusively African line and no longer find it possible to have European members. Indeed, the *Herald* phoned me up yesterday to report that Joshua [Nkomo] is supposed to have said just that in an interview from restriction - that the time had come

¹⁹ Maurice Nyagumbo to Shelagh Ranger, Letter, 12 October 1962, Box 86, Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

²⁰ 'Whites not wanted - Nkomo', *The Rhodesia Herald* (17 October 1962), p.2

²¹ Reed, 'Thursday 18 October 1962', Diary, Vol.95

when it was impossible and embarrassing to have whites as members of the nationalist movement.²²

Nyagumbo was quick to attempt to set Ranger's mind at ease:

In the last five years Joshua [Nkomo] has experienced the terrible hardships which you people have undergone after having joined the nationalist organisation. [...] Joshua was not happy with these waves of threats after threats of deportation orders against you. He realizes how much it will damage our cause if you were to be deported. Thus Joshua decided to make that statement in order to disarm our enemies. [...] I don't want to tell you how much we value your ability in the struggle. But I want to tell you this secret. The first Nkomo parliament will not do without the following people - Guy Clutton-Brock, the already deported Faber, T. Ranger, John Reed and Mackay. I know that you may not believe me but this is the fact.²³

Painting Nkomo's public rhetoric as security for the white radicals provides an insight into the deeply politicised place of race in Zimbabwean nationalism by late 1962. The nationalist executive had realised that with the popular anti-white hostility, any vocal support for non-racialism (particularly by the former multi-racialist Nkomo) weakened their credentials to lead the African struggle. Thus attempts were made to preserve the support of non-black radicals through less-public methods and those whites who knew Nkomo reported that there had been no change in his positive attitude to non-racialism.²⁴ Seeing his anti-white statement as an attempt to detract attention from the radicals explains the dramatic divergence from his previous public rhetoric.

Nyagumbo's letter to Ranger was important for a second reason, namely the five men identified as being intrinsic to the future of a post-colonial Zimbabwe: Guy Clutton-Brock, Michael Faber, Terence Ranger, John Reed, and Peter Mackay. Although a small list, the recognition of five specific non-black radicals demonstrates what Zimbabwean nationalist leaders in 1962 regarded as desirable

²² Terence Ranger to Maurice Nyagumbo, Letter, 16 October 1962, Box 86, Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

²³ Maurice Nyagumbo to Terence Ranger, 20 November 1962, Box 86, Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

²⁴ See Sibanda, 'The Contributions of Joshua Nkomo', p.64

criteria for non-black radicals and it is necessary to highlight some common elements of their identities.

ii. Women and the Nationalist Movement

All five radicals made significant contributions to the African nationalist cause, predominantly in Rhodesia but also throughout central Africa. Clutton-Brock, Ranger, Reed, and Mackay are already familiar from this thesis, but Faber was an equally important supporter of African nationalism. A British economist, journalist, Eton and Oxford graduate, Faber had settled in Northern Rhodesia in 1956 where he was involved with the University College of Northern Rhodesia's Department of Economics and participated in the Northern Rhodesian ANC, forming close attachments to many of the CAF nationalists in the process.²⁵

Within the broader heterogeneous group of white radicals, the 'impeccably orthodox [...] credentials' of the five men were striking.²⁶ All were born into middle-class British families; all went to private schools (Clutton-Brock to Rugby, Ranger to Highgate, Reed to Bancroft's, Mackay to Stowe, and Faber to Eton); and four went to Oxford or Cambridge, whilst the fifth (Mackay) had a distinguished career in the British Army. Writing in Ranger's obituary, John McCracken noted 'there is a certain irony in the fact that a man perceived in the early 1960s by white Rhodesians as the very epitome of left-wing radicalism should have had an entirely conventional English middle-class upbringing.'²⁷ All five men retained a strong connection to Britain in both their politics and culture, and both Mackay and Faber were reported to have worked with British intelligence services.²⁸ Furthermore, apart from Clutton-

²⁵ Richard Jolly, 'Michael Faber obituary: Development economist who helped newly independent nations', *theguardian.com*, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/mar/25/michael-faber> (accessed 25 March 2015)

²⁶ John McCracken, 'Terence Ranger: African Historian and Activist', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.41, No.5 (2015), pp.1102-1106, p.1102

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.1102

²⁸ Bob Sconan, interviewed by author (7 December 2015)

Brock, the other four were around the same age as the nationalist leaders, having been born between 1926 and 1931. As Trevor Grundy explains, these were the 'upper-class, well-connected Britons who appeared as devils incarnate in the eyes of most indigenous Europeans'.²⁹ For the African elites who sought to emulate upper-class British culture, these five men were afforded recognition precisely because of their identities. In the imagined post-independence Zimbabwe, it stood to reason that if the Zimbabwean leaders were to be well-educated elites, their white counterparts would be similar. Citizenship was to be created around the nationalist leaders' personal identities and because it was black African elite men leading the debates, it was white elite men who were afforded the greatest accommodation.

This further explains the male focus of these discussions and of this thesis despite the number of radical white women involved with Zimbabwean nationalism. The most notable were Shelagh Ranger, Eileen Haddon, Molly Clutton-Brock, Judith Todd, and Margaret Moore, but there were several others who played less prominent roles including Mary Benson, Patricia Chater, Sylvia Roberts, and Sheila Graham. All were no less persistent in their activities than their male counterparts yet their names are conspicuously absent in the Nyagumbo letter and most primary accounts of events during the period. Both Eleanor O'Gorman and Susan Geiger have explored the subsuming of women under the umbrella of African nationalism, with O'Gorman concluding that women (like the non-black radicals) were viewed as 'a political constituency to be mobilised for support in the way of other sub-national groups'.³⁰ Like the non-black radicals, the role of women within the nationalist movement was affected by the male elites who shaped policy. Their voices tended to be hidden

²⁹ Trevor Grundy, 'Professor Michael Faber: An obituary', politicsweb.co.za, politicsweb.co.za/comment/professor-michael-faber-an-obituary (accessed 23 April 2015)

³⁰ Eleanor O'Gorman, *The Front Line Runs Through Every Woman: Women & Local Resistance in the Zimbabwean Liberation Struggle* (Harare, 2011), pp.17-22, 18. Also see Susan Geiger, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-65* (Portsmouth, 1997), pp.1-19

within the traditional sources, and only alternative approaches to the history of Zimbabwean nationalism have managed to reconstruct their contributions.³¹

These problems are further complicated when the focus of the research is a minority group within a minority group, as with the non-black radical women. Kate Law's work on white women in colonial Zimbabwe dedicates an entire chapter to Eileen Haddon solely because Haddon left behind a loud voice in existing sources. Tracing Haddon's progression from multi-racial liberalism to nationalist radicalism, Law demonstrates how respected Haddon was by the nationalist leaders despite her gender.³² Yet Law's chapter leaves the reader with the impression that Haddon was working in complete isolation and makes no mention of other white female radicals. This invisibility of the others is disappointing given the valuable contributions they made to Zimbabwean nationalism. Although her husband took most of the headlines, Molly Clutton-Brock was just as involved in the formation and administration of the SRANC and its successors,³³ and regularly organised informal gatherings of radicals and nationalists at the Clutton-Brocks' farm which facilitated the discussions that shaped racial thinking within the nationalist leadership.³⁴ Furthermore, Molly's letters to various radicals helped overcome the fractured existence of white radicals in Rhodesia.³⁵

Shelagh Ranger was another of the most prominent white supporters of the African cause whose husband garnered the most attention. All those who knew Shelagh emphasised that she had her own motivations that went far beyond simply following her husband (as was sometimes portrayed in contemporary reports).³⁶ Indeed, Shelagh was regularly a driving force behind other's actions, as Reed noted in May 1958. 'Terry reminds her [Shelagh] that she has spent the last year goading

³¹ See for example Barnes & Win, *To Live a Better Life*

³² Law, *Gendering the Settler State*, ch.3

³³ Reed, 'Saturday 17 September 1957', Diary, Vol.72

³⁴ Patricia Chater, "'By their fruits ye shall know them'", in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.102

³⁵ See Reed, 'Tuesday 19 July 1960', Diary, Vol.88

³⁶ See 'Ranger issued deportation order', *Natal Mercury* (21 March 1963)

me and himself into action - "Why don't you do something instead of sitting here and talking?"³⁷ As indicated by her threat to take 'an obscurantist policy of bovine imbecility' when subpoenaed for James Chikerema's trial (a threat that made both her husband and friends 'annoyed and alarmed' at the likelihood of repercussions by the white state), Shelagh was frequently willing to go further in her actions than many of the radical white men.³⁸ By the time of the 1959 emergency, Shelagh's reputation had grown to such an extent that her husband wrote: 'I am widely known among Africans as Mr Shelagh Ranger'.³⁹ After a contentious vote in September 1961,⁴⁰ Shelagh was elected chairwoman of the NDP Salisbury City branch's Council of Women, with Teresa Chirunga and Margaret Moore as Secretary and Treasurer respectively.⁴¹ Despite at least a dozen women of all races present ('Shelagh, Eunice Herbst, another European woman, Evelyn, the Rangers' maid, Teresa...'⁴²), Reed noted that Shelagh continued to call for more action.

Shelagh is [...] unimpressed by the mere driving for more members and more subscriptions. "A man doesn't become committed to a cause because he has paid a shilling. Organisation is not just getting members but doing something with the members you have got."⁴³

Due to this persistence, Margaret Moore (the American Quaker) persuaded her close friend Sally Mugabe to come to the branch's women's meeting the following week and speak on 'Ghana and national dress'.⁴⁴ This proactive attitude meant Shelagh was held in such high esteem by the nationalists that by the time the Rangers were deported from Rhodesia in February 1963, the ZAPU Women's League sang 'Nkomo

³⁷ Reed, 'Saturday 17 May 1958', Diary, Vol.78

³⁸ Reed, 'Friday 16 May 1958', Diary, Vol.77

³⁹ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.43

⁴⁰ According to Reed, the idea of only the NDP Salisbury branch's women voting for the women's council was contested by some of the African men present, including Lovemore Chimonyo.

⁴¹ Reed, 'Thursday 7 September 1961', Diary, Vol.92

⁴² Reed, 'Thursday 7 September 1961', Diary, Vol.92

⁴³ Reed, 'Monday 14 August 1961', Diary, Vol.92

⁴⁴ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.101

is a bull, Ranger is a bull, Shelagh is a militant woman.⁴⁵ Yet such statements demonstrated the limited recognition afforded to the few white radical women, and the keen distinctions with their male counterparts.

iii. The Rhodesian Front and ZAPU underground

When the SRANC and NDP were banned, it took only a matter of weeks for official successors to emerge. However, during the nine months in which ZAPU was allowed to operate relatively freely, amendments were made to the several laws to prevent the same process from recurring. Thus when ZAPU was banned, no office holders were permitted to join a new party, all meetings involving ZAPU members were banned, membership became punishable by lengthy prison sentences, and even possession of ZAPU literature became a crime.

Unsurprisingly, it was the nationalist leaders who were most severely affected by the restrictions. According to Timothy Scarnecchia, it is possible this was Edgar Whitehead's intention from the outset. In order to keep ZAPU's more moderate and less overtly anti-white elements as possible partners in future government, it was seen as necessary to 'separate Nkomo from Robert Mugabe and the ZAPU left'.⁴⁶ The majority of ordinary supporters thus continued with only minimal disruption, as Terence Ranger explains: 'The parties may have been banned; many local leaders may have been detained and restricted; but in a very real sense nationalism continued to function at the local level.'⁴⁷

The local ZAPU branches were efficient in their administration in both townships and rural areas because they had remained largely independent of the national executive. However, this disjointed structure also had unwanted consequences. As Scarnecchia's research has shown, the inability of the ZAPU leadership to control the violence of their supporters was partly a result of the

⁴⁵ Reed, 'Wednesday 27 February 1963', Diary, Vol.101

⁴⁶ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.122

⁴⁷ Ranger, *Peasant Consciousness*, p.160

relative autonomy that local branches and members had.⁴⁸ Moreover, as with the ANC in South Africa and the township violence of the 1980s, socio-political violence has a dynamic of its own that the nationalist movement was not always able to control from a centralised perspective.⁴⁹ Social unrest created spaces not only for discussion and debate, but for disorder, as Michael MacDonald explains. 'The ANC did call for the townships to become ungovernable and the townships were ungovernable, but they were ungovernable before and for reasons independent of the ANC's calls.'⁵⁰

The same is true for early 1960s ZAPU and violence proved to be an increasingly important theme in Rhodesia's socio-political environment by late 1962, both urban and international. The Sharpeville Massacre in March 1960 and the memories of the Mau Mau in Kenya had planted a belief in 'the violence of unchecked-Africans' in the minds of many white Rhodesians.⁵¹ This was reinforced by the arrival of hundreds of whites fleeing turmoil in the Congo and accounts of violence they had suffered.⁵² Sue van Reineen (a broadcast supervisor at Rhodesian Television) recalls the contents of one programme.

There was video footage from Katanga of black soldiers dragging whites from their homes and making them kiss their boots. We thought this could happen here if we let the blacks take power. [...] We wanted to be cautious because we had nowhere to go if things went wrong.⁵³

⁴⁸ See Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*

⁴⁹ See Abiodun Alao, 'A Comparative Evaluation of the Armed Struggle in Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe', in William Gutteridge & John E. Spence, eds., *Violence in Southern Africa* (London, 1997)

⁵⁰ Michael MacDonald, *Why Race Matters in South Africa* (London, 2006), p.77

⁵¹ 'Heed the warnings', LTTE, *Rhodesia Herald*, Wednesday 12 December, 1962, p.7. See also William J. Hanna, and Judith L. Hanna, *Urban Dynamics in Black Africa: an interdisciplinary approach* (Chicago, 1971)

⁵² For example, see Christopher Othen, *Katanga 1960-63: Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged War on the World* (London, 2015), ch.5. Also Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (London, 1992)

⁵³ Sue van Reineen, interviewed by author, (13 November 2016)

Combined with the emergence of FRELIMO in Mozambique, white Rhodesians felt increasingly isolated on the continent they called their home.⁵⁴ The result, as J.R.T. Wood has noted, was that 'many voters forsook Whitehead and the UFP to halt the slide to African majority rule and all it seemed to portend,'⁵⁵ and in the December 1962 election the white settler nationalist party, the Rhodesian Front (RF) under Winston Field, saw a surge of support. Brian Raftopoulos points to the success of the RF as an indication of how race was becoming a 'central modality through which people lived and experienced their lives'⁵⁶ and many of the non-black radicals were well aware of the precedent set by the RF's rise to power.

Worryingly, the RF specifically targeted non-black radicals during their election campaign, labelling them 'fellow travellers who were misleading the Africans in the country'.⁵⁷ For some white radicals, the election marked the complete end of multi-racial liberalism, for good or bad, and Ranger recalled the reaction of Jenny Frost, a white radical seller of prohibited books. '[Frost] came in and perched on my bed, greeting the election result with enthusiasm. The feeble liberals had been swept away. "Now we know where we are!", she said.'⁵⁸ Others were more despondent, including the typically cautious Reed.

The threat was that the society that the Europeans have built up - the kind of country, the kind of society could be made somehow viable for the future by a kind of multiracialism by buying up enough Africans, they could perpetuate the values of the white ruling autocracy, even though it had stopped being white. This is no longer on the cards [...]. Terry expects an onslaught against the white liberals. It is so easy and will be so satisfying. He is now wondering should he after all apply for the job in Dar es Salaam?⁵⁹

As soon as their restriction orders came to an end in January 1963, Terence Ranger was declared a prohibited immigrant. Although Shelagh was not similarly deported,

⁵⁴ King, 'Identity and Decolonisation', p.224

⁵⁵ Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.121

⁵⁶ Raftopoulos & Mlambo, *Becoming Zimbabwe*, p.xxii

⁵⁷ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.160

⁵⁸ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.143

⁵⁹ Reed, 'Saturday 15 December 1962', Diary, Vol.96

Ranger stated to the press that the RF 'said if she did not leave the country within the prescribed time' she would also be expelled.⁶⁰ The publicity garnered by Ranger's CACBA activities was obviously of greater concern to the RF than Shelagh's more radical inclinations.

Although Ranger embellished the African reaction to his deportation,⁶¹ there was admittedly some resistance amongst the white population about the precedent set by deporting a white man without trial. Once again, it was the ability of white radicals to attract attention to the nationalist cause which justified their participation with the nationalists. As Mackay begrudgingly admitted, some good came out of the deportation; 'it has brought out such African sympathy and support [for the white radicals] as could hardly have been expected at this time.'⁶² Ranger's deportation remained in the public eye for a matter of weeks, beginning with an editorial in the *Rhodesia Herald*. 'We stress, as we have done consistently in the past, that if a person is objectionable in any particular country, it would be better were he brought before the Courts [...] to stand trial,' wrote the editor.⁶³ Both the Association of University Teachers and the UCRN Principal Walter Adams similarly condemned the order:

No reasons for this drastic action have been given either to Dr. Ranger or to the college authorities. No charge has been brought against him that can be tested in the courts or by any independent tribunal. I presume therefore that Dr. Ranger has not broken the law but is being condemned for his political opinions and activities.⁶⁴

This concern about freedom of speech was repeated by both public figures and ordinary Rhodesians. The Bishop of Mashonaland, Rev. Cecil W. Alderson, attacked

⁶⁰ 'Ranger told to get out', *Rhodesia Herald*, Saturday 12 January 1963, p.1

⁶¹ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.145. The only reported incident was a protest by some 20 to 30 African students at the UCRN over the deportation of their lecturer. 'University Principal condemns Ranger order', *Rhodesia Herald*, Tuesday 15 January 1963, p.1

⁶² Reed, 'Monday 12 February 1963', Diary, Vol.98

⁶³ 'Quit order on Dr. Ranger', *Rhodesia Herald*, Saturday 12 January 1963, p.5

⁶⁴ 'University Principal condemns Ranger order', *Rhodesia Herald*, Tuesday 15 January 1963, p.1

the ability of the Rhodesian state to declare somebody a prohibited immigrant 'without accusation, trial or cause given.' After drawing comparisons with Guy Clutton-Brock's experiences, Alderson argued 'whether you like Dr. Ranger and his activities is, I believe, an irrelevant question in a society which claims to be governed by the principles of justice and fair play.'⁶⁵

In the days that followed, the letter pages of the *Rhodesia Herald* and the *African Daily News* demonstrated the broader debate. Some letter writers raised the issues of free expression.

Voltaire said: "I do not agree with one word you say, but I will die for your right to say it." I do not agree with all that Dr. Ranger has said and done, but I appeal to the Government, in the spirit of that quotation, not to send him out of the country simply because we do not agree with him. He is a brilliant lecturer and his going will be a loss to the country, if only for the stimulus he gives to our thinking, and that not simply in matters political.⁶⁶

Another Rhodesian wrote:

Dr. Ranger's name has become a pass-word among the African people. Surely no Government can wish to widen the chasm that now exists between the races? What is the Government afraid of – any voice of opposition, any mind of superior intellect, any man of courage? Is this to be the future policy of our "new" Southern Rhodesian Government?⁶⁷

Sharing the same outrage was an African woman in the *ADN*:

Dr. Ranger and Sheila [sp.] have done more for the people of Zimbabwe than fifty years of white rule. That they are being evicted because of their desire to help people of all colours shows the desire of the Mr. Field [the Rhodesian Prime Minister] to prevent even a gradual transition to fair African representation.⁶⁸

However, others had no sympathy for the Rangers.

⁶⁵ 'LTTE: Bishop's Address', *The Link*, Tuesday 15 January 1963, p.2

⁶⁶ 'LTTE: W.R.J. Sprowson, Highlands', *Rhodesia Herald*, Tuesday 15 January 1963, p.7

⁶⁷ 'LTTE: N.M. Robertson, Belvedere', *Rhodesia Herald*, Thursday 17 January 1963, p.9

⁶⁸ 'LTTE: Charity N., Harare', *African Daily News*, Friday 18 January 1963, p.5

It is thanks to Dr. Terence Ranger and his handful of multiracial fanatics that we have forced integration in our swimming baths today, and it is due to them that large numbers of our European children cannot enjoy the swimming facilities which we, their parents, pay for. The sooner the people responsible for this situation are deported or made to pay for what they have done to the unfortunate victims of their multi-racial rose-coloured dreams the better.⁶⁹

The desegregation of public baths was unlikely to cause the whole of white Rhodesian society to crumble but nevertheless, as a second anonymous letter stated: 'to many of us solid Rhodesians [... Ranger] has been a nuisance, an upstart, and an unwanted expatriate.'⁷⁰

Reactions within the white radicals and the African nationalists were similarly diverse. At one end of the spectrum, Mackay was vocal in his disdain for the commotion. Although buoyed by Hastings Banda's appointment as the first Prime Minister of Nyasaland on 1 February 1963, Mackay failed to see why Ranger was being celebrated. As Reed noted, 'Peter objects to the fuss being made over a European who won't suffer in being deported and thinks that dissenting persons would have avoided being deported and attracting so much attention.'⁷¹ A week later, Mackay was even more adamant in his criticism of Ranger. 'Peter says how remarkable it is that with all Terry's enemies no one has come forward to say that all this fuss about his being deported is unreal, because he was intending to leave the country anyway.'⁷² (Ranger had recently applied for a Chair at the University of Dar es Salaam.)

Apart from Ranger's deportation, the first few months of 1963 proved to be incredibly significant for the Zimbabwean nationalists and for the non-black radicals. The imminent granting of independence to two of the three countries in the CAF gave the RF a number of concerns about the future of race relations in the region, including the possible 'significant movement of Asiatics to Southern Rhodesia' as a

⁶⁹ 'LTTE: Mrs. J. Howarth, Mabelreign', *Rhodesia Herald*, Thursday 17 January 1963, p.9

⁷⁰ 'LTTE: A. Nuisance', *Rhodesia Herald*, Thursday 17 January 1963, p.9

⁷¹ Reed, 'Tuesday 5 February 1963', *Diary*, Vol.98

⁷² Reed, 'Monday 12 February 1963', *Diary*, Vol.98

result of the Federal collapse.⁷³ In an effort to build a workable relationship with the new African leaders to the north, Winston Field released over 125 prominent nationalists, including some senior ZAPU detainees like James Chikerema who had been in detention since 1959.⁷⁴ On 24 February, a farewell party at the Rangers' house provided an opportunity for the recently released to reacquaint themselves with the white radicals. In attendance were Margaret and Stanley Moore, Joshua Nkomo in an 'immense fur hat', several students from the UCRN, and, 'Maurice Nyagumbo [...], George Nyandoro, [James] Chikerema, Robert Mugabe, the Haddons, Herbert [Chitepo]. Even Peter is at the party sulking through the kitchen,' described Reed. The composition of the gathering gave Reed hope for the future. 'Such an occasion is one of the things that make the misery of the Southern Rhodesian situation tolerable. In spite of everything, this can happen.'⁷⁵ A few days later, in a well-attended departure from Salisbury airport, Ranger was bid farewell by a gathering of ZAPU leaders including Nyagumbo, Nkomo, Chikerema, and Mugabe.

Mackay, however, remained typically critical, arguing to Reed that 'it is going to be difficult for [Ranger] to contribute to the cause from the university in Dar [es Salaam]. It would be better to remain here, in prison, where he can at least be a symbol for cause.'⁷⁶ Mackay's differences with Ranger highlighted how close to the surface tensions were, particularly with the external pressures upon the white radicals. Whilst Ranger's contributions revolved around 'principled protest against racial discrimination',⁷⁷ Mackay was a more extreme radical, which even Ranger later recognised.

Peter put the rest of us to shame by being so useful to the nationalist movements, not merely rhetorically but practically [...]. My speeches were

⁷³ , "Memorandum: Inter-Territorial Movement of Persons (Control) Act: Movement of Asiatics", S.R.C.(F)(63)184, 2 July 1963, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

⁷⁴ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.57

⁷⁵ Reed, 'Sunday 24 February 1963', Diary, Vol.98

⁷⁶ Reed, 'Thursday 28 February 1963', Diary, Vol.98

⁷⁷ McCracken, 'Terence Ranger', p.1102

reported in the Rhodesian newspapers and made me notorious among the whites; Peter's unselfishly practical activities evaded public attention.⁷⁸

Mackay's activities ranged from providing support for families of the detainees, to publishing two pro-nationalist journals (*Tsopano* and *Chapapu*) as well as the *Malawi News* (the mouthpiece of the Hasting Banda's Malawi Congress Party). Starting in the early 1960s, Mackay also began transporting nationalists to safety in Northern Rhodesia (like NDP founder George Silundika), and running Land Rovers provided by Kwame Nkrumah into Malawi.⁷⁹ Although the majority of these contributions went unnoticed by the general public, the Rhodesian intelligence services were not so disinterested. It 'is believed that [Mackay] is also working with other extreme organisations within the Federation that seek to overthrow the government of these countries by unconstitutional means', noted a report in August 1962.⁸⁰

As with Ranger's deportation, Mackay's fervent belief in full commitment to African nationalism ensured he frequently came into conflict with fellow radicals, particularly because of his vocal dislike for white settlers in Rhodesia. In November 1962, Reed noted his thoughts following a lengthy conversation with Mackay:

Talking with Peter does not always do me good. [...] There is a kind of extremism in all he says and he seems to embrace a ruthless cynicism and a warm hearted belief in the people that is often nearly embarrassing. Sometimes this is no more illogical than a belief and trust in Africans and a hatred of the Europeans here, but Peter does not check this with facts or with a guilty feeling that it could perhaps be a racial way of thinking, [...] he refuses to be abashed by it.⁸¹

In another conversation between Reed and Mackay, the latter clearly laid out his personal ideology regarding non-black participation in the nationalist struggle:

⁷⁸ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.xiii

⁷⁹ McCracken, 'Peter Mackay', p.2

⁸⁰ 'Cabinet Memorandum: Prohibition Orders Under the Native Affairs Act (Cap.72)', S.R.C(F)(63)18, 16 January 1963, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

⁸¹ Reed, 'Thursday 1 November 1962', Diary, Vol.95

Peter's view is that the European must accept everything - he must substitute for the sins of the whites - embrace the racialism of African nationalism. I say that in joining a political party, one should expect to be treated to a member of the party. "How can you be treated as just another member of the party, a white man in a African Nationalist party?" says Peter. And this is true enough.⁸²

Reed noted that Mackay's long history as a champion for African advancement in Central Africa undoubtedly played some part in his staunch ideals.

Peter's ordinary multiracialism is much nearer the surface I think than mine - he has, much more than I have, a multiracial past - Capricorn and so on. [As Mackay repeatedly stated] "afterwards at least it cannot be said that it was a purely racial struggle." I feel this too. But for Peter, this is almost just a matter of honour.⁸³

Mackay and Ranger were on good terms in later years but the tension that existed around this issue of imprisonment was as much a result of their individual character as it was their actions. Single men like Mackay, Reed, or John Conradie were at greater liberty to take risks than those with families.⁸⁴ Moreover, proving oneself under trying circumstances was a common theme in Mackay's life story, particularly after 1948 and his departure from the British army. Thrust back into the civilian world, Mackay's firm disdain for publicity was a self-imposed reaction to his own heroic self-image and a justification for resigning his army commission. His commitment to the African cause was primarily driven by his desire for equality and justice, and yet the liberation struggle's depiction as a 'heroic enterprise for which brave and idealistic men were prepared to suffer and die' flattered Mackay's self-image.⁸⁵ Moreover, the sacrifice of imprisonment was a means of overcoming his externality and foreignness from the African cause, ostensibly granting him the legitimacy denied by his skin colour. As with other white radicals, Mackay also saw Zimbabwean nationalism as a means of securing a non-racial post-colonial nation

⁸² Reed, 'Tuesday 4 June 1963', Diary, Vol.99

⁸³ Ibid.,

⁸⁴ For more on Conradie, see chapter six

⁸⁵ Terence Ranger, 'Introduction', in Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.xii

and the election of the RF provided fresh impetus to his actions. Indeed, Mackay would go on to have the most impact between 1963 and 1966 when the stance of the nationalists shifted from peaceful protest to violent underground opposition.

Race relations in the country and the position of the non-black radicals become even more complicated in March 1963. It appeared that different elements of the nationalist movement were still following different racial policies, and public statements on the topic very much depended upon the audience for such speeches. In early March 1963, Nkomo reportedly stated that 'the white man should be made to leave this country because he was the cause of destitution.'⁸⁶ Yet, only a few days later, Reed and Mackay were welcomed to a United National Independence Party (UNIP) meeting in Highfield at which Mugabe and Nyandoro spoke.⁸⁷ They encountered no hostility at the small gathering despite a 'forceful' speech by Mugabe, dressed in a 'Ghana toga and a skin hat, against the Federation and minority rule.'⁸⁸ This anti-Federation stance had become a prominent topic once again with Rab Butler's (British First Secretary of State) announcement that same month that any of the territories of the CAF had the right to secede in principal.⁸⁹ Butler's rejection of Rhodesian independence due to its white government rankled the Rhodesian population and led to a resurgent attack on African nationalism. This repression, combined with the apparent stagnation of the struggle in Rhodesia, undermined what should otherwise have been a celebratory moment for the Zimbabwean nationalists. As Reed explained in an eloquent diary entry:

It is easy to feel a breeze as of the end of an era. Yet suddenly all the attention, the long waiting that has been directed towards this is released - and there is a moment like the moment as you step out through the door of a noisy crowded

⁸⁶ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.164

⁸⁷ UNIP was the party of Kenneth Kaunda's Northern Rhodesian nationalists. Using the name in Southern Rhodesia was a way around the ZAPU ban.

⁸⁸ Reed, 'Saturday 16 March 1963', Diary, Vol.98

⁸⁹ Roy Welensky, *4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland* (London, 1964), p.205

room to the coldness and starlit dark of the night. Exhilarant but only for a moment. And the night is colder than at first it seemed and much darker.⁹⁰

In a May 1963 circular written by the white liberal Patricia Chater for supporters of the inter-racial Chikore Mission school, strikingly similar rhetoric was employed. 'Here in Southern Rhodesia the future looks dark: the races have pulled so far apart in the last six years that one cannot see any sort of compromise having any chance of success,' she grimly observed.⁹¹

Given the racial tensions, it was entirely unsurprising that the RF returned to the idea of publicly prosecuting the white radicals. On 1 May, Mackay was arrested for declaring that he would not take up his mandatory service in the Rhodesian military. The arrest, occurring so shortly after Ranger's deportation, led Reed to once again question his own commitment: "Terry, Peter, then who? If Peter does go to prison [...] will I be going on my long leave after all? But if it is to be between serving the cause in jail and actively outside over the next year or so, perhaps it would be best in jail."⁹² The question was rendered irrelevant as Mackay was quickly handed a fine and a suspended sentence, and ordered to register again. Disappointed by the light sentence and seeking martyrdom for the African cause, Mackay confirmed to Reed and the Clutton-Brocks that he would refuse to register regardless of the consequences. He also expressed reluctance to move to Nyasaland, even though his relocation could help establish a ZAPU base there, and couldn't resist having one last jab at Ranger. "One just feels," [Mackay] says, "that enough people have run away lately from prison sentences." [...] It is a matter of personal pride - a determination to test oneself, to persuade oneself one is not a coward, is able to stand prison.⁹³

Jaap van Velsen (an outspoken UCRN lecturer with a history in the Dutch resistance movement during the Second World War) was less than impressed with

⁹⁰ Reed, 'Friday 29 March 1963', Diary, Vol.98

⁹¹ Patricia Chater, letter (circular), May 1963, Ranger Papers, Box 89, Bodleian Library, Oxford University, Oxford, UK

⁹² Reed, 'Wednesday 1 May 1963', Diary, Vol.99

⁹³ Ibid.,

Mackay's desire to go to prison as a martyr. In a conversation with Reed, van Velsen argued that:

[Mackay's] not doing any good here, and in Nyasaland he could be really useful. It's all very well this talk about getting in technicians and people with special skills from Europe - but these people are just there to do a job. Their hearts not in the thing like Peter's - he could be of immense value in Nyasaland. And what does he think he'll prove if he goes to jail. Africans won't say, "look there's a European whose ready to go to jail". They'll just say, "Oh, it's all right for Europeans, they can afford to go to jail, it's not like it is for us."⁹⁴

A party at Mackay's house on the 18 May 1963 saw Garfield Todd, Hardwicke Holderness, and a gathering of many other white critics of the Rhodesian state ('a kind of gathering of the last of the liberals', as Reed noted), all of whom were convinced that Mackay would be wasted in prison, especially as the situation in Malawi was demanding attention.⁹⁵ On 27 June, Hastings Banda was reported as stating to a rally that:

Whites were welcome in Nyasaland, but they must understand this is our country. If they did not accept this they would have to pack up and go. [...]We want no arrogance from Europeans. Those days are gone. We mean to rule here. I mean my people to be free. Any arrogant Europeans must be shown this even if he must be beaten up. If a European is stubborn, or behaves badly, my boys-in-white [bodyguards] will show him how tough they are.⁹⁶

In stark contrast to earlier promises regarding non-black citizenship, Banda now appeared to be tolerating whites only on their subservience to black Africans. The threat of vigilante violence heightened the concerns of white radicals, well aware of how majority rule elsewhere on the continent was being associated with anti-white violence. A few days later, Banda did a public about-face on the subject, almost certainly due to pressure from the British. As reported in a South African newspaper:

⁹⁴ Reed, 'Tuesday 7 May 1963', Diary, Vol.99

⁹⁵ Reed, 'Saturday 18 May 1963', Diary, Vol.99

⁹⁶ 'Banda says: Beat up Arrogant Whites', *The Star*, 27 June 1963

[Banda] urged his supporters not to beat up any Whites and to keep peace and calm. "If any European is giving trouble, do not beat him up or swear at him. Leave and go to your chairman of the Malawi Party." A report would then go to the Malawi headquarters and Dr. Banda added, "I will know how to deal with that European. You yourselves do nothing."⁹⁷

This inconsistency was a common feature of race relations between African nationalists and white radicals across the continent. It was a fact of life for one member of the executive to say something entirely at odds with a statement by another, and even for an individual to contradict themselves. Some of this uncertainty can be explained by the white radicals' exclusion from the highest levels of nationalist policy debates and the internal divisions of the nationalist movement as a whole. However, with the limitations of the available sources, it is also difficult for academics to ascertain the thought processes behind many public statements or decisions. This makes the eventual pronouncements and shifts in policy seemingly arbitrary, when the reasoning behind them may have been clear to those at the time.

iv. ZAPU-ZANU Split

Whilst the potential independence of Southern Rhodesia was being negotiated between the British and the RF at the Victoria Falls Conference in June and July 1963, conflicting visions for the future were generating tensions within the nationalist movement. Over the course of four weeks in July and early August, two factions of ZAPU moved against each other in a series of coups and counter-coups. Since the flight of the ZAPU executive from the country in February 1963, the two 'elders' (Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole) found themselves in a struggle for power amid attempts to draw members of the executive with common ideals to their camps.⁹⁸ Although these divisions had been bubbling under the surface since 1959, it

⁹⁷ 'Banda tells supporters: Don't beat up Whites', *The Star*, 8 July 1963

⁹⁸ There are several books that cover this period of Zimbabwean history in detail from different perspectives. See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, ch.8; Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*; and Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, pp.110-116,

was only by mid-1963 that the white radicals became aware that a new phase had developed, as Reed noted:

A move against Nkomo's leadership is now only a matter of time. As a European there is nothing I can do and it is essential not to get involved in this [...] But I am worried that the younger nationalists, like our students, may move too soon or ineptly and get themselves discredited, perhaps permanently.⁹⁹

Reed's reluctance to involve himself in any internal struggle was intrinsically tied to an awareness of racial identities. The involvement of white radicals would complicate matters as whichever faction received white support would be liable of being labelled 'sell-outs', 'imperialists', or 'white stooges'. Indeed, the factional disagreements were already motivated in part by Nkomo's interactions with the white state. Leopold Takawira, for instance, had been at odds with Nkomo since February 1961 over the NDP's provisional acceptance of the revised Rhodesian constitution.¹⁰⁰ As a former multi-racialist, Nkomo's willingness to negotiate with white powers had been used against him before. But with the election of the racialist RF, a larger number of Africans had begun to question whether there was anything to be gained by engaging with white Rhodesians. Furthermore, Nkomo's relationships with white radicals (particularly Guy Clutton-Brock and Garfield Todd) has raised questions about his belief in black nationalist ideologies.¹⁰¹ The Salisbury white radicals therefore elected to remain outside of the party politics.

Now living in Dar es Salaam, Terence Ranger did not feel the same anxieties about being involved as the distance from both the RF and the other white radicals afforded him a latitude that others lacked. Whereas white radicals in Rhodesia risked arrest for openly supporting the nationalists, Ranger was able to air his views in Tanzania with the only risk being his own standing with the leadership. As he recalled:

⁹⁹ Reed, 'Thursday 9 May 1963', Diary, Vol.94

¹⁰⁰ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.60

¹⁰¹ Ndabaningi Sithole, 'The Reason for our Action', quoted in Sithole, *Struggles within the Struggle*, p.40

I gave a press conference to [the Zimbabwe nationalists] and other African exiles and got my first taste of the greater difficulties of being a white nationalist in the outside world. The general tenor of the meeting was that the people of Zimbabwe were cowardly and unprepared to fight. I felt a populist indignation at this libel and said that the leadership were to blame rather than the people. This did not please the Zimbabwean political exiles who complained to London. Chikerema defended me. "This is just Terry speaking. If you want him as a member you have to accept that he will speak his mind."¹⁰²

Chikerema's recognition that there remained benefits to non-black participation was echoed by others in Rhodesia. On 6 July, Reed was approached by one of the anti-Nkomo nationalists, Nathan Shamuyarira (a lecturer at the UCRN in Adult Education). Shamuyarira had been a prominent member of the IASR and CAS before joining ZAPU in 1962 at the request of Stanley Parirenyatwa.¹⁰³ Given his multi-racialist credentials and Reed's position as Chairman of the Salisbury City branch, their conversation was an obvious effort to gauge the mood of the non-black radicals.

[Shamuyarira] says there will from now be a serious split. He asks me about the City Branch and I say that in my view the Europeans will have to keep strictly out of this - accepting the leadership that emerges but taking no part in the quarrels about who shall lead. Nathan fully agrees.¹⁰⁴

The split between Nkomo and Sithole became irrevocable by the end of July, despite the failed attempts by Todd and Clutton-Brock (the 'friends of African nationalism') to 'heal the rift'.¹⁰⁵ Sithole had drawn to his side Mugabe, Takawira, Morton Malianga, Shamuyarira, and Henry Hamadziripi, as well as a dozen other leading nationalists, all of whom Nkomo suspended from ZAPU.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.148

¹⁰³ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.202

¹⁰⁴ Reed, 'Saturday 6 July 1963', Diary, Vol.99

¹⁰⁵ 'Biographical information for Ndabaningi Sithole'. BC969.H5.7, The Diana Mitchell Papers, University of Cape Town Library, University of Cape Town, Cape Town, South Africa

¹⁰⁶ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.116; Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union*, p.91

Despite their promises to not get involved, many of the non-black radicals went back on their word. When Sithole and Takawira were arrested at Salisbury airport, their bail was paid using funds raised by Asian and Indian ZAPU supporters.¹⁰⁷ Mackay produced a strongly anti-Nkomo article on the split for the *Malawi News*, as well as arranging meetings between the anti-Nkomo faction and Hastings Banda, and actively tried to get James Chikerema to side with the separatists. Upon hearing of this, Reed wryly noted: 'Peter, though he argues there is nothing Europeans can do, seems to be remarkably busy in the matter.'¹⁰⁸ Yet Mackay's initial hostility to Nkomo and those who stayed with him quickly passed and after 1964, he would involve himself with ZAPU to an extent he never had before. In Dar es Salaam, Ranger began to find himself siding more and more with the anti-Nkomo faction, and formed a close friendship with Victoria and Herbert Chitepo (Rhodesia's first black lawyer). The result, as Nkomo recalled, was an uncomfortable incident involving Ranger at the Chitepos' house in Dar es Salaam.

I found Victoria [Chitepo] sitting with Dr. Terence Ranger, a liberal-minded white man who had just been expelled from the university in Salisbury by the Field regime. Victoria walked straight out of the room, leaving Dr. Ranger to make it clear I was not welcome in the house.'¹⁰⁹

Nkomo's dismissal of Ranger as a 'liberal-minded white man' demonstrates how the labels attached to the non-black radicals are highly subjective. Because Ranger had turned against Nkomo, the ZAPU president deliberately shifted Ranger from a radical nationalist to a white liberal. Nevertheless, Ranger's association with the anti-Nkomo group had seemed likely from the outset. In his own words: 'I had delivered the *Zambian letter* in June 1963; my friends were among the rebels; I admired Sithole.'¹¹⁰ Furthermore, a letter to Shamuyarira had been stolen by ZAPU supporters

¹⁰⁷ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.181

¹⁰⁸ Reed, 'Wednesday 10 July 1963', Diary, Vol.99

¹⁰⁹ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.114

¹¹⁰ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.163. The *Zambian letter* was a critical note from Kenneth Kaunda and Kapepwe via Julius Nyerere sent to Nkomo accusing the latter of cowardice for leaving Rhodesia in April 1963

and given to Chikerema as evidence of Ranger's apparent support for the rebel nationalists. The result was that by March 1964, Ranger found himself 'cut off from ZAPU'.¹¹¹ As Reed noted in his diary, 'I get the impression Terry is now completely identified with [the anti-Nkomo faction], though not Shelagh [...] On the ZAPU side I am regarded as having remained neutral.'¹¹²

It is easy to suggest that the non-black radicals aligned themselves along political lines, but the situation was far more complex. Personal relationships influenced all aspects of their attitudes. Edwin Lichtenstein, for instance, explained his support for the anti-Nkomo faction came 'largely because of the personalities involved, [...] Robert Mugabe and people who were then associated with him.'¹¹³ Mackay's long association with some of the senior anti-Nkomo leaders, such as Takawira, also goes some way to explaining his temporary shift to their camp. (Mackay described Takawira with fondness in his autobiography: 'It was Takawira, I felt, travelling on his own journey of discovery, who epitomised the national hope of a better world to come.'¹¹⁴) With the uncertainty that dominated the nationalist leadership, personal relationships proved a crucial factor in determining where the radicals' allegiances lay.

Interestingly, the white radicals became something of a commodity in the struggle (despite the associated criticisms) as they offered international legitimacy to whichever faction counted them as supporters. Knowing that Sithole's reputation as an intellectual would likely gain him the support of students, Nkomo asked Stephen Lombard and Judith Todd to arrange a clandestine meeting at the UCRN in the middle of July 1963.¹¹⁵ In another reversal of his previous anti-white rhetoric, Nkomo addressed a group of white, black, and Indian students and informed them that the liberation of Zimbabwe would require the participation of all individuals, whatever their race. The next day, however, one of those in attendance anonymously

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.163

¹¹² Reed, 'Monday 16 March 1964', Diary, Vol.103

¹¹³ Edwin Lichtenstein, interviewed by I.J. Johnstone (20 November 1983)

¹¹⁴ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.73

¹¹⁵ Judith Todd, interviewed by author (10 December 2015)

published a statement in the *African Daily News* pledging the support of the ZAPU student body to the anti-Nkomo group.¹¹⁶ Whilst factionalism would come to dominate student politics on the UCRN campus for the next two decades, its origins lay with the Nkomo-Sithole split of 1963.¹¹⁷

African nationalist leaders also attempted to consolidate support from the few Indian radicals. On 13 July 1963, Suman Mehta (an active supporter since the NDP's formation in 1959) was informed by Enoch Dumbutshena that the ZAPU Salisbury City Branch was going to be expected to 'send delegates to the conference which Joshua [Nkomo] is calling in three weeks time to settle the leadership.' As Reed noted in his diary, 'at the moment, it looks as if [Enos] Nkala and the rebels in the Executive will accept this challenge (Leo Takawira will be here on Monday). If this is so, then the City Branch ought to be represented - but I am convinced not by any non-Africans.'¹¹⁸ When Reed next spoke to Mehta on 1 August, he reported that the latter's 'talk with Sithole has converted him completely against Nkomo.' The same day Shamuyarira again contacted Reed regarding white involvement with any new party.

He says, they [the anti-Nkomo faction] will want Europeans to join them whatever capital the other side tries to make out of this. Then [Shamuyarira] says a curious thing: "In fact we may welcome a little neutralisation by Europeans."¹¹⁹

What Shamuyarira meant by 'a little neutralisation' refers to the concerns of former multi-racialists (like Shamuyarira and Chitepo) in siding with vocal anti-white nationalists. Although the Sithole faction were united in their rejection of Nkomo's leadership, there remained inherent divisions about race in their version of Zimbabwean nationalism. According to Masonda Bwalya (a UCRN student who sided with Sithole), throughout July and August 1963 there were frequent

¹¹⁶ Ibid. Also 'College Students Back Nkomo', *African Daily News* (13 July 1963), p.2

¹¹⁷ Michael Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island of Learning: A History of the University College of Rhodesia from its Inception to 1966* (Gwelo, 1978), p.232 & 242

¹¹⁸ Reed, 'Saturday 13 July 1963', Diary, Vol.99

¹¹⁹ Reed, 'Thursday 1 August 1963', Diary, Vol.99

discussions about racial policies within the African students on campus,¹²⁰ and it was agreed that including whites from the outset would immediately temper the anti-white rhetoric of any new faction.

The official announcement on 8 August 1963 of a new African party named the Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) therefore saw public re-affirmations to non-racial ideals.

Sensing the need for a new party, and having dedicated ourselves to the liberation of our country so that all people, regardless of the colour of their skin, their race, their religion and their sex, may enjoy equality, opportunity and full citizenship based on one man, one vote, we wish to declare that we have formed the Zimbabwe African National Union.¹²¹

The founding ZANU policy statement described the party as 'a non-racial Union of all the peoples of Zimbabwe who share a common destiny and a common fate, believing in the African Character of Zimbabwe and democratic rule by the majority, regardless of race, colour, creed, or tribe.'¹²² The similarities with the wording of the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU charters were striking, if somewhat unsurprising given the prominence of established nationalist leaders in ZANU. Although the new generation (including Robert Mugabe) were beginning to make their voices heard, they remained lower in the hierarchy and familiar racial policies dominated the discourse of ZANU to begin with. Shamuyarira was immediately tasked with obtaining tangible non-black support, as Reed recalled,

Nathan [Shamuyarira] phones me and suggests I come down to his office where he asks me if the City Branch thinks a new party should be formed. I say that we have been - at least in the committee - more concerned what to do if new parties were formed than to decide whether they ought to be. He tells me [...] Non-Africans will be welcome in the party. "And not", says Nathan, "just tolerated as they were in ZAPU."¹²³

¹²⁰ Masonda Bwalya, interviewed by author (6 December 2015)

¹²¹ 'Sithole forms new African party', *Rhodesia Herald*, Friday 9 August 1963, p.1

¹²² 'ZANU Policy Statement', Press Conference, Highfield, Salisbury, 21 August 1963

¹²³ Reed, 'Thursday 8 August 1963', Diary, Vol.99

Reed, however, was reluctant to engage with the new party. 'If I were an African I should be with Sithole. But as a white man, I am not sure. Sithole's party is largely a complaint against African leadership and I am not sure we whites can make such complaints.'¹²⁴ As with the initial stages of the split, these reservations saw many non-black radicals confine themselves to specific passive types of support on both sides of the split. ZANU, for instance, came to rely on the wealth of non-black radicals to survive, and particularly the white and Asian communities. 'The party had the whole second floor of the Vanguard House in Railway Avenue as its headquarters, because the flat belonged to an Asian, Mr Adams, who was our sympathiser,' explained Maurice Nyagumbo.¹²⁵ The Catholic Church proved to be another important source of funding, due in part to a few radical bishops, and remained largely impartial.¹²⁶ The multi-racial Mambo Press and *Moto* newspaper were both significant supporters of ZANU and ZAPU, and Aloysius Haene (the Bishop of Gweru) provided financial support towards printing ZAPU membership cards and posters, whilst also funding ZANU's first Party Congress.¹²⁷

Although some like Clutton-Brock and Garfield Todd made clear their support for Nkomo soon after the split,¹²⁸ others remained circumspect. Persuaded by the American Quaker Margaret Moore, Reed met with Sithole on 13 August. Yet despite an agreement with Sithole on many issues, Reed resolved to avoid declaring his allegiance, partly because Nkomo had established a new organisation only a few days earlier, the People's Caretaker Council (PCC).¹²⁹ Formed at a meeting on the Clutton-Brock's Cold Comfort Farm (a multi-racial cooperative run on land owned by the Haddons near Salisbury), ZAPU/PCC was defined as a social organisation

¹²⁴ Reed, 'Friday 9 August 1963', Diary, Vol.99

¹²⁵ Nyagumbo, *With the People*, p.188

¹²⁶ Canaan Sodindo Banana, *The Church in the Struggle for Zimbabwe* (Gweru, 1996); Ian Linden, *The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Church and State in Rhodesia, 1959-1979* (London, 1980); and R.H. Randolph, *Dawn in Zimbabwe: The Catholic Church in the New Order* (Gweru, 1985)

¹²⁷ McLaughlin, *On the Frontline*, p.14

¹²⁸ Wood, *So Far and no Further*, p.173

¹²⁹ Reed, 'Tuesday 13 August 1963', Diary, Vol.99

rather than a political party, did not register supporters, and therefore operated with a less-rigid view of membership.

Unlike ZANU, there was no mention whatsoever of race in the founding principles, only geography. It was 'a people's movement in which all people who were born or lived in Zimbabwe could be members.'¹³⁰ Zimbabwean nationalism as envisaged by ZAPU/PCC did not require the historic claims to land, race, or society. As well as being a means of ensuring non-black participation, the rejection of racial rhetoric was a simultaneous distancing from the multi-racialism that had tainted all previous nationalist groups. With the fracturing of the nationalists, white-dominated multi-racialism became an even more prevalent insult and this distancing was crucial to ensuring claims to legitimacy. Following the first ZAPU/PCC congress where ZANU were denounced as 'imperialists' controlled by Americans, accusations against Sithole of being a 'sell-out' became commonplace.¹³¹ One press release published in August 1963 by Benjamin Madlela (ZAPU/PCC representative in Dar es Salaam) highlighted the time Sithole had spent in the USA as a sign that he was no longer a 'genuine' African nationalist. 'There for over three years, he was ordained in religion and imbibed American culture. Whilst in the United States and from that angle he wrote his book on African Nationalism,' wrote Madlela. The document also denounced all ZANU leaders as multi-racialists.¹³² Sithole and the other 'intellectuals' were labelled as less-Zimbabwean because they had spent less time in Zimbabwe than many of the ZAPU/PCC's leaders, and were therefore deemed less likely to take the necessary actions for self-liberation because they were 'thinkers and not do-ers'.¹³³ Mugabe, for instance, was described as 'a distinguished scholar who

¹³⁰ Mlambo, *The Struggle* (London, 1972), p.202

¹³¹ Astrow, *Zimbabwe*, p.36

¹³² Quoted in Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.139

¹³³ David Coltart, interviewed by author (11 December 2015)

had travelled Africa and who possessed three university degrees'¹³⁴ but lacked the 'steel to banish the British when called upon.'¹³⁵

ZAPU/PCC was not exempt from these accusations either and the environment generated made prominent white radicals including Reed and Leo Baron question how their relationships with Nkomo were perceived. 'Many within the black nationalist elite criticised Nkomo's dependence on white advisors [whilst] at the same time he was accused of failing to consult his black colleagues,' notes Fay Chung,¹³⁶ and the old accusations of white men pulling the strings of African nationalism were increasingly regurgitated. One such example was an article published in *The Battle Cry* (ZANU's newspaper), as Terence Ranger recalled:

I told John [Reed] of ZANU statements, "some really distasteful stuff", reviving the old canard about Garfield Todd beating "naked African girls" and alleging that the PCC was run by the Haddons, [Ahrn] Palley, Leo Baron and "other imperialists", who took bribes down to Joshua in Gonakudzingwa. It wrote of ZAPU/PCC as "recanting, revisionist, recoiling and infested with white settlers – a multi-racial mixed grill".¹³⁷

Even ordinary ZAPU/PCC supporters were aware of the labelling of their leaders as 'stooges, sell-outs, dissidents and counter-revolutionaries',¹³⁸ particularly in the townships where disagreements routinely broke out between the supporters of different factions. 'We were always being called names [by ZANU supporters]. They would say, "you are dogs of the British. You are puppets for the *varungu*,"' remembered Patience Mzingezi.¹³⁹

¹³⁴ Martin Meredith, *Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe's Future* (New York, 2002), p.26

¹³⁵ 'PCC denounce ZANU for "lacking steel"', *African Daily News* (8 September 1963)

¹³⁶ Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.61

¹³⁷ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.163

¹³⁸ See Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni, & Wendy Willems, 'Reinvoking the past in the present: changing identities and appropriations of Joshua Nkomo in post-colonial Zimbabwe', *African Identities*, Vol.8, No.3 (2010), pp.191-208, p.196

¹³⁹ Patience Mzingezi, interviewed by author (6 December 2015). "Varungu" means white people in chiShona

These divisions also took a more violent turn. Describing the situation in April 1964, the Salisbury Police Commissioner stated that 'there was almost a state of civil war between supporters of rival nationalist parties in the African townships',¹⁴⁰ leading Timothy Scarnecchia to assert that 'Harare and Highfield were, by the beginning of 1964, much more chaotic and violent than the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU were willing to admit.'¹⁴¹ If the nationalist leaders could not control the violence within their groups, there were genuine fears that it would soon become explicitly racialised, and the white state and the white radicals would find themselves involved. Indeed, when he was arrested and imprisoned in late 1963 for again refusing to serve in the Rhodesian military, Mackay explained his refusal was based upon a fear 'that the army might be used to repress African nationalist movements'.¹⁴² When Mackay was finally released in February 1964, the untenable situation in Rhodesia for his kind of proactive contributions resulted in him establishing a refugee camp in Zambia with Clutton-Brock for Africans fleeing the violence in the Congo.¹⁴³

In April 1964, Ian Smith became the leader of the RF and Prime Minister of the increasingly divided nation.¹⁴⁴ The African nationalists were quick to recognise the dangers represented by Smith's staunch opposition for African nationalism. In a press statement released on 14 April, ZANU 'called on the African people to gear themselves for an inevitable head-on collision now that the "most reactionary element" have the day in Southern Rhodesia,' and for unity with ZAPU/PCC, despite their differences in opinion, in order to 'present a united front to the white regime.'¹⁴⁵ Smith wasted no time in demonstrating to the white population that he would not tolerate organised African nationalism. On 16 April (less than 72 hours after Smith

¹⁴⁰ Quoted in Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, p.173

¹⁴¹ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.143

¹⁴² 'Refugee Camp in Northern Rhodesia', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 February 1964) p.2

¹⁴³ Reed, 'Thursday 27 February 1964', *Diary*, Vol.102

¹⁴⁴ Ian Henderson, 'White Populism in Southern Rhodesia', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.14, No.4 (1972), pp.387-399

¹⁴⁵ 'ZANU says "reactionaries have won the day"', *Rhodesia Herald* (14 April 1964), p.2

took office), Nkomo and a host of other nationalist leaders were handed detention sentences of varying lengths.¹⁴⁶ Timothy Scarnecchia records that Nkomo had already been arrested in October and December 1963, as well as in January 1964,¹⁴⁷ and each time Nkomo had relied upon the white lawyer and 'very good friend', Leo Baron, to fight the charges.¹⁴⁸ In April he was not so lucky. Sentenced to ten years detention, he was moved to Gonakudzingwa (an isolated camp for African nationalists, located near the Mozambique border). This division of the nationalist leadership into detainees, exiles, and underground leaders proved to be an important factor in the development of Zimbabwean nationalism and is explored in the subsequent chapters.

In light of the relentless attacks, Reed criticised George Nyandoro (ZAPU/PCC's Secretary General) on 18 April for the party's 'bitter exclusion of the ZANU men'. Nyandoro replied 'he would rather have traitors and self-seekers working against the party outside it than inside it.' Clarifying this statement, he added, 'no-one is being excluded [...] Nkomo was asked should we accept these people, Takawira though he was Capricorn, Herbert Chitepo - etc; he said yes, accept them if they want to come in, accept everybody.'¹⁴⁹ The recognition given to the multi-racial histories of individuals showed the persistence of anti-partnership politics as well as the importance of gaining members despite their potentially problematic reputations.

Having only recently returned to Rhodesia after several months away, Reed found himself questioning his own future within Zimbabwean nationalism. 'Should I go back and join the PCC, in spite of [...] friends in ZANU, or keep out of politics, or try to work for the university's future under an African Government resenting

¹⁴⁶ James Barber, *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion* (Oxford, 1967)

¹⁴⁷ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.142

¹⁴⁸ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.107

¹⁴⁹ Reed, 'Saturday 18 April 1964', Diary, Vol.102

insolent intellectuals?'¹⁵⁰ He would eventually side with ZAPU/PCC, as would Garfield Todd who informed a press conference that:

I have been invited to assist the PCC in a number of small ways and have agreed. There are a number of us who want to help because we believe there are now only two alternatives for Southern Rhodesia – negotiation or a national tragedy. The time for negotiation is particularly short because that is the first stage. There are a number of white people I know who are tremendously concerned at the way things are going.¹⁵¹

Although still more liberal than radical, Todd's public support for Nkomo and the vocal anti-white policies of ZANU's members made ZAPU/PCC far more appealing to non-black radicals. As Fay Chung explains, 'ZANU was said to be a minority group of black intellectuals who opposed the entry of whites into black nationalist politics. They were accused of practising a form of reverse racism.'¹⁵² Under the determined drive of Nkomo, ZAPU/PCC were keen to make a clear distinction between those whites who buttressed colonialism and those who were distinguishable from black Africans only by their skin colour and Nkomo reaffirmed his personal views in a May 1964 national message:

I wish to warn you against creating racial animosity. We do not hate any particular race. We hate evil and whoever associates with such evil. Let us prove to all in this country and outside that our fight has only one motive – to free this country from the forces of evil and that all men and women in Zimbabwe, irrespective of their racial origin, should live a better and fuller life.¹⁵³

Although this was primarily a public relation move, there was little doubt that Nkomo still believed in the importance of non-racialism for the future of Zimbabwe. In his 1984 autobiography, Nkomo explicitly discussed the impact non-black participation had for Zimbabwean nationalism during this period.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.,

¹⁵¹ 'Todd to work for PCC', *Rhodesia Herald* (18 April 1964), p.1

¹⁵² Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.61

¹⁵³ Quoted in Rex Rimbo, 'Europeans would have a future under majority rule in S.Rhodesia', *Rhodesia Herald* (18 May 1964), p.8

I have mentioned that there were people of Indian descent and coloured citizens in that camp [Gonakudzingwa], fellow-members of our party and colleagues in our cause. I know that we did have some white people on our side. [...] We did what we could to show that our fight was not a racial one, against the whites, but for all the people of the country. From white supporters outside we received previous help.¹⁵⁴

Nevertheless, there were still ardent disagreements within the ever-shrinking group of Salisbury non-black radicals as to their role. Almost a year had passed since the first discussions about non-racialism in the nationalist split and the uncertainty had not abated. As Guy Clutton-Brock informed Reed on 6 June, 'support African Nationalism - ZAPU if you like. But there is nothing at present to be done with the Nationalists.'¹⁵⁵ A week later, Mackay expressed the opposite view. 'He [Mackay] disapproves of this feeling that it is still best for Europeans to steer completely clear of the in-fighting; though in fact he has gone and even if secretly much beyond neutrality in favour of ZANU.' Yet as Reed noted, even Mackay was less certain as to whether whites should be members of the nationalist parties:

He talks about some small European group, working for the Nationalists - both sides - but not of them, and this is attractive enough as an idea. But in practice when does it emerge? There is no political possibility of a European party committed to the Africans. And outside politics is there anything more to be done than isn't already being done - or could as well be done by SRLAW[F], and the loose liberal groups that raise money to send Todd and Holderness to London. Peter has the notion of a small devoted band of selfless servers, reviled by the Europeans and by one or perhaps both sides among the Africans, carrying on and helping the future to be born.¹⁵⁶

Mackay's vision for 'a small devoted band' would see fruition in his own actions, ferrying nationalists across central Africa, and with later groups at the UCRN. Yet for the first half of 1964, the white radicals were reduced to the very roles that they saw as being the purview of white liberals; namely providing support for the families

¹⁵⁴ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.133

¹⁵⁵ Reed, 'Saturday 6 June 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁵⁶ Reed, 'Saturday 13 June 1964', Diary, Vol.101. Emphasis in original

of the detainees. Whilst black ZANU and ZAPU/PCC supporters were continuing the sporadic violence across Rhodesia that saw dynamite explode at a Salisbury newspaper office, an African shot dead by a policeman, the attempted derailing of a mail train, and a failed bomb attack in a Checkers supermarket,¹⁵⁷ the white radicals were discussing house parties and plans to dispatch 'crates of Readers Digests' to the detainees.¹⁵⁸

This limbo ended abruptly on 5 July 1964. Rhodesians across the country awoke to the news that a white Rhodesian named Petrus Johannes Andries Oberholzer had been killed the night before in the rural Melsetter area of the country.¹⁵⁹ Although it was not immediately made clear, the culprits were ZANU's first guerrilla unit to operate inside the country, the self-styled 'Crocodile Gang'. Why they had attacked an unarmed man and his wife and daughter was not published in the press. Yet according to the Zimbabwean journalist, Peter Godwin (who claims to have witnessed the crime scene first hand as a child) a note was left with the body. It read: 'This is the work of the Clocadile Gang [sic]. We will keep on fighting until all white settlers are going and our land is returned. Viva *Chimurenga*!'¹⁶⁰ The murder marked a turning point in the liberation struggle, and provided a bleak foreshadowing of the racialised violence that was about to erupt and John Reed's diary entry when he heard the news was sombre. Under a newspaper cutting of the post-mortem results which confirmed the brutality of the assault, he wrote only one line: 'The first European to be killed...'.¹⁶¹

Conclusion

¹⁵⁷ For a very detailed account of the violence of this period, see Wood, *So Far and No Further*, ch.13

¹⁵⁸ Reed, 'Monday 22 June', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁵⁹ Oberholzer's first name is variously given as Petrus or Pieter in different sources. Petrus is the name used in the *Rhodesia Herald* news report and thus likely correct.

¹⁶⁰ Peter Godwin, *Mukiwa: A White Boy in Africa* (London, 1996), p.12. *Chimurenga* means "revolutionary struggle" in Shona and is the name given to the various attempts by Zimbabweans to resist colonialism.

¹⁶¹ Reed, 'Tuesday 7 July 1964', Diary, Vol.101

This chapter has examined the turbulent period between the banning of ZAPU in September 1962 and the consolidation of a violent, racialised, and divided Zimbabwean nationalism by July 1964. It has explored how the key tenets of African nationalism in the nation had shifted in response to domestic and global influences, and how race came to underpin national identities more than at any point prior. It highlights the escalation of anti-white rhetoric within the nationalist movement (particularly the leadership) and shows how the irreversible split between Ndabaningi Sithole and Joshua Nkomo in the summer of 1963 created spaces for a revision of non-black participation in the nation building efforts of the Zimbabwean nationalists. Finally, it argues that the destructive effect of a staunchly anti-nationalist Rhodesian state created previously unforeseen challenges for non-black radicals, and demonstrating need for the adaptation of their activities.

The underlying element of this chapter is once again uncertainty. At no point was Zimbabwean nationalism a static ideology. The place of race within the movement was continuously shifting to the extent that it was impossible for non-black radicals to ascertain whether they were needed, or indeed welcome, within the cause. As violence became an integral part of the movement and white participation became a burden rather than a benefit, it became clear that the utility of white radicals would be thrown into question once again.

Chapter 5

The Rise of Black Identity Politics: ZAPU and ZANU in 1964

Introduction

1964 marked a significant turning point for race in Zimbabwean nationalism. Whereas the period prior had seen non-racial nationalism dominate (albeit perilously) the African movement, now a liberation ideology based on black identity politics came to the fore. Catalysed by a repressive RF government, escalating African violence (including against white settlers), and growing anti-white sentiments, the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders became increasingly supportive of a movement where black Africans worked for their own liberation and excluded non-black participants.

This shift introduced important new dimensions into the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle for the African nationalists, the non-black radicals, and the Rhodesian state. This chapter seeks to explain exactly what these changes were and how 1964 marked an important change from the context and nationalist thinking of earlier periods. By focusing on the discussions about race and about the imagined future Zimbabwean nation, the chapter highlights the transnational connections and escalating violence between and against black Africans as an explanation for the rise of a new racially-conscious form of nationalism revolving around 'blackness'. To explore the period properly, the chapter is broken down into four sections.

The first section drops the narrative aspect present so far throughout this thesis to examine the specific conceptual theories of racial nationalism that emerged in 1964. It situates the discourses of the African leadership and the actions of the leaders as regarding non-black radicals into the global and pan-African context, and explores how events and ideologies influenced these developments. Section two examines the role of violence during the summer of 1964 and how the nationalist

agenda began to reflect a militaristic liberation ideology. Anti-white sentiments combined with disordered and decentralised nationalist groups led many non-black radicals to reluctantly distance themselves from the townships they had previously been active during the NDP and ZAPU eras.

The third section assesses the contributions of the non-black radicals to the struggle, including the Indian community, and how institutions like the UCRN provided a focal point for the persistent non-racialism of the radicals. Situated within the context of the banning of both ZAPU/PCC and ZANU, the section argues that the persecution of dissenting voices within Rhodesian society demonstrates the genuine concerns of the RF about non-black participation. This repression is expanded upon in the final section which focuses on the role of restriction or exile in shaping Zimbabwean nationalism. Divisions between detained nationalist leaders and those in exile provided space for competing visions of the Zimbabwean nation to struggle for legitimacy. The positioning of non-black radicals in the midst of these factions and their reception by African leaders highlights the distinctions between public and private racial and nationalist rhetoric and the importance of personal relationships in shaping debates about the Zimbabwean nation.

i. The Rise of Black Identity Politics: racial thinking by 1964

As the previous chapters have shown, Zimbabwean nationalism was never a static movement. The underpinning ideologies were constantly adapting to external and internal stimuli, particularly regarding racial thinking. When multi-racial partnership lost its allure in the mid-1950s, non-racial nationalism emerged as its successor, and between 1957 and 1961, the SRANC and NDP had promoted a broad-reaching doctrine of inclusion. Participatory rights in the struggle and the imagined post-colonial nation were ascribed regardless of skin colour and non-black radicals were invited to participate, even as elected party members. Yet these tolerant policies belied an underlying racialism. After 1961, this simmering anti-white/pro-black ideology became increasingly popular amongst the nationalist leadership, encouraged

by a resurgent distrust of racially cooperative movements, the repression of African nationalists, and the growing American and South African-led intellectual movement focused on 'blackness'. What emerged amongst Zimbabwean nationalists in early 1964 was a 'black identity nationalism'.

The rise of 'black identity nationalism' was not unique to Rhodesia, however it occurred there much later than in other African colonies. Since African politics was driven by elites, it was necessary for these elites to recognise the limitations of colonial systems before they conceived as working outside of them. As Toyin Falola explains:

[The African elites] would work within the European system, as long as the system was just and fair. [...] But as the system itself became either repressive or antagonistic toward the elite, the intelligentsia became more critical of the system, rejecting the moderate ideas propounded [by those within the system].¹

In Rhodesia, this rejection was delayed by the appeasement offered by multi-racial partnership, and the necessity of dealing with an entrenched white settler population (as opposed to in purely economic or exploitative colonies). As multi-racialism lost its allure after 1957 and the Rhodesian state grew hostile to African nationalism, the racial component of African politics became increasingly dominant. The ZAPU/ZANU split in 1963 further exacerbated the positioning of race within Zimbabwean nationalism with both factions seeking to identify themselves as more 'Zimbabwean' and less 'European', and drawing on a black identity nationalism to achieve this goal.

One aspect of this shift was the rejection of prominent involvement by white radicals in nationalist politics. Although both ZANU and ZAPU/PCC were more dismissive about non-black participation than their predecessors, it was ZANU who were more extreme. Some point to external influences on this radicalism, particularly as international supporters became increasingly involved. Gugu Ndlovu, the daughter

¹ Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, p.100

of Edward Ndlovu (ZAPU's national secretary), pointed to Chinese influences in particular.

I have to wonder if ZANU's political attitudes and behaviours were influenced at all by the Chinese. [...] For me, the Chinese were not embracing everybody and trying to include everyone [...] and I'm wondering if on an individual level as a member, how it would have affected your thinking and your reasoning.²

The impact of racialised Chinese nationalism has been explored elsewhere,³ but the conflict generated by multiple conflicting influences was evident in ZANU's struggles to define racial policy. Edgar Tekere (ZANU's Deputy Secretary for Youth and Culture) classified ZANU's stance as:

(1) the doctrine of self-liberation: that freedom which relied on the intervention of others was not worth having; (2) non-racialism, i.e. blindness to race, as opposed to multi-racialism, which sees and accepts racial multiplicity and "partnership".⁴

Neither stated principle is particularly different than those of the NDP or ZAPU. However, the association of 'non-racialism' with 'self-liberation' complicates Tekere's defined meaning of non-racialism beyond 'blindness to race'. Within the context of rejection 'the intervention of others', non-racialism as defined by ZANU appeared a justification for excluding poorly-defined 'others'. Once again, Brubaker's theories of 'insider-outsider' nationalism explain this division, and it is racial identities that provide the key feature behind categorisation. David Moore highlights such rhetoric as a deliberate part of 'ZANU's effort to carve out a space of authenticity and autonomy for what could be termed the "African experience" in opposition to ZAPU's more universalistic claims.' Moore expands further that by 1964, "'multi-racialism" in the white liberal-ZAPU-PCC lexicon apparently meant much less than

² Mary & Gugu Ndlovu, interviewed by author (11 December 2015)

³ See David Shinn & Joshua Eisenmann, *China and Africa: a century of engagement* (Philadelphia, 2012), p.164. Also Paresh Pandya, *Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga: An investigation into Zanu strategies* (Braamfontein, 1988)

⁴ Edgar Tekere, quoted in Victor De Waal, *The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade* (London, 1990), p.98

majority-rule, while ZANU's phrase of "non-racialism" was supposed to embody true democracy.⁵

ZANU's adherence to this discourse meant even ZAPU/PCC's leaders found themselves in a position where non-black supporters exposed them to criticism. As the party containing the greatest number of former multi-racialists from the CAS and IASR, ZAPU/PCC found itself negatively tainted by association. Although multi-racialism had provided 'contacts, quickly transferred into firm friendships' between white radicals and 'a number of equally disillusioned African members, [...] in later years Capricorn had become a term of abuse, synonymous with "sell-out" among Central African nationalists,' explains John McCracken.⁶ With this criticism of multi-racialism reaching its zenith, Joshua Nkomo had no choice but to respond. In a 1964 document ('The Case for Majority Rule in Rhodesia') ZAPU/PCC's leader explicitly denounced non-racialism and non-black supporters.

I am well aware of the fact that there are many well-meaning European men and women who have spent their lifetime working for and with the African people.

Some of them have contributed very important services; others have quietly worked to bring human equality in the country; others still have altruistically worked to improve the lot of Africans; and still others are working quietly to bring about majority rule in the country, sincerely believing it is the only and best way to secure peace and prosperity in the country.

All this is true; all this I know. But it is too little, ineffectual and incapable of changing the wrong course and direction followed by those who want a destination only known to themselves, and by people who are bent on destroying the country and themselves. [...] **One has to be an African to know and to feel what is going on.** I do hope that some people among us will be spared to write the history of this dismal period that we are passing through.⁷

⁵ Moore, 'The Contradictory Construction', p.174

⁶ McCracken, 'Peter Mackay'

⁷ Joshua Nkomo, *The Case for Majority Rule in Rhodesia* (Gonakudzingwa, 1964) quoted in Nyangoni & Nyandoro, *Zimbabwe Independence Movement*, pp.99-103. My emphasis.

Although Nkomo had been critical of white participation in the nationalist struggle before,⁸ this document marked the first time he had placed emphasis on the necessity of being 'African'. This was a direct result of the racialisation of African nationalism more broadly and an extension of existing concerns regarding the motivations of non-black radicals. The empathy of the similarly marginalised was a strong motivation for participation, yet it did not facilitate access to the fundamental grievances that drove African nationalism.

Whilst these debates occurred primarily amongst the elites, there was an opening of spaces for discussion at all levels of the African nationalist movement. Middle-class and educated Africans challenged views within the letter pages of the African press (the *African Daily News* and *Bantu Mirror*), although only the literate and those with the time and inclination to write letters could participate.⁹ Informal venues (including beer halls, working men's clubs, and trade union societies) and official party meetings and rallies, facilitated discussion within working class Africans in urban and rural areas. As Enocent Msindo explains, throughout all these spaces 'there were important debates about the identity of the imagined "nation-to-be"'.¹⁰ Between May and July 1964, a series of events took place around Salisbury involving members of the ZANU and ZAPU/PCC elites and branch members, with race the focal point.

On 12 June, the Rhodesian National Affairs Association (one of the oldest non-political multi-racial discussion groups) held a lunch-time meeting, attended by Edson Zvogbo (ZANU Deputy Secretary-General). Zvogbo had spent time in the USA and South Africa,¹¹ and the conversation revolved around the role of whites in an independent Zimbabwe. The ZANU representative insisted the struggle was not

⁸ See this thesis, chapter 4. In October 1962 he had stated that 'Europeans [...] have no place in the struggle of African nationalists in this country now.'

⁹ See Rasmus Kleis Nielson, 'Participation through letters to the editor: Circulation, considerations, and genres in the letters institution', *Journalism*, Vol.11, No.1 (2010), pp.21-35, 24-26

¹⁰ Msindo, 'Towards a New Understanding', pp.7-8

¹¹ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.208

racial: 'the implementation of majority rule is itself a task requiring both African and European [...] There is no question that one group will be excluded from the result on the basis of their race alone.' However, in reference to the CAS Salisbury branch's statement a few days earlier that former members now in ZANU or ZAPU/PCC should persist with multi-racialism,¹² Zvobgo replied:

ZANU's executive includes a number who began their careers in politics with the Capricorn Association, but all of these individuals have now realised the route to a liberated nation lies with the Zimbabwean people working for themselves. [...] There is no place anymore for Europeans within such a movement.¹³

Although they limited themselves to discussing the role of non-blacks in Zimbabwean nationalism, what Tekere, Nkomo, and Zvobgo were all emphasising was the necessity of creating a new form of nationalist ideology, rejecting external methods and structures (such as multi-racialism). The reasoning was that a non-African agenda would only work to misdirect the impetus of black Zimbabwean nationalism. Between 1956 and 1964, thirty-three African nations had gained independence. Yet the Rhodesian situation (specifically the white settler population) meant the routes to majority rule seen elsewhere were not applicable. The rise of the RF, the collapse of the CAF, and Ian Smith's increasingly ardent demands for independence regardless of British policies meant the Zimbabwean nationalist struggle had more in keeping with Algeria than white-settler states like Kenya. Because British colonialism had won out over settler interests in Kenya in the 1920s, white society in southern Africa was stronger and more entrenched, and thus able to better resist African and colonial metropole efforts to enforce change.¹⁴

¹² 'CAS Press Release: 4 June 1964', Capricorn Africa Society Papers, 1955-1966, ICS/8/4032, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, London, UK. The Salisbury branch of the society was the last left in Africa but had remained relatively active in political discussions despite its decreasing membership. 'Capricorn Society Sees Only Danger', *Rand Daily Mail* (12 March 1964)

¹³ Author unknown, 'Transcript of RNAA forum, 12 June 1964', SA Institute of Race Relations, AD1912-C47, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

¹⁴ See Kennedy, *Islands of White*

Consequently, when multi-racialism failed in Rhodesia, inspiration was taken from the struggles of other nationalist and anti-colonial movements including racially-exclusive ideologies. Zimbabweans were forced to reject previously accepted routes to independence that had worked in Zambia and Malawi and construct a new liberation ideology based upon their collective black identity as a means of perpetrating their struggle within nation state borders. Pan-Africanist racial thinking had shifted from black communities acting in opposition to colonial rule, to black states working to assist those neighbouring nations still under white rule.¹⁵ National agendas began to adopt greater racial overtones due to the solidarity amongst black Africans. There was a development of what Veera V. Williams calls 'African self-consciousness' brought about by four factors in individuals: an awareness of a black identity and African heritage, the recognition of black institutions (practices, customs etc), the participation in liberation and development efforts for black people, and the resistance to oppression against black communities.¹⁶ Such thinking encouraged the racialism associated with pan-Africanism of the mid-twentieth century. This insistence on being a black African in order to participate in the struggle was a logical response to the rejection of multi-racialism and the persecution of the nationalists by the white state. Yet on the surface it also seems to have been fundamentally incompatible with the proclaimed non-racialism of ZAPU/PCC and particularly ZANU.

The explanation for this contradiction lies with black identity nationalism being seen more as a constructive ideology than a destructive one, particularly in regards to the nation building efforts. Race was turned from a weakness to a strength, and utilised in conjunction with the size of the African population and the unity of pan-African solidarity based on 'blackness'. Kenneth Kaunda (black Zambia's first President) explained clearly why this focus on skin colour and race was so important:

¹⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Africa: the politics of unity* (New York, 1967)

¹⁶ Veera V. Williams, 'Brothers of the trade: a new direction in examining the intersections of racial framing and identity processes upon African-Americans and African immigrants in America', in Toyin Falola & Cacee Hoyer, eds., *Global Africans: Race, Ethnicity, and Shifting Identities* (London, 2017), pp.34-35

Colonialism, for all its benefits, devalued man. It created elite societies in which man's worth was determined by an irrelevant biological detail - skin pigmentation. And, even more serious, the colonialists set out to destroy our self-confidence. They dinned into the African mind the idea that we were primitive, backward and degraded, and but for their presence among us, would be living like animals. The result is that even today [...] you will find a certain sector of the population suffering from a "Bwana" complex. They cannot stand on their own feet as free men but must look over their shoulder all the time for the approval of the white man.¹⁷

Kaunda's appeal to reclaim blackness as a positive identity was the same motivation behind Mugabe's cultural programme during the NDP period and a well recognised concept by the 1960s. In 1967, Frantz Fanon explicitly summarised the feelings of dependency and inadequacy experienced by black people in white-dominated societies in his work *Peau Noire, Masques Blanc* (Black Skin, White Masks). Approaching the subject as a psychoanalyst and revolutionary thinker, Fanon explained that if a black person's inferiority belief came from living 'in a society that derives its stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a society that proclaims the superiority of one race' then the solution was the 'need for combined action on the individual and the group.'¹⁸

The black man should no longer be confronted by the dilemma, *turn white or disappear*; but he should be able to take cognizance of a possibility of existence. [...] My objective, once his motivations have been brought into consciousness, will be to put him in a position to *choose* action (or passivity) with respect to the real source of the conflict - that is, toward the social structures.¹⁹

Blackness was consequently perceived as being a vital tool in the nationalist agenda and consequently Zimbabwean nationalism after 1964 rejected the imposed colonial socio-political structures because they were foreign and therefore an imposition of

¹⁷ Kenneth Kaunda, *A Humanist in Africa: Letters to Colin Morris from Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia* (London, 1966), pp.20-21. "Bwana" is Swahili for "Master" or "Boss", a term employed by whites during the colonial era.

¹⁸ Fanon, *Peau Noire*, p.99

¹⁹ Ibid., p.100. Emphasis in original.

non-black culture on African society. Pan-Africanism and transnational black liberation ideologies became increasingly useful tools for defining a nationalist movement where the key distinction revolved around skin colour. Although the Nigerian academic Toyin Falola explains the new direction in terms of anti-imperialism rather than anti-colonialism,²⁰ his core argument remains applicable to the Zimbabwean case study:

Pan-Africanism added an additional dimension – that of colour: imperialists are white, victims are black. Very powerfully, an ideology constructed out of skin colour and anti-imperialism merged in such ideas as Negritude, Blyden's "African personality," a host of home-grown socialistic ideas, communism, socialism, and Marxism.²¹

'Negritude' was another expression of the black consciousness espoused by W.E.B Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aimé Césaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and Steve Biko,²² and as David Moore has shown, the foreignness of these individuals did not prevent the Zimbabwean nationalists from embracing their ideas.²³

Indeed, the benefits of this black identity nationalism lay in the broadness of the support it could create. Compared to national identities, blackness was a concept that was truly transnational and black men and women could share solidarity with others in their struggles regardless of locale, making it particularly useful alongside the liberation nationalism of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC. American groups like the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and especially the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the United States both played important roles in shaping the liberation ideals and thus the nationalist ideologies of the African anti-

²⁰ The presence of white settlers in Zimbabwe demands that colonialism is the more apt description in this case.

²¹ Falola, *Nationalism and African Intellectuals*, p.124

²² See Reiland Rabaka, *The Negritude Movement: W.E.B Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aime Césaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and the Evolution of an Insurgent Idea* (London, 2015)

²³ See Moore, 'The Contradictory Construction'

colonialists.²⁴ Indeed, the shift within the black American community about 'the most effective means of addressing the community's problems' mirrored the changes occurring in Zimbabwean nationalism.²⁵ As Cleveland Sellers explains:

the SNCC began in 1960 as a decentralized coalition of largely African American student groups that adhered strictly to Gandhian principles of nonviolence and sought to obtain equal citizenship rights through integration and other reforms. By 1967, the majority of SNCC's members considered themselves part of an "emerging Third World coalition of revolutionaries."²⁶

According to Robin Hayes, there was a dialogic exchange of 'ideas, strategies, people, and organisations' between the US and Zimbabwe, facilitated by the 'process of racial identity formation that occurred within each of these movements.' Hayes expands;

Activists and organizations within these movements believed that both racial identities and racist practices were transnational phenomena. As a result, they were open to engaging black anti-racist movements that were active in other countries.²⁷

Several Zimbabwean nationalist leaders had lived in the USA prior to 1964 (including Edson Zvogbo, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Enoch Dumbutshena²⁸) and the networks established by these individuals played an important role. In 1967, the SNCC was involved in promoting a fundraising dance in New York for ZAPU's US Student Branch, due to Dumbutshena's personal connections to Stokely

²⁴ See for example Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca, 1997); George J. Sefa Dei, *Reframing Blackness and Black Solidarities through Anti-colonial and Decolonial Prisms* (Cham, 2017); and Tunde Adeleke, *Africa in Black Liberation Activism: Malcolm X, Stokely Carmichael, and Walter Rodney* (London, 2017)

²⁵ See Robin Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship Between Black Power and African Independence: A Case Study of SNCC's Role, 1960-1970', *Post Identity*, Vol.4, No.2 (2005), pp.1-13, p.2

²⁶ Cleveland Sellers, *The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant and the Life and Death of SNCC* (New York, 1973), p.188

²⁷ Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship', p.3

²⁸ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.208, 135, 7

Carmichael.²⁹ Two of the leading American Methodist ministers in Rhodesia also acted as a channel. Bishop Ralph Dodge was a close acquaintance of Joshua Nkomo, whilst his colleague Reverend Robert Hughes was a long-term friend of Martin Luther King, Jr.³⁰ On a number of occasions they worked to connect the Zimbabwean leaders with American activists, although the outcome of these efforts is unclear. Nevertheless, the general interactions did facilitate the racialised nationalisms adopted by the Zimbabwean nationalists. Dumbutshena was well aware of this and situated his own ideological shift in terms of the growing black identity politics throughout the world. As he explained, 'black races everywhere are in the process of winning for themselves national pride and identity. To do that they must rid themselves of the stigma of inferiority derived from their colonial subjugation.'³¹

Yet not all nationalist leaders were eager to denounce non-racial nationalism. A few openly lamented an ideology centring around black identity, including Stanlake Samkange. A member of the CAS until its disbandment in 1965, Samkange's views had been reinforced by his experiences of Luther-King's peaceful multi-racialism in the USA between 1957 and 1960. Samkange despised the racial overtones Zimbabwean nationalism had adopted. In August 1964 he wrote to Terence Ranger, 'mourning the death of his father's inclusive and tolerant nationalism' in the face of this racial thinking.³² As a result, Samkange distanced himself from Zimbabwean nationalism and moved to the USA to undertake a doctorate in philosophy.³³ Others shared Samkange's views. Sylvester Tawonezwi Bgoni (former chairman of the Mufakose NDP and ZAPU branches and the Salisbury District PCC) stated: 'I don't believe in racialism. [...] I believe that this country is for both black and white, and the Black and White must live side by side

²⁹ Hayes, 'The Dialogic Relationship', p.14; & Adeleke, *Africa in Black Liberation*, p.138

³⁰ See Dickson Mungazi, *The Honoured Crusade: Ralph Dodge's theology of liberation and initiative for social change in Zimbabwe* (Gweru, 1991), p.93

³¹ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.81

³² See Terence Ranger, *Are We Not Also Men? The Samkange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-1964* (London, 1995). Stanlake's father was the Reverend Thompson Samkange was a one of the first African politicians to pursue multi-racial advancement.

³³ Cary & Mitchell, *African Nationalist Leaders*, p.33

on equal terms.³⁴ Given the uncontrollable nature of the violence dominating African politics by 1964, the fear was that the wishes of the majority and the instability created made this equality unlikely.

ii. Disorderly Disruption: Intra- and inter-racial violence in 1964

The attack on Petrus Oberholzer in July 1964 changed the fundamental relationship between violence and Zimbabwean nationalism. Although aggressive actions had been increasing, thus far they had been largely intra-African or against state infrastructure. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems justified to portray Oberholzer's death as the inevitable next stage for a Rhodesian society increasingly separated along racial lines and a Zimbabwean nationalism resolved to dismantling the white state. Oberholzer was killed not because of his political views, but simply because he had white skin. When attacks on rural whites increased during the 1970s, Oberholzer's death began to look like a precursor to the violent strategies employed by the nationalist movements wholesale against white settlers. Yet, as Terence Ranger notes, it remains unclear whether ZANU's leadership had formally adopted a policy of anti-white violence or whether Oberholzer's death was simply the actions of a ZANU group tasked with causing unrest within a rural area.³⁵ As was discussed earlier, social protest creates spaces for political violence which cannot be easily controlled by organised leadership.³⁶ This makes the connection between the Crocodile Gang's actions and Zimbabwean nationalism's racial thinking difficult to ascertain.

Situated in the broader context of anti-Rhodesian violence, the murder of Oberholzer demonstrates how concerned Zimbabwean nationalists were about the strength of the RF. Joshua Mpofu (Chairman of ZAPU/PCC's Makhokhoba Branch)

³⁴ 'Sylvester Tawonezwi Bgoni', biographical material, Diana Mitchell Papers, BC 969 H.51, University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa

³⁵ See Terence Ranger, 'Violence Variousy Remembered: The Killing of Pieter Oberholzer in July 1964', *History in Africa*, Vol.24 (1997), pp.273-286

³⁶ See this thesis, p.177

was a vocal advocate for increased military actions and points to the racially divisive political context as being the most important motivation. 'The swing to the right [of the white electorate] made many young Africans feel that there was no other option to achieve freedom other than by war,' he explains.³⁷ The political scientist Graham Kinloch argues that because any socio-cultural or political differences within white Rhodesian society were mostly superficial, distinctions between the white state and population are impossible.³⁸ Such claims have led others to justify the later targeting of white civilians on the basis that by simply being resident in the colony, white citizens tacitly supported and benefited from the oppression of the African people, and thus become viable military targets for the nationalist forces.³⁹

Accounts of violence against white civilians have been given recognition far exceeding the number of casualties or significance within the liberation struggle,⁴⁰ but the emergence of violence against white targets (rather than specific elements of the white Rhodesian state) is important nonetheless as it marked the beginning of the black identity nationalist struggle. Although attacks on white civilians had been taking place since 1962,⁴¹ the frequency of these incidents was beginning to worry the RF. Throughout the summer of 1964, the number of violent incidents and attacks throughout Southern Rhodesia increased dramatically. Accompanied by daily

³⁷ Mpofu, *My Life*, p.82

³⁸ See Kinloch, *Racial Conflict*

³⁹ See for instance, Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union*, p.171

⁴⁰ This is due to the RF's propaganda efforts like the infamous *Massacre of the Innocents* (Salisbury, 1977). The continuing popularity of memoirs or military histories written by white Rhodesians has also seen the relatively few attacks on white civilians dramatised and given precedence in the narrative of white Rhodesia under siege. For more see Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia, *Rhodesia: The Propaganda War* (Salisbury, 1977)

⁴¹ According to a Rhodesian government document produced in August 1964, there had been 8 attacks by black Africans on whites between September 1962 and August 1964. All had involved white individuals caught up in urban unrest during periods of township violence, such as township officials. See 'Schedule Contraventions Section 37(A)(1)(A), Chapter 39, Law and Order Maintenance Act, 16-9-62 – 26-8-64', Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, S.R.C.(B)(64)329, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

township violence, grenades were thrown into several hotels and the South African High Commissioner's house, and a railway line and post office were attacked.⁴²

The spaces for individual autonomy created by civil unrest as well as the continuing presence of non-black nationalist supporters, were also utilised by the Rhodesian state, and a white Rhodesian agent named John Brumer was allegedly behind some of the violent acts attributed to the nationalists. In late 1963, Special Branch had Brumer (a former member of the CAS) make contact with the old multi-racialists Leopold Takawira and Ndabaningi Sithole whilst the three were imprisoned together.⁴³ Sithole was quick to take Brumer into his trust and in March 1964 allegedly asked Brumer to bomb a number of targets around Salisbury, including the Prime Minister's office and the BSAP's sports club. Bill Crabtree (a CIO officer) recalls that with the assistance of a Special Branch explosives expert, Brumer instead detonated a bomb at an electricity sub-station,⁴⁴ and another attack on the railway line near Bulawayo on 5 August was also credited to him.⁴⁵ Brumer was consequently made ZANU's emissary to Zambia, a role which he continued for several years, providing information to Rhodesian intelligence services the whole time.⁴⁶

Brumer's sudden rise to prominence within Sithole's inner circle caused disruption with a ZANU leadership already wary of being labelled 'sell-outs'. Fay Chung explains that Brumer's 'entrustment with the most delicate of tasks' despite being 'a person they did not know' caused increasing alarm amongst the ZANU elite.

⁴² Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.226

⁴³ See Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.107; Roy Christie, *For the President's Eyes Only: The story of John Brumer, Agent Extraordinary* (Johannesburg, 1971)

⁴⁴ Bill Crabtree, *Came the Fourth Flag or Dombashawa* (Lancaster, 2002), p.256. Fay Chung states that it was the Kopje post office in Salisbury city centre

⁴⁵ Martin & Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p.20

⁴⁶ According to Valentine Musakanya (Zambian Secretary to the Cabinet), Brumer was so influential that he succeeded in getting the Permanent Secretary and Under Secretary in Kaunda's office removed, as well as 14 white Special Branch officers working with them who had suspected his role with Rhodesian intelligence and thus keep his cover intact. See Valentine Musakanya & Miles Larmer, *The Musakanya Papers: The Autobiographical Writings of Valentine Musakanya* (London, 2010), p.104

'It is also relevant to note the anti-white sentiments of the majority of the old ZANU leaders, and Sithole's misplaced trust in Brumer aroused bitter suspicion,' adds Chung.⁴⁷ When the Minister for Law and Order announced that 'Rhodesia was up against organised thuggery, some of it [...] directed by Europeans,'⁴⁸ it further undermined the legitimacy of African nationalism by removing any sense of independent agency from the black African leaders. As Brumer's involvement had shown, the Rhodesian state were not above instigating disorder. Stories circulated of white police officers being found at the scene of vandalism, as an article in the *Central African Examiner* in June reported.

A European police officer [was] apprehended in the disguise of an African, by African police at 1 a.m. one morning in Highfield. There is very strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that he was running away from the house of a "moderate" African whose window had just been broken by a stone.⁴⁹

In the confused and violent environment of the townships, these stories stirred up distrust of all whites, even those who had long been nationalist supporters. The *ADN* editor Eugene Wason recalled 'the only European who dared to walk through the townships at night was an American Methodist minister, the Rev. Robert Hughes.'⁵⁰ None of the white radicals would enter the areas, as they regularly had whilst members of the SRANC, NDP, or ZAPU. The scale of the unrest and the death of Oberholzer had both sown doubts that the nationalist leaders were no longer able to control their members and this worry was exacerbated when Sithole was arrested in June 1964 and sentenced to a lengthy jail term.⁵¹ With Nkomo, Sithole, and many lieutenants restricted, questions were asked about whether the violence was even being deliberately orchestrated. Due to the relatively self-contained nature of the

⁴⁷ Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.107

⁴⁸ Reed, 'Sunday 29 November 1964', Diary, Vol.101

⁴⁹ Quoted in Judith Todd, *Rhodesia* (London, 1965), p.111

⁵⁰ Wason, *Banned*, p.57. Hughes was a personal friend of Martin Luther King, Jr., and would be deported from Rhodesia in 1964 for his activities in support of the nationalists. See Clayborne Carson et al. eds., *The Martin Luther King, Jr., Encyclopaedia* (Westport, 2008), pp.137-145

⁵¹ Wason, *Banned*, p.60

townships, the RF and the Rhodesian police had willingly permitted 'factions to battle against each other at the cost of township residents with little complaint from white voters.'⁵² Race was a key component as the Mayor of Salisbury at the time, Frank Clements, acknowledged.

Official policy for a while was to intervene as little as possible in the party gang warfare. So long as the two parties were breaking their competitors' heads and burning their property, and so long as the victims were, with the rarest exception, Africans, they were not only doing harm to each other but to the whole African cause.⁵³

Yet despite their concerns about the violence and racialism and relegated to an auxiliary role by the anti-white ideology, many white radicals nevertheless maintained that there was a place for them in the struggle. They utilised their public salience to draw attention to the African issues and encouraged others within their own racial communities to support African nationalism. On 7 August 1964, an article written by Judith Todd was published in the student magazine *Unicorn* calling for white students to 'further African aims' and denouncing any who refused to engage in politics.⁵⁴

In a charged multi-racial gathering in Bulawayo on 16 August, a number of ZAPU/PCC supporters vocally denounced the RF for its insistence on 'dragging Rhodesia into the dark against the wishes of her majority.' In attendance was Athol Allenby (a young BSAP officer) who noted down the names of those who spoke out against Ian Smith. Allenby recalled one young white man (possibly Steven Lombard) who declared that it was '[to] Nkomo that the Europeans should look for a future in Rhodesia, as he was the only one who could protect you from the African'.⁵⁵ In a speech on 9 August, the American Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge similarly pointed to Nkomo as the most viable option. Dodge called on white Rhodesians to fulfil their obligation as Christians and protest against the RF's handling of the violence in the

⁵² Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.134

⁵³ Frank Clements, *Rhodesia: The Course to Collision* (London, 1969), p.33

⁵⁴ 'A Piece of the Continent', *Unicorn* (7 August 1964)

⁵⁵ Athol Allenby, interviewed by author (26 November 2015)

African townships, and to assist those Africans in restriction or detention.⁵⁶ When Dodge was declared a prohibited immigrant a few days later, his case provided a focal point for those non-racial nationalists and the non-black radicals to rally behind. ZAPU/PCC and the Salisbury Asian Association both released statements condemning Dodge's prohibition, as did a number of white radicals and liberals.⁵⁷ By now a familiar explanation, it was Dodge's personal connection with Nkomo that ensured such a public stance by ZAPU/PCC and these connections proved to be increasingly important as the repression of the nationalist movements increased.

iii. The Banning of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC: The role of Indians in the development of Zimbabwean nationalism

On 26 August 1964, the Rhodesian state clamped down on African nationalism once again with Desmond Lardner-Burke (Minister of Law and Order) stating in Parliament that public safety was being threatened by the actions of the nationalists and ZANU and ZAPU/PCC were now considered proscribed organisations. Both had used 'violence wherever possible to embarrass the Government', explained Lardner-Burke.⁵⁸ Police immediately moved to search, question, and detain nationalist supporters, the majority of whom were black Africans. However, a number of sympathetic non-black radicals were also visited. At 4am on 27 August, two Indian ZAPU/PCC supporters' homes were searched and their occupants (Manilal Naran and Ramandbhai K. Naik) questioned by police. At the same time, another Asian ZAPU/PCC member named S. Joseph had his home in Kezi searched by the BSAP.⁵⁹

Although only three of the large number of nationalists targeted by police, the news coverage afforded to Naran, Naik, and Joseph sheds light on the salience attached to their racial identities. The dozens of arrested blacks were a statistic, yet

⁵⁶ Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.222

⁵⁷ 'More support for banned bishop', *Star* (18 July 1964)

⁵⁸ 'Minister charges PCC, ZANU with violence', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 August 1964), p.1

⁵⁹ 'Police raids on offices, people', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 August 1964), p.11

these three Indians were explicitly named and interviewed; a clear reflection of the unusualness of Indian involvement with the African cause. Despite the participation of a number of younger, radical Indian men (including Hasu Patel, Laman Lalloo, and Buga Bukhat) there had only been one Indian detained to date - Ramandbhai K. Naik in 1961. This was surprising given how the young Indian radicals had been personal acquaintances of the nationalist leaders and active contributors to the African cause since the foundation of the NDP. From driving people to the Mozambican border, to cheering Nkomo's speeches in townships, the Indian radicals had contributed what they could to Zimbabwean nationalism. In doing so they forced the nationalist leaders to address what position the Indian population held in the imagined Zimbabwean nation. Were Indians to be tolerated as foreign settlers in the same manner as whites, or were they to be treated as another racial group that had been victims of European colonial imperialism and accommodated into the national reconstruction process in Zimbabwe as equals?

The importance of these questions and the general reluctance of the Indian population to engage with African nationalism, spurred these young Indian radicals to take matters into their own hands. Much like John Reed's perception of being an 'ambassador' for the white race, the Indian radicals sought to influence their community and ensure that their voice would be heard in the nationalist debates. In an interview, Patel recalled:

Our job was to be visible, to be assuring the Indian community that they need to move but that it is quite okay to move, and to identify with majority rule [...] and to be seen at public events of the ANC, NDP, things like that.⁶⁰

As was discussed in chapter two, the Muslim and Hindu communities had often isolated themselves from other racial groups in Rhodesia. There was some resistance from some of the older groups because they were the immigrant families. So it took

⁶⁰ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

time for us to change the mood,' explained Patel.⁶¹ Furthermore, working within exclusively Asian groups, even the most liberal Indians consequently found it difficult to engage with non-Indians despite sharing the same political beliefs. The most obvious example of this is the absence of Indian radicals (barring a few exemptions) in John Reed's diaries, correspondence between the white supporters, or the recollections of white radicals. For instance, Terence Ranger's autobiography mentions the young radical Indians only once, and Peter Mackay's not at all.⁶²

This lack of interaction is best explained by what Anna Weinrich terms the 'elaborate pattern governing race relations' in Rhodesia. Due to the hierarchical nature of racial segregation in the nation, any race's given a sense of superiority over another (even without being the topmost within a society) leads to an 'insistence on conformity' and a desire to maintain their social standing.⁶³ Patel highlights that the Indian community sought to 'remain in the politically "middle" position - neither allying ourselves with the Europeans nor with the indigenous Africans,'⁶⁴ precisely because they sought to guard their own superiority. As Weinrich explains,

this superior status [...] can only be maintained by a rigid conformity of all members of society to generally accepted norms. Any deviation, even by members of the dominant race, evokes sanctions forcing the deviant members back to conformity.⁶⁵

The 'young Turk' Indian radicals⁶⁶ were thus subject to pressures for conformity, including an expectation that they socialise only within their racial communities. Utilising Michael Banton's theories of racial formation,⁶⁷ Weinrich argues that self-contained racial communities meant 'contacts across the colour line become depersonalised, communication is impaired, and the knowledge which members of

⁶¹ Ibid., 'Sports diplomacy' was an effort by Patel and other young Indians to bridge the racial divide by playing sports like table tennis against non-Indian groups.

⁶² See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.94

⁶³ Weinrich, *Black and White Elites*, p.4

⁶⁴ Hasu Patel, 'The Indian Dilemma', *Dissent*, No.16 (18 February 1960), p.6

⁶⁵ Weinrich, *Black and White Elites*, p.4.

⁶⁶ A term Hasu Patel used to describe themselves.

⁶⁷ See Michael Banton, *Race Relations* (London, 1967), p.150

the separated races have of each other is generally confined to stereotypes.⁶⁸ The small number of Indian radicals involved with the Zimbabwean nationalist movement further exacerbated the issue. Between January 1960 and May 1965, only nine Asians were prosecuted under LOMA compared to thirteen coloureds, 58 whites, and 6,301 black Africans.⁶⁹

This theory of racial 'conformity' also explains why it was white radicals who attracted the greatest wrath of white Rhodesian society. When non-conformists in dominant racial groups gained publicity, it was because they were undermining the strict racial divisions in the Rhodesian nation. As Patel argues,

in the white community, in parliament and government, people like Terry Ranger and John Reed were seen as traitors to the whites, they were seen as prominent targets. The black nationalists they could handle one way or another, or so they thought. We [the Indians] were viewed as less important.⁷⁰

The handful of white radicals involved with the nationalists were therefore regarded as dangerous deviations from the social norms and had to be dealt with accordingly, given the fragile racial hierarchy. Conformity theory further explains why the African nationalists were publicly depicted as being outside of their own societies. 'Police and soldiers have been placed in the area of Highfield so that they may sort out those people who are worrying you,' warned signs posted in the Highfield township in August 1964.⁷¹

Efforts to control the image painted of Zimbabwean nationalism came to a head that same month over the newspaper, the *ADN*. Much to the chagrin of the RF, the European-owned *ADN* provided detailed coverage of the urban violence, openly criticised the RF, and was somewhat sympathetic to the nationalists. Under the leadership of a white editor, the Scottish-born Eugene Wason, the *ADN* frequently

⁶⁸ Weinrich, *Black and White Elites*, p.4

⁶⁹ Palley, *The Constitutional History*, p.626

⁷⁰ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

⁷¹ 'Checkpoints in Highfield', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 August 1964), p.10

published letters and articles written by supporters of the nationalist movements.⁷² Consequently, when a State of emergency was declared in Highfield, the RF tried to push a controversial banning order on the newspaper through Parliament.⁷³ Made aware of the proposal by several MPs who opposed the bill, a number of UCRN students and faculty immediately organised a demonstration outside Parliament for that afternoon and around a hundred black, white, and Indian men and women joined the peaceful multi-racial protest, holding signs and copies of the *ADN* outside the entrance to the building.⁷⁴ A public statement of support for African nationalism was also released. 'This move by a desperate Government is an attempt to stifle the impossible - African Nationalism and any form of criticism,' the students proclaimed.⁷⁵

As usual, the presence of non-black participants caught the attention of the RF and the Rhodesian press and the front page of the next day's *Rhodesia Herald* featured a prominent photo of the white ZAPU/PCC members Judith Todd and Wendy Clarke. The two women were part of the 90 demonstrators (including 'Africans, Asians, and Europeans') arrested later in the day.⁷⁶ Given the large number of detained students, Todd noted ironically that 'the police had no option but to adopt non-racial methods in dealing with us and we were herded together in the cells - Africans, Europeans and Asians.'⁷⁷

Although all of the detainees were eventually released, the mass trial of 81 students a few weeks later indicated how fearful the Rhodesian state had become of any dissenting individuals. Having avoided the protest itself, Reed attended the trial in following weeks. 'Gradually the long rows of benches fill up. Eighty one [accused]. Almost all Africans. Perhaps 10 European men including Hilary Jenkins,

⁷² See Wason, *Banned*, pp.94-96

⁷³ See Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.155

⁷⁴ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.113. Eugene Wason claims 250 students took part which seems significantly higher than either anybody else estimated.

⁷⁵ Wason, *Banned*, p.95

⁷⁶ '70 Demonstrators Sit down Outside Parliament', *Rhodesia Herald* (27 August 1964), p.1

⁷⁷ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.115

the only member of staff among them.⁷⁸ All of the demonstrators were cleared on a technicality, meaning the focus now shifted to the six 'leaders' who were tried the following week.⁷⁹ Given the tendency to focus on white radicals more than any other racial group, it was unsurprising that the Rhodesian police blamed white protestors for instigating the unrest. Alongside Judith Todd, three white male students (Stephen Lombard, John Tassell, and Michael Cowen) were charged and tried separately, as well as two young black men (Byron Hove and Mabvuta Zvichavanetsa).⁸⁰ All were handed suspended sentences. For many observers it seemed strange that the government had gone to the trouble of charging 81 students for simply protesting an issue of censorship. However, as Reed wryly noted, once the occupations of the protestors were taken into account, the move seemed more deliberate: 'I wonder what the government are after? I suppose to fix the university finally; to have suspended sentences over the heads of a fair proportion of the students and so quieten the whole place down.'⁸¹

The *ADN* arrests also demonstrated the shifting anatomy of the white radical group in Rhodesia. Individuals had regularly become more or less involved at different points, particularly on the fringes of the movement, and the transnational nature of white radicalism meant migration had a regular impact on the group as a whole. By 1964, even the core group had felt the effects of this mobility: Peter Mackay was in Zambia, the Rangers in Tanzania, the Lichtensteins in London (alongside others), leaving a greatly reduced and isolated original cohort. White radicalism thus became reliant on a new generation (in Mannheim's definition) to take up the mantle. This new generation was not necessarily younger than the one it replaced (although it contained younger elements), nor was it comprised of people

⁷⁸ Reed, 'Tuesday 29 September 1964', Diary, Vol.101

⁷⁹ Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island*, p.246; Reed, 'Friday 28 August 1964', Diary, Vol.101; Todd, *Rhodesia*, pp.111-116

⁸⁰ 'Students charged in Salisbury', *The Star* (27 August 1964). Hove would later become the Justice Minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under Muzorewa's unity government.

⁸¹ Reed, 'Monday 14 September 1964', Diary, Vol.101

with fundamentally different identities (indeed many traits such as education, class, and social marginality remained prevalent).

Hilary Jenkins, for instance, was the only UCRN lecturer arrested during the *ADN* protests and shared many traits with the older cohort including being highly educated (a graduate of Rhodes and Cambridge) and a personal history of multi-racialism (having worked with an Anglican mission school in South Africa for several years).⁸² Yet Jenkins also had more in common with younger radicals like Judith Todd than Reed, Ranger, or Mackay ever had, and the changing environment of the UCRN was largely responsible.⁸³ When Ranger and Reed had been the face of white radicalism on campus, informal relationships had existed between the faculty and students who supported African nationalism. Through dinners at the Rangers' house or Reed's sharing of his car with students going to NDP's township meetings, there had been a distinctly social aspect to white radicalism that surmounted otherwise significant divisions. Such activities had ensured that the UCRN was quickly branded as 'troublesome' by the RF. As an editorial in the South African newspaper *The Star* stated: 'Ever since it [the RF government] came to power it has regarded the University with distrust born out of the anxiety that it was a breeding ground for extreme African nationalism and therefore a considerable political threat.'⁸⁴

Admittedly the RF was not the first Rhodesian government to raise concerns about the UCRN's connections to African politics. White lecturers and students suspected of being sympathetic to African nationalism had been subject to vetting, surveillance, and even open harassment by Rhodesian intelligence services since the UCRN's foundation in 1956.⁸⁵ As Tapiwa Zimudzi argues, reports exaggerated the danger posed by the staff and students:

⁸² 'Old Rhodian visits his Alma Mater', Rhodes Newsletter: Old Rhodian Union (December, 1985), p.6

⁸³ Judith Todd, interviewed by author (10 December 2015)

⁸⁴ 'Campus Sense' Editorial, *The Star* (2 June 1966)

⁸⁵ Zimudzi, 'Spies and Informers', p.199

[Special Branch portrayed] the UCRN as a "hotbed of politics", where an "ultra-liberal pressure group" led by Walter Adams and comprising Ranger, Reed, Faber and other staff, actively encouraged racial integration on and off the UCRN campus [and] urging African students, as well as some white students, to support African nationalist parties.⁸⁶

Reed's accounts of campus politics present a different picture. Adams is depicted as a moderate conservative and ardent anti-nationalist; the faculty only spoke politics with students who approached them first; and an equal number of students were against African nationalism as were for it. The reality was likely somewhere in between Reed and the RF's versions, and consequently the Rhodesian state remained largely unwilling to act against the small number of radicals. Even by 1964, the RF could still permit dissent on campus for a variety of reasons. The UCRN was located on the outskirts of Salisbury, away from both the African townships and the white suburbs, and somewhat isolated from broader society. The concept of 'academic freedom' was also intrinsically tied to the concept of a respectable institution and was necessary to attract new academics. As Marshall Murphree (a UCRN lecturer) argued,

it is a particular and paradoxical characteristic of universities that they can only effectively perform their role of analysing and reformulating the components of societal and cultural heritage in terms of particular sets of contemporary relevance by assuming a critical and oppositional stance to the *status quo*.⁸⁷

Yet although dissent was somewhat tolerated, limits were imposed on how far white radicals would be permitted to go and a number of academics were restricted or deported for their activities.⁸⁸ It was thus somewhat surprising that in 1964 a number

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.201

⁸⁷ Marshall W. Murphree, 'Universalism, Particularism and Academic Freedom: The Rhodesian Case', in H.W. van der Merwe, & David Welsh, eds., *The Future of the University in Southern Africa* (Cape Town, 1977), p.105

⁸⁸ Faber was deported in 1959; Reed, Ranger, Lombard restricted in 1962; Ranger deported in 1963; and Nathan Shamuyarira fled an arrest warrant in 1964. See Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.228

of radical academics were permitted to join the university, including the South African John Conradie and the Italian political economist Giovanni Arrighi.

A staunch Marxist and committed anti-colonialist, Arrighi's outspoken nature endeared him to some of the Salisbury white radicals (like Reed), but brought him into confrontation with many others. As Reed noted in the aftermath of another round of 'exciting arguing' between Arrighi and UCRN faculty,

clearly Giovanni is having a powerful impact on the staff [...] There has been not so much influence as impact; not so much Giovanni's ideas - though knowing him and in a way needing to please him I have done a good deal of Marxist reading I wouldn't have been doing otherwise - as his fierceness, intolerance, and passion. We got to know each other by quarrels about the majority independence committee and then a closeness from sharing risks or possible risks. I am shocked to hear other people criticising Giovanni - but I don't defend him - partly I suppose because I don't share his intellectual approach and it was his fear under attack - but partly because I am embarrassed by the way he has backed me over, uneasy that I may be regarded as Giovanni's man.⁸⁹

As Reed noted, the fundamental divisions between the white radicals persisted despite the cohesion provided by the RF's repression, the anti-white politics of the nationalists, and the growing racialism in broader Rhodesian society. Although the many within the UCRN persisted in the belief that 'the College was the last stand of the concept of a non-racial society', the UCRN was not entirely sheltered from broader socio-political changes.⁹⁰ The segregation which had seemed to be narrowing under Garfield Todd and Edgar Whitehead was being rapidly reintroduced. For instance, on 29 August 1964, Bulawayo's only multi-racial hotel 'closed its doors to Asians, Africans and Coloured people'.⁹¹

This racialisation of society was reflected in tensions on the UCRN campus between those who supported African nationalism and those who did not. At a meeting in September regarding the students arrested during the *ADN* protest, there

⁸⁹ Reed, 'Tuesday 2 March 1965', Diary, Vol.105

⁹⁰ Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island*, p.257

⁹¹ 'Hotel Victoria closes doors to non-whites', *Rhodesia Herald* (29 August 1964), p.3

was a clear division between the 'overwhelming' majority who were 'in full support of the students who had demonstrated', and 'a small, vocal section' who were 'opposed to the demonstration and antagonistic to those who had participated' and who booed the arrested students.⁹² Whilst most students were supportive of the nationalists, a sizeable portion of the white students (and several of the faculty) actively worked against the African cause. Some offered to supply the police with information regarding the activities of 'known troublemakers' at the university, including 'who they spoke to, what they said, and where they went.'⁹³ When Ndabaningi Sithole was jailed in October 1964,⁹⁴ several RF supporters complained in the UCRN newspaper *Unicorn* 'about the small nest of white students who, in the guise of "liberals" influenced by multiracialism, employed their energies in anti-government activities.'⁹⁵

Towards the end of September, the RF reaffirmed its domination of the white electorate in a contested by-election between Roy Welensky and Clifford Dupont.⁹⁶ Judith Todd's account of the election result announcement provides a graphic reminder of the isolation these white radicals faced due to their political beliefs and the prevalence of racial conformity theory in white Rhodesian society. Already alone in an overwhelmingly pro-RF crowd and repeatedly asked who she would have voted for, Todd replied, 'Joshua Nkomo actually.' Her response was met with disbelief and aggression.

I felt a hand on my shoulder and turned around again. A man of about fifty was staring at me. "What did you say my girl?" [...] "She says she supports Nkomo," the first questioner stated. [...] "My girl," said the man who had put his hand on my shoulder, "if you say things like that we'll string you up on that lamp post."⁹⁷

⁹² Todd, *Rhodesia*, pp.117-118

⁹³ Ibid., p.119

⁹⁴ Scarnecchia, *Urban Roots*, p.156; Wason, *Banned*, p.60

⁹⁵ *Unicorn* (9 October 1964)

⁹⁶ Wood, *So Far and No Further*, p.239

⁹⁷ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.131

Whereas white radical men were mainly seen as acting from a purely political standpoint (barring the accusations involving sexual abuse of African women⁹⁸), young white radical woman (like Todd or Wendy Clarke) were often regarded as having been led astray or acting amorously. These assertions became so incorporated into the colloquial narratives of white radicalism that many white Rhodesians primarily remember Todd within this context. 'Garfield Todd and his daughter supported them [African nationalists]. She slept with them, you know,' recalled Markham Batstone (a BSAP officer).⁹⁹ Such views were a reflection of the explicit criminalisation of sex between black men and white women (the so-called 'Black Peril') that dominated Rhodesian segregation throughout the twentieth century.¹⁰⁰ 'Whites shared a conceptual language for crisis and it was corporeal,' explains Jock McCulloch, arguing that miscegenation became a scapegoat for the socio-political weakness of the Rhodesian state.¹⁰¹ It is notable that the same accusations did not follow the married white radical women like Shelagh Ranger, Molly Clutton-Brock, or Eileen Haddon.

iv. Nationalism in Restriction: Gonakudzingwa and Wha Wha

The mass imprisonment or restriction of the nationalist elites and a large number of their urban supporters during the summer of 1964 created an air of uncertainty for all involved. As John Day neatly summarises, the banning of the PCC and ZANU 'ended one era for the nationalist movement and inaugurated another.'¹⁰² Denied any

⁹⁸ In March 1965, Garfield Todd was accused by ZANU of 'beating "naked African girls"'. See Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.163

⁹⁹ Markham Batstone, interviewed by author, (17 November 2015)

¹⁰⁰ Jock McCulloch, *Black Peril, White Virtue: Sexual Crime in Southern Rhodesia, 1902-1935* (Bloomington, 2000); & Munyaradzi Mushonga, 'White power, white desire: Miscegenation in Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe', *African Journal of History and Culture*, Vol.5, No.1 (2013), pp.1-12

¹⁰¹ McCulloch, *Black Peril*, p.82

¹⁰² John Day, 'The Insignificance of Tribe in the African Politics of Zimbabwe Rhodesia', in W.H. Morris-Jones, ed., *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House* (London, 1980), p.90

formal structure within Rhodesia and with most of the senior figures detained or restricted, the nationalist movements were forced abroad or underground. In combination with the anti-white sentiments, the non-black radicals struggled to find their place within the official party structures. Many of the 'original' generation of radicals battled self-doubt over their continued participation in a violent, underground movement. "We whites, running around, asking to be allowed to help. They [the nationalists] don't need our help, and perhaps we ought to be glad of this," lamented John Reed in September 1964.¹⁰³

Given the challenges to their involvement, some radicals remained convinced that financial assistance and welfare support were the most appropriate means of contributing. Membership fees from the ordinary grass-root supporters generated a lot of revenue, but it was the middle-class white, Indian, and Asian supporters who were able to provide the logistics needed to run a political party. For instance Amra Bukhat (a young Indian radical) provided office space for ZAPU,¹⁰⁴ Peter Mackay assisted the Nyasaland ANC with publishing and distributing several newspapers, and Shelagh Ranger mimeographed NDP material for distribution. The white-run SRLAWF had also been supporting detained black Africans and their families for five years by this point, yet even its future was unsure.¹⁰⁵ On 21 October 1964, at the house of Axel Sommerfelt (a recently arrived Norwegian lecturer), a gathering of white radicals provided a roll-call of those sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Representing the NDP-era cohort were Eileen and Mike Haddon, Jaap and Ruth van Velsen, John Reed, and the Sommerfelts, accompanied by the newly arrived Giovanni and Sisa Arrighi. As Reed bitterly noted, the meeting descended into a 'shouting match' over the 'hopelessness of the Africans and the Europeans who support them' and 'the uselessness of welfare work.'¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³ Reed, 'Monday 21 September 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁰⁴ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

¹⁰⁵ Originally it was the Southern Rhodesia Legal Aid Welfare Fund, then briefly the Southern Rhodesian Legal Aid and Welfare Defence Fund, and finally the Southern Rhodesia Legal Aid and Welfare Fund.

¹⁰⁶ Reed, 'Wednesday 21 October 1964', Diary, Vol.101

This doubt was a reaction to the perceived failing of African nationalism elsewhere, particularly the Malawi Cabinet Crisis. Colin Baker's summary of the incident highlights why the crisis was so disturbing to the white radicals. Within three months of independence:

all save one of [Hasting Banda's] cabinet ministers resigned or were dismissed. All but one of the former ministers fled the country. A number of actively pro-Congress Europeans, including a former cabinet minister, fearing for their lives, followed them. Severe fighting, including killings and arson, occurred between the followers of the former ministers and Banda's supporters.¹⁰⁷

Peter Mackay was particularly disillusioned, due in no small part to his personal connections with many of those involved.

I had followed the events in Malawi from a distance and found them hard to believe, difficult to understand and impossible to accommodate. In a few rushing weeks the triumph that was Malawi had become a tragedy; the unified efforts of so many people over so many years had been undone; the model had been defaced. In the settler states of southern Africa and further afield among those who did not wish Africa well, they could say, "You see."¹⁰⁸

Incidents like the Malawi crisis made the inactivity of the African nationalist leadership following the banning of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC appear even more dangerous. Eileen Haddon and Giovanni Arrighi were both vocal critics on the stagnancy of the movements, as well as the dependency of the detainees on white financial support. Discussing the situation with Haddon at the start of 1965, Reed reported:

It looks almost as if the Africans have given up trying. It is not, as it is sometimes put, that they are hesitating to turn to violence. The situation is violent through and through. It is that violence is being successfully employed against them and they are failing to use violence effectively back.

He continued:

¹⁰⁷ Colin Baker, *Revolt of the Ministers: The Malawi Cabinet Crisis, 1964-65* (London, 2001), p.x

¹⁰⁸ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.259

Giovanni wants a complete withdrawal from "good works" activity to make things easier for the detainees and restrictees. Only desperation can provide the energy now needed by the nationalists - or is it not that despair has already taken hold of them and that this is why nothing is being done?¹⁰⁹

Arrighi's observation about the extent of non-black financial support was astute. According to Jocelyn Alexander,

detainees increasingly relied not on the state but on the expanding [...] work of international organisations [...] which funded legal representation, helped detainees and prisoners with study materials and access to degree programmes, and provided welfare support for the families of detainees.¹¹⁰

Although those involved in welfare work were becoming frustrated, they nevertheless continued to go to great efforts to ensure that the nationalist detainees were afforded the assistance they needed. One avenue of support was in the shape of the Majority Rule Independence Committee (MRIC). The MRIC was a multiracial group established after the banning of ZAPU/PCC by Enoch Dumbetshena, John Reed, Guy Clutton-Brock, and Arrighi. The group had the explicit support of Joshua Nkomo and the other Gonakudzingwa detainees and was intended to be a legal means of protesting the RF's continued independence negotiations with Britain. In many ways, the MRIC was an effort by one of ZAPU/PCC's most vocal supporters of non-racialism (Dumbutshena) to preserve Zimbabwean nationalism's inclusivity. However, the political marginality of the MRIC, its inclusion of prominent non-black radicals, and its close association with only the restricted ZAPU/PCC leaders generated issues within the nationalist leadership as a whole.

In October 1964, Giovanni Arrighi travelled to Lusaka to meet the ZAPU/PCC leaders in exile.¹¹¹ Given the remoteness of those in Gonakudzingwa and

¹⁰⁹ Reed, 'Sunday 21 February 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹¹⁰ Jocelyn Alexander, 'Nationalism and Self-government in Rhodesian Detention: Gonakudzingwa, 1964-1974', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol.37, No.3 (2011), pp.551-569, p.556

¹¹¹ John Reed, 'A Recollection of G.A.', unpublished document, undated, John Reed Collection, Chetham's Library, p.4

in exile abroad, Arrighi had found it difficult to fully integrate himself with the highest levels of leadership and the trip to Lusaka was thus the first time he met some of the most senior leaders, including George Nyandoro, James Chikerema and Jason Z. Moyo. When Arrighi returned to Salisbury, he brought with him a stern message from Nyandoro (the most senior ZAPU/PCC leader not restricted or detained) that 'the Majority Rule Independence Committee was to be disbanded at once - there must be complete inactivity.'¹¹² Nyandoro's decision was in direct contradiction to the support the MRIC had received from the Gonakudzingwa detainees, and clearly indicated the uncertainty surrounding where genuine authority lay. After a discussion with Arrighi, John Reed highlighted the lack of clarity, worsened by the division of the nationalist movement between detention and exile.

There were often differences between the views in Gonakudzingwa and those of the exile leadership in Lusaka. Giovanni looked at the situation logically. Whatever their relative rank in the party monarchy, those being held in restriction inside Rhodesia were unable to act and the decisions that prevailed must be taken in Lusaka. I felt it was more complicated than this, and that there was a real danger, that as a small group of whites, we could easily find ourselves charged with sowing dissent between the two groups.¹¹³

Both Jocelyn Alexander and Munyaradzi Munochiveyi have written on how restriction camps affected structures of authority within the Zimbabwean nationalist movement.¹¹⁴ As Alexander explains, the isolated detention of the camps forced the detainees to construct for themselves a 'coherent, efficient and symbolically compelling alternative [...] to the Rhodesian state.'¹¹⁵ To a degree the restriction camps acted as a microcosm of Zimbabwean nationalism, where black, Asian, Indian and coloured detainees 'sought to imagine an inclusive - if rigidly hierarchical - social order and nationalist mythology, alongside a rule-bound and expert

¹¹² Reed, 'Monday 12 October 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹¹³ Reed, 'A Recollection', p.6

¹¹⁴ See Alexander, 'Nationalism and Self-Government', pp.551-569; and Munochiveyi, *Prisoners of Rhodesia*

¹¹⁵ Alexander, 'Nationalism and Self-government', p.10

bureaucracy.¹¹⁶ The detainees were presented with the opportunity to practice the non-racial nationalism they had propagated since 1957, away from the presence of a white population. The bridging of class, generational, gender, religious, ethnic, and racial divides (albeit amongst supporters of the same political movement) provided a possible construct of a Zimbabwean nation. As Nkomo himself recalled,

The few policemen at the Vila Salazar frontier post [Gonakudzingwa] had to tolerate this [political activity]. They soon grew relieved that we were keeping order with no need for any intervention from them. It was our strict policy to behave politely to all our guards, and to show them that we had nothing against white people as such, only against the system of government that denied the rights of black people.¹¹⁷

One critical observation is that there were no white detainees at the camp, and therefore the anti-white stance of some nationalist leaders could not be challenged by close confinement with sympathetic whites.¹¹⁸

Although neither Alexander nor Munochiveyi fully address it,¹¹⁹ the isolation of the camps also created struggles for authority between the restricted nationalists and those in exile.¹²⁰ Into the midst of this complex situation were placed the non-black radicals because of their ability to convey messages between the detainees and exiles. Few Africans could afford a car or the fuel required to travel hundreds of miles, and travel permits also presented significant challenges. As with Mackay's efforts with the Nyasaland ANC during the late 1950s, or Ranger in Tanzania after his deportation, this mobility endeared the white radicals to the nationalists and reinforced their utility to the cause. However, this was the first time they had been tasked with acting as go-betweens for factions within the same party. Consequently,

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.2

¹¹⁷ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.125

¹¹⁸ It should also be noted that the majority of those nationalist elites who had expressed anti-white views were members of ZANU and therefore restricted in Wha Wha rather than Gonakudzingwa.

¹¹⁹ Munochiveyi skirts the issue with regards to the prisoners' challenges to the 'inside-outside divide that detention and imprisonment created' through the smuggling out of prison writings. See Munochiveyi, *Prisoners of Rhodesia*, p.301

¹²⁰ See for example Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.117

their insertion into high-level politics made it likely that they could be accused of being more than simple messengers, particularly in light of the lingering accusation surrounding multi-racialism and white influences.

Nevertheless, many non-black radicals still perceived this mobility as a key component of their own place within Zimbabwean nationalism and the journeys undertaken often became something of a rite of passage. In interviews, many non-black radicals proudly recall a 'pilgrimage' to Gonakudzingwa restriction camp where the leaders of ZAPU/PCC were being held. Given that Gonakudzingwa was located near the Mozambique border, some 400 miles from Salisbury and with no tarred roads for a quarter of that distance, this was not an easy journey to make. Yet at least three separate groups of non-black radicals visited Gonakudzingwa in the months immediately after the August 1964 proscriptions. These visits served a variety of purposes. Some were purely social, whilst others were personal demonstrations of solidarity with the detainees.

One trip was made in October 1964 by four UCRN lecturers on behalf of the Salisbury welfare groups. Accompanying John Reed were Axel Sommerfelt, Jaap van Velsen, and Giovanni Arrighi (who had returned from Lusaka only a few days earlier). The visit ostensibly had a respectable objective. 'I spent most of my time there logging complaints and needs which our Legal Aid and Welfare Group could deal with,' recorded Reed.¹²¹ However, it also served a second, clandestine purpose, and the four lecturers took possession of various letters from Nkomo and others which they were instructed to deliver to the ZAPU/PCC executive in Lusaka.¹²² Frustrated at being unable to physically contribute to the struggle in other ways, the group were quick to agree.

However, the radicals also knew their presence at the camp opened them up to suspicion by the white state, exacerbated by the RF's established perception of the UCRN faculty. Reed, Arrighi, Sommerfelt, and van Velsen had already attracted the attention of the CIO and Special Branch. However, as Reed noted, 'all this was legal,

¹²¹ Reed, 'A Recollection of G.A.', p.5

¹²² Ibid.

though the government could assume we were active as couriers for what they regarded as a banned terrorist organisation.¹²³ Ironically, the RF's fears were correct. On 24 October, Reed and the Arrighis drove up to Lusaka for the official celebration of Zambian independence. With them came the letters from the Gonakudzingwa detainees. After being searched at the Zambezi border ('if it was because we were visiting Gonakudzingwa a week before, a careful eye was being kept on us'), they eventually successfully delivered the documents to the ZAPU/PCC officials in Lusaka.¹²⁴

The second group to visit the ZAPU/PCC detainees in Gonakudzingwa comprised three UCRN students - Judith Todd, Stephen Lombard, and Peter Fry – and the *Drum* magazine journalist Dick Walker.¹²⁵ An anthropology doctoral candidate from Cambridge conducting long periods of fieldwork in rural Chiota, Fry's experiences with Zimbabwean nationalism were markedly different than those based on campus. As he recalled:

I didn't spend much time at the University, I was stuck out in the countryside. [...] Jaap van Velsen, every time I'd come into town, he'd throw me back out again, and say "no, you have to be back there. [...] I was very alienated, I was totally alienated from this entire world [of nationalism on campus].¹²⁶

Nevertheless, Fry kindled a friendship with Lombard and through him, Todd and when the latter two planned a visit to Gonakudzingwa, they asked Fry to join them. Despite lasting only a couple of days, the journey provided an insight into both the relationship between the nationalists and the white radicals, but also the anatomy of the group of whites sympathetic to the African cause.

We drove to Gonakudzingwa. I felt really proud that Judy and Steve had let me go, I thought that was wonderful. She was a member of ZAPU from early on, and most of these guys in Gonakudzingwa were ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, Josiah

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ The University had been renamed the University College of Rhodesia in October 1964 following the granting of independence to Zambia and Malawi.

¹²⁶ Peter Fry, interviewed by author (1 May 2015)

Chinamano, Joseph Msika. That was a major event, I felt very proud of that, that I was at least integrated into that small group of white people who were related to African nationalist politics.¹²⁷

The trip served two roles. First, it reminded the nationalist leadership that there were white men and women willing to support their struggle. In the racial isolation of the restriction camps (containing no white detainees), it would have been easy for the anti-white racialism of the nationalists to grow unopposed. Visits by non-black radicals forced the issue to remain salient. Secondly, the visit helped the non-black radicals understand how the Zimbabwean nationalist ideology was developing in restriction. For Todd, her lasting (and idealistic) memory of the trip was of African nationalism's inclusivity.

I thought as we sat there that night, how this place above all others illustrated the way in which the Government mock the values they use to justify the things they do to the people of Zimbabwe. The glowing fire picked out the faces of teachers and students, chiefs, scholars and businessmen, old men, young boys and women, evangelists and farmers – people who themselves represented the various facets of the Christian and the civilised standards Smith so endlessly talked about, and who were banded together, Indian, African, Eurafrican and European to achieve the democracy and justice he was claiming to uphold, their unity destroying the charges he made that African nationalism was a racist, anti-white movement. Gathered together we were a non-racial group.¹²⁸

When Todd, Lombard, Walker, and Fry left after only a few days in the camp, they found themselves burdened with 'dozens of letters', like the lecturers who had preceded them. As Todd recounts:

All mail to and from Gonakudzingwa is censored and we were afraid we might be stopped by the police and searched and that the letters would be taken from us. We hoped though, that they would not search me, so the women restrictees helped me tie the letters under the shift dress I was wearing - all over me, like a stiff crackling layer of skin.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Ibid.,

¹²⁸ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.83. Eurafrican was a colloquial term sometimes used by 'coloured' citizens in Rhodesia.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.85

Such precautions turned out to be unnecessary but Todd's willingness to assist the nationalists despite the severe punishments, further endeared the non-black radicals to the nationalists.

In contrast to the visits by UCRN lecturers and students, the third group to visit Gonakudzingwa in late 1964 complicates the typical understanding of racialised mobility in Rhodesia. It is also the only account of Indian radicals visiting detained nationalists prior to UDI, despite the presence of prominent Indians like R.K. Naik in the camp. Consisting of Hasu Patel, Amra Bukhat, Suman Mehta, Laman Lalloo, and Buga Bukhat, the group were the same young, radical Indians that formed relationships with many nationalist leaders during the period of the NDP and their own involvement with the NDP City branch in 1960. In explaining why the Indian radicals made the long and arduous trip to the restriction camp, it is their connections with the nationalist leaders which proved important. As Patel recalled in an interview:

In '64, I came back [from London] and said to our people here, "Our leaders are in Gonakudzingwa, in the restriction camp, what are we doing? Why don't we go and see them?" This was in 1964 when there were no roads from Masvinga to Gonakudzingwa, you had to go through farmland. Amra Bukhat had an old black Mercedes, I remember, so he was the driver [...] His [Bukhat's] was the only car which was solid, his Mercedes.¹³⁰

Across all accounts of non-black radicalism during this period, the ownership or access to a car is a common theme in facilitating mobility. Reed make reference to his purchasing a car after arriving in Rhodesia in 1957, and the efforts he made to give African students lifts to NDP meetings.¹³¹ Peter Fry similarly recalls lending his car to black friends in Salisbury whilst away on fieldwork, and the police interest this action garnered. As he recalled: 'the police [...] did appear once in their Land Rover with a dossier of my movements – and the movements of my car which I had lent to

¹³⁰ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

¹³¹ See for example, Reed, 'Thursday 7 February 1957', Diary, Vol.74

friends in Harare - that was quite impressive.¹³² Even Joshua Nkomo mentions how the nationalists utilised individuals with vehicles to great effect during the early 1960s.¹³³ However, it was Mackay whose contributions to the Africa cause utilised vehicles far above all others, and who recognised the significant attached to such endeavours. Referring to his regular passenger-carrying journeys across southern central Africa, Mackay explained:

When my own course took me from time to time across the Zambezi I could feel that I was breaching the divide [between colonised and decolonised Africa], perhaps in some small way moving towards its demolition, and under the sun and the stars I could find a sensation of freedom. The journeys would end in recklessness, but it was a calculated recklessness. [...] But as I travelled the Freedom Road there could be no recklessness at the wheel; there was instead the obligation to reliability, for I was carrying people to a new life of hope which must not be dashed in a tangle of metal and blood.¹³⁴

Patel also recognised that even with a car, a journey (in this case to Gonakudzingwa) was anything but easy given the conditions in rural Zimbabwe.

So we went to Masvinga, stayed with N.J. Patel's family overnight there. [...] We stayed at that place overnight because at that time we had strip roads, we didn't have full tar, and then after Masvinga you didn't really have much of a road at all. And Gonakudzingwa was on the border with Mozambique, Malvenia they called it, the border post. So we went there, we drove I don't know how long.¹³⁵

When the group finally arrived at Gonakudzingwa's boundary after almost two days of travelling, they remained uncertain whether they would actually be granted entry. Visitors were permitted at the discretion of the officers on duty and certain restrictions applied, including not sleeping in the buildings erected by the

¹³² Peter Fry, interviewed by author (1 May 2015)

¹³³ For example, see Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.81. The targeting of cars in nationalist attacks during 1963 and 1964 was a particular side effect of this awareness of the importance of transport in the liberation struggle, to the extent that anybody caught setting fire to a car, whether occupied or not, was legally subject to a mandatory death sentence. See Sibanda, *The Zimbabwe African People's Union*, p.89

¹³⁴ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.283

¹³⁵ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

government for the restrictees.¹³⁶ The fact the visitors were Indian also raised problems with the police unsure whether to treat them as Europeans or Africans. The RF was notoriously irresolute when it came to classifying minority racial groups within their strictly racialised structures. For instance, the Residential Property Owners (Protection) Bill classed ethnic Chinese citizens as European, yet the Ministry of Education considered Chinese as Asians,¹³⁷ and the Chinese-Zimbabwean Fay Chung found herself isolated at the UCRN because of the institution's uncertainty over where she fell in the residential laws of the nation.¹³⁸ 'Evidently the Yellow Peril had no significance in Southern Rhodesia at that time. The Black Peril was all that mattered', explained Grace Keith,¹³⁹ and the result was a certain amount of legal and social uncertainty. As Patel recalled:

So we went there, we pitched up at the perimeter and these security people said "what do you want here?" And we said "we've come to see our leaders". Very brash. So we waited a while and they talked and talked. We were actually admitted. [...] And we spent a few hours. Chinamano was there, Nkomo was there, all kinds who I forget.¹⁴⁰

Again, the visitors departed bearing a number of letters which they had been instructed to post in Salisbury, away from the scrutiny of the Gonakudzingwa police. As with Todd, Patel saw the visit as being less about the physical opportunities to support the anti-colonial struggle than it was about the ideological bolstering afforded by these interactions. 'Things like that we did, just to show solidarity. [...] It was like solidarity in Poland,' he recalled.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Reed, 'A Recollection of G.A.', p.4

¹³⁷ "Education: Chinese Pupils. Cabinet Memorandum by the Minister of Education: A.P. Smith', R.C.(S)(69)46, 15 March 1969, Cabinet Memoranda, Ian Smith Cabinet papers, Cory Library for Historical Research, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa. See also Alois S. Mlambo, "'Some are more white than others": Racial Chauvinism as a factor in Rhodesian immigration policy, 1890-1963', *Zambezia*, Vol.27, No.2 (1998), pp.87-103

¹³⁸ Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*, p.39

¹³⁹ Keith, *The Fading Colour Bar*, p.106

¹⁴⁰ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author, (15 December 2015)

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

Nevertheless, such activities made those involved well aware of the precariousness of their continued liberty in Rhodesia. On 29 October 1964, Terence Ranger warned John Reed 'we should make what realistic plans are needed. I suppose it is reasonable to assume that you will be picked up and detained or restricted, especially after your membership, however aborted, of the Enoch [Dumbutshena] committee and the sinister sounding Smith attempt to pin the blame on the whites.'¹⁴² Reed's reconnaissance of potential escape routes saw him travel to Dar es Salaam in December to visit the Rangers but also see how the university there was developing. The trip afforded a number of notable incidents for Reed, including his first encounter with a member of the ZANU elite, Noel Mukono. The encounter turned out to be accidental ('Terry tells me he only met them by chance at the airport where they had come to meet someone') but Reed still found the situation 'a bit alarming' given his own vocal support for Nkomo and ZAPU.¹⁴³

Ranger also arranged for Reed to talk to the Tanzanian Academy on the subject of 'Cultural Aspects of the Struggle between Black and White in Central Africa'. 'What I talk about is the rejection of liberalism by S.R. [Southern Rhodesian] Africans as a rejection of European culture,' Reed noted in his diary.¹⁴⁴ Liberalism's association with whites, as Reed saw it, was the reason multi-racialism had failed and why non-racial nationalism was being replaced by an ideology focusing on black identity. This was a discerning observation for 1964: as Reed noted, 'I am surprised myself by how coherent it all seems to me.'¹⁴⁵

Although pro-black rhetoric within the nationalist leadership had become increasingly common, it was unusual to hear a white radical publicly associate race with the development of Zimbabwean nationalism. Robert Mugabe's NDP cultural reclamation programme had focused on the physical aspects of European culture, but the distancing from European political ideologies had been less clearly defined.

¹⁴² Ranger to Reed, 29 October 1964, quoted in Reed, 'Monday 2 November 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁴³ Reed, 'Wednesday 16 December 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁴⁴ Reed, 'Thursday 17 December 1964', Diary, Vol.101

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.,

Indeed, many within the audience appeared to find this reasoning too abstract, as Reed lamented: 'from the questions it looks as if most of the Africans in the audience have not understood what I was saying'. The concept of rejecting existing power structures for their foreign nature was not one that was immediately obvious to the predominantly Zimbabwean crowd. When faced with the rejection of ideologies for being associated with white European culture, some ordinary nationalist supporters were unable to integrate this concept into their own personalised ideas of Zimbabwean nationalism. Attempts to define Zimbabwean nationalism were further exacerbated by the rise of the RF and the closing down of discursive spaces between the African nationalists and their supporters - most visibly signified by the banning of the *African Daily News* and the restrictions on township meetings. As Enocent Msindo explains, the consequences would fundamentally shape Zimbabwean nationalist discourse in the coming years.

the leaders became the megaphones, and its membership, the ears. Anti-government information dissemination became top-down and none of the African recipients of this nationalist propaganda and media campaigns had any alternative space to answer back or debate issues in the new party presses.¹⁴⁶

Conclusion

As the year drew to a close, it was apparent that 1964 had marked a turning point for the non-black supporters of the nationalist movements. The outlawing of ZANU and ZAPU/PCC, the escalating intra-party violence in the African townships, the death of Petrus Oberholzer, and the growth of the RF had all drastically worsened the situation in Rhodesia. 'The year had seen white nationalism whipped to boiling point and black nationalism ruthlessly suppressed,' summarised Judith Todd.¹⁴⁷

For the non-black radicals, taking risks now came to define commitment. A satirical article published in the South African newspaper *The Star* on 25 November 1964 emphasised just this sentiment:

¹⁴⁶ Msindo, 'Towards a New Understanding', p.10

¹⁴⁷ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.144

At parties where White liberals gather "for mutual consolation and admiration," the correspondent says, the greeting, "Hello, old boy, booked that room next to mine in the camp yet?" is now common. 'Such a restriction camp, intended for Whites with unpopular views, may or may not exist, says the correspondent, but "a certain status can be acquired by stating firmly your definite knowledge that you are on the guest list."¹⁴⁸

After comparing these 'liberals' to 'anarchists in the old Russia', the tongue-in-cheek article continues:

just knowing Africans on a calling basis gave status among liberals. Now it is essential to know an African under restriction - and the choice is wide, but the names are dropped in a hushed voice and with a glance over the shoulder.¹⁴⁹

The humorous observations sadly quite accurately mirrored how many white radicals felt by the end of 1964. In light of the nationalists' anti-white stance and the RF's increased repression, they had been limited to acting as fund-raisers, messengers, and representatives for their races. However, the ascribed roles and the commitment of the radicals would be put to the test in the most dramatic of ways in the coming months as the radicals found themselves faced with an increasing number of opportunities to contribute to the nationalist cause that went beyond 'welfare work'.

¹⁴⁸ 'Rhodesian liberals "console" each other', *The Star* (25 November 1964)

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

Chapter 6

Uncertainty and Untaken Trajectories: Zimbabwean nationalism and UDI, 1964-65

Introduction

This final chapter focuses on the period immediately preceding the Rhodesian government's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965; a controversial seizure of self-government by the white minority that would come to define the future of the Rhodesian nation. Backed into a corner, the Zimbabwean nationalists were forced to embrace military conflict in order to achieve their aims. Certainly, this fitted neatly into contemporary observations of the inherent violence of all anti-colonial struggles. As Frantz Fanon argued in 1961 with reference to the Algerian case; 'colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence.'¹ The adoption of increasingly antagonistic attitudes by both groups, so the argument goes, had made it apparent that the endemic political violence in the townships throughout 1963 and 1964 was fated to expand from a predominantly intra-African conflict to a broader intra-racial one. From November 1965 onwards, Zimbabwean nationalism became a liberation movement which sought to turn the violence of the colonial system against their colonial masters. The necessity and popularity of action saw the nationalists gain popular support on unprecedented scales, both domestically and internationally. The Liberation War would last until 1979 and claim thousands of lives, and the

¹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London, 1961), p.100

Zimbabwean nation to emerge would continue to perceive itself in predominantly terms of this struggle for decades to come.

Yet prior to UDI, the situation was markedly different. Following the banning of both ZAPU/PCC and ZANU in August 1964, the period is portrayed as a relatively quiet span in which the Zimbabwean nationalists were focused on transition and recovery, hampered by the repressive legislation of the RF.² The removal of many nationalist figureheads as well as a large number of the ranking party officials complicated party structures, exacerbated by the divisions between those nationalists in exile and those in restriction. Supporting the perception of a broken nationalist movement is a 1965 survey of white Rhodesians in which 70 per cent of the respondents 'did not believe that the nationalists had widespread African support' and a majority agreed that 'African nationalism was not in itself perceived as a threat.'³ As Joshua Mporo (a ZAPU branch leader) recalled, the nationalists 'were operating at half capacity due to either mass arrests or retreat of comrades from the heat of political activism under constant surveillance by security branches.'⁴ Even accounts of the period by the senior nationalists gloss over these years: Joshua Nkomo spares only four pages to the two years between 1964 and 1966, and Maurice Nyagumbo only three.⁵

Through its opening up of discursive spaces, this environment saw alternative trajectories considered by those within the nationalist movements. Some (including many non-black radicals) hoped for British military intervention on behalf of the African people. Others wanted an immediate declaration of war against the white state. The last few lingering multi-racialists hoped the RF could be persuaded to accommodate black advancement alongside their own white supremacist policies. The uncertainty within Zimbabwean nationalism provided opportunities for a re-imagining of the nationalist ideology and nationalist movements, much as physical

² For example see Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.112

³ Hintz, 'The Political Transformation', p.182

⁴ Mporo, *My Life*, p.110

⁵ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, pp.121-125; and Nyagumbo, *With the people*, pp.188-190

locations like restriction camps or parties in exile did. In light of the racialisation of Zimbabwean nationalism and Rhodesian society in 1964, key discussions took place around an inclusive versus exclusive liberation movement, the outcome of which had an important impact on the non-black radicals.

This chapter therefore focuses on two themes. First, the conflict within the nationalist executive between those who sought to resist a shift to racialised violence and those who did not. The rise of a black identity nationalism (discussed in the previous chapter) and the rejection of non-racialism had made the contributions of non-black radicals increasingly precarious. Factors such as transnationalism (including connections and comparisons to white radicalism in South Africa), and the anatomy of the non-black radical group are explored for their impact on the imagined post-independence Zimbabwean nation. With the alternative trajectories being discussed and the shifting composition of the non-black radical cohort, internal disagreements about strategy and identities came to the fore.

The second theme is the RF's increased persecution of non-black radicals in the build-up to UDI, and the how such criminalisation induced a mood of despondency, including reflections on the necessity of their involvement with Zimbabwean nationalism. The chapter assesses and chronicles how the activities of some non-black radicals developed during this period, and explains why there was a shift away from radical liberalism to violent radicalism within several members of the core faction. Described as a largely-ignored period of 'fascinating interaction among the surviving white radicals,'⁶ the motivations of the non-black radicals are explored in light of the nationalist's anti-white rhetoric and the RF's open hostility.

i. South African and Rhodesian radicals: sabotage versus goodwill work

In December 1964, Joshua Nkomo released a Christmas statement in the *Gonakudzingwa News*, a newsletter produced by the ZAPU/PCC nationalists

⁶ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.165

restricted to the isolated camp and 'done up with a picture of [Nkomo] on the front, and greetings and thanks for coming in several languages'.⁷ The statement read:

This message is not only for Christians, but for all the people throughout the world regardless of race, colour or creed. [...] I ask for the elimination in our country of greed, arrogance, selfishness, and falsehood. [...] To us, the people of Southern Rhodesia where selfishness and ruthlessness on the part of the racial minority have gravely hampered the interests of the majority, I commend this message.⁸

Nkomo's condemnation of the racialised problems faced by the Rhodesian people did not go unnoticed. Nkomo had long been regarded as being a more vocal supporter of non-racialism than many other senior nationalists, his increasingly frequent anti-white public rhetoric notwithstanding. As Eugene Wason, the banned-*African Daily News* editor, recalled in his memoir: 'I thought then, as I think today, that reconciliation between the races would be easier under Nkomo than under Sithole. Nkomo understood Europeans. [...] He was in no sense a racist.'⁹

However, by the time of Nkomo's Christmas message, race had become an increasingly prominent issue on the social and political agenda.¹⁰ In particular, the worsening situation in the Congo during the last months of 1964 iterated the apparent dangers of black rule for white settlers and provided fuel to the RF's anti-nationalist and anti-communist agenda. A report in the *Rhodesia Herald* on 25 November 1964 was demonstrative of the fears within the white settlers of African nationalists taking power. Under images of white children protected by white Belgian soldiers, the article stated 'two hundred and fifty white hostages were herded together for an hour at the Patrice Lumumba Monument in Stanleyville this morning while the Congo rebels decided what to do with them. Then the rebels machine-gunned the crowd.'¹¹ Another account spoke of Belgian paratroopers rescuing white settlers from

⁷ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.125

⁸ 'Good will towards Men', *Gonakudzingwa News* (December 1964), p.1

⁹ Wason, *Banned*, p.46

¹⁰ Mlambo, 'From the Second World War', p.111

¹¹ '250 hostages are machine-gunned in the street', *Rhodesia Herald* (25 November 1964), p.1

'murderous crowds of blood-thirsty Africans'.¹² Enoch Dumbutshena was enraged by the picture being painted of independent Africa. 'Settlers in Zimbabwe deride independent black states and mockingly refer to the mess that independence produced in the Congo in 1960. They talk freely of the raping of white women and the killing of missionaries,'¹³ he wrote.

Accompanying this depiction of events in the Congo and the political turmoil in Ghana were similar stories from central Africa.¹⁴ In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda had recently stated his intention to remove the exclusively-white seats in Parliament, an issue so distressing to the RF that they raised it with the British government. 'Control [in Rhodesia] would stay in white hands [...] until the Africans treated the whites in the same way that whites currently treated them,' argued Ian Smith.¹⁵ The irony in the statement was missed by all in the room. Meanwhile in Malawi, the ruling party declared in January 1965 that 'if Europeans and Asians wish to give the party their moral or other support, they are free to do so, and their support is welcome. But they cannot enrol as members.'¹⁶ The situation worsened the following month when Major Peter Moxon (one of Hasting Banda's most prominent white supporters) was declared a prohibited immigrant, with Banda warning other 'Europeans not to meddle in politics.'¹⁷

Given this international context, white Rhodesians became increasingly reluctant to persevere with racial integration (in the words of Reverend Cecil Alderson, the Anglican Bishop of Mashonaland).¹⁸ In January 1965, *The Star* was unequivocal with where the blame lay.

¹² 'Belgian Paratroops Capture Airport in 4 min. But 30 whites die', *Rhodesia Herald* (26 November 1964), p.1

¹³ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.68

¹⁴ In 1964, Kenneth Nkrumah controversially declared himself Ghanaian President for life and the nation a one-party state. See Geoffrey Bing, *Reap the Whirlwind: An Account of Kenneth Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966* (London, 1968), Ch.18

¹⁵ Wood, *So Far*, p.229

¹⁶ 'Ruling party in Malawi bars Asians, Europeans', *Rhodesia Herald* (9 January 1965), p.7

¹⁷ 'Declared prohibited immigrant', *Rhodesia Herald* (16 February 1965), p.9

¹⁸ 'Integration recedes in Rhodesia', *The Star* (29 January 1965)

A few years ago, the people of Rhodesia were prepared to accept a wide measure of integration with good grace. Why, now, the swing? Many theories can be advanced but probably the strongest is reaction against the disastrous failures of Black Africa. With every new atrocity in the Congo, every new act of political savagery by African against African in Rhodesia, the opinion of many Europeans hardens a little against Africans in general. To them, the "wind of change" has become tainted with blood.¹⁹

White Rhodesians felt isolated on the continent and so retreated into the racialised 'laager' mentality idolised in their pioneer column histories of the 1890s. They perceived themselves as stoically defending white Rhodesian civilisation against an onslaught of violent, uneducated, racist blacks.²⁰ Zelda van Greunen (a schoolgirl in Marandellas) recalled the sense of distrust that pervaded the white community. 'It was impossible to know which of the blacks supported the terrorists. So you just didn't trust any of them. The only people you could trust were your own kind.'²¹

Thus when news emerged from South Africa that a radical white anti-apartheid group had been broken in the midst of a widespread bombing campaign, the reaction amongst white Rhodesians was one of heightened paranoia about those in their own country sympathetic to the nationalists. Bob Swift (former deputy-head of the Rhodesian CIO during the liberation war and the first years of independence) explained:

We could protect ourselves from the Africans - they were clumsy and left documents, incriminating stuff, in their houses and on their dining tables [...] The ordinary troopers could deal with them. But when it was a European chap trying to destroy your country [...] there was some real trouble there. We'd seen in South Africa that they were smart and organised and had the support of the Reds. What then do you do?²²

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ J.L. Fisher, *Pioneers, Settlers, Aliens, Exiles: The Decolonization of White Identity in Zimbabwe* (Canberra, 2010), p.94

²¹ Zelda van Greunen, interviewed by author (5 December 2015)

²² Bob Swift, interviewed by author (5 December 2015)

The unearthed group, the African Resistance Movement (ARM), was 'composed mainly of middle-class South African whites, who had set themselves the task of helping to bring about the destruction of apartheid and the fall of the National Party government.'²³ Working in association with the ANC and the SACP (thus feeding into the fear of white communists directing African violence), the ARM was one of several organisations in South Africa that used violence to achieve their aims. Between 1961 and 1964 the group carried out bombings and sabotage against the apartheid state to great public attention. Yet such actions were largely symbolic. As Peter Mackay noted, they 'went about demolishing electricity pylons - in substitute to windmills - to demonstrate their disapproval of apartheid'.²⁴ Following a controversial bombing at Johannesburg railway station in July 1964 in which one white woman was killed and 23 other whites injured, the ARM was exposed by the testimony of the captured bomber (Frederick John Harris). Almost thirty members were arrested and handed sentences varying from fifteen to two years.²⁵ Harris was sentenced to death and executed in April 1965, becoming the first and only white South African executed for actions against the apartheid state.²⁶

It is impossible to ignore the transnational connections that existed between the white radicals in Rhodesia and their counterparts in South Africa and the impact such connections had. One of the earliest voices of Rhodesian white dissent was Doris Lessing. Married to a South African communist, this connection had been noted as 'a threat to internal security' by the European Desk of Special Branch in 1956.²⁷ Eileen Haddon's connections with the Black Sash movement in South Africa were similarly highlighted in Special Branch's personal file on her.²⁸ Other South

²³ Du Toit, 'Fragile Defiance', p.96. The ARM was formerly known as the National Liberation Committee.

²⁴ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.248

²⁵ See Du Toit, 'Fragile Defiance', p.96

²⁶ Fredrickson, *Black Liberation*, pp.298-299

²⁷ Henrick Ellert, 'The Rhodesian Security and Intelligence Community, 1960-1980', in Ngwabi Bhebe & Terence Ranger, eds., *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War* (Harare, 1995), p.90

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.89

Africans who actively supported the Zimbabwean nationalists included the journalist Theo Bull (editor of the *Central African Examiner*), the UCRN student Stephen Lombard, the lecturer John Conradie (whose involvement in a ZAPU cell would generate headlines in 1966), and Jack Halpern (a Jewish journalist and childhood refugee from Nazi Germany).

In more than one case, the experiences of South African radicals demonstrated to the Rhodesian radicals the reality of involvement with a violent liberation struggle. One interaction came in Lusaka in 1964 where Peter Mackay was running a transit centre for the International Refugee Council for Zambia. In August 1964, Mackay was approached by Dennis Higgs, an ARM member fleeing the South African courts. Given Mackay's support for the ARM ('a band of South African Europeans, brave and quixotic'²⁹), it was unsurprising that Higgs turned to Mackay for assistance.

Higgs, with British citizenship and a British passport, managed to elude his hunters and reach Lusaka. He had come to the office where I was setting up shop - for word had gone round - to ask if he should acquire a gun. I said no. It is true that I was not fully aware of his activities in South Africa, nor at this time was I conscious of the South African capacity for revenge, but the fact he was concerned for his safety should have given me pause. [...] Instead I suggested locked doors and keeping an eye open.³⁰

Shortly after, Higgs was kidnapped at gunpoint by South African police.³¹ For Mackay, the incident provided an 'extreme indicator of the milieu' in which he was now working and the very real threat of imprisonment that faced all supporters of the African cause.³²

Just as the white Rhodesians frequently looked to events in South Africa (albeit with morbid fascination) so too did the white radicals, particularly given the more extensive actions of their counterparts to the south. As an example, during the

²⁹ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.248

³⁰ Ibid., p.249

³¹ For more see Hugh Macmillan, *The Lusaka Years: the ANC in exile in Zambia, 1963 to 1994* (Johannesburg, 2013), p.71

³² Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.250

small period between 7 and 20 November 1964, the following events regarding non-black radicals in South Africa were all covered extensively in the Rhodesian press. Four coloured men were charged with attempting to bomb a post-office, a power sub-station, and the University College of the Western Cape;³³ the ARM and SACP member, Frederick John Harris, was sentenced to death;³⁴ two white men and a white woman were imprisoned for furthering the aims of Communism;³⁵ another two white men and a white woman (confessed members of the ARM) were found guilty of acts of sabotage;³⁶ two white men, two Indian men, and one coloured man all pleaded not guilty to being members of the national high command of *Umkonto we Sizwe*, the military branch of the ANC, as well as two charges of sabotage;³⁷ and 14 other white men and women were charged with breaking the Suppression of Communism Act.³⁸

The writings of the non-black radicals in Rhodesia during the winter of 1964-65 make clear that they were well aware of the actions of the South African radicals. Whilst Mike and Eileen Haddon holidayed in France, Peter Mackay and John Reed both paid visits to their families in Britain. Yet in the true spirit of transnationalism these relocations did little to hamper their interactions with one another. For the duration of his time in London, the Haddons lent Mackay their car, and Mackay and Reed also met twice whilst abroad.³⁹ However, these meetings served only to reinforce to Reed how precarious the white radicals' position was in Rhodesia and how limited their contributions in comparison to the South Africans. A dinner in December 1964 was a particularly sombre experience. Mackay was again facing imprisonment for refusing to register for Rhodesian military service and his resolution to challenge the issue in court had opened the white radicals up to

³³ 'Surprise in S.A. Trial', *Rhodesia Herald* (10 November 1964), p.2

³⁴ 'Harris sentenced to death', *Rhodesia Herald* (15 November 1964), p.1

³⁵ 'Three guilty of aiding Red aim', *Rhodesia Herald* (10 November 1964), p.1

³⁶ 'Woman admits sabotage acts', *Rhodesia Herald* (13 November 1964), p.1

³⁷ 'Secret S.A. witness trained in sabotage by Chinese', *Rhodesia Herald* (20 November 1964), p.1

³⁸ 'Fischer trial adjourned until Monday', *Rhodesia Herald* (19 November 1964), p.7

³⁹ Reed, 'Wednesday 23 December 1964', *Diary*, Vol.101

persecution by the RF. The execution of the ARM member Harris had also reaffirmed the real risks facing the white radicals, as Reed noted.

Peter himself seems very resolute in going up against what are now becoming appalling risks. "What they [the RF] really want to do," says Peter, "is to string up a white man." I don't think this is true. But they may find themselves without much choice. The risks of war. The chance, which in wartime anyone is expected to accept not as a matter of bravery but as a matter of course, of being killed.⁴⁰

The widespread support by white Rhodesians and the RF to the death sentence handed down to Harris was impossible to ignore. During the late 1970s, Tim Tanser was the detained ZANU leaders' state-appointed lawyer and a 'whole-hearted Rhodesian who emigrated to Zimbabwe after independence', in his own words. He ardently believed in the non-racialism of the law, particularly with regards to violence.

We knew there were some European radicals within ZANU and ZAPU who wanted to embark on a campaign of sabotage, even if it meant killing Rhodesians. [...] If they'd done it, I believe they'd have been hanged. There was a clause in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act that specified mandatory hanging for using bombs and that applied to everybody whatever their skin colour.⁴¹

The infamous 'hanging clause' was introduced in December 1964 along with a mandatory thirty-year sentence for the possession of explosives.⁴² In 1966 both would come back to haunt the lecturer John Conradie, yet for non-black radicals in 1965 the risk of execution or even imprisonment remained low.

This was particularly evident when considering the history of punishment meted out to that point. From Guy Clutton-Brock's arrest in February 1959 through till February 1965, not a single white radical in Rhodesia had been held in custody

⁴⁰ Ibid.,

⁴¹ Tim Tanser, interviewed by author (7 December 2015)

⁴² 'Police and Army units move into Mrewa to stop violence', *Rhodesia Herald* (4 December 1964), p.1

for more than 24 hours.⁴³ The simple fact that these were white citizens or foreign residents granted white dissenters a leniency not afforded to their black compatriots and the racial overtones of supposedly non-racial laws did not go unnoticed by broader Rhodesian society. When a group of white men destroyed a car in Bulawayo on 5 November 1964 because it bore an anti-independence slogan, a letter printed in the *Rhodesia Herald* asked:

I wonder if the Government will be restricting those European hooligans [...] or is the Law and Order Maintenance Act only applied to Africans, and intimidation of Europeans by Europeans perfectly legal?⁴⁴

In March 1965, one of the few black Rhodesian MPs asked about the races of those currently in restriction. 'There were no Europeans, Asians, or Coloureds restricted at Wha Wha [the ZANU camp]. At Gonakudzingwa [the ZAPU/PCC camp] three Asians and three Coloureds were under restriction,'⁴⁵ replied the Secretary to the Minister of Law and Order. The restrictions of John Reed, Terence Ranger, and Stephen Lombard in September 1962 generated much publicity in the Rhodesian press precisely because such events were a rarity, as did the arrests of a coloured and Indian man in February 1965.⁴⁶

The deportations of non-black radicals were similarly accompanied by extensive press coverage, particularly given the high proportion of white radicals declared prohibited immigrants.⁴⁷ These included Michael Faber (the radical economist) in 1959, the Rangers and Jack and Sophie Halpern in 1963, and Robert Hughes and Ralph Dodge (the American Methodists) in 1964. In 1965, L.K. Weiner (an American missionary) was deported after penning a sonnet criticising the use of police dogs against African protestors.⁴⁸ Marieke Clark (a British teacher at Inyati

⁴³ The last whites detained for political activities were during the *ADN* arrests. Most were released after a few hours.

⁴⁴ 'LTTE: Will thugs be restricted?', *The Rhodesia Herald* (10 November 1964), p.7

⁴⁵ 'Non-African restrictees', *Rhodesia Herald* (6 March 1965), p.3

⁴⁶ 'Coloured man and Asian restricted', *Rhodesia Herald* (10 February 1965), p.2

⁴⁷ For example see the response to Ranger's deportation in this thesis, ch.4, pp.16-18

⁴⁸ 'Teacher ordered to leave', *Rhodesia Herald* (3 July 1965), p.1

mission) was deported in November 1965 for possessing four ANC pamphlets smuggled from South Africa. Her position as 'an educator of impressionable children' raised the Rhodesian state's hackles, despite her having little active involvement with the nationalist parties, and the Rhodesian state paid for Clark's flight back to Britain.⁴⁹

It was Jack and Sophie Halpern who provided Reed with further doubts about his support for the nationalists. Whilst in London in February 1965, the three met for dinner. Reed and Jack Halpern had been friends since the late 1950s. Halpern was a well-respected journalist, born to Jewish-German parents who had fled from Nazi Germany to South Africa during the 1930s, and a long-time liberal with deep hostility to race-based states. Described as 'a rather theoretical, but quite genuine, leftist' and anything but an 'establishment liberal' (Theo Bull's term for those who worked for social change from within the existing structures),⁵⁰ Halpern worked first for the South African Institute of Race Relations, then became the editor of the *Central African Examiner* between 1960 and 1963. His arrival coincided with a shift in the *Examiner's* position from a critical supporter of government policy to 'a more forthright Government critic'. As Anthony King explains, 'by 1964, [the *Examiner*] was the only medium left for the expression of nationalist opinion,' due largely to Halpern's leadership.⁵¹

Halpern's reputation as a radical leftist (similar to Reed and Arrighi) was such that in 1960 when offered the editorship of the *Examiner*, the CAF's Prime Minister Roy Welensky had 'seriously considered refusing him a permit' to work in Rhodesia. In a letter to Ellis Robins (president of the British South Africa Company), Welensky lamented: 'I don't know what's coming over us as a people, Ellis. Are we determined to destroy the way of life we have built by playing into the hands of these Leftist

⁴⁹ See 'Teacher tells how she was deported', *Rhodesia Herald* (10 November 1964), p.1

⁵⁰ See Anthony King, 'The Central African Examiner, 1957-1965', *Zambezia*, Vol.13, No.2 (1996), pp.133-155, p.152

⁵¹ King, 'The Central African Examiner', p.133

elements all the way?'⁵² Ultimately, Welensky's doubts were proven right and the Halperns were deported in 1963 for their support for the nationalists. However, both remained prominently involved with the anti-colonial struggles across southern Africa: Jack as Secretary-General for Amnesty International, Sophie with the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

As a leftist, Jewish, South African radical, Jack Halpern had inevitably formed acquaintances with many from the ARM, including Baruch Hirson, a South African Trotskyite academic and founding ARM member who had been arrested during the mass crackdown in 1964. Hirson's story was 'a march with many stumbles, false starts, and wrong directions,' in the words of his autobiography's editor,⁵³ and consequently permits important comparisons between white radicalism in Rhodesia and South Africa. Issues such as the concealment of African nationalist materials, constant police attention, attending nationalist meetings, and the balancing of professional integrity with personal politics are all shared themes. Both groups also talked of the smallness of the circles of white radicals, and the wide-ranging ideologies contained within them.

Marginality from society remained the common theme motivating their activities. In Hirson's case, his peripheral status came from his Jewish identity, as it did for Edwin and Leone Lichtenstein, Barry and Sonja Gordon, Leo Baron, Gerry Caplan, and Jack Halpern, amongst others.⁵⁴ (One South African police officer asked Hirson during questioning, 'why are so many of you Jews?'⁵⁵) Denis Higgs (the ARM member who was arrested in Lusaka) feared being discovered for being gay – an identity shared with John Reed, John Conradie, Peter Mackay, Stephen Lombard, and Peter Fry of being discovered as gay. Hirson recalled:

⁵² *ibid.*, p.153

⁵³ Tom Lodge, 'Foreword', in Baruch Hirson, *Revolutions in my Life* (Johannesburg, 1995), p.ix

⁵⁴ See Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980* (Chapel Hill, 2001), p.89. Also Hendrickse, *The Essence of Multi-Racialism*

⁵⁵ Hirson, *Revolutions*, p.329

I discussed the matter [of being arrested] with Denis Higgs who was staying with us prior to leaving for Zambia with his African companion. The continued threat of discovery and prosecution under South Africa's notorious Immorality Act was forcing him to emigrate, leaving his position in some doubt.⁵⁶

This echoes Peter Fry's fears that dominated his time in Rhodesia:

I was also, as I said to you before and this we can raise at least in my interview, I was so terrified of being accused of being gay. That was a major factor, so I just had to keep all of that undercover as well. So I was busy, you know, producing the most innocent possible persona to everyone. Luckily because I was so young, people couldn't really accuse me of not having a wife and children at that time, so I didn't have that to worry about as much. But that was an important dimension of life, of which I have never spoken but now I can. And some of my friends had similar desires, as you may know.⁵⁷

As was discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the concept that marginality and discrimination (whether for race, religion, ideology, or sexuality) were universally transferable experiences explains why the diverse group of white radicals were able to work together, often across national borders. Jack Halpern, for instance, was liable to discrimination for his Jewish identity whether in South Africa, Britain, or Rhodesia, just as John Reed faced prosecution for his sexuality in many countries. Individuals could thus empathise with others in similar positions regardless of national identities or other fundamental differences.

Nevertheless, the broader comparisons between white radicalism in Rhodesia and South Africa demonstrate many differences that these commonalities could not overcome. Hirson's talk of cells, pseudonyms, and decentralisation are in stark contrast to the informal, less structured, and disorganised Rhodesian movements.⁵⁸ Reed's diaries regularly refer to discussions over dinner or drinks at others' homes, and the impromptu meetings to make important decisions where only one or two radicals were present. Hirson's account of seeking support from a Kibbutz in Israel

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.322

⁵⁷ Peter Fry, interviewed by author (1 May 2015)

⁵⁸ Hirson, *Revolutions*, p.313.

for sabotage training was also incomparable to anything the Rhodesian radicals did prior to 1965, as was the nine-year sentence Hirson was handed for his role in the ARM.⁵⁹ Nine years was more than the cumulative sentencing of all Rhodesian white radicals to that point.

By far, however, the largest difference lay with the non-racial avenues for political expression. Outside of the struggling African trade unions (already largely subsumed into the nationalist cause),⁶⁰ there were few spaces for the non-black radicals and African activists to cooperate within a political organisation that was not African nationalist. Whilst the non-racial SACP had a long history of activity, the Southern Rhodesia Communist Party formed in 1941 had disappeared within the decade without making a broad impact.⁶¹ The left-leaning Rhodesian white radicals (including Reed, Arrighi, and Clutton-Brock) were consequently forced to position their beliefs as secondary to African nationalism. Forced to coexist with other radicals espousing a wide range of political views, the leftist elements were further forced to temper their personal opinions on issues ranging from economic reform to violence. The latter proved particularly divisive. A pronounced aversion to violence from many white radicals ensured the orchestrated sabotage campaigns in Rhodesia remained the exclusive purview of the black nationalists.⁶² The disastrous outcome of the ARM's bombing campaign only reaffirmed this belief, as Reed discovered in conversation with Jack Halpern:

What Jack finds most depressing is that [Hirson's] lawyer - who has been over here [London] since the conviction - says he is now convinced the thing was not worth attempting - they all made themselves believe they had a real popular movement behind them but in reality it was nothing. As he drives me back to the underground, Jack remarks from the South African experience it is completely foolhardy for Europeans to get involved in sabotage - it is just too

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.316, 340

⁶⁰ C.M. Brand, 'Politics and African trade unionism in Rhodesia since Federation', *Rhodesian History*, Vol.2 (1971), pp.94-107

⁶¹ See Earl G. Ingersoll, *Doris Lessing: Conversations* (Princeton, 1994), p.16

⁶² The one exception was the case of John Brumer. See this thesis, ch.5

easy to pick the Europeans up or go on until somebody talks (or even easier in SR, where the number of Europeans is so much smaller).⁶³

The small number of Rhodesian white radicals was a perennial feature of non-black radicalism. No more than fifty whites had actively supported the Zimbabwean nationalists between 1957 and 1965, and this small number ensured an interconnectedness driven by personal relationships which a larger movement could not have obtained. Reed's friendships with Terence Ranger, Jaap van Velsen, Axel Sommerfelt, John Conradie, and Giovanni Arrighi (all academics sympathetic to the nationalists) ensured a radical presence on the UCRN campus even when individuals left temporarily or permanently. When Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock sought to establish a new multi-racial venture in Rhodesia, Mike and Eileen Haddon offered their farm as the location,⁶⁴ and it was Judith Todd who rescued the Clutton-Brocks' daughter Sally from school bullies in 1959.⁶⁵ Demonstrated through the social gatherings at each other's homes, the personalisation of white radicalism demonstrated that a belief in African nationalism was often enough to overcome conflicting personal political beliefs.

Yet this interconnectedness was also a negative. Because of the close-knit nature of these radicals, nearly all were known to the Rhodesian state. The familiarity with one another ensured that the anonymity practised by the ARM was impractical. As Reed recorded in June 1965, 'Eileen [Haddon] tells me that of course they are watching every move I make but I am too useful to them for them to arrest and restrict me. By keeping an eye on me they can tell easily what is going on.'⁶⁶ Even the radicals' most peaceful activities did not go unnoticed by the Rhodesian state.⁶⁷

⁶³ Reed, 'Friday 5 February 1965', Diary, Vol.101

⁶⁴ Faith Raven, 'From Europe to Africa - and back: Friends abroad', in Haddon, *Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock*, p.62

⁶⁵ Roschnik, 'Growing Up', p.69

⁶⁶ Reed, 'Saturday 19 June 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁶⁷ Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981* (London, 1987), p.63

Referring to a pro-nationalist demonstration in November 1965, a Special Branch report declared:

European nationalist sympathisers, including the University College group can always be relied upon to assist in any "suitable" demonstration, should a favourable opportunity present itself. [...] The Eileen Haddon ultra-liberals and the University College pro-African Nationalist groups entered into the spirit of the Airport demonstration with considerable fervour.⁶⁸

The March 1965 annual report of the Secretary for Law and Order was similarly explicit in its condemnation. African nationalists in Rhodesia, it argued, had provided 'a classic example of the use of the Communist methods of subversion from within [...] materially assisted, even though innocently, by the naive approach of idealistic ultra-liberal organisations to the problems facing the country.'⁶⁹ Whether this was a deliberate misrepresentation, or a failure to comprehend the white radicals' motivations, the stance explains why the RF nevertheless remained keen to act against the UCRN.

ii. Divisions and disagreements within the white radicals

Because of the state repression and the knowledge that they were likely under heightened surveillance, there remained an element of uncertainty about the place of non-black radicals in the nationalist cause. Only a few days after dinner with the Halperns, Reed was back in Rhodesia and discussed the matter with Eileen and Michael Haddon. The period of introspective doubt brought about by the restriction of the nationalist leaders and the banning of formal nationalist parties saw some white radicals (like Giovanni Arrighi) doubt the effectiveness of continued 'good

⁶⁸ 18 Nov 1965, "Organisation of Anti-Government Demonstrations", cabinet discussion of report produced by Special Branch Headquarters, Salisbury, 13 Nov 1965, pp.6-8, R.C.(S)(65)321, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

⁶⁹ 3 March 1965, 'Annual Report of the Secretary for Law and Order, 1964-65', p.7, R.C.(S)(65)104, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

work' activities. The Haddons were more disheartened by the apparent stagnation of the nationalist parties, as Reed noted in his diary:

In talking with Eileen, we [the white supporters] seem to be getting nowhere. There seems no chance of breaking the present situation, and Africans are not ready to rise or even to take risks; of course rebellions do not require the support of the majority but the support they have must be absolute. [...] The Haddons say that there is now nothing Europeans can do. This is not in the last resort our struggle because we can always go away. And perhaps now all we can do is to go away. To hear the Haddons talk of leaving is certainly new to my ears.⁷⁰

One evening in March 1965 at the Blue Boar pub in Salisbury, Mackay clashed heads with Arrighi, van Velsen, and Reed over the future of non-black radicalism. Frustrations within the group had reached a boiling point over the failure of the African nationalists to respond to the RF's actions.

Peter is, really, quite inexcusable telling Giovanni that he has no place poking his nose into these African matters, and why doesn't he concern himself with Sicily if he is so interested in the problems of underdeveloped areas; but Jaap becomes so angry at Peter and shouts so much that I can't help feeling on Peter's side. And this belief of Peter's that whites must always keep in the background, although usually irritating has a certain quality about it. And I have already had a quarrel with G[iovanni] myself during the afternoon about his insistence on a firmly consolidated line and his accusation that I agree to a thing one day and go back on it the next.[...] Peter believes - or at least has said, on different occasions - that the things I have done - have done more harm than good.⁷¹

The disagreements between what is typically portrayed as a small, like-minded, and homogenous group are indicative of the problems that came with a movement based only on one shared goal. Arrighi and Mackay were at opposite ends of the political spectrum and had little in common apart from their support for Zimbabwean nationalism. Arrighi's Marxist ideology ensured a belief in using socialism as a tool for the national liberation. As a committed anti-communist, Mackay found this idea

⁷⁰ Reed, 'Sunday 21 February 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁷¹ Reed, 'Friday 5 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102. The Sicily reference refers to the rise of Sicilian nationalism during the 1960s.

offensive. 'These people coming here and trying to impose their own idea and categories which are completely foreign to Africa, instead of trying to understand what is going on, instead of being ready to learn from Africa and Africans,' he complained to Reed, Arrighi, and van Velsen.⁷²

Jaap van Velsen, whose own experiences in the Dutch resistance during the Second World War shaped his contributions to the African cause, was also frequently at odds with Mackay over the role whites should play within the African movement. Despite warning students to avoid any active involvement that could jeopardise their studies, van Velsen frequently did the opposite. As Peter Fry recalled, van Velsen warned him: 'Peter, you'll probably feel strongly about African nationalism. You will not involve yourself in politics, this is not where you are supposed to be. If you wish to have an effect on politics then write to your equals, write to your peers.' Yet only a few months later, Fry witnessed van Velsen participating in pro-nationalist student protests on the UCRN campus.

I witnessed one scene of this, of Jaap was telling them [the students] what to do basically, it was good advice. And I said "But hang on Jaap, you told me that we weren't supposed to be directly involved in African politics?" So he said, "Well Peter, I wasn't, I wasn't involved. All I was doing was sticking a red-hot poker up their arses, that's all I was doing!"⁷³

van Velsen's reluctance to convincingly commit to supporting Zimbabwean nationalism infuriated Mackay. '[Mackay] is bitter about Jaap. "All this talk but what has he ever done - except slosh someone at a swimming pool and that probably did more harm than good," Reed noted.⁷⁴ van Velsen was similarly unimpressed by Mackay's zealous belief in martyrdom: 'Jaap speaks very stupidly of Peter. Going to jail was just a way of drawing attention to himself. After all, what good did it do.' Arrighi was similarly unconvinced, warning that: 'Peter will be a most dangerous influence in Lusaka' on the ZAPU government in exile. With all these vocal

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Peter Fry, interviewed by author (1 May 2015)

⁷⁴ Reed, 'Friday 5 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102

arguments and criticisms, it was unsurprising that Reed ended his diary entry on a frustrated note: 'I am very annoyed by all this.'⁷⁵

When fundamental disagreements were so prevalent, it is amazing that the white radicals interacted with one another at all. The explanation lies with the significance attached to separating ideological differences from personal relationships. As Peter Mackay explained:

It was possible in these times for political differences to breach personal friendships, such was the imperative of Africa's call to freedom. The cause came first and many among those serving it would fall out with each other over differences about the ways and means of doing so.⁷⁶

When Reed met Simpson Mutambanengwe (ZANU's Secretary for Foreign Affairs and a former student) in January 1965, their politics were laid aside. It was 'good to see Simpson and be able to talk. I hope we may be able to keep open a personal contact across the political division,' recorded Reed.⁷⁷ Outcast for their beliefs by white Rhodesian society, and further whittled down by deportations and restrictions, the necessity of preserving relationships despite personal differences was thus something of a necessity.

The importance of personal relationships also extended to the black nationalist leaders. In February 1965 and in response to the anti-white incidents in Malawi, Joshua Nkomo issued a statement.

We do not regard the Europeans as a separate entity, but as part and parcel of the population of the country. [...] Under the majority rule which he called for, they would be treated as individuals and exactly the same manner as every citizen of the country.⁷⁸

The primary targets of the statement were two visiting British officials, Arthur Bottomley (Labour MP and Commonwealth Relations Minister) and Gerald Gardiner

⁷⁵ Ibid.,

⁷⁶ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.282

⁷⁷ Reed, 'Thursday 14 January 1965', Diary, Vol.101

⁷⁸ 'Europeans are "part of population" - Nkomo', *Rhodesia Herald* (26 February 1965), p.1

(Lord Chancellor). Both were in Rhodesia to 'discuss matters with the government and meet a representative cross-section of opinion,'⁷⁹ and had met with Nkomo the day before and with ZANU's leadership on 1 March. Utilising the opportunity afforded by their brief removal from the isolated restriction of Wha Wha, Leopold Takawira made a passionate speech, pleading for white Rhodesians not to judge the Zimbabwean nationalists on the actions of Africans elsewhere. As the *Rhodesia Herald* reported, Takawira argued:

For the past 70 years the African had worked well with the European. The "excuse" that some Europeans were afraid of a majority government was not justified "because we cannot be judged by what happens outside our borders. We claim to be judged by our record."⁸⁰

Both Nkomo and Takawira's speeches were not well received by white Rhodesians. One individual highlighted previous declarations by Ndabaningi Sithole denouncing multi-racialism as directly refuting the current proclamations.⁸¹ Even some historians (notably J.R.T. Wood) have dismissed the statements as merely attempts to appease British sentiments.⁸² Yet the rhetoric of Nkomo and Takawira was completely in-keeping with the non-racialism publicly espoused since 1957 and as if to reaffirm this belief, Arrighi and Reed received an incredible welcome upon their arrival at Gonakudzingwa only a few days later. As Reed recorded with some amazement:

We wonder how exactly we shall know when we arrive at Vila Salazar [Gonakudzingwa]. After all there is no station building. But we need not have worried - for the train draws up in a tumult of bobbing skin hats and singing and we jump down into a great crowd of men, who gather round to shake our hands and help us to carry our luggage. [...] We had not sent any word that we were coming but we are already well enough known, and we walk back to the camp with Josiah Chinamano and Willie Musarurwa.⁸³

⁷⁹ Ian Smith, *Bitter Harvest: The Great Betrayal* (London, 2008), p.86

⁸⁰ 'Bottomley says he is seeking a peaceful transition to majority rule', *Rhodesia Herald* (2 March 1965), p.1

⁸¹ 'Judge us by our record', LTTE, *Rhodesia Herald* (8 March 1965), p.7

⁸² Wood, *So far and no further!*, p.280

⁸³ Reed, 'Tuesday 9 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102

As there were no press present to document their arrival and Reed had no incentive to exaggerate their reception in his diary, the question has to be asked to what British sentiments the restricted nationalists were appealing with such a display of affection? The obvious answer is that this was a genuine reaction to the arrival of two committed supporters of the nationalist cause, at a time when these people were few and far between. It was also a response to a very public demonstration that there were still white radicals who wanted to see majority rule established, despite the increasingly anti-white nationalist rhetoric.

However, Reed and Arrighi's visit was not solely a social one as such excursions provided an opportunity for visitors to carry with them correspondence from nationalists elsewhere. All involved recognised the importance of this mobility. '[Nkomo] directly asks Giovanni about the report, which apparently Giovanni mentioned to him that he was writing for Lusaka the last time he was here. We have not brought a copy of the report with us, because Lusaka told us not to. Giovanni says he will explain tomorrow.'⁸⁴ The report was one of a number of papers Arrighi, Reed, and van Velsen were asked to 'write on request or rewrite' for ZAPU during 1965, covering current events such as the Rhodesian negotiations with the British government or the likelihood of a UDI, and providing suggestions on how the nationalist struggle should proceed.⁸⁵

Nkomo also took the opportunity to ask Reed, 'before anything else [...] whether they [the nationalists] could expect any cooperation from any of the whites' in Rhodesia.'⁸⁶ This question left Reed confused. Apart from the small group of white radicals, most sympathisers had already come forward. '[Nkomo] did not seem happy with my answer that there was no considerable group among the Europeans that could possibly be looked to for help.'⁸⁷ The reason for this incident was clarified the following month when Willie Musarurwa (Nkomo's aide) wrote to Eileen

⁸⁴ Reed, 'Tuesday 9 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁸⁵ Reed, 'A recollection', p.8

⁸⁶ Reed, 'Friday 30 April 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁸⁷ Ibid.

Haddon, asking her to try and approach any whites who would be willing to 'find some common ground' with the nationalists and encourage them to make the trip to meet with the ZAPU leadership. Already Nkomo had met with Hardwicke Holderness and Robert Tredgold, as well as Ahrn Palley (the independent MP for Highfields).⁸⁸ Reed observed the likely reason for this political gambit.

It occurs to me that Bottomley may have told Nkomo that he has got to ally himself in some way with the other forces in the country which are opposed to Smith. [...] Eileen thinks that at Gona[kudzingwa] they are now quite out of touch with feeling among Europeans and seeing no other way out, have felt driven to try and make an alliance with whatever opposition to the Rhodesia Front they can find among the whites.⁸⁹

The timing of this drive so soon after the British visit suggests that this search was brought about at the behest of the British government. A multi-racial alliance involving ZAPU would relieve the concerns of Harold Wilson's government who were 'appalled' about 'the latest events in the Congo where Belgian paratroops and white mercenaries had assisted local troops in [...] freeing white hostages.'⁹⁰ Reed and Haddon thought as much and said so to the nationalists at the start of May and the response by Musarurwa is arguably one of the most significant documents for understanding race and citizenship in mid-1960's Zimbabwean nationalism.

As I said in my last letter we need European support. This is not a sudden realisation; right from the outset we tried our best to get European support. Our country is different from many former colonies in that it has a settled European population, many of whom were born and bred here and are true Zimbabweans. It is important we convince Britain that we don't stand for African interests alone but for the rights of all Zimbabweans. European support is also important to convince our people right now that this battle is not against the white people, and our intention is not to drive away Europeans, but to establish basic rights for all.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Wood, *So Far*, p.409

⁸⁹ Reed, 'Friday 30 April 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁹⁰ Wood, *So far*, p.256

⁹¹ Willie Musarurwa to Eileen Haddon, Letter, 18 May 1965, Box 86, Terence Ranger Papers, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

Musarurwa's letter contained several important points, especially the recognition that the racial aspect of Zimbabwean nationalism had to be addressed. The apparent acceptance of non-black people in the post-independence Zimbabwean nation demonstrated a pragmatism to the specific racial context of Rhodesian society and the settler population. For Nkomo and ZAPU to recognise that non-black individuals would have to be included in the nation-building efforts was notable. Nevertheless, this remained a private letter between personal acquaintances, aimed at reassuring two respected white radicals that the movement they supported was not racist. The words on one of the African leaders did not always translate into party policy and consequently Reed dismissed much of the letter, noting that 'from this it looks as if the move to gain Europeans support is considered and serious, even if it does not reflect a fundamental change in policy.'⁹²

However, ZAPU's search for non-black support also ensured that the white radicals remained in the angry gaze of the RF. At the Salisbury Ex-Servicemen Association's annual dinner in March 1965, the guest of honour was Desmond Lardner-Burke (the Minister for Law and Order) who delivered a surprisingly explicit speech condemning white involvement with Zimbabwean nationalism.

It is not a native African movement. It is a communist movement, a Red movement led by certain residents in this nation of all races and their Peking and Moscow masters [...] We have banned those organisations intent on overthrowing a democratic government through violent means - and restricted those who instigated the violence - but the disturbances in the townships have not abated. The reason is simple. Those involved are still out there and escape punishment because they use others to do the real work whilst they hide behind university walls and welfare and aid groups.⁹³

Although the condemnation was explicit, the anti-communist rhetoric was routine by this point. Besides the fact that some radicals were openly leftist and ZAPU and

⁹² Reed, 'Thursday 27 May 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁹³ 'Minister welcomed to Annual Dinner', *Newsletter of the Salisbury Ex-Servicemen Association* (13 March 1965), No.18, p.1, in the possession of Roland Letchworth-Mills, Cape Town, South Africa

ZANU both had association with the Soviets and Chinese, respectively, the pairing of African nationalism with Communism was deliberate. As Sue Onslow explains, there were attempts to portray Rhodesia as being at 'the cutting edge of the struggle against Communism and a stalwart trying to uphold Western civilised standards', and consequently to unify white (and international) support behind the RF.⁹⁴ Fears of Communism were tied into the apparent brutality of African rule elsewhere in very effective propaganda,⁹⁵ as Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo explain.

Anti-communist rhetoric and propaganda was used by RF politicians to undercut the democratic space of the liberal element of the white community. It was a means to maintain the solidarity of the European population, and was used as a tool to transcend race.⁹⁶

Whether the radicals were actually Communist was irrelevant. What mattered was the accusation. Being labelled a Communist guaranteed that any opposition to the RF could be painted as being anti-Western and therefore anti-civilisation. Combined with the well-known activities of the SACP to the south, the accusations were enough to divert the messages any white radicals were seeking to get across. Yet not all of the white radicals were truly concerned. After attending a meeting of the Current Affairs Association with Arrighi and Axel Sommerfelt in April, Reed noted wryly: 'Josiah Chinamano is speaking. A large number of African students and a sprinkling of Europeans. I find it all very boring. The innocent nationalist, friend to all. Perhaps I am a communist as Lardner-Burke says.'⁹⁷

Nevertheless, the growing attention being paid to the white radicals was concerning, particularly for Reed.

⁹⁴ Sue Onslow, 'The Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Conflict, 1974-1980', paper presented at the Oral History Conference: Southern Africa and the Cold War, Post-1974, Monash University, 29-31 January 2009

⁹⁵ Donal Lowry, 'The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca.1920s-1980', *Cold War History*, Vol.7, No.2 (2007), pp.169-194

⁹⁶ Raftopoulos & Mlambo, *Becoming Zimbabwe*, p.xxiv

⁹⁷ Reed, 'Tuesday 27 April 1965', Diary, Vol.102

I wonder whether I have ever seriously faced up to the chance of disaster - getting restricted or, more likely and much worse, sent to jail. Life is often almost insupportable even now. Yet still I drift on from day to day - just keeping up, managing more or less to discharge the days requirements.⁹⁸

As events in the summer of 1965 would prove, the chances of disaster were beginning to mount.

iii. Elections and repression:

The announcement that a general election was to be held in May 1965 forced the Zimbabwean nationalists and their non-black supporters to assess the future struggle. Discussing the election with the Clutton-Brocks at their Cold Comfort Farm, Reed found them already thinking how best the nationalists could utilise the election.

We sit in the descending sun on old car seats and Molly serves tall beakers of tea and slices of ginger cake [...] Guy at least doesn't believe the nationalists ought to take part in the elections - or at least I think he does not believe they ought not for strategic purposes to do something they do not really believe in. But he sees no point in attempting to face the present regime with violence, and talks about the need to go round and effect a change of heart in the whites.⁹⁹

Clutton-Brock's suggestion to ignore the election was taken to heart by the ZAPU leadership with Nkomo stating on 2 April 1965 that 'as far as we are concerned, it does not exist'. Neither ZANU nor ZAPU put forward any candidates.¹⁰⁰ A last minute suggestion by Eileen Haddon that 'since this is a white man's constitution, B-roll blacks should not vote for black men but white men' and fifteen liberal whites should therefore run for the B-roll seats ('15 Palleys in 15 Highfields', as Reed noted) was rejected by Nkomo.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Reed, 'Tuesday 16 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102

⁹⁹ Reed, 'Sunday 21 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹⁰⁰ "'Election does not exist"- Nkomo', *Rhodesia Herald* (2 April 1965), p.1

¹⁰¹ Reed, 'Wednesday 31 March 1965', Diary, Vol.102. Palley referring to Ahrn Palley, the independent liberal-minded MP.

However, a protest organised by UCRN students on the eve of the election demonstrated that not all nationalist supporters were ignoring the election entirely. As Ian Smith tried to address a meeting at the Rhodesia Memorial Hall in Salisbury, he was heckled by a crowd of about forty students. Most of the protesting students were black (leading RF supporters to shout 'go back to the bush') but a small number were white and as the heckling continued, Smith announced that 'he could see that while the majority of the students were African, they were being led by Europeans.'¹⁰² The only protestors arrested were three white men and a white woman, and the trial of two of these (an English UCRN student couple named Roger and Laura Farmworth) remained in the news for some weeks. Eventually found guilty, the couple were fined and deported but their supposed role as leaders of the protest was dismissed by the magistrate.¹⁰³

Despite such disruptions, the election continued unabated. Yet the scale of the RF victory was surprising even to its most optimistic supporters. Winning all fifty A-roll seats with an unprecedented 79.3% of the vote, the RF cemented its position as the ruling party in the nation.¹⁰⁴ Ahrn Palley was one of five independents to win a B-roll seat, including an Asian, and ten African candidates,¹⁰⁵ whilst the only coloured MP (George Raftopoulos) lost his seat.¹⁰⁶ The RF's victory marked an end for multi-racialism. In a symbolic example of this demise, Garfield Todd had attempted to meet with Ian Smith in June utilising 'a convention that former premiers could from time to time call on their successors for discussions', but was refused an audience.¹⁰⁷ Both the CAS and the IASR officially disbanded that same month.¹⁰⁸ 'The Capricorn African Society had failed in its call for a common patriotism and the

¹⁰² 'Four whites held by police after disturbance at Smith's meeting', *Rhodesia Herald* (7 May 1965), p.1

¹⁰³ 'Student couple convicted', *Rhodesia Herald* (9 June 1965), p.3

¹⁰⁴ Hintz, 'The Political Transformation', p.173

¹⁰⁵ Wood, *So Far*, p.311

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Judith Todd, *Through the Darkness: A Life in Zimbabwe* (Cape Town, 2007), p.12

¹⁰⁸ Hancock, *White liberals*, p.123

Interracial Association had been unable to inspire a communal sense of sharing,' explained Mackay.¹⁰⁹

The electoral result also had a huge impact on the mental state of the white radicals. In mid-May, Reed travelled to Lusaka with Arrighi, taking various letters and papers to the ZAPU leadership from Gonakudzingwa. On his return, he wrote an unusually pessimistic diary entry.

Although at Lusaka all seemed to go well, I have been deeply depressed ever since. Partly I am afraid. I am frightened of being sent to jail. I find in myself no real determination, no courage. Nothing can carry me through this except indecision. I know when it is too late I shall have nothing but regrets. Partly a hatred of violence, or rather a horror, a drawing back and though I might be glad to discover I have no love of violence it is so closely associated with the recognition of my own cowardice that these two seem to me only aspects of the same thing: all that is good - or all this is in my character of which I with my character approve, and all that is weak and despicable seem to spring from a simple and compelling desire: what can I call it but the desire for quiet. To be uninvolved, unanxious, unconcerned. To stay at home in the evening and read a book. To be my own master but to exercise mastery not in assertion but in withdrawal.¹¹⁰

Yet he added, with typical self-diminishment of his contributions, 'I have always forced myself to get involved; I have not stayed at home of nights.'¹¹¹ Participation by the non-black radicals was neither easy nor expected. It took great effort to continue to act when not wanted by a majority of the nationalist leadership, persecuted by the state, and outcast from their own society. To potentially lose one's job, one's liberty, and even one's life (as Frederick John Harris did) in the name of a struggle in which you are not fully included required strength.

Now buttressed by their mandate from the white Rhodesian population, the RF adopted 'frantic efforts to silence the African nationalist opinion and voice by every available means, while carrying out a Nazi-like brain washing campaign

¹⁰⁹ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.70

¹¹⁰ Reed, 'Monday 24 May 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹¹¹ Ibid.,

among the population'.¹¹² The widespread detentions of nationalist leaders (including Ndabaningi Sithole¹¹³) as well as a fundamental change in access to the restricted nationalists, were accompanied by the declaration of a State of Emergency in the two rural areas containing restriction camps.¹¹⁴ All visitors were banned from Gonakudzingwa and any large meetings were prohibited within the five separate camps which comprised the restriction area.¹¹⁵

Both Reed and Arrighi had returned from Gonakudzingwa only that morning to find the UCRN in a state of uproar. Highlighting the confusion of such events, a very confused Reed recorded in his diary:

I am puzzled to find some of the drawers of my desk are empty [...] Then G[iovanni] comes in to tell me that there has been a panic in our absence - Sisa [Arrighi] on hearing the one o'clock news yesterday naturally assumed we would run into the police unexpectedly and especially feared that they would find the paper on economic planning. She goes to Richard [Whitaker] and Axel [Sommerfelt]. Together they get into my office very fast and take away anything that might interest the police - in case we have both been arrested.¹¹⁶

Reed was more than grateful: 'It is remarkable what careful friends we have.'¹¹⁷ Others were not so fortunate. Leo Baron (Joshua Nkomo's 'wonderful lawyer and good friend'¹¹⁸) was restricted to Bulawayo for twelve months.¹¹⁹ As with the restrictions of other whites, Baron's case generated more attention than the thousands

¹¹² Transos Makombe to Terence Ranger, Letter, 20 May 1965, quoted in Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.170

¹¹³ See 'Sithole is restricted for 5 years', *Rhodesia Herald* (21 May 1965), p.1; Wason, *Banned*, p.60; Chengetai J.M. Zvogbo, *A History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript: Zimbabwe, 2001-2008* (Newcastle, 2009), p.119

¹¹⁴ 'Card issued by Nkomo is banned', *Rhodesia Herald* (22 May 1965), p.1; Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.125, pp.124-125; 'State of Emergency declared in Nuanetsi and Lupani areas', *Rhodesia Herald* (29 May 1965), p.1

¹¹⁵ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.125

¹¹⁶ Reed, 'Saturday 29 May 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.122

¹¹⁹ 'Baron has week to make appeal', *Rhodesia Herald* (31 May 1965), p.1

of restricted black Africans.¹²⁰ In an interview with the South African *The Star*, Baron stated angrily:

The order against me is absolutely nonsensical. The restriction order says it is based on the belief that I have actively assisted in activities prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order in Rhodesia. My only actions have been strictly legal. I have been Mr. Nkomo's legal advisor for many years.¹²¹

Many white Rhodesians assumed that Baron's restriction was an attempt by the government to prevent legal but confrontational activities. A *Herald* editorial entitled 'What has he done?' called for the Minister of Law and Order to provide evidence as to 'how he justifies such grave action against a servant of the Courts.' It continued:

Mr. Baron claims that some of his submissions have been successful, but "can hardly think" that the Minister regards such successes as being prejudicial to law and order. "Naturally" to think otherwise would be to suggest that the Minister is attempting to intimidate the Courts by issuing a not-so-roundabout warning that judicial insistence on upholding the Law will be construed by the Executive as prejudicial to Order, and punishable.¹²²

Discussing the situation with Eileen Haddon, Reed noted: 'it goes with the expounded theory that what the government is above all afraid of is constitutional activity by Africans or on their behalf. This is why Leo Baron has been restricted and why Michael and herself [Eileen] were restricted from visiting Gonakudzingwa.'¹²³ Evidently annoyed by the publicity Baron's case had received, a speech to Parliament on 10 June saw Desmond Lardner-Burke explicitly warn 'Nkomo's white backers' that their activities would not be permitted for much longer, regardless of the legality of their activities.

The actions of certain members of this country of all races has compelled me to sign restriction orders against them to maintain law and order. Others from all

¹²⁰ Nevertheless, the *Rhodesia Herald* still erroneously claimed that Baron was the first white person restricted in Rhodesia.

¹²¹ 'Smith's police swoop on Nkomo's men', *The Star* (30 May 1965), p.1

¹²² 'Editorial: What has he done?', *Rhodesia Herald* (31 May 1965), p.8

¹²³ Reed, 'Saturday 19 June 1965', Diary, Vol.102

walks of life – including individuals at our university – are constantly coming before our notice because of their subversive activities. Legitimate political activity is one thing – and is welcomed by the Government – but subversion which threatens the security of our country, is quite another matter and will not be tolerated. This is a warning to those involved.¹²⁴

A clamp-down was expected imminently. Over lunch with Axel Sommerfelt and the Arrighis, Reed discussed the possibilities of restriction or arrest and the likelihood that a number of them would soon be in jail.¹²⁵ A visit to Guy Clutton-Brock saw Reed receive advice from the former detainee for when he was arrested: "You must try and educate these fellows [the police]," [Clutton-Brock] says. "They haven't really got much of a clue you know what motivates a chap like you."¹²⁶ The following weekend, Eileen Haddon and Reed sat 'drinking coffee and brandy and contemplating the unpleasantness of going to jail; Eileen for publishing some subversive thing in the *Examiner*, and myself, well for putting a foot wrong somewhere.'¹²⁷

iv. "Petals in a flower": The Roles of Non-Black Radicals

Lardner-Burke's sweeping warning highlighted that even more reserved white radicals were at risk. Ahrn Palley (the liberal MP) was particularly troubled. A former multi-racialist, Palley and his wife Clair (a legal scholar) had previously been vocal critics of the nationalists and had condemned the 'radical' NDP: 'the danger of the political philosophy preached by these organisations to the untutored masses of this country lies in their belief in political violence rather than constitutional political development,' Palley had declared in 1959.¹²⁸ By 1965, however, Palley was a supporter of African nationalism insofar as it was non-violent and operated legally. His vocal support in Parliament for ZAPU forced the RF's more nefarious activities

¹²⁴ 'Nkomo's white backers warned', *Rhodesia Herald* (11 June 1965), p.2

¹²⁵ Reed, 'Friday 11 June 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹²⁶ Reed, 'Saturday 12 June 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹²⁷ Reed, 'Saturday 19 June 1965', Diary, Vol.102

¹²⁸ Hansard, Vol.42 1959 (col.2028/9)

into the public sphere 'without resorting to un-civilised means,' in the words of one white Rhodesian.¹²⁹ His public image also shed light on Zimbabwean nationalism to the Rhodesian public. As Morris Hirsch explains, 'he gave African Nationalism respectability, but alone amongst this group of its supporters, although resented, he came to be admired by White Rhodesians as well as the Africans for whom he fought.'¹³⁰ (Ian Smith would later describe Palley as 'one of the most able politicians this country has produced', adding that 'although our political philosophies did not coincide, we always respected one another and maintained friendly relations.'¹³¹)

Much like the black Rhodesian MPs, Palley is frequently written out of Zimbabwean nationalism as a liberal sympathiser whose participation in Rhodesian politics only legitimised the state. Joshua Nkomo makes only one mention of Palley in his autobiography and passes no comment on his contributions.¹³² Others including Garfield Todd, Diana Mitchell, Terence Ranger, and even Eileen Haddon are also regularly rejected as being radicals, despite their often-significant contributions to the struggle. In 2003, Rob Sacco (father to ZANU-PF's last white MP) condemned Mitchell, Ranger, and Haddon for 'their ineffectual lack of any real commitment to a Zimbabwe that exists for the comfort of all its people, not simply for that of whites, liberal or otherwise.' He went on:

As has been questioned in the press recently, how many whites did fight for the Patriotic Front during the war of liberation? And how many of these fought for an African nationalist agenda? The answer to the latter question is perhaps three: Jeremy Brickhill, John Conradie and Clutton-Brock. Where were the rest? And where are they now?¹³³

¹²⁹ Cathy Buckle, interviewed by author (5 December 2015)

¹³⁰ Morris I. Hirsch, *A Decade of Crisis: Ten Years of Rhodesian Front Rule* (Salisbury, 1973), p.40

¹³¹ Smith, *Bitter Harvest*, p.47

¹³² Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.105

¹³³ Rob Sacco, 'Trevor Grundy article was trash, why publish it?', [theindependent.co.zw](http://www.theindependent.co.zw), <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2003/11/28/trevor-grundy-article-was-trash-why-publish-it/> (accessed 12 November 2015)

When I asked the Zimbabwean-Indian academic Hasu Patel about such attitudes, his reply was a cautious rebuttal:

I think it is a bit unfair. It's just that we had different degrees and different ways of supporting, not all of them were necessarily critical, but they all came together, like petals in a flower - each petal in itself means nothing but when you put the whole thing together as a flower it makes sense.¹³⁴

In the context of late 1965, the analogy of petals in a flower is particularly apt. Whilst Ahrn Palley continued to criticise the RF in Parliament over a number of pertinent issues, others were variously assisting the nationalists. Guy Clutton-Brock was at the centre of things; 'busy in the common front - now trying to bring the 15 black MPs and Nationalists together', reported Reed at the start of August.¹³⁵ The South African John Conradie (newly appointed UCRN lecturer in history) began making frequent journeys between Salisbury, Lusaka, and Dar es Salaam whilst working on a thesis pertaining to Zimbabwean nationalism from 1935-1962.¹³⁶ Conradie utilised the visits to interview prominent nationalists to act as 'a courier between resistance groups in Harare and the ZAPU leadership in Lusaka'.¹³⁷ The increasingly radical Garfield Todd engaged himself in communications with nationalist leaders, notably James Chikerema in Lusaka to whom Todd paid a brief visit.¹³⁸

Peter Mackay, meanwhile, was engaged in ferrying people, goods, and messages across central Africa in his work with the Zambian International Refugee Council and various nationalist groups. It was this period which earned him the title 'the warden of Freedom Road,' as one of his former passengers emphatically titled him.¹³⁹ Armed with his trusty 'two-ton' Land-Rover purchased second-hand with

¹³⁴ Hasu Patel, interviewed by author (8 December 2015 and 12 December 2015)

¹³⁵ Reed, 'Sunday 1 August 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹³⁶ This thesis would unfortunately never be completed due to Conradie's arrest in 1966.

¹³⁷ Patrick van Rensburg, 'Obituary: John Andrew Conradie, Liberation War Hero in Zimbabwe', *SARE with EWP* (August 1993), Vol.3, p.85

¹³⁸ Wood, *So Far*, p.397

¹³⁹ Tonic Shambati, interviewed by author (12 March 2016)

funds raised by the refugee council, Mackay would regularly cross the Zambezi on the 'freedom ferry' at Kazungula, where Botswana, Rhodesia, Zambia, and Namibia all met.¹⁴⁰ Mackay provides a modest yet entertaining account of these activities in his memoirs, but it is only a snapshot of the significant contributions these trips made to the African struggles across southern and central Africa.¹⁴¹ In contrast to his academic friends, [Mackay was] a highly practical individual, capable of stripping down an engine when that was required just as he had been able to put together a printing press and make it work,' explains John McCracken,¹⁴² and it is this 'romantic adventurer' identity that partly explains the conflict between Mackay and the other white radicals.¹⁴³

Vocal elements of the Church in Rhodesia were also demonstrating support for the nationalists, although the majority were still critical of violence. The Bishop of Matabeleland compared the situation in Rhodesia to that of pre-war Europe and cautioned his congregation to 'remember what happened came through the complacency of the many good, decent Christian folk as much as through the deliberate evil of the few.'¹⁴⁴ In a speech to the Rhodesian National Affairs Association, Stanley Mark Wood (the Anglican Dean of Salisbury) stated that even practising Christians were on the side of nationalists, although they abhorred their methods.

Nationalism is not just a political thing, although it has a political end product. But it is something that has risen now in the heart of Africa, and it has risen out of great shame. [...] All Christians share this distaste for discrimination, for subjugation of one man by another, and so understand African nationalism for its pursuit of universal justice.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ McCracken, 'Peter Mackay', p.5

¹⁴¹ For an account of his activities during this period, see Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, pp.272-279

¹⁴² McCracken, 'Peter Mackay', p.5

¹⁴³ Ranger, *Writing Revolt*, p.165

¹⁴⁴ Quoted in Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.158

¹⁴⁵ 'Nationalism big problem for Church', *Rhodesia Herald* (31 July 1965), p.3

The significance of such a statement from a senior figure in the Anglican Church is difficult to gauge. Many black nationalists saw the Church in Rhodesia as being too closely associated with the white state and likely to be a 'stumbling block' for the African cause.¹⁴⁶ 'Nine out of ten nationalist leaders have been educated at mission schools, and owe a great deal to missionaries; yet nearly all would say today that they mistrust the Church as a whole,' Nathan Shamuyarira explained.¹⁴⁷

Although less than ten per cent of white Rhodesians routinely attended Church services, the RF's frequent use of 'the term Christianity to delineate or justify a secular world which was anti-communist, democratic, and civilized (that is, White ruled)' meant a statement of support for the African nationalists by the Church was afforded attention.¹⁴⁸ Guy Clutton-Brock recognised the impact of such challenges to Rhodesian society. 'The enemy front, feared, widens beyond African nationalists to include "communists", "terrorists" and "hippies". These are spied in the ranks of big business, liberals, Christians, socialists, in the government circles of Britain and America and in the United Nations and the World Council of Churches.'¹⁴⁹ Judith Todd similarly noted:

Liberals, communists, the heads of commerce and industry, African nationalists, the Press, the Church, the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the BBC, the United States of America, Russia, China, the University College, traitors, quislings and an endless list of other groups and individuals had all been subjected to the wrath of the Rhodesian Front government.¹⁵⁰

In the face of vocal support from prominent individuals, the RF were quick to make clear that African nationalism and its supporters were under control in Rhodesia and the 'turmoil of independent black Africa would not be arriving any time soon'.¹⁵¹ On 21 July, Ian Smith stated 'there seemed to be a sense of disillusionment among the

¹⁴⁶ Mutasa, *Black Behind Bars*, p.123. See also Carl F. Hallencreutz, & Ambrose M. Moyo, eds., *Church and State in Zimbabwe* (Gweru, 1988)

¹⁴⁷ Shamuyarira, *Crisis in Rhodesia*, p.141

¹⁴⁸ Godwin & Hancock, '*Rhodesians Never Die*', p.44

¹⁴⁹ Clutton-Brock, *Cold Comfort Confronted*, p.112

¹⁵⁰ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.160

¹⁵¹ Wood, *So Far*, p.334

forces of nationalism because the revolution they had expected to take place (in Rhodesia) had just not materialised. They were now, in spite of themselves, inclining to the idea that independence was an evolutionary process.'¹⁵² A few days later, P.K. van der Byl (Parliamentary Secretary for Information) declared that the Land Apportionment Act would never be abolished, despite the hatred many Africans had for it.¹⁵³ On 24 August, the trial of Nathaniel Nyagomo (a ZAPU/PCC member) saw the court told that 'the wearing of fur hats and the carrying of certain types of walking sticks were symbols of membership of the banned People's Caretaker Council.'¹⁵⁴ In response, Dave Tippetts (a BSAP officer at Gonakudzingwa) confiscated all items he could find including 'two walking sticks which were intended as gifts to Garfield Todd, the former Prime Minister who now supported the Africans, and whose daughter visited the restrictees several times.'¹⁵⁵ (Tippetts also recalls how 'some [visitors] we gave "confused" directions on how to find the camp. Some - unfortunately - never found it.'¹⁵⁶)

Despite the confiscation of walking sticks, Zimbabwean nationalism proved hard to fully subdue. The UCRN in particular remained a 'thorn in the side of the extremist sections of the ruling Rhodesian Front Party, who consider it a hotbed of liberalism and communism'.¹⁵⁷ What troubled the RF most was seeing the openly nationalist students and faculty going largely unpunished. Nondo Mbuwa (a UCRN student between 1964-67) remembered: 'we protested every week against the government. But we were students and it seemed they [the government] just accepted that that was part of having a university.'¹⁵⁸ On 27 August 1965, this toleration

¹⁵² 'Nationalist disillusion apparent', *Rhodesia Herald* (21 July 1965), p.1

¹⁵³ Wood, *So Far*, p.338

¹⁵⁴ 'Fur Hats, Sticks said to show membership of banned organisations', *Rhodesia Herald* (24 August 1965), p.1

¹⁵⁵ Dave Tippetts, *Fearful Odds: A Personal Account of Rhodesia's Struggle* (N.P., 2013), loc.1210

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, loc.1315

¹⁵⁷ 'Mass walk-out of students: Governor snubbed in Salisbury', *Sunday Times* (3 October 1965)

¹⁵⁸ Nondo Mbuwa, interviewed by author (8 December 2015)

ended. A Ministry of Education circular was distributed to all faculty members of the university entitled 'Conditions Governing the Award of Government Scholarships, Grants or Loans'. As John Reed described:

This sets out a declaration which from 1966 students selected for Gov. grants will have to sign. In this they acknowledge financial assistance from the Gov. precludes them for [sp.] taking part in political activities outside their University of College, and undertake a) not to join a political party b) canvass c) display posters or wear political badges etc.¹⁵⁹

In the following days, the motivation behinds this strategy was explained by Arthur Smith (the Minister for Education). 'If they bite the hand that feeds them, they must expect what comes,' he told the *Sunday Mail*.¹⁶⁰ Although supposedly indiscriminate, the Minister's statement did not 'suggest the restriction was going to be impartially operated,' as John Reed noted.¹⁶¹

In a way this will hit European students harder than Africans - after all there are legal political parties they can join. [...] Though I suppose it is not likely that a student will lose his grant for sporting an RF favour or asking a sympathetic question at one of Mr. Smith's meetings.¹⁶²

Nondo Mbuwa willingly signed the document: 'I did not hesitate. The choice was to complete my studies or be made to leave. And I was still a member of ZAPU, so long as I didn't get caught!'¹⁶³ Nevertheless, the intended intimidation was clear and the Association of University Teachers was quick to issue a statement condemning the new policy as interfering with the universal rights of free speech and the freedom of political expression.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Reed, 'Friday 27 August 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁶⁰ 'Sign the Pledge or....', *Sunday Mail* (29 August 1965), p.1

¹⁶¹ Reed, 'Sunday 29 August 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁶² Reed, 'Friday 27 August 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁶³ Nondo Mbuwa, interviewed by author (8 December 2015)

¹⁶⁴ 'Lecturers condemn politics pledge', *The Star* (2 September 1965)

Although staff politics had not explicitly been touched, many radical lecturers assessed where they now stood. On 30 September, Reed and Arrighi discussed the problem at length.

What we have to decide if we are not arrested is whether we keep ourselves out of trouble in order to be able to go on living in the country and helping when the opportunity arises, or whether some kind of futile gesture has to be made with the immediate result of expulsion or incarceration.¹⁶⁵

Reed noted bitterly that neither option particularly appealed to him: 'Rhodesia is now, I believe, my home. But if I want to stay here I shall have I suppose to renounce my British passport and my British citizenship - perhaps forever? And probably affirm my loyalty to a government that I don't recognize.'¹⁶⁶

In October 1965, the issue of British citizenship was a particularly topical one. Since the RF's victory in the May election, Ian Smith's cabinet had been engaged in almost endless negotiations with the British government over the question of independence.¹⁶⁷ By October it appeared that a UDI was inevitable.¹⁶⁸ Harold Wilson's Labour government had made clear that their policy of 'No Independence Before Majority Rule' was non-negotiable, yet they also emphasised that they would not intervene militarily in the case of a UDI.¹⁶⁹ In protest against British equivocation, on 2 October some 200 UCRN students (including black, white and Indian men and women) 'deliberately snubbed the Governor [...] when he rose to

¹⁶⁵ Reed, '30 September 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ See Wood, *So Far*, for the most detailed account of these negotiations.

¹⁶⁸ Carl Peter Watts, 'The Rhodesian Crisis in British and International Politics, 1964-1965', Ph.D., University of Birmingham, 2006, p.108

¹⁶⁹ See Joshua Pritchard, "'Bulawayo or Bust!': The British Press and Public Opposition to Military Action Against Rhodesia, 11-18 November 1965', paper presented at the Contemporary History Society Workshop, University of Cambridge, October 2014; Richard Coggins, 'Wilson and Rhodesia: UDI and British Policy Towards Africa', *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2006), pp.363-381; and Philip Murphy, "'An Intricate and Distasteful Subject": British Planning for the Use of Force Against the European Settlers of Central Africa, 1952-1965', *English Historical Review*, Vol. 121, No.492 (2006), pp.746-777

make the closing speech at the annual presentation ceremony.¹⁷⁰ Immediately following the walk-out, a gathering of black, Asian, Indian, coloured, and several white students gathered on campus and 'for the first time at the College [...] sang the African nationalist song.'¹⁷¹ When Stephen Taylor (the white president of the Student Union) condemned the actions as 'puerile',¹⁷² the non-white members of the Student Representative and Activities Councils resigned and proclaimed their support for ZAPU and ZANU.¹⁷³

In retaliation for the white radical's continued defiance, on 18 October Garfield Todd was restricted to his farm near Shabani for one year. Although still a moderate radical, Todd's transition since leaving the Prime Ministership was remarkable. As Morris Hirsch described, 'now [Todd] was a devotee of African majority rule, inevitable and just,'¹⁷⁴ and had been due to travel to Edinburgh University to speak against UDI (although the RF denied that the restriction had anything to do with Todd's anti-independence attitude).¹⁷⁵ The *Zimbabwe Review* (ZAPU's newspaper in London) was quick to note the coincidental timing in their message of support: 'Mr. Garfield Todd, a former Premier of Rhodesia and a strong supporter of one man, one vote and ZAPU was ruthlessly placed under restriction yesterday by fascist Ian Smith, only a few hours before he was due to board a plane for Britain.'¹⁷⁶ The restriction order instead informed Todd it was 'based on the belief that you have associated yourself with the leaders of an unlawful organisation, the

¹⁷⁰ 'Mass walk-out of students: Governor snubbed in Salisbury', *Sunday Times* (3 October 1965). The Governor was Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Queen's official representative in Rhodesia. See Alan Megahey, *Humphrey Gibbs: Beleaguered Governor. Southern Rhodesia, 1929-1969* (Basingstoke, 1998)

¹⁷¹ Gelfand, *Non-Racial Island*, p.253

¹⁷² 'Student's divided over Gibbs protest', *Natal Mercury* (3 October 1965)

¹⁷³ Dean Sanders, quoted in, Gelfand, *A Non-Racial Island*, p.253

¹⁷⁴ Hirsch, *A Decade of Crisis*, p.41

¹⁷⁵ Wood, *So Far*, p.397

¹⁷⁶ 'Smith Places Todd Under Restriction', *Zimbabwe Review* (18 October 1965)

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU),' and had recently 'visited Zambia to get in touch with people aiding and abetting saboteurs.'¹⁷⁷

Naturally, there was a significant outcry from global liberal elements. As the South African newspaper *The Star* noted, 'the decision to place Mr. Garfield Todd under restriction is unlikely to cause White Rhodesians nearly as much concern as it will arouse overseas.'¹⁷⁸ Even Ian Smith noted that they had 'lost some ground' with the international community by restricting Todd.¹⁷⁹ The only reason why the RF felt comfortable to restrict Todd given the unfavourable reception was best summarised by the *Zimbabwe Review*. 'This looks like a prelude to UDI. If it is, then all white liberals as well as Africans are in for a rude time'.¹⁸⁰ As if to reaffirm the point, on 22 October, R.K. Naik (the Indian radical and ZAPU's national counsellor) was released from Gonakudzingwa but immediately restricted to his home in Bulawayo.¹⁸¹

The RF now seemed to be operating without concern for British demands, as was made evident when Harold Wilson made a last-ditch effort to secure a compromise on majority rule with the nationalists in late October.¹⁸² The nationalists had thus far been unrelenting in their demand for majority rule and no transition period and Wilson's meeting with Nkomo and Leo Baron (acting as ZAPU's legal advisor) resulted in a photograph of the three in which the uncomfortable atmosphere is palpable.¹⁸³ The white radicals were equally unimpressed with the British response to the Rhodesian situation. 'Too little, too late' read a sign at what would turn out to be one of the final peaceful actions of the white radicals, a pro-ZAPU demonstration organised by Giovanni Arrighi, Eileen Haddon, and Enoch Dumbutshena to mark

¹⁷⁷ Wood, *So Far*, p.397

¹⁷⁸ 'Mr. Todd', *The Star* (18 October 1965); Nondo Mbuwa, interviewed by author (8 December 2015)

¹⁷⁹ Wood, *So Far*, p.417

¹⁸⁰ 'Smith Places Todd Under Restriction', *Zimbabwe Review* (18 October 1965)

¹⁸¹ 'Naik Under House Arrest', *Zimbabwe Review* (23 October 1965)

¹⁸² Nkomo, *The Story of My Life*, p.128

¹⁸³ 'Today and Tomorrow may be vital for negotiated independence', *Rhodesia Herald* (28 October 1965)

Wilson's arrival.¹⁸⁴ The protest ended when a police dog attacked a white female UCRN student 'because she was singing African freedom songs', leading Dumbutshena to note that even having white friends was now dangerous and demonstrating how violence was becoming an intrinsic part of nationalist activities.¹⁸⁵

A couple of days after the demonstration, Arrighi admitted to Reed that 'his opinions have changed [...] There is no real resolution among the Africans. [...] Nkomo must compromise with Wilson - accept 5 years, 10 years before African rule, so long as the period of waiting is not under Smith or the whites here.'¹⁸⁶ The assessment by the politically-astute Arrighi left Reed lamenting the missed opportunity for the nationalists to assert themselves as an important political ally to the British.

We must accept that there has been an absolute failure. The Nationalists have neatly succeeded in doing the worst for themselves. They have impressed Wilson now as well as Bottomley before with their weakness and their lack of realism. Instead of bargaining, showing flexibility and cunning to Wilson, they have shown their own staunchness in the demand that **he should act and rescue them**. The chance that was surely there for them to clench something with Wilson behind Smith's back they have completely lost. Instead of relinquishing 'one man, one vote' for any period of time that Wilson wished to say yes, provided that the interim was under something other than the absolute power of the RF - they have antagonised the Labour Government, made themselves absurd, achieved nothing. How delighted Smith must be after all that Wilson spent so much time with them.¹⁸⁷

Wilson's departure at the start of November indicated that negotiations with both the RF and the nationalists had failed. On 5 November, a State of Emergency was declared. 'The regulations governing the emergency stripped the last vestiges of

¹⁸⁴ "Organisation of Anti-Government Demonstrations", cabinet discussion of report produced by Special Branch Headquarters, Salisbury, 13 Nov 1965, R.C.(S)(65)321, 18 Nov 1965, Ian Smith Cabinet Papers, Cory Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa

¹⁸⁵ Dumbutshena, *Zimbabwe Tragedy*, p.57

¹⁸⁶ Reed, 'Wednesday 27 October 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁸⁷ Reed, 'Saturday 30 October 1965', Diary, Vol.103. Emphasis in original.

disguise from a police state masquerading as a democracy', wrote a disgusted Judith Todd.¹⁸⁸

At 11am on 11 November 1965, Ian Smith and his cabinet signed the UDI. Within hours a flood of economic and political sanctions, as well as near-universal international condemnation hit Rhodesia.¹⁸⁹ The refusal of Smith's white-minority government to hand over power was seen as an embarrassment that needed the swiftest of resolutions.¹⁹⁰ Britain was criticised for allowing Rhodesia to get to the point of UDI and the issue became front-page news around the world, with the primary debate raging over whether economic sanctions would end Smith's regime, or whether (as many independent African states demanded) military intervention would be required. Jack Halpern was convinced that a war would turn out to be necessary. John Reed noted bleakly: 'Jack says that economic sanctions by themselves will not bring down Smith's regime - unless this is with massive African unrest, an armed intervention.'¹⁹¹ Joshua Mpofu's autobiography similarly highlights the feeling amongst members of the underground cells of ZAPU that UDI ensured violent armed struggle was now the preferable, and most likely to succeed, method of resistance.¹⁹²

UDI made clear to the Zimbabwean nationalists that majority rule would not be forthcoming from either the RF or the British government, and a violent self-liberation struggle would consequently be required to secure change. With the proliferation of violent strategies of resistance at the expense of peaceful forms of protest, Zimbabwean nationalism post-UDI lost many of the non-racial credentials on which it had been formed. A firmly anti-white ideology was consolidated after UDI, and the events that transpired undermined the benefits that came to Zimbabwean nationalism from having non-black members. Whereas the non-black radicals' utility had once lain with their ability to offer dissenting points of view within white

¹⁸⁸ Todd, *Rhodesia*, p.11

¹⁸⁹ Martin Loney, *Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response* (London, 1975), p.14

¹⁹⁰ John D. Hargreaves, *Decolonization in Africa* (London, 1988), p.237

¹⁹¹ Reed, 'Thursday 11 November 1965', Diary, Vol.103

¹⁹² Mpofu, *My Life*, p.56

Rhodesian society, those who acted against the state were now labelled as terrorists and their views discounted by white Rhodesians without consideration. Combined with their physical removal from the nation, non-black radicals were no longer distinguished from their black brethren and the unique benefits of their racial identities were abandoned by a nationalist leadership whose primary focus was now on a insurgent war against an entrenched and strengthened white Rhodesian state.

Despite paying lip-service to the ideals of old, both Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole largely abandoned their plans for a non-violent transfer of power following UDI. Whether through the guns of their guerrillas or an intervention by foreign military powers, the nationalist leaders were forced to embrace violence as the most likely tool in their arsenal for achieving their aims. Driven by internal competition between the two groups and pressure from external factors, white radicals found themselves in a situation where their best means of contribution were similarly violent. John Reed (whose disdain for the brutality and bloodshed of open racial conflict had been persistent since his first days in the SRANC) was a reluctant convert to sabotage campaigns precisely because the uncertainty of the nationalists in the pre-UDI period had been replaced by a single-minded drive towards violent resistance.

For Reed and the other remaining white radicals, Zimbabwean nationalism was now irrevocably intertwined with military actions. When their group was discovered and broken, it highlighted the unsuitability of non-black supporters acting in such roles and thus reduced their utility in the current paradigm of Zimbabwean nationalism to a point where the non-racial ideal served more to weaken than strengthen the concepts of a Zimbabwean nation. The racialised rhetoric spouted by ZANU and elements of the ZAPU leadership was repurposed to drive home the point that liberation would come only from the African people themselves, as nationalist strategy came to adopt conversion and rural support as necessary in their campaigns of insurgency.

There was little that white radicals could do in this environment, much to their dismay. Instead in the years to come, most were reduced to fund raisers and

international promoters, seeking financial and political support in nations where their racial identities were a benefit not a handicap. The few that engaged with the liberation struggle through more violent methods were the exception not the rule. For most, a full circle had been made with their origins as multi-racial liberals in the late 1950s, organising protest groups and soliciting donations from larger organisations like the CACBA and the SRLAWF, a fact that did not go unnoticed by those who had been there since the earliest days. On the 27 August 1966, the same day that police arrested three of the ZAPU guerrillas that Peter Mackay had assisted in infiltrating into Rhodesia, John Reed noted in his diary:

Evening, Peter [Mackay] comes round and we worry about the arrests in Rhodesia. There is little else we can do. I feel like we are back in Salisbury, in the early days of the ANC, sitting with Guy and Molly C-B [Clutton-Brock] and T. [Terry] and Shelagh [Ranger], planning and talking and arguing and worrying but not acting - a dismaying thought.¹⁹³

Conclusion

This final chapter has explored the turbulent period between the banning of ZAPU/PCC and ZANU, and the RF's declaration of UDI. Throughout a complex series of events, actions, and reactions, one thread is clear: the pervasive sense of uncertainty. Neither the RF, the African nationalists, or either groups' supporters, were able to predict what was going to happen in the coming days or weeks or months. With hindsight it is easy to portray the nationalist movement as one that endlessly and faultlessly proceeded along a route to national liberation. It is equally accepted to depict UDI as the inevitable conclusion of escalating tensions both within Rhodesia's racial and political groups, but also between the RF and the British Government. Yet as the year prior to UDI showed, this was rarely the case. Rather, individuals and groups ventured cautiously down one path, unsure where it was headed or what lay along the way. This uncertainty provided opportunities for debate

¹⁹³ Reed, 'Wednesday 27 August 1966', Diary, Vol.105

and discussion that blind-faith-sureness never could, and despite efforts to close down these spaces, the uncertainty ensured that numerous elements contributed to the events that unfurled. Shaped by events occurring elsewhere on the continent, and even on their own borders, these decisions were made in light of personal beliefs and reflected an environment that was fluid and continually changing.

Nowhere was this more evident than within the ranks of the remaining white radicals in Southern Rhodesia. Whilst Jaap van Velsen and Peter Mackay clashed heads over their activities, Ahrn Palley stood up for the African cause in the RF dominated Parliament and Garfield Todd defended the nationalists in the press. As Guy and Molly Clutton-Brock tried to undermine the racial Rhodesian society, John Reed and Giovanni Arrighi couriered messages between detained nationalist leaders in Gonakudzingwa and their colleagues in Lusaka. The demonstrations organised by the 'ultra-liberal' Eileen Haddon, the articles written by Jack Halpern, and the nationalist songs sung by multi-racial groups of students at the University all contributed to the nationalist cause. Hasu Patel's analogy of the petals of a flower is an especially appropriate one when applied to the last months before UDI and it was through these associated activities that the white radicals demonstrated they would not permit the non-racial nationalism to die without a fight.

Conclusion

Throughout this thesis I have argued that the dominant theme of non-racial Zimbabwean nationalism for much of the period 1957 to 1965 was uncertainty. Uncertainty in the actions taken and the routes chosen. Uncertainty about the concept of a Zimbabwean citizen and a Zimbabwean nation. Uncertainty in the debates and discussions that arose around the role of race in a nation building ideology.

UDI changed this. Now violence by African nationalists came to be seen as the dominant route forward. As Peter Mackay explained in his memoirs:

My colleagues in the political leadership of ZAPU – Chikerema, Nyandoro, Moyo, Silundika and Ndlovu – and their military lieutenants – Dabengwa and Akim Ndlovu – had been steadily moving from the uncertainty and disorder of early exile towards a firm command structure with support bases.¹

Over the next few years, Zimbabwean nationalism would become inexorably tied to a violent liberation struggle, and the non-black radicals along with it. In April 1966, the Battle of Sinoia marked the first open military conflict between the nationalists and the Rhodesian state and is traditionally seen as marking the start of the Liberation War. That same year a group of white radicals including Giovanni Arrighi, John Reed, and John Conradie would smuggle grenades into the country in order to instigate a bombing campaign against Rhodesian state infrastructure, comparable to the ARM's efforts in South Africa in the preceding years. Conradie would eventually be found guilty and sentenced to twenty years in prison, the only white radical in Rhodesia to serve a serious prison sentence for their activities.² In July 1966, not only would Peter Mackay infiltrate ZAPU guerrillas into Rhodesia from Zambia and Bechuanaland (Botswana),³ but the UCRN found itself under

¹ Mackay, *We Have Tomorrow*, p.316

² Todd, *Through the Darkness*, p.23

³ Wood, *A Matter of Weeks*, p.124. Also Henrik Ellert, *The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980* (Harare, 1989), p.11

attack, having exhausted the RF's patience. Nine lecturers (including Jaap van Velsen, Giovanni Arrighi, and Axel Sommerfelt) and one student were arrested, and 31 other students, including four whites and two Indians, suspended.⁴ Other non-black radicals would continue to contribute in a variety of ways to the liberation war, including Paul Brickhill (whose funeral inspired this thesis), Bishop Donal Lamont,⁵ Fay Chung,⁶ or Garfield, Grace, and Judith Todd.⁷

These individuals' contributions were no more or less significant than those who had proceeded them, and it could be argued that the non-racial element of Zimbabwean nationalism persisted despite the rise of violent liberation ideology. Yet in a 2015 article about the deaths of Terence Ranger, Lionel Cliffe, Nathan Shamuyarira, and Paul Brickhill, David Moore noted there was a unique aspect of Zimbabwean nationalism that was dependent on individuals and the ideas they espoused, and the interactions between those with different racial and political identities.

Their passing may indicate the death of not only what Ranger called "liberal nationalism" [...] but something more. That would not by any means be nationalism as a whole, but nationalism as a contested mode of politics and ideology, blending liberalism, various socialisms, traditions and new idioms of "Africanism" born of the apostles and disciples of all of these and more from around the world and the new ruling classes inheriting their states.⁸

Moore's description of the changed nature of Zimbabwean nationalism equally applies to UDI. Although non-black individuals would continue to participate in the Zimbabwean nationalist movements after UDI, the nationalist ideology itself had fundamentally changed. The 'black identity nationalism' explored in chapters four

⁴ "Nine of UCRN staff held", *Rhodesia Herald* (28 July 1966)

⁵ Míceál O'Neill, ed., *A Bishop Could Not do Otherwise: The Life and Witness of Bishop Donal Lamont (1911-2003)* (Blackrock, 2013)

⁶ Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga*

⁷ Judith Todd, *The Right to Say No: Rhodesia 1972* (Harare, 1987); also Frederikse, *None but Ourselves*.

⁸ David Moore, 'Five funerals, no weddings, a couple of birthdays: Terry Ranger, his contemporaries, and the end of Zimbabwean nationalism - 24 October 2013 – 3 January 2015', *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol.42, No.144 (2015), pp.316-324, p.316

and five had replaced the non-racialism of the SRANC, NDP, and early ZAPU. Race had gone from an element of consideration to *the* defining factor. Non-black participants were no longer integral to the movement but peripheral to a fight against white rule, their inclusion based on total adherence to the African ideology. Their presence no longer forced discussions about race, citizenship, and belonging in the Zimbabwean nation but instead raised questions of allegiance and the 'African-ness' of those who assisted them. Although individual relationships persisted (Joshua Nkomo and Garfield Todd would remain friends for many years, as did Robert Mugabe and Guy Clutton-Brock), these were no longer enough to ensure a non-racial approach to participatory rights in the imagined Zimbabwean nation. As chapter five showed, by 1965 Zimbabwean nationalism no longer considered race as a matter for discussion. To be a black African was an integral part of being a Zimbabwean.

This thesis opened with a tripartite question: *how*, *when*, and *why* did Zimbabwean nationalism's stance on race shift from non-racialism to a black identity ideology. I have summarised above *how* Zimbabwean nationalism changed, but *when* and *why* it changed are far more complex (and intertwined) questions. Once again, it is the uncertainty prevalent in the history of early Zimbabwean nationalism which explains the incremental nature of the changes that occurred between 1957 and 1965. In the words of A.J.P. Taylor, non-racial Zimbabwean nationalism was 'a turning point which failed to turn',⁹ yet as a complicating case study in what Tony Ballantyne calls 'the messy, decidedly uneven, and ultimately incomplete dismantling of the empire',¹⁰ the significance of race in the piecemeal development of the Zimbabwean anti-colonial struggle demonstrates the complex manner in which British decolonisation and nation formation occurred. Scholars have already begun to integrate gender and religion into conceptions of the late British empire 'as a set of

⁹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Course of German History: a Survey of the Development of German History since 1815* (London, 1961), p.69

¹⁰ Tony Ballantyne, 'The Changing Shape of the Modern British Empire and its Historiography', *The Historical Journal*, Vol.53, No.2 (2010), pp.429-252, p.445

shifting, uneven, and often unstable inter-regional and global connections',¹¹ but as this thesis demonstrates, race is an equally important factor in explaining this process, not only in Zimbabwe but across the globe. In a multitude of dead-ends and stuttering starts, in small bounds and large leaps, Zimbabwean nationalism reactively changed in response to a multitude of factors (both internal and external) that constantly acted upon the nationalist leadership, the non-black radicals, and the mass of ordinary nationalist supporters.

Some formative influences dated from the earliest conceptions of a Zimbabwean nation, as chapter one demonstrated. Social memories of colonial conquest and the racial formation inherent in the Rhodesian nation, childhood experiences of discrimination, education at the hands of white liberal missionaries, and encounters with radical African intellectuals and activists elsewhere on the continent all shaped the racial thinking of the Zimbabwean nationalist leadership. The emergence of white-led liberal multi-racialism in the early 1950s brought with it conceptions of race which argued for black Africans as being in need of education and guidance before they could run their own nation. When the CYL emerged in 1956 from a younger generation of African radicals, they rejected this view of race and demanded majority rule but lacked the popular support to create a nation.

Thus when the SRANC was formed in 1957 (marking the beginning of a mass Zimbabwean nationalism) it was receptive to the varied antecedents from which it was born. The party combined both multi-racialism and African activism to create a Zimbabwean nationalism at war with itself over the issues of race and racial cooperation. It simultaneously acted as a bridge between the old and the new, retaining many of the same African elites in positions of leadership, and persisting with a trust in white Rhodesians to elicit reform which would later be regarded with mistrust and regret. Within a broader atmosphere elicited by Garfield Todd's moderately liberal Rhodesian government, the SRANC was less hostile to the concept of non-racialism than later parties. White settlers were not the enemy; racial

¹¹ Ibid.,

discrimination was, and so non-black radicals were welcomed to participate as members and supporters in a visible demonstration of non-racialism.

As chapter three showed, the NDP and ZAPU further highlighted how fluid the competing conceptions of race were in Zimbabwean nationalism. By providing financial and logistical support, forming close friendships with nationalist leaders, and establishing a non-racial Salisbury city branch, the non-black radicals tried to remove this uncertainty about their role in the struggle and helped ensure that race remained a pertinent theme within the conceptual and political discussions. Key individuals (like the Clutton-Brocks, the Haddons, the Rangers, John Reed, Peter Mackay, Margaret Moore, Hasu Patel, Suman Mehta, and Edwin Lichtenstein) actively participated in a variety of visible and discrete ways. As chapter three concluded, for the SRANC, NDP, and ZAPU, it was the presence of non-black radicals requesting inclusion which challenged racial thinking, more so than the legacy of multi-racialism or the existence of a white settler population. By late 1962 when ZAPU was banned, Zimbabwean nationalism was truly non-racial in many regards.

Yet anti-white rhetoric had begun to creep into the nationalist discourse, and over the next two years would continue to gain salience. Consequently, the crux of *when* Zimbabwean nationalism fundamentally shifted to a black identity ideology was the period 1962 to 1964. As chapters four, and five showed, it was during these few decisive years that the leadership and ordinary members became increasingly and vocally opposed to racial cooperation and non-black participation. It was this period when the ZNP and other vocally anti-white elements made themselves heard and thus forced a reactionary change in the dominant nationalist parties. The rise of the RF and a Rhodesian population increasingly hostile to African nationalism and its supporters ensured that despite shared experiences of discrimination (for race, gender, sexuality, religion, or politics), the non-black radicals found themselves forced outside of the core Zimbabwean nationalist ideology. With the ZANU-ZAPU split, a situation was created in which even partial acknowledgement of a non-racial (or worse, a multi-racial) ideology ensured criticisms by more radical Zimbabwean

nationalist elements. The non-black radicals were pushed to the margins, relegated to a supportive role, and denigrated by those they had previously worked hand-in-hand with. By removing the non-black radicals from their position as integral to the imagined Zimbabwean nation, the Zimbabwean nationalist movement lost the moral claims it had over the RF's white Rhodesian nationalism. By the time of UDI, non-racial nationalism was over and Zimbabwean nationalism was irreversibly tied to an anti-white ideology. Whilst a handful of whites would continue to contribute in various ways, the widespread adoption of violence limited the nature of their activities and encouraged a broad race-based liberation ideology.

This thesis began with the funeral of one white radical and ends with that of another. Separated by almost twenty years, the differences between the two demonstrate how complex and fluid perceptions of race and nationalism are in the Zimbabwean context. When Paul Brickhill died in 2014, his achievements went unrecognised outside of a small group of acquaintances, colleagues, and friends. Few in Zimbabwe were willing to afford him the status deserved by his contributions to the liberation struggle and nation building efforts. The place of whites in Zimbabwean nationalist discourse was tenuous and marginal. ZANU-PF and the Zimbabwean nation in 2014 had no desire to celebrate the existence of white radicals.

Yet in March 1995, at the memorial service in London for Guy Clutton-Brock, the contributions of a white radical was celebrated and utilised by all. In the context of the end of apartheid in South Africa and a prosperous and developing Zimbabwe (albeit one with growing social and economic issues), Clutton-Brock provided a unifying figure for the nation to rally behind. When some young Zimbabweans questioned the decision to posthumously declare Clutton-Brock a 'National Hero of Zimbabwe', Ruth Chinamano (the first female Zimbabwean MP) gave a remarkable response in Parliament.

We speak of Clutton-Brock and people ask who he was. Of course you do not know him, where were you during the first days of stone throwing in this country? You were frightened, with you trousers shaking. Clutton-Brock is the

first man, whose wife registered me as a member of the ANC and I paid 2s and 6d. These people helped us to go where we are. These people kept the fires burning after the ANC was banned. I am very sorry that Clutton-Brock died, but he died a hero. Whoever has declared him a hero speaks well of the dead.¹²

At the memorial itself, the list of those who provided tributes demonstrates the international respect garnered by the ardent non-racial activist. Amongst others, Terence Ranger spoke about his friend's 'vision of a free and human Africa as a corner-stone of a free and humane world', Diana Collins declared him 'a remarkable man [...] embarrassed, at being called any kind of a hero', and Emeke Anyaoku (Commonwealth Secretary General) proclaimed that:

[Clutton-Brock's] work, his steady courage, and his commitment laid a foundation of ideals of reconstruction and reconciliation which have been so central to the miraculous history, not only of Zimbabwe, but of Southern Africa as we see it today. His life was itself a successful testing in the cauldron of authoritarianism and racism.¹³

Most notable however, was the long, adoring, and heartfelt tribute to Clutton-Brock's 'selfless dedication and sacrifices for the cause of freedom and justice in Zimbabwe' paid by his 'comrade-in-arms', Robert Mugabe. 'A man of rare noble deeds, who, in his own relentless way, contributed immensely to the liberation of our country and people, a liberation which ushered in the new era of independence and democracy, as it destroyed in the process a system totally unjust, undemocratic, racial and oppressive,' declared Mugabe, emphasising the sincere respect he felt for the former British missionary and farmer. Yet amongst all the accolades and acclamations, one part of Mugabe's speech stands out.

Guy Clutton-Brock stood as an isolated beacon in the midst of settler forces of reaction. [...] It is indeed people like him who helped us to revise our general view of the white man as we ceased to believe that all whites were evil, which view later found expression in our policy of tolerance and national

¹² Ruth Chinamano in (Zimbabwe) Hansard, Vol.42, No.1 (7 February 1995)

¹³ 'A Celebration of the Life of Guy Clutton-Brock, 5 April 1906 - 29 January 1995: Record of Events and Texts of Tributes', (14 March 1995), BC1329, H70.3.1, The Colin Legum Papers, University of Cape Town Library, Cape Town, South Africa

reconciliation, now the cornerstone of our political philosophy that has yielded greater political stability in our country than we would have had without it.¹⁴

These words from the first President of an independent Zimbabwe signified something far more than a personal connection between two old fighters in the African cause. They demonstrated how the Zimbabwean nation was built out of the experiences and memories of individuals and how one person or a small group of people (like the non-black radicals of early Zimbabwean nationalism) could have an impact far beyond their numbers. Whilst the actions of the non-black radicals during the pre-liberation war period were insignificant compared to the white radicals in South Africa or the African nationalists themselves, their presence was instrumental for other reasons. What Mugabe's testimony showed was that racial thinking within Zimbabwean nationalism had been fundamentally shaped by these individuals, and that these changes had persevered even after independence. The Zimbabwean nation that emerged was as much the result of these concepts of race as it was the experiences of the liberation struggle.

¹⁴ Ibid.

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